Defining the Precision Weapon in Effects-Based Terms.

In his article "Defining the 'Precision Weapon' in Effects-Based Terms" (spring 2006), Maj Jack Sine is squarely on the mark with his closing observations: "Operational and tactical planners should thoroughly understand the desired effects and undesired effects associated with each of the weapons available for use. Tactical planners do not require a separate term to distinguish between a weapon with three-meter [circular error probable] and one with 10-meter CEP. Operational and tactical planners, however, do require the ability to associate a level of effectiveness to a particular weapon in a particular scenario" (p. 87). Speaking on the basis of more than 35 years of experience as a retired USAF regular and Reserve component and civilian targeteer with the Department of Defense, I wholeheartedly second his appraisal of both the problem and the solution.

Semantic corruption, ignorance of the interplay of fundamental concepts, the desire for simplistic answers to complex questions, and failure to follow historically validated processes and methodologies for planning the application of capabilities have perennially deflected us from achieving the purposes embodied in Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, 17 January 2002. Further, they have hobbled efforts to improve the full range of tasks associated with formulating courses of action and assessing consequences of execution.

The "precision weapon" of choice is whatever weapon we employ in the tactical scenario that accomplishes our ultimate purposes at the strategic level of warfare. From that perspective, the requisite level of "precision" is defined not by whatever guidance technology happens to be built into any particular weapon but by the commander's objectives, guidance, and intent that energizes and directs the targeting process. Thus, a volley of artillery projectiles, a high-power radio-frequency weapon, a leaflet drop, or a diplomatic demarche is just as likely to be as "precise" a weapon of choice in any hypothetical scenario as a Joint Direct Attack Munition or cruise missile--both of which might turn out to be precisely the wrong weapon to use in that same scenario.

The truth of the preceding has long been known and accepted by a small community of individuals, primarily those from various service communities who migrated into the targeting profession. It is encouraging to see them become the substance of wider discourse. And it is time to stop the silly semantic gymnastics wherein the invalid definition and application of terminology serve only to confuse issues rather than solve problems.

Col Calvin W. Hickey, USAFR, Retired

Warrenton, Virginia