Defensive operation of the Western Front troops in Byelorussia in 1941.

The tragic beginning of the Great Patriotic War has acquired new significance in the year of the 60th anniversary of the Victory, the celebrations of which symbolized the triumphal conclusion of the war. Certain changes took place in our country's academic community and academic approaches in the 60 years that have elapsed since the victory and 64 years since the day the war began. This interval has seen numerous scholarly publications and theses; periodicals published numerous historic documents and materials related to the eve and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. I regret to say that while some of them were genuine (still classified) documents others were obvious fakes. I should say that the books, articles, TV, feature and documentary films that misrepresent or even distort the early period of the war have outnumbered those that tell the truth.

Distorted or false ideas about the early period of the Great Patriotic War do a lot of harm to public consciousness. Distortions impress those who know next to nothing about military history, who have no access to historical sources and who are unwilling, and unable, to verify the avalanche of facts, figures, and quotations. They sow doubt not only in the minds of the young men but also in the mature minds of army and naval officers and even of certain of our historians.

Today the Internet is abounding in materials related to the Great Patriotic War and to its initial period, in particular, yet they offer scant, and often distorted, information about the events at the Western front.

I have written this article to make the truth known to the public, to expose falsities of the early and most dramatic period of the Great Patriotic War.

I offer here an analysis of the defensive operation in Byelorussia, its content, chronological frameworks, the sides' fighting and numerical strength, the course of the hostilities, their results, and losses as well as my conclusions. This material is reflected in Volume 5 of the Voennaia Entsiklopedia prepared by the Encyclopedia Department of the Institute of Military History of the RF Defense Ministry (1) as well as in Strategicheskie operatsii Vooruzhennykh Sil S.S.S.R. v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne (Book 1. Letne-osenniaia kampania 1941 goda) prepared for press by the Encyclopedia Department and in the Internet (the Mir istorii journal.) It is for the first time that this material appears in a periodical.

It is common knowledge that the defensive operation in Byelorussia that was part of the campaign of the summer and fall of 1941 and included events and hostilities of the first eighteen days of the war--from 22 June to 9 July--was carried out by the troops of the Western Front and, partly, by the Pinsk Military Flotilla. The operation was carried out in an effort to rebuff German onslaught in the Western strategic sector and to create conditions for mobilization and deployment of the Red Army's main forces, and for a decisive counteroffensive.

While planning the war against the Soviet Union and during the initial period of the war the German military command attached special importance to the western sector. According to the Barbarossa Plan it was planned to concentrate the main efforts to the north of the Pripiat Marshes toward Minsk and Smolensk along the Moscow highway. Being aware that the very first battles would predetermine, to a large extent, further developments the German command strove to rout the Soviet forces in Byelorussia at the Bialystok bulge in the first place.

The enemy was well aware that while the troops of the Western Special Military District (WSMD) were retaining the Bialystok bulge that jutted far into the west the German offensive at the Baltic republics and Ukraine would be stalled. The Bialystok group of the Soviet troops could deliver blows at the flanks and the rear of the German troops on an offensive in the Baltic republics and Ukraine and upset the German plans at the very beginning of the war. The German commanders knew that the Soviet troops should be deprived of such possibility. The German command also planned convergence of two separate forces from the Suwalki bulge and Brest area with an intention to encircle, split up and destroy the main forces of the WSMD. When planning a speedy rout of the Soviet troops in Byelorussia the Germans hoped to move smoothly to Smolensk and to achieve their main strategic aim in the Moscow direction.

Encirclement and liquidation of the Soviet troops in the Bialystok bulge and the Minsk direction as well as development of thrust at Smolensk and Moscow were entrusted to the Army Group Center under Field-Marshal von Bock that included two field armies (the 4th and 9th) with 11 army corps, and two panzer groups (the 2nd and 3rd) that were part of four motorized corps. Field-Marshal von Bock had the same amount of mobile formations as the North and South army groups taken together.

By 21 June 1941, the Army Group Center had been already deployed along the line 550 km long between Goldap and Wlodawa with 31 infantry, nine panzer, six motorized, one cavalry, and three protection divisions (50 in all) as well as a motorized brigade and the Gross Deutschland motorized SS regiment. The Army Group Center had in reserve six infantry divisions; it was further strengthened by considerable means of the OKH reserve. A great number of artillery divisions, engineering battalions, pontoon parks and bridge trains as well as all sorts of specialized units were attached to it. The air protection of the Army Group Center was entrusted to the 2nd Air Fleet under General Field-Marshal Kesselring who had 1,367 planes under his command. The Army group was supported by 1,611 planes in all. (2)

Originally it was planned that the Army Group Center will press forward in two large strike groups at the flanks to split the Soviet troops in Byelorussia, encircle and destroy them between Bialystok and Minsk, in order to move swiftly to the Smolensk area to prevent Soviet strategic reserves from mounting defenses at new positions; the double movement was designed to create prerequisites and conditions for coordinated actions between the mobile troops and the Army Group North to destroy the Soviet troops in the Baltic republics and at Leningrad.

According to these plans the panzer groups and armies were given the following tasks: the northern assault group that comprised the 3rd panzer group and the 9th army were concentrated and deployed at the Suwalki bulge between Augustowa and Ostrolenka (the stretch was 270 km long). The group had to upset the Soviet defenses to the northwest of Grodno, move toward Minsk at a fast pace and destroy the Soviet troops between Bialystok and Minsk acting jointly with the southern assault group. Still later it was expected to develop its offensive and reach Vitebsk, Polotsk and the area to the north of them so as to prevent concentration of Soviet troops in the upper reaches of the Zapadnaia Dvina (Daugava) River and create favorable conditions for later operations of the Army Group Center.

The southern assault group that consisted of the 2nd panzer group and the main forces of the 4th army was concentrated and deployed along the line 280 km long that stretched between Ostrolenka to the southeast and further on along the Zapadny Bug River to Wlodawa. It was posed the task of disrupting Soviet defenses at Brest, move its panzer formations at a fast pace to Minsk and, acting together with the northern assault group liquidate the Soviet troops fighting to the west of Minsk. After that, while advancing to Smolensk it was expected to capture its region; fighting to the south of it the assault group was to prevent Soviet concentration in the upper reaches of the Dnieper to create conditions for an offensive of the Army Group Center.

On the whole the depth of the German operational disposition varied from 15 km in the auxiliary (Bialystok) sector to 120 km in the assault sectors of the Army Group Center. The group was set up so as to deliver two simultaneous blows (at the Suwalki-Minsk and Brest-Baranovichi directions).

The Germans deployed the 3rd panzer group (two army and two motorized corps that comprised five infantry, four panzer, and two motorized divisions) and two army corps of the 9th army against the 11th army of the Baltic Special Military District (until 25 June the 3rd panzer army had been waging an offensive in the Northwestern Front. For this reason it was not included in the estimate of manpower and equipment and was described as brought into action.) Other forces of the Army Group Center were intended for an offensive in the WSMD area. The 3rd and 2nd panzer groups were placed at the flanks of the Army Group Center as part of its assault groups. Four out of five motorized corps were placed in the first echelons of the assault groups.

The Army Group Center was deployed in full conformity with the German operation plans. Directive No. 21--Case Barbarossa of the German OKW said that the Army Group Center "should advance with its strongest panzer and motorized formations from the area of Warsaw and to the north of it with the aim of splitting the enemy forces in Byelorussia." (3)

While fulfilling the task the German forces of the Army Group Center had to achieve the following specific objectives: the panzer formations had to deliver two convergent strikes at the Soviet flanks in Byelorussia in the Minsk direction, to split and encircle them, while the field armies had to destroy the main forces of the WSMD between Bialystok and Minsk. In all three main blows, one secondary and one auxiliary blow were to be delivered. The depth of the Group's initial objective was from 130 to 350 km; of the subsequent task, 670 km; by the beginning of the operation the front was 550 km; the front of the main formation's offensive was up to 115 km wide. Fifty-one divisions were engaged in the offensive operation of which 31 were infantry divisions; nine panzer, six motorized, one cavalry, three protection divisions; one motorized brigade and one motorized SS regiment. The main battle group that had 44.5 divisions of which 15.5 were panzer and motorized divisions was 820,000 strong. (4) It also had 1,765 tanks and assault guns, (5) 14,390 guns and mortars (not counting 50mm mortars), (6) 1677 planes (980 bombers, 530 fighter planes, and 167 reconnaissance planes). An average operational density was 7.5 divisions per 1 km of the frontline.

The panzer groups and field armies were given the following initial and subsequent tasks:

The 3rd panzer group, in cooperation with the 9th army was to breach the Soviet defenses to the northeast of Suwalki and by developing its offensive was to reach the Minsk area. It had to deliver one main blow and one secondary blow. The depth of the initial objective was designated as 270 km, of subsequent task, 210 km; the main battle group would have to advance along the front 35 km wide. Eleven divisions were engaged in the offensive (four infantry, four panzer, and three motorized divisions). The group had 955 tanks and assault guns; 3,627 guns and mortars (not counting 55 mm mortars). The offensive was supported by over 600 planes of the 2nd Air Force; average operational density was 5.5 divisions per 1 km of the frontline; over 200 tanks were engaged in the axis of the main thrust.

The 9th Army was to support the offensive of the 3rd panzer group by part of its forces; the rest was to advance toward Lida and Grodno with the aim of splitting up and liquidating the already encircled Soviet troops. The depth of the initial objective was designated as 130 to 190 km; the subsequent task, 270 km; by the beginning of the operation the front was from 32 to 60 km wide. The offensive was carried out by 9.5 divisions (eight of them were infantry divisions; one, protection division and one motorized brigade). The 9th army was supported by 4,865 guns (without 50 mm mortars.)

The 2nd panzer group, together with infantry formations was to break through the border fortifications to the northwest and south of Brest, advance toward Kobrin, Baranovichi, and Minks where it was expected to join the 3rd panzer group and complete the encirclement of the main Soviet forces in Byelorussia. This should be accomplished with two main and one auxiliary thrust; the depth of the initial objective was designated as up to 350 km; of the subsequent task, up to 320 km. At the beginning the operation would be unfolding along the frontline of up to 105 km; the main battle group would have to advance along the frontline of up to 75 km long. The operation involved 16.5 divisions, seven of them infantry divisions; five panzer, three motorized and one cavalry divisions, and a motorized brigade. There were 15.5 divisions engaged in the operation (of them 8.5 panzer divisions). The group had 810 tanks and assault guns, 4,737 guns and mortars (not counting 50 mm mortars) and was supported by up to 1,000 planes of the 2nd Air Force. An average operational density was five divisions per 1 km of the frontline; over 170 tanks were advancing at the axis of the main thrust.

The 4th army was given the task of moving, with part of its forces, behind the motorized corps of the 2nd panzer group to consolidate its success while its main forces were expected to press in the northeastern direction toward Bialystok and Volkovysk with the aim of splitting the Soviet troops at the Bialystok bulge and liquidating them in cooperation with the 9th army. The depth of initial objective was designated as up to 240 km; of the subsequent task, up to 290 km; by the operation's beginning the front was expected to be up to 145 km wide while the main battle groups were expected to advance along the front of from 3 to 12 km wide. The operation involved 13 divisions (12 infantry and one, protection); the main group consisted of 14 divisions.

On the whole, there were 39 divisions (not counting the 3rd panzer group) fighting in the zone of the WSMD, a motorized brigade and a motorized SS regiment Gross Deutschland (the brigade and the motorized regiment can be counted as half of a division, therefore there were 40 design divisions) and a brigade of six-barrel mortars. On the whole, there were two field armies (the 4th and the 9th), one panzer group (the 2nd), 13 corps (of them 10 rifle and three motorized) fighting in the WSMD zone (40 design divisions, including 27 infantry, five panzer, three motorized, one cavalry, and three protection divisions); one motorized brigade and a motorized SS regiment Gross Deutschland. The battle group was deployed in Poland in the strip 470 km long between Goldap and Wlodawa; it was up to 635,000 strong and had 10,763 guns and mortars (not counting 50 mm mortars), over 810 tanks and assault guns.

The Army Group Center was supported by the 2nd Air Force under General Field-Marshal Kesselring that consisted of the 2nd and 8th air corps. On 22 June 1941 the 2nd Air Force had 1,367 planes, of them 994 battle-ready. The land forces of the Army Group Center had 224 planes under their command while the 2nd Air Force had 1,611 planes, 1,194 of them battle-ready.

The German command looked at this sector as the main one in the Barbarossa Plan, therefore the Army Group Center was the strongest in the Eastern Front: 40.2 percent of all divisions deployed along the wide stretch between the Barents and the Black Seas (including 42.8 percent of motorized and 52.9 percent of panzer divisions). (7)

The Army Group Center was to deliver a blow from Suwalki and Brest toward Minsk to carry out double envelopment of the troops of the Western District in the Bialystok area, then move to the Smolensk region to "create conditions for cooperation of large panzer and motorized forces with the Army Group North with the aim of liquidating large enemy forces in the Baltic republics and in the Leningrad area." (8) For this reason the main forces of the army group were deployed at flanks. The main blow was delivered to the south of Brest.

According to German plans the Army Group Center was to move at a fast pace to the Zapadnaia Dvina and Dnieper rivers to form the front from the Drissa to the mouth of the Sozh River, to force them en march and move on to Smolensk. The 3rd panzer group and the 9th army had to advance in the northeastern direction to capture the Polotsk-Vitebsk area, while the 2nd panzer group and the 4th army were to advance to Smolensk. Having taken Smolensk the 3rd panzer group was to act together with the Army Group North that pressed in the Leningrad direction. The Soviet 3rd army had to face divisions of the 8th, 20th and partly of the 42nd corps of the 9th German army. The 10th army of the WSMD was confronted with the larger part of the divisions of the 42nd corps of the 9th army, the 7th and 9th corps and one division of the 13th corps of the 4th German army. The 4th Soviet army was opposed by units of the 43rd corps of the 4th German army and the 2nd panzer group (47th, 24th, and 46th mechanized corps and the 12th army corps). The Germans managed to achieve considerable numerical superiority there.

To increase the might of the initial blow to the troops of the WSMD commanders of the Army Group Center concentrated the main part of their troops and fighting equipment in the first operational echelon that included 28 divisions (22 of them being infantry divisions), four panzer, one cavalry and one protection division. The Germans achieved high operational density at the breakthrough stretches (one division per 10 km on average and one division per 5 or 6 km at the main axis of advance), which enabled them to deliver a powerful initial blow and achieve considerable superiority over the Soviet troops in forces and assets: at the main axis of advance their superiority in forces was 6.5 times; in tanks, 1.8 times, in guns and mortars, 3.3 times.

An analysis of the situation has shown that the enemy's average superiority in personnel was 1.2 times while the Soviet side had more tanks, planes, guns, and mortars. At the axis of the main thrust in the area of responsibility of the 4th army, however, enemy superiority was overwhelming.

The Army Group Center had 10 divisions in its second echelon (five infantry, three motorized, one panzer, and one protection division as well as a motorized brigade and the Gross Deutschland motorized SS regiment); there was one protection division in reserve.

Between 20 June and 3 July the OKH planned to move six more infantry divisions of its reserve. They were not counted at the initial stage since they arrived after 22 June: being en route by the moment of calculation they were described as arriving in the course of operation.

The WSMD under General of the Army D. Pavlov that covered the sector between the southern border of the Lithuanian S.S.R. and the northern border of Ukraine (Wlodawa) was expected to stop the enemy at these borders, organize stubborn defense along the state border to allow Soviet troops mobilize, concentrate, and deploy. To fulfill this task and to cover the stretch of the state border 470 km long the District had three cover armies in the first echelon (the 3rd, 4th, and 10th), while the 13th army (skeleton command and control structures without troops) was being formed in the second echelon. The District commander had the Pinsk Military Flotilla (commanded by Rear Admiral D. Rogachev) under him. The District headquarters were stationed in Minsk.

The Soviet troops were expected to actively defend the fortified areas and field fortifications along the state border and to concentrate its main defenses in the following directions: Suwalki, Lida and Suwalki, Bialystok; and along the front from Ostrolenka, Malkinia-Gorna to Bialystok; Sedlec, Volkovysk; Brest, Baranovichi. If the enemy managed to drive wedges into the defense lines the troops and reserves were expected to be prepared to deliver lightning counterblows to rout the enemy battle groups and to transfer fighting to the enemy territory to capture advantageous positions. The Soviet battle groups were adequately structured while the District's territory was equipped to suit the task. There were detailed instructions for the troops that took into account all possible directions of enemy attacks; there was a strong offensive battle group in the Bialystok bulge area that included the main forces of the first WSMD echelon (19 tank divisions out of 26) prepared to deliver a crushing blow in response to an enemy attack according to the plan of covering the state border. The larger part of the main forces belonged to the 10th army concentrated in the central part of the WSMD in the Bialystok bulge area.

The cover plan included five detailed variants of operations in case the enemy pierced the army defenses. The plan paid particular attention to coordinated efforts of the mechanized corps and infantry, artillery, anti-tank brigades and aviation in all directions and lines (areas). The WSMD had at its disposal 44 divisions including 12 tank, six motorized and three airborne divisions; three artillery brigades, eight fortified areas, eight air divisions, two air defense brigades and other units. It was the second strongest military district in the Soviet Union after the Kiev Special Military District. Together with the Pinsk Military Flotilla it was over 673,000 strong and had over 14,000 guns and mortars, about 2,900 tanks (2,189 of them battle ready, including 383 new tanks), 1,909 planes (1,685 of them battle ready). This amounted to a quarter of the forces and assets concentrated in the western military districts. The Pinsk Military Flotilla had 31 launches, seven monitors, a minelayer, four gunboats, an air squadron of 10 planes, an antiaircraft artillery battalion of 18 guns and a marine infantry platoon. Eleven border guard units (19,519 strong) of the Byelorussian Border District were stationed in Byelorussia together with a regiment of operational troops of the People's Commissariat for the Interior. The old state border was also guarded by a border guard zone manned by five border guard detachments. (9)

The first echelon of the covering army deployed 40 km away from the state border consisted of 13 divisions (12 rifle and one cavalry division), their operational density being one division per 30 to 35 km. They were removed from the state border to the distance of 15 to 40 km. The other 13 divisions (eight tank, four motorized and one cavalry divisions) were deployed in the second echelon of the covering army.

The mechanized corps of the second echelon of the covering army were deployed at the distance of 50 to 100 km from the state border.

The District commanders had a reserve of 18 divisions (12 rifle, four tank, and two motorized) stationed 100-400 km away from the border as well as three airborne brigades, four fortified areas at the old state border, an anti-tank artillery brigade, two air defense brigades and several units, of which 12 divisions were not completely mobilized while two newly formed mechanized corps had practically no tanks, an inadequate amount of small arms, and no chance to train teamwork in action.

The armies' defense depth was 50-75 km; the District's--100-150 km; an average operational density was one division of the first echelon per 47 km; the troops' operational density was one division per 30-37 km. The troops of the both echelons of the covering army remained in places of their permanent deployment; a small number of units and subunits were engaged in building fortifications close to the border. The formations were understaffed even though the Soviet side had more tanks and planes. Many of the tanks, however, were either obsolete or out of order. Those produced in the 1930s had inadequate armor, armaments and small mileage remaining to next routine overhaul. In the very first hours of its attack the enemy destroyed a great number of machines that had no time to get into action.

On 21 June, at 23:30 the People's Commissar for Defense and Head of the General Staff finally persuaded Stalin to send Directive No. 1 to five border military districts that instructed them to alert part of their troops. This was done under strength of intelligence and information from other sources about an imminent German attack scheduled for the small hours of 22 June. Having received the directive at 02:25 WSMD Commander General of the Army D. Pavlov immediately ordered his staff to transfer it without changes to the commanders of the 3rd, 4th, and 10th armies. The directive instructed to carry out part of the measures designed to alert the troops that were envisaged by the operational and mobilization plans. By instructing the commanders "not to succumb to any provocations that might cause large-scale problems" the directive in fact did not allow them to put into effect the cover plan in its entirety. Puzzled commanders asked Moscow--precious time was lost. Obviously, the troops could not be brought to combat readiness at short notice. On average 2 hours and 30 minutes (instead of the required 25 to 30 minutes) were spent on informing the troops. It turned out that in the border areas saboteurs and nationalists had disrupted communication lines among the troops, therefore army and corps staffs could not swiftly transfer their commands. Many of the units were alerted by enemy bombing and shelling.

On 22 June the army and corps staff were still trying to alert the units and formations until 5 or 6 a.m. The troops alerted on 22 June found themselves under land and air blows while trying to reach the concentration areas. When alerted, the forward detachments of the 3rd, 4t and 10th armies had no time to deploy at the prescribed defense lines and, while moving according to Directive No. 1 to the cover and concentration areas, had to engage in encounter battles being still scattered and lacking adequate tactical order; they were engaged in fighting at unprepared positions, under enemy bombs and without artillery and air cover. As a result, command and control of the troops was mainly paralyzed.

In places where the units were alerted in advance (an hour and a half or two hours before the German attack) the situation was different. The troops left places of their deployment well in advance and mobbed into action in good order. In WSMD the 27th and 56th divisions of the 4th rifle corps of the 3rd army, the 2nd and 8th divisions of the 1st rifle corps and the 86th division of the 5th rifle corps of the 10th army were alerted without many losses. This makes five out of 44 divisions deployed in the District, or 11.37 percent. (The five divisions comprised 19.23 percent of 26 divisions that belonged to the covering army.)

At the first stage of the defensive operation in Byelorussia, between 22 and 29 June, the German battle group acting according to plan, unfolded an offensive at the flanks of the Bialystok bulge from the areas to the west of Grodno and to the south of Brest. Eight enemy divisions were concentrated along a 70 km-long stretch to deliver a blow to the boundary between the 4th and the 10th armies. At the breakthroughs the enemy had built up three- or four-fold superiority. On the very first day of the war the right flank of the 3rd army under General V. Kuznetsov was exposed and encircled by the 3rd panzer group. The 56th rifle division of Major General S. Sakhnov had to fight against three German infantry divisions of the 8th army corps in the strip 40 km wide. A breach up to 130 km wide appeared between the Northwestern and Western fronts through which enemy panzer units poured into the Soviet territory. By the night of 23 June they had covered up to 120 km.

The situation at the left wing of the Western front was no better: in the Brest-Baranovichi direction the 6th and 42nd, the right-flank 49th and the left-flank 75th rifle divisions of the 4th army under General Korobkov that had not been brought up to full strength and had had no time to move forward from the Brest Fortress had to face 16 German divisions (five of them panzer divisions) on a 100-km-long sector. Under the pressure of the numerically stronger enemy the troops of the 4th army (the 6th and 42nd rifle divisions) had to retreat with great losses.

In 05:25 despite the vague, complicated and very contradictory situation the Military Council of the Western Front dispatched the first battle order to the commanders of the 4th and 10th armies: "In the face of the obvious massive war actions of the Germans we order to alert the troops and move into action." This meant that the covering plan was fully enacted while Directive No. 1 was annulled ("all units should be alerted ... Until further notice no other actions are permitted").

On the very first day of the war 26 Soviet airfields on which the most battle ready air units were deployed were exposed to mass bombings. Having inflicted the crippling blow the enemy captured domination in the air. On the first day of the war the Air Force of the Western Front lost 738 planes (of which 528 were destroyed on land), or about 40 percent of the total number of planes of the Western front (or 63.7 percent of all losses of planes at the German-Soviet front on 22 June). By the end of the first day the Western Front had merely 950 planes at its disposal. Having learned this Commander of the Air Force of the Western Front Ivan Kopets, Hero of the Soviet Union and bearer of two Orders of Lenin and the Red Banner Order, committed suicide. Despite heavy losses, pilots of the Western Front demonstrated staunchness, courage and skill by destroying on 22 June 143 German planes. During the defensive operation that lasted 18 days they destroyed 708 planes, or about 40 percent of the initial number of planes that belonged to the 2nd Air Force of Germany.

In the course of the first day of war the enemy landed several tactical airborne units in the Western Front's rear that delivered heavy blows to the rear services of the Western Front and disrupted communications. Being completely unaware of the rapidly changing situation at the front and the enemy's fast advance inside the country the Soviet political leaders issued an order to the Armed Forces to rout the aggressor. At 07:15 the Chief Military Council send out Directive No. 2 that opened with the order "to attack the enemy with all forces and assets, to destroy it in places where it violated the Soviet border." The Front commanders could no longer control the troops that made the situation still worse. Communication lines with armies and divisions were frequently disrupted while fighting was localized at the fortified areas. In the evening of 22 June, at 21:15, in an effort to turn the tide the Chief Military Council instructed the Western Front "to deliver a counterblow using the combined-arms armies and mechanized corps that should be supported by the front and long-range bombing air force ... to encircle and rout the enemy at Suwalki by the evening of 24 June." The Chief Military Council concentrated on the need to destroy the infantry formations that had broken through at Grodno and to develop this success by pressing against the Suwalki German group.

The counterblow of the right wing of the Western Front carried out according to Directive No. 3 of the Main Headquarters failed to produce expected results. The units engaged in the defensive battles were too scattered; there was no time to properly prepare coordinated offensive in the absence of reliable communication lines. All this made it impossible to create a striking force.

For nearly a month (from 22 June until nearly the third decade of July) the completely encircled defenders of the Brest Fortress were repulsing fierce attacks of the 45th German division that was ten times stronger than the defending forces. By the end of the first day of the war German assault groups wedged 35 km inside the Soviet territory (in some places they moved as far as up to 70 km). This created a threat of tank encirclement for both wings of the Western Front. The troops of the 10th army operating in the center of the front faced a threat of encirclement; on the very first day the German troops moved 60 km inside the Soviet territory in the Brest-Baranovichi direction and occupied the town of Kobrin.

Late on 22 June the vanguard of the Pinsk Military Flotilla reached the Kobrin area yet failed to communicate with the headquarters of the 4th army and the units of the 28th rifle corps.

This means that by the end of the first day of fighting the threat of deep envelopment of both flanks of the Western Front by panzer formations became imminent. Having lost contacts with the troops neither General Pavlov nor his headquarters managed to identify the threat on time.

On 23 and 24 June bloody fighting was going on at Grodno with huge losses on both sides. On 24 June when Grodno was lost the front commander specified the task of Boldin's group (the 6th and 11th mechanized corps and 36th cavalry division) that was ordered to recapture the city and advance by 70 km. The order failed to take the real situation into account, therefore the Boldin group that kept considerable German forces engaged at Grodno and delivered a fairly heavy blow to them could not take the city. The counterblow improved, to a certain extent, the situation of the 3rd army and checked the German onslaught. In some places German troops were even pressed back yet success could not be developed. The command of the Army Group Center sent two more army corps from its reserve and together with several units of H. Hoth's 3rd panzer group. Having captured the initiative in the air German aviation showered the Soviet battle formations with bombs. Being unable to withdraw the crippled tanks from the battlefield the mechanized corps had to blast or ignite them on spot to prevent the enemy from capturing them. In an effort to avoid encirclement the 3rd Army retreated behind the Nieman.

The hastily organized counterblow by the forces of the 14th mechanized corps of the 4th army at the left wing of the Western Front failed to produce any noticeable success either. In fact, the situation of the 4th army, especially in its center, was growing critical: the gap between it and the troops of the Northwestern Front in its right flank attracted the panzer group of H. Hoth; the critical situation at the left bank where the 4th army was retreating created a threat of encirclement of the entire Bialystok group in the north and in the south. Commander of the Western Front General Pavlov decided to strengthen the 4th army with the 47th infantry corps. Simultaneously, the 17th mechanized corps of the front reserves was moved to the Shchara River yet strong defenses along it could not be established. German panzer divisions crossed the river and on 25 June moved to Baranovichi.

By night of 23 June the Pinsk Military Flotilla was dispersed along the water routes to the east and west of Pinsk yet it failed to establish communication with other troops. The situation at the Western Front became critical; its northern wing with an unprotected gap of 130 km was in danger. The front had failed to check the enemy's advance in the border area and liquidate its deep-cutting breakthroughs. Under enemy pressure the Soviet troops had to retreat with fighting.

By the end of the fourth day the panzer groups of the Army Group Center moved inside the Soviet territory by 200-250 km; as a result over 60 front ammunition depots and stores found at the distance of 30 to 100 km from the state border were either blasted or abandoned. The front lost from 50 to 90 percent of fuel, ammunition, kits, tank equipment, foodstuffs, and forage stored during peacetime. (10) Naturally enough, in the very first days of fighting the army lacked necessary ammunition and foodstuffs both for the fighting units and for the newly formed units and formations.

While trying to check the enemy onslaught the Soviet troops were suffering huge losses, therefore on 25 June the High Command Headquarters passed a decision on creating in the Western Front's rear a defensive line to concentrate on it a group of armies of the High Command Headquarters' reserves (the 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd) under Marshal of the Soviet Union Semen Budenny. The reserve armies were ordered to forward to the line of Kraslava-the Disna-Polotsk Fortified Area-Vitebsk-Orsha-the Dnieper at Loev by the night of 28 and defend it so as to prevent an enemy breakthrough. The front air force received two more air divisions from inland districts. Until 9 July the front aviation got 452 planes with crews as well as the 3rd corps of long-rage bombers.

On 25 June the High Command Headquarters ordered General of the Army D. Pavlov to promptly remove the troops from the Bialystok bulge to the fortified areas on the old state border. It turned out that the order came too late. By the moment it reached the troops the 3rd and 10th armies had been fighting in semi-encirclement: the only route open to them was a 60 km wide corridor between the towns of Skidel and Volkovysk (the latter controlled by the Germans). On 26 and 27 June the vanguard units of the 2nd and 3rd German panzer groups attacked in convergent directions; together with the panzer divisions of the 3rd panzer group they reached Minsk in the southwest. Three panzer divisions of the 2nd panzer group were advancing to Minsk from the northwest. The defense battle for Minsk lasted for four days.

On 25 June fierce fighting began in the Minsk Fortified Area where the Germans lost more than 100 tanks in one day. On 28 June enemy army corps fighting on the internal front of the encirclement split a group of Soviet troops in the area of Krynki. On 29 June the German assault groups (2nd and 3rd panzer groups) reached an area to the east of Minsk thus trapping the main forces of the Western Front. They broke through to the city and captured it. Eleven Soviet divisions had no retreat routes. To the west of Minsk, between Bialystok and Minsk (in the Nalibokskaia Pushcha area) six divisions of the 3rd and 10th armies, three divisions of the 13th army, two divisions that belonged to the front as well as bits and pieces of other units of the same front were encircled. (11) In an effort to break through the enemy rings they were fiercely fighting, suffering huge losses, until 8 July and held about 25 German divisions. Some of the units later broke through the ring and joined the main forces of the Western Front; others went over to guerilla warfare.

In the first week of the war the troops of the Western Front did their best to counterattack and deliver counterblows; they were selflessly fighting to disrupt the enemy plans of destroying the main forces of the Western Front before they reached the old state border. Despite this the situation remained very hard: 16 Soviet divisions that had already suffered great losses in previous fighting had to hold the troops of the 2nd and 3rd German panzer groups pressing to the east. The Soviet troops were waging uncoordinated battles along the Dokshitsy, Smolevichi, Slutsk, and Pinsk frontline that had contracted to 350 km. The limited numerical strength of the Soviet forces made it impossible to create a continuous defense line to the west of Minsk and hold the enemy that was pressing toward Dnieper some 140-160 km away.

The first stage of the defensive operation in Byelorussia ended with the Soviet troops' retreat to the old state border. The enemy's mobile units had covered up to 400 km in eight days and captured Grodno, Bialystok, Brest, Lida, Volkovysk, Baranovichi, and Minsk. The German troops were moving with the maximal speed of 35-50 km a day. The covering armies that had to stop the enemy in the border zone and allow, together with the armies of the neighboring front if necessary, the main forces of the Soviet Army to deploy, was not fulfilled.

At the second stage of the defensive operation in Byelorussia (from 30 June to 9 July) the units of the Western Front still tried to hold the enemy at natural obstacles.

On 30 June General of the Army D. Pavlov was removed from his post for losing control over the troops. He was put on trial by military tribunal and executed by shooting. His post was given to Lieutenant General A. Yeremenko. On 2 July People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Timoshenko was appointed commander of the Western Front. Generals V. Klimovskkh, A. Grigoriev, A. Korobkov, and other officers were also executed. The Pinsk Military Flotilla was removed to the Luninets-Mozyr stretch.

Early in July the commanders of the Army Group Center decided to capitalize on the success achieved through fighting in the border area to accelerate their advance in the Moscow direction, to reach the Dnieper and continue pressing at Moscow.

On 3 July German panzer divisions of the 2nd and 3rd panzer groups realized a lightning advance to the east and northeast of the Dnieper and the Zapadnaia Dvina with the aim of capturing the bridges and crossings on the march. Meanwhile, the main forces of the army corps of the 4th German army had been already fighting against the Soviet troops trapped to the west of Minsk. The units isolated from their staffs and deprived of centralized command, supplies and communication were stubbornly fighting in the enemy rear. Until 8 July they were holding up to 25 German divisions, that is, about 50 percent of the forces of the Army Group Center. They let the Soviet High Command to gain time to bring in reserves from the inland areas.

Sixteen exhausted Soviet divisions were holding units of the 2nd and 3rd German panzer groups outside the encirclement ring.

The defeat of the troops of the Western Front let German forces break the strategic front at the Minsk direction where a huge gap of over 400 km had been formed in Soviet defenses. Neither the commanders of the Western Front, nor five marshals of the Soviet Union (B. Shaposhnikov, G. Kulik, K. Voroshilov, S. Timoshenko, and S. Budenny) who had arrived there on Stalin's order could correctly assess the situation and use the available forces reasonably. The marshals were followed by L. Mekhlis, head of the Main Political Administration of the Red Army, who arrived with punitive functions.

By 4 July the Soviet High Command Headquarters transferred to the Western Front four more armies (the 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd) to bring up the number of armies fighting on the Western Front to seven. Preparations for defensive operations at the lines of the Zapadnaia Dvina and Dnieper rivers were carried out in difficult conditions. Many of the formations and units of the 19th, 20th, and 21st armies (13 divisions in all) were just approaching the frontline. By the time the Germans reached the Zapandnaia Dvina and Dnieper the Soviet reserves that had just arrived had no time to concentrate, create defensive positions, and deploy into battle formations. There were 24 divisions in the first echelon that had to hastily dug-in and setup antitank obstacles. The defense was unfolded in wide strips from 35 to 70 km per one division. Inadequately supplied with machines and battle equipment the troops were ill prepared for fighting. Units and groupings were understaffed and inadequately armed. The first echelon divisions had only 145 tanks; the front could dispose of merely 3,800 guns and mortars and 501 planes (389 of them battle ready). (12)

The German supreme command hastened to capitalize on the favorable situation in the western strategic sector to press against Moscow. On 3 July the 2nd and 3rd panzer groups were united into the 4th panzer army under Field-Marshal G. von Kluge to increase the striking power of its panzer groups that had suffered great losses in the very first days of the war and to speed up their advance to Moscow. The 4th field army was disbanded; its infantry units were transferred to the newly arrived 2nd army under Colonel General M. von Weichs that belonged to the OKH reserves.

The Army Group Center was strengthened with fresh troops: while at the beginning of the war it had had over 50 divisions at its disposal (the 3 rd panzer group included) by the beginning of July it had 63 divisions, 28 of which (12 infantry, nine panzer, six motorized and one cavalry divisions) were fighting in the first echelon and 35 infantry divisions, in the second. Ten infantry divisions arrived from the OKH reserves; two infantry divisions were transferred from the Army Group North while a cavalry brigade arrived from Germany. (13) German superiority in manpower and fighting equipment became overwhelming.

Early in July fierce fighting was going in the Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, and Bobruisk directions. On 4 July the Military Council of the Western Front formulated a task: to defend the Polotsk fortified area, the line of the Zapadnaia Dvina, Senno, Orsha and further on along the Dnieper so as to prevent an enemy breakthrough.

The Berezino-Mogilev direction where the 2nd panzer group was pressing against the Soviet troops was most dangerous for the Western Front.

Between 1 and 3 July three panzer divisions supported by aviation crossed the Berezina between the towns of Berezino and Bobruisk along a stretch of 80 km and developed their offensive at Mogilev. The German command expected that having breached the defenses at the Berezina Guderian's panzer group would reach the Dnieper on the next day and capture the river crossings at the towns of Rogachev, Mogilev, and Orsha on the march. The German troops, however, met with stubborn resistance especially at the Bobruisk-Mogilev highway.

To ease the pressure in the Mogilev direction the commander of the Western Front ordered the 21st army under General M. Efremov to deliver a counterblow and rout an enemy battle group at Bobruisk and Bykhov. Having gone over to the offensive the units of the 21st army crossed the Dnieper and liberated the towns of Zhlobin and Rogachev; they pressed further toward Bobruisk and wedged into the enemy's dispositions by up to 30 km.

The Soviet strike delivered at Bobruisk that outflanked the German Mogilev group in the west worried the commanders of the Army Group Center. To rebuff the Soviet onslaught they had to move there considerable force--two army corps from the reserves of the Army Group Center and two more infantry divisions. The counterblow of the 21st army held eight German infantry divisions and inflicted great losses on them. This considerably weakened the right wing of the Army Group Center. Still, the situation in the Mogilev direction remained complex.

On 6 July the forces of the 5th and 7th mechanized corps delivered a counterblow between Vitebsk and Orsha to halt for a while the German onslaught to gain time for organizing defenses. On the first day the 5th mechanized corps moved by 30 to 40 km and reached the area of the town of Senno. Acting successfully the units of the 7th mechanized corps that had inflicted heavy losses on the enemy went on to defenses in this direction. Fierce fighting went on for four days and nights. The counterblow at Senno and the Soviet counterblows in other places halted the German onslaught and, by night of 9 July created a defense line along the rivers of Zapadnaia Dvina and Dnieper. Units of the German 4th panzer army reached the line by the evening of 9 July yet failed to capture toeholds on the Dnieper's eastern bank on the march.

Numerical superiority in manpower and fighting equipment let the troops of the Army Group Center overcome the resistance of the Soviet vanguard units in the Mogilev direction and reach the main defense line on 9 July.

During the defensive operation in Byelorussia (22 June-9 July 1941) the Soviet troops fighting at the Western Front demonstrated courage and heroism. Nineteen soldiers were awarded the title of the Hero of the Soviet Union; during the first day of the war the pilots of the Western Front performed eight rammings in the air and on land; later, from 23 June to 10 July--four rammings in the air and six on land.

One of the first defensive operations of the Red Army in Byelorussia ended. The troops of the Western Front suffered a crushing defeat: 24 out of the initial 44 divisions were routed (ten of them were rifle divisions; eight, tank divisions, four mechanized and two cavalry divisions). Twenty other divisions lost from 30 to 90 percent of their manpower and fighting equipment. The Soviet troops lost 417,729 people (the figure includes the losses of the routed 24 divisions and losses in other 20 divisions, 60 percent on average); together with the losses of the Pinsk Military Flotilla the figure was 417,780 people (341,073 were irrecoverable losses; 76,717 were wounded). A large part of the losses took place in the encirclements at Bialystok and to the west of Minsk.

According to information supplied by the German high command on 11 July 328,898 military were taken prisoner in the first large-scale double fighting for Bialystok and Minsk. There were several prominent generals among the prisoners; 3,332 tanks, 1,809 guns and other military trophies. Later, on 28 September 1941 at 11:00 intelligence and counterintelligence of the staff of the Army Group Center supplied more exact figures of the number of prisoners and trophies taken at Bialystok, Minsk, Smolensk and elsewhere that differed from the original ones. The later document said: "When liquidating the enemy battle groups at Bialystok and Minsk we took 338,493 prisoners and captured 3,188 tanks, 1,830 guns and 344 planes."

During the defensive operation in Byelorussia the Western Front lost 9,427 guns and mortars, over 4,799 tanks, and 1,797 planes, 738 of which were destroyed on 22 June.

Material losses were huge: 19 depots were destroyed, some of them in panic (six depots contained ammunition; 13, POL). The depots held in all 1,766 wagonloads of ammunition (65,276 artillery rounds; 1,101,000 50 mm and 80 mm mines; about 1,5m of hand grenades, etc.), over 17,500 tons of fuel, 2,038 tons of lubricants. The Western Front lost 60 percent of the stored foodstuffs and forage; 100 percent of kits (370,000 basic kits).

The Soviet army lost nearly all artillery depots that contained over 2,000 wagonloads of ammunition; 32 out of total 45 depots with fuel and all ammunition depots: they were either captured by the enemy, blasted by the retreating Soviet troops, destroyed by enemy aviation or perished for other reasons.

The troops of the Western Front failed to stop the enemy and give the strategic reserves breathing space to completely concentrate and create stable defenses. They had to retreat with fierce defensive battles. By 9 July the enemy penetrated inside the country by 450 to 600 km in the western direction; the defense front extended from 470 to 800 km. The enemy's momentum of advance dropped on average from 35-50 km to 25-33 km a day. It occupied nearly entire Byelorussia and threatened to achieve a breakthrough on the march to Smolensk.

Despite this heavy defeat at the initial stage of the war the German command failed to achieve its main task of routing the Soviet forces in Byelorussia. They expected to finally breakdown Soviet resistance on the Dnieper and open the way for an easy advance to Smolensk and Moscow.

The Germans lost about 40,000 soldiers and officers; 708 planes were downed. According to the German General Staff during the first 18 days of the war the Wehrmacht lost on the Soviet-German front over 100,000 soldiers and officers, which means that the enemy suffered 40 percent of the total losses at the Western Front. By 10 July the German army lost about 40 percent of its tanks. On 4 July, the 13th day of the war, General F. Halder betrayed his concern: "only 50 percent of the total number of the 3rd panzer group remained battle ready." General H. Guderian reported that "by 12 July the 2nd panzer group lost 6,000, including 400 officers, the larger part of them being commanders." The German strikes weakened and the rate of advance slowed down. They could, however, bring in fresh forces from the reserves to maintain battle-worthiness.

The defensive operation in Byelorussia in 1941 armed the Soviet army with the first experience of preparing and waging defensive operations of the Great Patriotic War in the conditions of time shortage, rapidly changing situation, massive use of tanks and aviation, and a large number of landing groups. The Soviet army inflicted considerable damage to the Army Group Center and slowed down its advance by stubbornly fighting at intermediary lines and delivering counterblows by mechanized corps and combined-arms formations. This allowed the Soviet Supreme Command to deploy the troops of the second strategic echelon at the rivers Zapadnaia Dvina and Dnieper. It was at the Dnieper that a new state of fighting in the western direction began. It was the Smolensk defensive battle that lasted for two months--from 10 July to 10 September 1941--that slowed down German advance to Smolensk and Moscow.

The troops of the Western Front were defeated at the stage of fighting at the border not only because they lacked adequate battle readiness but also mainly because command and control of the troops at all levels was frequently interrupted.

NOTES:

1. Voennaia entsiklopedia, in 8 vols., Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 2001, Vol. 5, pp. 537-538.

2. Germanskiy reykh i vtoraia mirovaia voina, Vol. 4, Book 2, IVI MO RF, Moscow, 1985, pp. 572-573.

3. 1941 god--uroki i vyvody, Voenizdat Publsihers, Moscow, 1992, p. 181.

4. Istoria vtoroy mirovoy voyny. 1939-1945, Vol. 4, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1975, pp. 21-47.

5. Strategichesky ocherk Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg., Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1961, p. 57.

6. Ibidem.

7. Ibid., p. 982.

8. Istoria vtoroy mirovoy voyny. 1939-1945, pp. 22-23.

9. Istoria voennogo iskusstva: Kurs lektsiy, Vol. 5, Frunze Military Academy, Moscow, 1958, p. 24.

10. Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal, No. 8, 1966, pp. 18-19.

11. Strategichesky ocherk Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg., p. 180; Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Record Group 500, Inventory 12484, File 1, p. 9. A map of the German General Staff with the disposition of the German troops by 29 June 19941.

12. Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Record Group 208, Inventory 256210, File 1, p. 17.

13. Sbornik materialov po sostavu, gruppirovke i peregruppirovke sukhoputnykh voysk fashist-skoy Germanii i voysk byvshikh ee satellitov na sovetsko-germanskom fronte za period 1941-1945 gg., Department of Military History, Administration of Scientific Research of the General Staff, Moscow, 1955, Issue 1, From 22 June to 31 December 1941, p. 21.

Col. V.A. SEMIDETKO (Res.)

Vladimir Anatolyevich SEMIDETKO was born on 1 July 1955. He graduated with honors from the Tashkent Officer Cadet Academy, the Frunze Military Academy (Department of Military History) and served in the Southern Army Group, the Carpathian Military Okrug, the Institute of Military History of the RF (U.S.S.R.) Defense Ministry and in the Military Memorial Center of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation where, having retired from the RF Armed Forces he continued working as the leading documentation specialist.

From 1992 to 1994 he was secretary of the Independent Expert Council for the Construction of the Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 on the Poklonnaia Gora in Moscow. Vladimir Semidetko is professor of the Academy of Military Sciences, member of learned councils of several museums; presidium member of the Association of the Historians of the Great Patriotic War at the Russian Academy of Sciences; board member of the Russian Society of Archivists, deputy chairman of the joint commission of the Ministry of Culture and the Defense Ministry as head of the author group working on a handbook Perechen naimenovaniy ob'edineniy, soedineniy i drugikh formirovaniy Vooruzhennykh Sil, narodnogo opolchenia, grazhdanskikh vedomstv SSSR i inostrannykh formirovaniy, uchastvovavshikh v Velikoy Otechestvennoy i sovetsko-iaponskoy voynakh 1941-1945 gg. He has to his name over 20 scholarly publications that appeared in this country and abroad.