Defenseless: Command Failure at Pearl Harbor.

Lambert, John W. and Norman Polmar. Defenseless: Command Failure at Pearl Harbor. MBI Publishing, Co., Galtier Plaza, Suite 200, 380 Jackson St., St. Paul, MN 55101-3885. 2003. 256 pp. $29.95.

For the last six decades, the surprise attack on American installations in Hawaii by the Japanese on Sunday, 7 December 1941, has generated many books and articles. Each effort touches on who was to blame for the Japanese operation's military success. The theories fall into two categories: the attack was a brilliant piece of offensive planning complemented by a fair share of luck and unprepared American forces; or the current thinking which says that although caught off guard, the Americans had ample warnings right up until the first Japanese bomb hit its target just before 0800 but ignored the signals and suffered the consequences.

After reading this latest examination, it is hard not to believe the latter explanation. Jack Lambert's area of expertise is the early Pacific war, and Norman Polmar has written extensively on the naval experiences of WW II. Thus, when these two individuals combine their considerable experience, the reader has to pay attention.

Lambert and Polmar examine the organization and equipment of U.S. forces in the islands in the week leading up to the attack. Appendices follow the rather short text, giving facts and figures of men and machines available to the leading commanders (particularly Army Lieutenant General Walter Short and Navy Admiral Husband Kimmel) to mount standing patrols over the vulnerable target areas during the ongoing, political negotiations between Tokyo and Washington.

These patrols would have spotted the oncoming Japanese fleet and given warning in time for Army and Navy interceptors to launch and meet the invaders well before they reached their targets. But it was not to be, and Short and Kimmel were retired in disgrace shortly after the attack. In May 1999, however, the U.S. Senate voted by a close margin to rescind the findings of several boards of inquiry and basically recall the blame from these two senior officers.

The authors cry "Foul," and maintain that both men are to blame, along with others in Washington, and that no amount of historical distance can alter the facts. They note a list of near-misses and dismissals of intelligence information and events that should have told the American commanders in Washington and Hawaii that the Japanese were on their way.

A detailed description of the attack and the eventual American response shows that at least the defenders did what they could under the trying circumstances. Closing chapters examine the collective failure and culpability of the commanders, particularly Short and Kimmel. With the sufficient numbers of aircraft and other assets available during the last week in November 1941, it is hard to not place the blame squarely on their heads.