Defense against subversive and terrorist attacks in a combat operation.

In local wars and armed conflicts of recent decades, practically every combat operation or battle would involve the situation when the troops had to repulse terrorists' attacks and rebuff various sorts of saboteurs arranging ambushes and mine obstacles, making fire assaults and sniper shootings. Therefore, the task of preventing the enemy's subversive and terrorist attacks and protecting the troops has actually become as fundamental as the problem the defending and advancing units have always been challenged with, i.e. fighting against the opponent's tanks, motor-infantry, artillery and aircraft forces. Moreover, in internal armed conflicts, the troops have been increasingly focused on the struggle against subversive and terrorist attacks as it was the case, for instance, during the two Chechen military campaigns.

However, this task is rather complicated since subversive and terrorist formations (STFs) usually have an advantage in choosing the time, place, ways and methods for their attacks, and besides, they tend to use a surprise factor. And the fact that they possess the most sophisticated arms down to mass destruction weapons, robotized equipment, space navigation technology, information, psychotropic and other kinds of weapons makes their subversive activities even more dangerous.

To protect the troops against subversive and terrorist attacks, plenty of instruments from the previously stockpiled arsenal of tactical methods can be used. For instance, they could include security strengthening, creation of consolidated defensive positions, offensive lateral echeloning, construction of various sorts of obstacles, barriers etc. However, these measures would be highly insufficient in the modern conditions. Besides, the STFs have now become more, so to say, penetrative, mobile, ubiquitous, pervasive; they have been extensively using air vehicles and sophisticated destruction weapons. Therefore, to withstand the STFs, not merely passive defensive measures should be applied as it used to be in the past, but also active tactical methods, such as preemptive maneuvering, long-range fire attacks, as well as combat reconnaissance, raiding, blocking and assault actions.

A solid, multilayered defensive posture similar to the one applied in countersabotage purposes during the Great Patriotic War, can be effective today provided that it is supplemented with the firing obstruction system, flexible air-ground maneuvering by immediate reserves, fighter squads, attack helicopter groups. For example, during combat operations in the Chechen Republic, the main method in annihilating the illegal armed groups involved long-range fire attacks by aircraft forces, rocket troops and artillery units. In our opinion, such long-range fire knock-out attacks against the enemy are supposed to form the basis of countersubversive and antiterrorist active defense in a modern combat operation.

However, the present-day defense system may become vulnerable when its elements are disposed both in width and in depth. Big battle array gaps and intervals between defensive positions and lines create a precondition for extensive and sudden penetration of subversive and terrorist groups and in-depth airborne assaults. Therefore it is not always possible to protect open flanks and seams, to cover extensive interposition and intersector space by available defensive resources, screens and even by fire barriers and reinforcing obstacles. Actually, in a combat operation (battle) the troops can be protected from subversive and terrorist attacks only if a package of tactical, technical, operating, security-oriented and supporting measures are taken, with aggressive and assault actions playing the key role.

In this connection, a diversity of new tactical methods should be developed by the army commanders, and the troops should learn how to use them in present-day combat operations. These methods could involve "aerial fire mopping-up" of the areas where the subversive and terrorist groups' bases are located; selective strikes by using high precision weapons firing at aerodromes and sites where the enemy's STFs are getting ready for an assault action or are currently landing; air-ground maneuvering by rapid deployment forces toward threatened areas; preparation and implementation of countersabotage and antiterrorist actions in cooperation with the Interior Ministry troops, units of the Frontier Service of FSB, territorial defense divisions; installation of remote anti-subversive protecting electronic barriers in the areas where the enemy's subversive and terrorist formations are landing and on the routes where its STFs are maneuvering.

To ensure reliable defense against subversive and terrorist attacks, it is required first of all that the methods of ground, air and radar-tracking observation over possible airborne landing areas are developed and improved. For this purpose, a total in-depth observer post system should be created with all the service arms being involved in such observation activities.

As for combat reconnaissance units, they will also have to deal with a rather important task. Reconnaissance actions should be implemented not only in the outer defense front, on flanks and on seams, but also in the rear, especially in the intervals between the defensive positions, sectors and lines, as well as at communication facilities. To implement these measures, complementary enhancement would be required. Besides, such reconnaissance measures should be of special character since only well-trained scouts are able to reveal small-sized subversive and terrorist groups making cross-country maneuvering and landing at night time. In such conditions, air and radar-tracking reconnaissance actions may not always be effective.

In addition to the above, the defense posture requirements should be toughened. It would be expedient to organize all-round protection of small units' (companies and platoons) defensive posts in a combination with fire and barrier system. The defense system should be organized in such a way so that the approaches to the defensive posts were overlooked and swept with effective and lateral crisscross fire. It is especially important that the existing obstacles and barriers are also overlooked and raked with fire.

The fire protection system should include, first of all, a solid multilayered all-type fire zone in the forward edge of the battle area, in the intervals between the defensive posts, on the flanks and in depth. And secondly, it should involve deliberate fire maneuvering by infantry vehicles, tanks and other fire-strike forces on the directions, whence the subversive groups' approach could be possible.

Countersabotage defense system stability can be increased through position hardening activities. These measures could, first of all, include installation of wire and mine obstacles; clearance of fire zones and observation sectors; arrangement of entrenchments for armored vehicles, tanks, antitank guided missiles and other firing weapons and installations; construction of overhead cover slots and funk-holes; excavation of trenches and communication ditches. In case there is a direct threat of saboteurs' assaults, a portable mine-laying kit can be applied. It is capable of creating an off-site 200-400 sq. m. minefield in the range of about 100 m from the defensive positions.

To arrange adequate countersabotage defensive measures, it would be expedient to map a special defense plan covering different objectives and facilities, force location areas, observer, command and rear control stations, firing positions, logistics support units. This plan should reflect the sites where different block-posts, outpost reserves, barriers, surveillance patrol squads, check points, patrolling routes and ambushes are located. It is highly important that it includes troop basis tables as well.

From countersubversive and antiterrorist protection point of view, the existing outpost system needs to be improved. First of all, an integrated force (major combat formation) centralized outpost system should be established; secondly, security reliability level should be increased by applying laser devices, ground radar stations, television systems, electric alarm networks, electrified obstacles, military-type robots. Besides, the outpost force structure should be adequately developed and perfected.

Countersubversive and antiterrorist defense-related issues should also be reflected in the operation plan drafted by the commander-in-chief (commanding officer). First of all, the commander, being based on the available operational data, should assess the antiterrorist situation in the integrated force (major combat formation) defense (approach) zone. He should also determine, what military assets have been allocated by the senior commander to maintain the struggle against the STFs; where and on what direction the superior forces have been concentrated; what missions the aircraft forces, rocket and artillery units have been assigned with; in what way air, radio engineering and other reconnaissance efforts have been arranged; what tasks have been given to other security structures, such as the Interior Ministry troops, combat units of the Frontier Service of FSB, territorial defense divisions, and what forces are involved in the struggle against the STFs; what needs to be done to maintain proper interaction with them and in what way the units and troops will be controlled and supported.

At the situation forecast stage, the commander should have a clear idea of how the enemy is planning to use its STFs: at what stage of operation (battle) the STFs could be landed, what mission they will have and what forces they will consist of; what objectives and targets within the integrated force (major combat formation) defense (offense) posture can be attacked by the enemy's STFs; and finally, the commander should be aware of their strong and weak points and have a clear understanding of the measures to be taken to neutralize their actions.

For instance, recent local wars and armed conflicts have shown that during a defensive operation, in the integrated force defense zone the enemy is expected to use about 100-120 subversive and terrorist groups (STGs) of various strength and functions, and about 28-34 STGs could be used in the defense zone of a major combat formation. Besides, the enemy is most likely to use its superior forces when trying to capture the tactical defense area. In this situation, its efforts could be distributed as follows: in the struggle for the initial defensive belt up to 50% of STF forces can be landed, in the struggle for the secondary defensive belt--up to 20-25%, and in the fight for the army belt--up to 25-30% of STF forces.

The attacks by subversive and terrorist formations can be primary targeted at airdromes, integrated force (major combat formation) control stations, communication centers, antiradar stations, launch (firing) positions, as well as at the sites where rocket troops, artillery units, air defense forces, logistical support elements and critical communication facilities are located.

Therefore, during a combat operation, the defending (advancing) troops can be exposed to continuous aerial, frontal, flank and rear attacks by the enemy's STFs. In the advancing army (unit, corps etc.) defense zone up to 200-250 targets can be attacked both simultaneously and consistently (on the basis that a single subversive and terrorist group is capable of attacking one or two targets).

When evaluating its own forces, the commander is supposed to consider their aerial, electronic, combat long-range reconnaissance potential enabling timely detection of subversive and terrorist groups' landing sites; besides, the commander should be aware of their striking, firing and maneuverable capabilities that could be used to destruct the enemy's STFs both in the air and on the ground, and maintain the efforts aimed at their disablement, encirclement, dispersal, pursuit and overthrow.

To ensure reliable protection of its forces against sabotage and terrorist activities, the commander is supposed to introduce additional measures to strengthen the defense of the most critical integrated force targets and objectives, including communication facilities. The commander should also develop a package of measures aimed at misleading the opponent in relation to the integrated force defense posture system, its command posts, firing positions, rear units and facilities. Besides, a complex of security-oriented and restrictive measures in cooperation with other power structures should be taken.

When planning reconnaissance operations, the command staff is supposed to determine their purposes, objectives and methods, the forces involved, as well as the ways the aviation forces, airborne troops, combined arms units (divisions) will be performing their detecting activities. In addition to that, aviation spotter and artillery controller combat deployment procedure should be developed. And finally, the command staff should apply its best efforts to arrange cooperation with the Interior Ministry troops, combat units within the Frontier Service of FSB when waging the operations aimed at detecting and eliminating the enemy's STFs.

As for blocking actions, they should also be planned very thoroughly. These measures should involve adequate troop basis effort; determination of the tasks and missions to be assigned to raider squads, blocking groups and army maneuvering forces. It would also be expedient to determine blockade line positioning and seizure procedure, fire mopping-up and assault group fire supporting procedure, as well as the sites where active (standing) screen borders and protecting barriers will be established and the methods according to which target identification and warning signals will be arranged.

Since the countersubversive and antiterrorist defense system has not been adequately tested so far, high-ranking officials' functional duties during a defensive (offensive) operation (battle) should be elaborated. It would also be expedient to determine operation planning and assessment procedures, and to establish a precedence rule according to which individual tasks will be issued and disseminated to action officers. Besides, the area of expertise possessed by the high-ranking officials within combined-arms staffs and operational task force divisions in relation to the given problem should be expanded, and it is also required to set up specific regulations as to who will be responsible for operation planning and what exactly needs to be done during the operation to achieve a high coordination level among staff commanders, service branch commanders, and the commanding officers of special troops and services. Along with traditional tasks, each senior staff officer (senior general staff officer) should do his best to meet new, additional challenges related to arranging and maintaining the struggle against the enemy's STFs.

For instance, the chief intelligence officer should be responsible for accurate and efficient effort coordination by air, army, electronic, artillery, engineer reconnaissance units and divisions so that the enemy's preparation for subversive and terrorist actions could be revealed in advance. With this purpose, regular information exchange and round-the-clock observation over potential airmobile assault areas should be provided in the integrated force (major combat formation) responsibility zone.

As for electronic warfare-related tasks, along with enhanced communication jamming, radio-electronic combat support and electronic situation assessment activities, they should also involve electronic destruction of the control systems manipulating the subversive and terrorist formations of the enemy.

As far as engineer support activities are concerned, in order to maintain increased active impact on the enemy's STFs it is required to seek out new methods to ensure enhanced application of remote mine dispersing systems and mining obstacles, as well as new ways for using more effective engineer shielding installations, camouflage devices, special information and material support assets and protecting fire barriers during operations aimed at blocking large airmobile squads of the enemy's STFs.

As for radiological, chemical and biological defense, it would be expedient to develop adequate methods for using flame throwing incendiary weapons to destruct the STFs, especially during their urban, mountain and wood landing.

Actually, every senior commander of any special task force and its staff (department) will ultimately be challenged with a very urgent task, which involves complete implementation of required functional capabilities of specific support elements so as to create a unified dedicated integrated force (major combat formation) defense system against subversive and terrorist activities of the enemy. To solve these tasks, the commander should use available protective properties and capabilities of military vehicles, equipment and facilities, and ensure their comprehensive application based on a single integrated plan.

In addition to the above, a Countersabotage and Antiterrorist Planning and Coordination Group should be created in each combined-arms staff*. Such group could train military specialists possessing special data estimation techniques and force interaction planning skills in relation to fighting against the enemy's STFs. From the organizational point of view, this group will be primarily responsible for implementation and execution of proposals (plans, directives) put forward by service branch, task force and unit commanders and approved by the commander-in-chief under the Countersabotage and Antiterrorist Defense Plan with respect to their force application.

It would be expedient that representatives from the Interior Ministry troops and the combat units within the Frontier Service of FSB are included in this group. This will make power structures' interaction closer during combined operations against the enemy's STFs. However, when management headquarters are created, it would be highly important to avoid the mistake committed when the combat operations in the Chechen Republic were underway; especially at their earliest stage when the newly created, improvised "operative groups," "centers," "departments," "combined formations" were hastily reestablished with the latter being included in the structures belonging to different departmental agencies. And it took them quite a while to achieve compatibility with joint task fore operations.

With all this said, we should apply our best efforts to maintain the command system that has been established in peacetime. The units newly arriving in the battle zone should, so to speak, easily "flow into" the existing multi-service forces, which will make it possible to create an efficient force grouping within the shortest possible time frame. However, to make this happen, the interdepartmental intercommunication control system should be planned and developed in advance through joint command and staff exercises, staff trainings etc. This will enable the management headquarters to maintain smooth coordination of their joint activities in a combat operation (battle) when implementing such complex task as troop protection against subversive and terrorist actions.

Maj. Gen. I.N. VOROBYOV (Ret.)

Doctor of Military Sciences, professor

Col. V.A. KISELEV

Doctor of Military Sciences, professor

* If such group cannot be created, its functions, in our opinion, should be assigned to a general planning group.