Deepening democracy in Taiwan.

Abstracts

Over the past decade and a half, Taiwan has democratized. During this process of political change, progressive politics issues--social policy, environmental awareness, human rights--have become a part of the political mainstream in Taiwan. Simply put, democracy in Taiwan has deepened, moving from minimalist conceptions of procedural democracy to more substantive notions of social, economic and political citizenship. In this article, I explain the politics of democratic deepening in Taiwan. I offer four arguments. First, economic growth with equity inculcated a normative expectation among Taiwanese for continued socioeconomic justice and for state intervention in the interests of the public good more generally. Second, the institutionalization of democratic competition created incentives for political entrepreneurs to latch onto, and thus legitimate, progressive politics issues. Third, the increasingly important role of societal actors during the 1990s and tightening electoral competition facilitated a continual 'spiral upwards' in progressive politics legislation. Finally, the construction of a civic national identity in Taiwan has reinforced democratic deepening.

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As the threat of democratic reversal continues to recede in Taiwan and in other third wave democracies, scholarly attention regarding the politics of transition has increasingly focused on the resultant 'quality' of democracy. People's faith in democracy--particularly in societies where blatant inequalities persist, human rights are dismissed in the interest of power politics, and citizens' voices are either muted or simply ignored--is tenuous at best. Indeed, a general survey of recent scholarly work on democratic change in Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe suggests that deepening democracy is crucial for democratic survival. (1) Democratic deepening, in this respect, is the transition from the minimalist conception of 'procedural' democracy toward more 'substantive' forms of democratic politics.

On this score, Taiwan's still relatively young democracy has progressed considerably since its somewhat shaky foundations were first laid during the late 1980s. Then, ethnic conflict dominated politics. Since that time, we have witnessed new social policy legislation, growing environmental awareness, an increasing respect for human fights and an attitudinal shift toward more inclusive conceptions of social, economic and political citizenship. While ethnic cleavages continue to hold centre stage in Taiwan, the political stage is now shared with new and progressive social, economic and political concerns, a process reflective of democratic deepening. The old image of Asian society as Confucian, patriarchal, authoritarian and socially conservative has begun to give way to a new reality wherein progressive political agendas have started to push the limits of political possibility in democracy.

This article offers an explanation for the politics of democratic deepening in Taiwan. I argue four main points. First, equitable economic growth during the pre-democratic period in Taiwan fostered a normative expectation for socio-economic equity and state intervention for the public good, an expectation that has continued to persist into the democratic period. Second, democratic competition in Taiwan created incentives for politically entrepreneurial actors to introduce and consequently legitimate progressive political issues as part of the political mainstream. Third, tightening electoral competition during the 1990s and the increasingly important role of societal actors in agenda setting facilitated, and continues to facilitate, a ratcheting up of, or what I call a 'spiral upwards' in, progressive political legislation. Finally, the ongoing cultivation of a new civic national identity in Taiwan has reinforced the politics of democratic deepening. Nation-building in Taiwan is inextricably linked to democratic reform. Before elaborating further on these four arguments, the next section first unpacks the concept of democratic deepening and locates it in the context of Taiwan.

Deepening Democracy

The concept of democratic deepening is vague. Just as the conceptual distinctions between, for example, democratic breakthrough and consolidation, or procedural and substantive democracy, or restricted and full democracy are fuzzy, so too is the distinction between the concepts of democracy and deepening democracy. (2) Democratic deepening is a process of social, economic and political change over time. It is not an end in and of itself. The direction of change, in this respect, is particularly important. Yet this notion of deepening-as-process provides little sense as to what exactly constitutes democratic deepening. How do we know it when we see it? At an abstract level, democratic deepening, according to Kenneth Roberts, entails "both procedural and substantive connotations." (3) Put another way, it is the process by which progressive politics, or what others call new politics, become part of the mainstream political agenda.

In this article I examine three dimensions of democratic deepening. First, the socio-legal dimension is rooted in the idea of human rights, dignity and equality. Democratic reform, at a minimum, institutionalizes political rights. The equal extension of the franchise, the legal space for associational life, and, more generally, the right to participate in the political process are important aspects of democratic crafting. However, democratic deepening cultivates and legally codifies the respect for human rights across all social categories, irrespective of gender, ethnicity, class and sexual orientation. Policies designed to prevent discrimination among social groups, to promote respect for individual human rights and to inculcate more inclusive attitudes regarding diversity are therefore important social markers of democratic deepening. (4)

Second, the economic dimension of deepening democracy reflects the distribution and allocation of resources within society. People generally expect that the introduction of political democracy will lead to greater socioeconomic equity. (5) Indeed, for many analysts of democratic deepening, particularly in regions such as Latin America and Eastern Europe, economic redistribution and social policy innovation are the very cornerstones of the deepening process. (6) Social policy reform is one important aspect of what I consider to be a more general economic dimension of deepening democracy--the extent to which accountable governments, rather than markets alone, distribute economic benefits and allocate scarce resources. Changes in social welfare policy and in environmental protection, for example, are important to democratic deepening in this respect.

Third, popular participation in the policy-making process, and politics more generally, is a measure of the political dimension of democratic change. Democratic deepening involves the re-valuation of the state as an arena for deliberative decision making. It guarantees that the de jure right to political participation translates into the de facto practice of participatory politics. (7) Simply put, democratic deepening alters political and policy-making processes. The degree to which actors outside of the state apparatus influence policy reform agendas, and the extent to which governmental decision making is determined by consensus and compromise rather than imposition, indicate the level of deepening and thus the meaningfulness of political participation and representation.

Human Rights and Social Rights

In recent years, gay and lesbian issues have become prominent in Taiwan's political mainstream. (8) Social movement groups such as the Taiwan Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Association, the Tongzhi Hotline Association, the Gender Sexuality Rights Association and the 9001 Gay and Lesbian Campaign Taskforce have argued that gay and lesbian rights need to be considered an inalienable part of Taiwan's emerging human rights regime. Persistent political pressure, particularly during legislative and presidential elections, has resulted in some significant policy changes. In 2001, the Taipei City government under Kuomintang (KMT) mayor Ma Ying-Jeou set up a network of gay-friendly businesses in the city. The Ministry of Education announced that same year that it planned to include sexual diversity issues in its next curriculum. In March of 2002, the Ministry of Justice drafted an amendment to the Human Rights Protection Law that would allow same-sex couples to adopt children and to form families. At present, the cabinet is considering proposals for the legalization of same-sex marriages, a legal status that is protected in only a handful of countries worldwide. Finally, in May of 2002, the Ministry of Defense rescinded a policy that previously restricted gay men from serving in the elite military police corps. A defense official went on record stating that "times have changed. The rule [to restrict gay men] is not quite appropriate by current standards. We will revise it to show our respect for the rights of soldiers, regardless of their sexual orientation." (9)

The women's movement and proponents of gender equality have similarly become a major force in shaping Taiwan's politics. Spearheaded by civil society organizations such as the Awakening Foundation and several high-profile politicians, public policies relating to women specifically and gender relations more broadly have been introduced in recent years. During the mid-1990s the Council of Grand Justices, the highest body of the judiciary, found that the pre-existing child custody law systematically discriminated against women. In 1996, the legislature amended the law in what was considered to be the first major victory for the women's movement in Taiwan. The most recent watershed reform for women was the passage of the Gender Equality Labor Law. Unveiled in late 2001 by Council (Ministry) of Labor Affairs Chairwoman Chen Chu, the new labour law was implemented on International Women's Day in March of 2002. The Gender Equality Labor Law stipulates equal pay for equal work, two years of maternity leave and monthly menstrual leave. It allows women on maternity leave to retain their national health insurance benefits while postponing their premium contributions (shared with employers) for three years. The law also forces employers to adhere to non-discriminatory hiring practices with respect to married or pregnant women. Finally, the equality labour law requires all enterprises to provide nursery facilities in the workplace in addition to implementing and enforcing a sexual harassment policy.

Public Goods Over Markets

Despite global economic pressures for welfare retrenchment, social policy reform in Taiwan has gradually moved in the direction of deepening the welfare state. In 1995, the government implemented the National Health Insurance (NHI) programme, universalizing health care in Taiwan. According to public health scholars in Taiwan, the NHI has had a progressive re-distributive effect across different income groups. (10) Efforts by the government in 1998 and 1999 to privatize and marketize the NHI programme were blocked by a coalition of legislators, bureaucrats and grassroots activists. (11) During the past two years, the government has begun implementing an occupational hazards protection law and an unemployment insurance programme. The Chen Shui-Bian government has worked hard to legislate new old-age social protection measures, and the government is presently debating a national pensions programme. In the meantime, the legislature decided in May of 2002 to amend the Elders Welfare Law, providing senior citizens over the age of 65 with a monthly stipend of 3000 New Taiwan Dollars (NTD). Aboriginal people, due to their shorter life expectancy, receive the same stipend starting at the age of 55.

Environmental organizations such as the Green Citizens Action Alliance have raised awareness in Taiwan about environmental issues. Their impact has been gradually felt in both industrial policy and pro-active environmental initiatives. (12) In the area of waste disposal, for instance, concerted campaigns by local-level politicians and environmental groups forced the government in March of 2002 to cancel the construction of four new garbage incinerators. Though grassroots movements and their legislative allies failed to block the construction of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant, their actions were instrumental in steering environmental debates toward alternative energy sources and energy conservation. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of the government has taken the lead in several new environmental initiatives, such as in establishing a 'green police corps' to monitor industrial dumping, the creation of 'eco-industrial pares' on the island, the use of eco-labeling on consumer products, the enforcement of 3 'R' campaigns (Reduce, Reuse, Recycle) and the promulgation of the Soil and Groundwater Pollution Act of 2001. Most notably, the EPA began enforcing the Waste Disposal Act in the summer of 2002 in an effort to promote the reduction and reuse of plastic goods. According to the new policy, first government-operated retailers and restaurants, followed by private sector operations in 2003, will no longer be allowed to provide free plastic bags and eating utensils. Violators have been subject to hefty fines. Despite tremendous opposition from the plastics manufacturing industry, the EPA continues to enforce this new policy.

Democratic deepening in Taiwan has been reinforced by a general attitudinal shift in public opinion, and in the opinions of political elites, regarding progressive politics issues. For instance, according to a 1991 survey, the two policy areas identified as the top priorities for improvement were the environment and social welfare. Sixty-nine percent of those surveyed agreed that government welfare expenditures should increase, while less than one percent believed that cutbacks were needed. (13) In exit-poll survey data from the 1993 local elections, 74 percent of respondents believed that environmental protection should be of equal priority to, or of greater importance than, economic growth. Only 14 percent felt that economic development was more important than environmental protection. (14) Public opinion about progressive politics is mirrored in elite attitudes. According to survey data on elites collected in 1999, 91 percent of legislator and bureaucrat respondents (101 of 111) agreed that "[u]niversal health care is a democratic right." Indeed, 87 percent (n=111) agreed that the "[p]ublic provision of social welfare is a fundamental characteristic of democracy." (15)

Democratic Deepening in Taiwan

From this brief overview of Taiwan's recent democratic development, I offer four general observations about the process of democratic deepening in Taiwan. First, progressive politics issues are not trivial, nor are they sideline issues in Taiwan's politics. They may not be the primary sources of political conflict, though they are increasingly salient in mainstream political debates. They are definitely on the agenda. Second, debates about progressive issues span both elite and mass politics. Moreover, socio-economic cleavages, social policy positions and post-materialist concerns are not divided along partisan lines, nor are they neatly delineated between state and society. New politics crosscut traditional cleavages in Taiwanese politics. Third, both political elites and civil society actors have equally shaped the course of democratic deepening. Reform agendas are increasingly constituted through the interaction of strategic political actors and emerging civil society groups, rather than through a top-down approach.

Finally, the direction of political change in Taiwan is unequivocally towards democratic deepening. Some may take exception to this generalized characterization. Taiwan's aboriginal population continues to be marginalized, and workers are still subjected to restrictive labour laws. Political corruption has only begun to be addressed. Tensions between Chinese immigrants, ethnic Taiwanese and aboriginal communities persist in democratic Taiwan. Excessive pollution is still a reality. These and other challenges to the quality of Taiwan's democracy are not trivial. However, their existence does not negate the myriad ways in which Taiwan has made great strides in social, economic and political change, nor do they undermine the significance of changing attitudes in Taiwan with respect to progressive politics issues.

How can we explain this directional change in the development of democratic politics in Taiwan? What factors have facilitated democratic deepening?

Legacies of Development

The answers to these questions require us to go back to the period leading up to democratic transition in Taiwan. Experts on democratic transition teach us that legacies of authoritarian politics shape national pathways to democracy. (16) Authoritarianism in Taiwan took root in 1949, initiated by the emigre Kuomintang (KMT) party from the Chinese mainland, first under the leadership of General Chiang Kai-Shek and then under his son Chiang Ching-Kuo. To consolidate its power, the KMT party-state quickly suppressed political opposition from the Taiwanese inhabitants on the island. This ethnic divide in authoritarian Taiwan consequently had a profound impact on the KMT developmental state and on the politics of democratic transition. In particular, the political economy of equitable economic growth had a lasting legacy on the politics of democratic deepening in Taiwan.

Rapid economic growth rates aside, the true 'miracle' in Taiwan's development was the relatively egalitarian distribution of income sustained throughout the postwar period. In 1959, the gini coefficient, a statistical measure of the distribution of household income, was .44 in Taiwan. By 1970, the gini coefficient had decreased to .29, indicating a more equal distribution. The gini coefficient in Taiwan hovered around .30 from the 1970s up through the 1990s, making the distribution of income in Taiwan one of the most egalitarian in both the industrial and developing worlds. (17) To be sure, wage differentials during the 1980s, when Taiwan's economy became more diversified, were minimal among workers employed in different industrial sectors. In 1983, the average wage for heavy industrial workers was only 8 percent higher than the mean wage across all manufacturing industries. (18)

Equitable economic growth in Taiwan was the product of clearly defined policy, rather than fortuity. Land reform carried out by the KMT between 1949 and 1953 forced the redistribution of land and institutionalized private property rights. It also dealt a decisive blow to what remained of the absentee landlord class. In 1949, 70 percent of farmers in Taiwan were tenant farmers; a decade later, 85 percent of farmers owned their own land. (19) The distribution of income improved markedly, with the gini coefficient decreasing from .56 in 1953 to .44 six years later in 1959. (20) Some social policy was also initiated at this time. A limited and selective labour insurance scheme and a social insurance programme for government employees were implemented during the 1950s. (21) Perhaps most remarkable, as alluded to above, was the equitable outcome of Taiwan's industrial development. The authoritarian developmental state actively prevented the concentration of industrial capital. Unlike in South Korea, where the Park Chung-Hee regime used state-controlled investment capital or credit to nurture industrial growth, the KMT in Taiwan took a more hands-off approach, opting instead to strategically employ fiscal incentives in industrial targeting. The authoritarian state in Taiwan thus focused on developing small--and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) rather than large industrial conglomerates. Ninety-eight percent of all firms in Taiwan were considered to fall into the SME category. (22) Consequently, capital was never concentrated in the hands of the few, creating a sense of upward mobility for all Taiwanese workers and entrepreneurs. According to Thomas Gold, "Taiwan's proletariat lacks class consciousness." (23) In fact, the overwhelming majority of Taiwanese consider themselves to be from the middle class. (24)

The left-leaning principles of KMT founder Dr. Sun Yat-Sen shaped, in part, the policies that promoted equitable growth in Taiwan. (25) However, the active promotion was really a political strategy for managing ethnic tensions on the island. Simply put, 'growth with equity' fostered 'growth with stability.' The arrival of the KMT during the late 1940s and subsequent efforts by the authoritarian regime to politically suppress the Taiwanese and to impose Chinese culture on them fomented a deep-seated enmity between the two ethnic groups. As a minority population in Taiwan, the Chinese mainlanders needed to quickly legitimate the KMT party-state. Unwilling, at least early on, to relinquish political power to the native Taiwanese, the authoritarian regime reasoned that equitable economic growth would undermine socioeconomic distributional claims on the state. Growth with equity was an economic payoff by the ruling regime in exchange for political peace. Most importantly, an egalitarian distribution of wealth in Taiwan prevented the concentration of economic resources among Taiwanese who could potentially convert that economic power into political resources against the KMT regime. The promotion of equity was never for equity's sake alone. It was always politically motivated and its political consequences have carried over into Taiwan's current democratic project.

Equity and Democracy

The push for democratic breakthrough is often driven by demands for economic equity. Democratic mobilization in South Korea and Latin America, for instance, focused around socioeconomic conflict. The minjung movement in Korea and the socialist and workers' parties in Chile and Brazil were instrumental agents in sparking democratic transition. The political opposition to the authoritarian KMT regime in Taiwan, on the other hand, demanded a more equal distribution of political power. Though the New Tide faction of the opposition expounded a social democratic vision of reform, the introduction of democracy in Taiwan had less to do with economic inequalities than was the case for its developmental counterparts elsewhere. (26) Ironically, equitable growth under authoritarianism meant that economic inclusion in Taiwan was realized before the extension of political citizenship.

Two important political legacies resulted from equitable economic growth. First, ethnic tensions in Taiwan were not, and are not, structured along socioeconomic lines. As we know, some of the most illiberal polities are those that are deeply divided along ethnic or racial lines. Ethnic conflict is even more destructive when socioeconomic disparities or the perceptions of relative economic deprivation reinforce and sharpen ethnic cleavages, particularly during periods of major political instability. (27) The absence of extreme socioeconomic inequality in Taiwan--at least in the processes of ethnic identity formation and contestation among the two major groups in Taiwan--has prevented, for instance, the type of violent ethnic conflict endemic to places such as Indonesia and Malaysia. The redistribution of political power through democratic change and the legacy of growth with equity have together mitigated the potential explosiveness of ethnic confrontation in Taiwan. In the current period of democratic deepening in Taiwan, multi-ethnic cohabitation has been surprisingly peaceful and accommodating. When ethnic tensions have percolated, they have played out in the context of democratic rules and institutionalized political competition.

A second legacy of equitable growth in Taiwan was the entrenchment of societal expectations about what is appropriate, and thus politically acceptable, in terms of socio-economic distribution. These normative expectations about equity and the distributive consequences of economic growth have impacted the course of democratic deepening in Taiwan. In 1993, 57 percent of exit-poll respondents indicated that they believed economic equity to be equally important to (36.8 percent), or even a higher priority (19.9 percent) than economic growth alone. (28) Not surprisingly, social welfare reform emerged as an important public policy issue during the early stages of democratic transition in Taiwan. In a 1991 Academia Sinica survey, 44 percent of respondents indicated that they were dissatisfied with the present state of Taiwan's welfare regime. Only 28 percent were satisfied. (29) Three years later, in 1994, the percentage of dissatisfied respondents increased to 50 percent while those who were satisfied declined to 20 percent. (30) In other words, people in Taiwan not only came to expect a degree of socioeconomic equity, but they also saw the promotion of equity as the responsibility of the state. (31) By extension, state intervention in the market was perceived as legitimate, and even desirable, so long as it reflected social, economic and political goals that were deemed to be of public good. Attitudes reflecting the importance of environmental protection, even over economic growth, affirm this notion.

Public opinion, political mobilization and a relatively strong economy--all of which were consequences of growth with equity in Taiwan--maintained expectations for continued efforts by the government to intervene in the economy and to take some responsibility for the distribution of economic benefits and the allocation of resources. The democratizing state in Taiwan has thus--counter-intuitively-- strengthened its social safety net and environmental regulations at a time when economic forces both at home and abroad have supposedly undermined the effectiveness of the interventionist state. (32) From the perspective of political entrepreneurs in Taiwan, the unwillingness or inability to promote equity is potentially very costly in the current democratic period, even in the face of globalization pressures. Ninety-two percent of legislators surveyed in 1999 (n=47) agreed that public welfare is fundamental to democracy. Even more telling, 89 percent of legislators (n=47) also agreed that "[s]ocietal inequality leads to political instability." (33)

The Logic of Democratic Competition

Democratic change fundamentally alters the rules of the game. Political competition transforms the political game from one of suppressing dissent (authoritarianism) into one of winning support (democracy). I contend that institutionalized political contestation, most notably with frequent elections, can turn previously marginal issues or causes into politically salient ones. This logic of political competition was important in setting the course of Taiwan's democratic development in two related ways. First, democratic change in Taiwan resulted in the construction of new affiliations around progressive politics issues. Second, these emerging affiliations were not structured around diametrically opposed 'proponents' and 'opponents' of progressive politics; rather, competition over these new cleavages was based on 'how much' progressive policy reform should take place. Simply put, latching onto new politics was a winning strategy for everyone in Taiwan's democracy.

Though the democratic movement in Taiwan comprised environmental groups, human rights activists and social policy advocates, progressive politics issues were not the most significant source of affiliations in the early stages of democratic transition. They were always secondary to the ethnicity affiliation. To be sure, the political left was suppressed under authoritarianism. Union mobilization was weak (and continues to be so in the era of democracy). Grassroots social movements became disorganized in the period immediately after democratic breakthrough. (34) To date, there is still no explicitly left-leaning political party. (35) Democratic activists, who were by and large Taiwanese, fought for democracy in order to equalize political rights among the two ethnic groups. Therefore, the basis of political competition, at least early on, was primarily over issues relating to national identity and ultimately democratic claims for self-determination. (36)

Democratic competition in Taiwan, then, was based on a single issue. Two things quickly became clear, however. One, the Beijing regime was not going to let Taiwan claim independence under any circumstances. Escalating tensions across the straits, culminating in the 1996 missile exercises during Taiwan's first ever direct presidential elections, made independence a non-option, at least in the short to medium term. Two, the vast majority of Taiwanese voters wanted (and continue to want) to maintain the status quo with respect to the sovereignty issue, choosing neither immediate independence nor unification. The independence/unification cleavage was irreconcilable in the short term and quickly became static; it was thus less strategically useful for political entrepreneurs in Taiwan. As one DPP official asked during the 1990s, "[n]ow that 'independence versus unification' no longer dominates the domestic political debate, the crucial question is, how will the two major parties distinguish themselves?" (37) The likes of Lipset, Rokkan, Sartori and Kitschelt teach us that political cleavage structures need not be fixed. Issues and the bases of competition can be very dynamic. (38)

When competition becomes static, political actors have an incentive to diversify the bases of political competition. Political actors in Taiwan, particularly those on the pro-independence side of the debate, soon realized that they needed new issues or new cross-cutting cleavages over which to compete and to gain new constituencies of political support. In other words, the logic of political competition compelled strategic actors to engage in a dynamic process Of constructing cleavages. Herbert Kitschelt explains that

   the problem of party strategy is thus not simply an ideological
   membership pitted against a pragmatic, office-seeking leadership.
   The real problem is to increase the strategic responsiveness of
   parties to new competitive opportunities both from the bottom,
   via an entry of militants with fresh ideas, as well as from the
   top of the party, by enabling leaders to create some strategic
   degrees of freedom in their decision making process. (39)

Out of this agent-driven process of constructing cleavages in democratizing Taiwan, progressive politics issues emerged as a new basis of competition. They became part of mainstream political debates. This is not to say that ethnic cleavages were suddenly no longer salient in Taiwan, as ethnic identity remains the single best predictor of electoral outcomes. However, new lines of competition became increasingly salient in Taiwan, making democratic politics a strategically complex game of multiple cleavages.

But why progressive politics specifically? First, the emergence of progressive politics issues was the natural offshoot for pro-democratic activists in Taiwan. The democracy versus authoritarianism cleavage did not altogether disappear after the late 1980s. Rather, it was redefined by held-over democratic activists into a new set of causes, where the goal of deepening democracy beyond procedural democracy became increasingly central to the post-transition political project. Second, new political issues were especially appealing to competitive political elites in Taiwan because they crosscut traditional cleavages such as ethnicity and related claims for independence. They essentially carved up the electorate in new ways, giving actors new potential bases of political support. For the opposition in particular, making progressive politics issues salient provided alternative appeals to traditional KMT and/or pro-unification voters. The KMT had no choice but to follow suit. (40)

Third, the relative absence of pre-existing socioeconomic or social political cleavages made progressive politics issues even more strategically useful for political entrepreneurs in Taiwan. The political system in Taiwan provided the issue space in which new political cleavages could emerge. That there was no entrenched left-right cleavage between the major political parties--the parties were founded on the ethnicity cleavage--meant that there was ideological space for new political issues. Senior DPP legislator Hong Chi-Chang explains:

   The parties in Taiwan are not as rigid as they are in, say, Europe.
   In Europe, the lines are clearly drawn between the left and the
   right. However, in Taiwan, the founding ideologies of the three
   parties, the DPP, the KMT and recently the New Party, were based on
   ethnic politics. Because of this, legislators from all three
   parties care about social policy issues. (41)

The non-ideological nature (left versus right) of the party system, and of politics in Taiwan more generally, eliminated any ideological constraints on strategic actors who considered pinning their political fortunes onto new politics issues. The effect was that social policy, environmental policy and human rights causes were essentially up for grabs by any and all willing actors. It was therefore rational for strategic actors in Taiwan, irrespective of party affiliation, to turn to progressive politics issues and bring them into the political mainstream. This was (and continues to be) an especially appealing strategy given that these new issues resonate so well with voters in Taiwan.

To be sure, with respect to new political issues, partisan differences have become increasingly blurred. The evidence bears this out. An analysis of newspaper campaign advertisements from throughout the 1990s found that "welfare state expansion" was consistently a major electoral issue for both the KMT and the then opposition DPP. (42) According to data culled from the survey of elites, 73 percent of DPP legislators agreed with the following statement: "The DPP tends to represent the interests of lower income groups"; however, 71 percent of KNIT legislators disagreed with this partisan characterization. (43) Indeed, the DPP has had to balance a pro-business position on the one hand, with the party's commitment to social welfare reform and environmental protection on the other--a policy platform balancing act with which the KMT has long been familiar. (44) Party membership along social class lines is also not a good indicator of partisan difference. With respect to the socioeconomic profiles of politicians in Taiwan, 73 percent of the KMT legislators I surveyed identified themselves as being of an upper- or upper-middle-class background. Among legislators from the 'grassroots' DPP, 75 percent of respondents similarly considered themselves to be from an upper- or upper-middle-class background. (45) In other words, the cross-class composition of both the opposition and ruling parties has further blurred partisan differences along conventional social cleavages.

Race to the Top

As argued above, an important consequence of democratic competition in Taiwan was the construction and mainstreaming of new political cleavages. Interestingly, conflict over these cleavages has primarily focused on the issue of 'how much reform' rather than over the desirability of reform in the first place. Over the past few years, there has been a continual upward spiral in progressive policy outcomes and, more generally, in new political causes. To explain this, it is important to examine civil society and the development of social movement activity in Taiwan during recent years. According to data from my 1999 elite survey, three-quarters (74 percent) of respondents (n=109), comprising both bureaucrats and legislators in Taiwan, perceived societal group influence in policy making to be increasing. Only 6 percent felt it to be on the decline. (46) Civil society groups have re-emerged over the past half-decade and they have positioned themselves in the centre of political and policy battles. They have also been the engine for what I call the 'race to the top' in agenda setting for progressive politics.

It is interesting to point out that progressive societal groups in Taiwan are not limited to only those involved in the labour movement. The independent labour movement is but one of several new social movement groups to have emerged in post-transition politics. (47) Organizations like the Taiwan Labor Front and the Committee for Action on Labor Legislation are flanked by the feminist Awakenings Foundation, the Judicial Reform Foundation, the Gender Rights Association, the Taiwan Tongzhi Hotline, the Taiwan Association for Human Rights, the Buddhist Tzu-Chi Foundation, and several environmental groups, to name a few. These non-governmental organizations are mobilized and professional, and are made up of 'expert--activists.' (48) Movements often staff a corps of policy researchers and enlist outside academics and policy experts to serve as consultants and policy makers. They focus on specific issues and bring expertise to particular policy initiatives and debates. These new social movements increasingly play an important educative role, especially in the legislature. (49) Pre-existing linkages held over from the democratic movement days have also helped to forge a tight network of social movement leaders, facilitating inter-group cooperation. In short, civil society in Taiwan has become a tremendous source of ideas, and for the most part, a generator of new progressive policy initiatives.

The political influence of these new social movements in political agenda setting, however, is not solely dependent upon the organizations themselves. They fit well into the institutional context of Taiwan's democratic politics. (50) Specifically, the political system in Taiwan, particularly the institutions governing political competition, provides an important electoral agenda-setting mechanism for new political initiatives. Remarkably high voter turnout rates for various elections that take place nearly every year attest to the degree of competition in Taiwan's democracy. Part of this can be explained by the sheer enthusiasm shared by all Taiwanese about their new democracy.

Yet part of the explanation is institutional and is therefore, in many ways, unique to Taiwan. The multi-member district (MMD) electoral system in Taiwan promotes intense competition. Because candidates have to often compete against members of their own party, they have an incentive to appeal to more narrow constituencies. As alluded to in the previous section, party labels are less meaningful and party discipline is weak. (51) The MMD system also means that in many districts the actual number of votes needed to win a seat is quite small, amounting to about only 4-5 percent of the entire district vote. (52) In terms of progressive politics issues in Taiwan, the effect of this institutional pattern of electoral competition is that political actors, irrespective of which party they belong to, are motivated to seek out novel and often radical ideas and their corresponding constituencies. It is irrational to always try to appeal to the median voter. (53) Because of this incentive structure, constant electoral competition in Taiwan has provided the political space for new social movements to steer politics and policy from below. Intense competition among candidates for these constituencies has promoted an upward spiral of policy promises, contributing to an increasingly progressive political agenda in Taiwan. At the very least, this interactive dynamic has made new political issues salient.

During local elections in 1993, for instance, a DPP candidate promised monthly old-age pensions, to which a KMT candidate responded by not only promising a new old-age protection policy, but one that would pay even more per month. Yeun-Wen Ku recounts that "[i] n a short period--less than one month--pensions became a big issue all over the island and the size of the [proposed] allowance grew and grew." (54) The lesson here is that if one only has to win a few thousand votes to get elected, it pays to appeal to and to promise state-provided concessions for such a narrowly bounded constituency. Some may characterize this simply as pork barrel politics endemic to any democratic system. (55) It may be. But the fact remains that these contests have legitimated new political issues in mainstream debates, which, no matter how one interprets it, represents a significant transformation in recent Taiwanese politics.

Thus far, I have argued that the combination of intense political competition and a well-developed civil society have together promoted a ratcheting up of new politics in Taiwan's democracy. However, this sort of argument begets the important question of why we have not seen a downward spiral or a countervailing race to the bottom. For one, as I argued above, the non-ideological nature of Taiwan's political system, in terms of left-right politics, means that there is no 'right' already in place. Until new political causes prove to be a losing strategy, political entrepreneurs in Taiwan, unbounded by ideological constraints, will continue to perpetuate this upward spiral. Perhaps more importantly, however, is the inherent 'stickiness' to policy legislation. As Paul Pierson and his colleagues teach us, once a new policy is put into place, new interest coalitions converge around these new institutions (or regulations or safeguards), making it politically costly to dismantle them. The logic of institutional and ideational path dependency takes over. (56) For instance, in reference to state-led efforts to privatize the cash-strapped national health insurance system during the late 1990s, legislator Shen Fu-Hsiung put it best: "The government's biggest mistake was to make its first attempt at universal health care such a generous program. It is impossible in a democracy to now convince people that what is best for them is to be less generous." (57) People benefit from certain policies and they therefore expect them to be maintained. Politicians, in turn, would never promise to take benefits away.

Realist Global Politics

This last section situates our analysis of Taiwan in its proper transnational context. Understanding the politics of deepening democracy in Taiwan requires us to examine the blurred intersection of international and domestic politics. In Taiwan, domestic politics is de facto its foreign policy, and vice versa. On the one hand, Taiwanese voters' choice of elected officials elicits responses from other states. Yet, on the other hand, Taiwan's foreign policy dictates the terms of debate in domestic issues. This blurred intersection of the transnational and the local plays itself out most explicitly in the independence versus unification debate and, more broadly, in the nation-building project. I contend that the progressive character of Taiwan's domestic politics has been very much couched in the dynamics of Taiwanese aspirations for state sovereignty and in related attempts to construct a corresponding Taiwanese nationalism.

Up until the recent past, Taiwanese claims for independence rested almost exclusively on broadly conceived arguments about ethnicity. Activists argued that a common language, a shared history, unique cultural rituals and a geographical separation from mainland China justified an independent Taiwan. While these claims were intriguing for scholars and policy officials interested in the changing conceptions of state sovereignty and nation-building, in the end, realpolitik considerations, particularly strategic calculations among American and Chinese foreign policy makers, stymied Taiwan's ethnic claims for independence. Maintaining regional stability in East Asia is critical. Promoting Taiwanese independence would only raise the ire of an increasingly shaky political-economic regime in Beijing and thus de-stabilize the region. The more moderate positions taken by President Chen Shui-Bian in cross-straits relations--moderate given his party's mandate to pursue Taiwan's de jure independence--have signaled a change in Taiwan's foreign policy. Indeed, the fiery debates about Taiwanese independence that were once so prevalent during the early 1990s have cautiously ebbed and flowed in recent years, reflecting signals from the Beijing regime across the straits. (58) Yet the nation-building process in Taiwan is not dead.

In her theoretical work on nationalism, Liah Greenfeld offers two conceptions of the modern nation. First, in what she calls 'civic nationalism,' the "people" are an "eminently positive entity ... the bearer of sovereignty, the basis of political solidarity, and the supreme object of loyalty." Nationalism is thus a "political ideology." The second conception is 'particularistic nationalism,' wherein the idea of the nation "signif[ies] a unique sovereign people." (59) Ethnicity, or ascribed notions of ethnicity, often mark the boundaries of particularistic nations. In both conceptions, the nation is constructed. In the context of Taiwan, we have witnessed over the past decade or so the reconstruction of national identity, with the gradual movement away from ethnic conceptions of the nation toward more secular, civic notions of what it means to be Taiwanese. Christopher Hughes suggests that in Taiwan, the conception of "political community is built by the subjective identification of individuals, rather than objective criteria imposed by ethnicity." (60) He goes on to add that, [w]hat defines one's membership of Taiwan's Gemeinschaft ['living community'] is not when you came to the island, nor what ethnic group you belong to, but whether you yourself want to identify with Taiwan. (61) Indeed, once exclusive ethnic categories such as Chinese and Taiwanese, or outsiders and locals, have become increasingly muddied with more complex identities like Chinese-Taiwanese, Taiwanese-Chinese or 'New Taiwanese.'

Deepening Democracy as Nation-Building

Inclusion in Taiwan's nation-building project is increasingly tied to its democratic project. By deepening democracy on the island, Taiwanese hope to make Taiwan the paragon of 'third wave' democratization. (62) This, of course, has transnational implications. Deepening democracy reinforces on the global stage an already positive image of Taiwan as a success story, not only in terms of economic growth but also in political development. Taiwan has worked hard to export its image to the rest of the developing world--to Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and even the People's Republic of China. Indeed, successful democratic consolidation in Taiwan and the continued deepening of democracy differentiates social, economic and political life in Taiwan from that of mainland China. Whether explicitly or unconsciously, Taiwanese identity is increasingly distinguished from that of China, not along ethnic lines but rather along social and civic lines. One would he mistaken to think that Taiwanese nationalists do not see the significance of Taiwan's strengthened social safety net, given the absence of similar policies in a China governed by a purportedly socialist party.

This tactical shift from ethnic justifications for the Taiwanese nation-state to civic claims about Taiwan's uniqueness vis-a-vis China has manifested itself in very real ways, both in Taiwan's foreign and domestic politics. In its desire to rejoin the international community, Taiwan has strived to be the ultimate global citizen. The government in Taiwan has been a major donor to and participant in international aid and development projects and disaster relief campaigns. While Taiwan is continually denied membership into certain international organizations, it has maintained its commitment to groups like the World Health Organization, both financially and in terms of lending medical expertise. Under the Chen Shui-Bian regime, and even under the Lee Teng-Hui administration before that, the government has turned to a strategy of human rights diplomacy, championing rights-based claims around the world. Borrowing from the language of those who study the global diffusion of ideas, Taiwan's connectedness with increasingly dense transnational networks has promoted both 'normative transmission' outwards and the politics of 'emulation' inwards. (63) Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Taiwan have enmeshed themselves in important transnational NGO networks, a process that has fostered global learning and, through these networks, the discussion and internalization of new ideas. (64) Excluding official state linkages in the new global political arena, Taiwan has attempted to join the international community through almost every other avenue by fostering a positive image of fairness, justice and democracy at home. In short, a progressive Taiwan helps make a case for its independence, if not in statehood, then at least in nationhood.

In sum, we are seeing a tactical move from ethnic nationalism to more inclusive ideas about civic nationalism in Taiwan. As Timothy Ka-Ying Wong writes, "the new citizens of Taiwan are beginning to identify their political future with the concerns of Taiwan's own civic state." (65) This is not to say that ethnic or identity politics have become irrelevant in Taiwan. Rather, an alternative and complementary understanding of what it means to be Taiwanese has emerged. The inculcation of political, social and economic citizenship is inextricably tied to ethnic politics on the island. The inclusion of ethnic Taiwanese into the larger body politic is just as much about the dynamics of ethnic politics and ethnic reconciliation as it is about a more secular form of democratic civic-ness. Indeed, the idea of a civic Taiwan, as distinct from its non-democratic neighbours, has reinforced, and should continue to reinforce, democratic deepening in Taiwan.

Conclusion: Democratic Deepening at a Crossroads

Human rights and broader conceptions of social citizenship are firmly situated at centre stage in Taiwan's politics. The preservation of socioeconomic equity and demands for state intervention in the economy for the public good, such as in the environment, have persisted in the era of democracy. Progressive political issues such as welfare, gender relations, sexual diversity rights and the environment have become mainstream issues, in large part due to a more participatory political system. Although concrete policy reform addressing these issues may be lagging, the fact that they have been included in the mainstream political agenda in Taiwan is remarkable in and of itself. Taiwan's democracy, borrowing from the language of democratic theorists, is deepening.

In this paper I have presented four arguments to explain democratic deepening in Taiwan. Growth with equity prior to democratic transition entrenched a normative expectation in Taiwan for socioeconomic equity and, more generally, it legitimated state intervention for the public good. Incentives intrinsic to democratic competition compelled strategic actors to draw on progressive political issues as new bases of political contestation. Civil society mobilization and flexible cleavage structures in Taiwan fostered a spiral upward in new political legislation. And finally, the shift from ethnic nation-building to civic conceptions of national identity has reinforced democratic deepening in Taiwan.

Yet, our conclusions should not be so sanguine, particularly with respect to the future trajectory of democratic change in Taiwan. Democratic deepening in Taiwan is presently at a crossroads. First, there remain several challenges for social, economic and political reformers in Taiwan. Persistent ethnic conflict, the systematic exclusion of aboriginal peoples, welfare loopholes, environmental disasters and corrupt 'black-gold' politics sully Taiwan's democratic record. Much reform is still needed if Taiwan is to further deepen its democracy.

Second, Taiwan's recent economic recession and the continual hollowing out of its traditional industrial base to China threaten the 'luxury' of new politics and progressive political legislation. The perception of economic crisis currently weighs heavily on the minds of all in Taiwan and this is not conducive to sustained democratic deepening. To be sure, the process of democratic deepening described in this article benefited from a strong economy throughout the 1990s. New politics is post-materialist politics. (66) In the current period, however, traditional bread-and-butter issues such as employment security are returning to the political forefront, particularly in manufacturing-dependent regions outside of the Taipei metropole. It remains to be seen how much longer the government can consider progressive political reform agendas, and indeed, how much longer politicians and the general public will even tolerate these agendas. It is reasonable to expect, however, that whichever way the economy goes, progressive politics in Taiwan will follow suit.

Third, the current way of doing politics in Taiwan simply cannot sustain democratic deepening. Pork barrel politics and constituent service are increasingly traversing the line toward more sinister forms of vote-buying. The fragmentary effect of Taiwan's electoral system undermines the political party system. Party identities and leadership are increasingly meaningless and legislative politics tend toward anarchy and deadlock. The consequences of this environment are not trivial. Policy making in Taiwan is incoherent, as legislative promises accumulate with each round of elections. Furthermore, policy enforcement is becoming a major challenge in Taiwan. Policies that are legislated often do not have teeth once they are implemented, as evidenced by lax environmental enforcement despite the EPA rhetoric. Finally, the state is increasingly hamstrung fiscally as politicians continue to gratuitously dole out favours, yet are unwilling to raise government revenues. The fact that the current government is hesitant to raise health insurance premiums, despite the programme's financial crisis, is emblematic of this seemingly irreconcilable tension.

In sum, the politics of democratic reform in Taiwan has begun to reveal the inherent pathologies in the deepening process. One might say that the pattern of democratic deepening in Taiwan was intrinsically prone to overload, and in a way, preset the limits of how far progressive politics reform could go. Addressing these pathologies is necessary if Taiwan is to continue down this path. This is, I think, the most important lesson the case of Taiwan has to offer, both for other democratizing countries and for scholars concerned about the processes of deepening democracy elsewhere.

University of Toronto, Canada, April 2003

* Many thanks to Edward Friedman, Ito Peng, Linda Gall Arrigo, Mark Selden, Scott Simon, Larry Diamond, Jacques Bertrand, Linda White, Jay Krishnan, Emanuel Adler and three anonymous reviewers for their comments and insights on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks also to Uyen Quach for her research assistance.

(1) Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and John D. Stephens, "The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory and Social Dimensions," in Lisa Anderson, ed., Transitions To Democracy (Columbia University Press, 1999); Adam Przeworski et al., "What Makes Democracies Endure?, "Journal of Democracy, vol. 7, no. 1 (1996) ;Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

(2) David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy With Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research," World Politics, vol. 49, no. 3 (1997).

(3) Kenneth Roberts, Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru (Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 3.

(4) Ian Shapiro Democracy's Place (Cornell University Press, 1996); John Dryzek, "Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization," American Political Science Review, vol. 90, no. 1 (1996).

(5) Adam Przeworski, "Minimalist Conceptions of Democracy: A Defense," in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon, eds., Democracy's Value (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 40.

(6) drear Encarnacion, "Labor and Pacted Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Politics (April, 2001); Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mandelbaum, eds., Sustaining the Transition: The Social Safety Net in Postcommunist Europe (Council on Foreign Relations, 1997); Douglas Chalmers et al., eds., The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America (Oxford University Press, 1997); Kurt Weyland, Democracy Without Equity: The Failure of Reform in Brazil (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996).

(7) Roberts, Deepening Democracy?; Douglas Chalmers, Scott Martin and Kerianne Piester, "Associative Networks: New Structures of Representation for the Popular Sectors," in Chalmers et al., eds., 1997.

(8) See Scott Simon, "From Hidden Kingdom to Rainbow Community: The Making of Gay and Lesbian Identity in Taiwan," in M. Moskovitz and A. Morris, eds., Taiwan: The Minor Arts of Daily Life (forthcoming, University of Hawaii Press).

(9) Quote cited in Brian Hsu, "Military Police to Accept Gays," Taipei Times, May 2, 2002.

(10) Tung-Liang Cheng and Shou-Hsia Cheng, "The Effect of Universal Health Insurance on Health Care Utilization in Taiwan, "Journal of the American Medical Association vol. 278 (July, 1997), pp. 91-92.

(11) Joseph Wong, "Resisting Reform: The Politics of Health Care in Democratizing Taiwan," American Asian Review, vol. 21, no. 2 (2003).

(12) For a general introduction to the environmental movement in Taiwan, see Michael Hsin-Huang Hsiao, "Environmental Movements in Taiwan," in Y.S. Lee and Alvin So, eds., Asia's Environmental Movements: Comparative Perspectives (M.E. Sharpe, 1999).

(13) Cited in Ku Yeun-Wen, Welfare Capitalism in Taiwan: State, Economy and Social Policy (St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 190-191.

(14) John Fuh-Sheng Hsieh and Emerson Niou, "Salient Issues in Taiwan's Electoral Politics," Working Papers in Taiwan Studies #3 (American Political Science Association, Conference Group on Taiwan Studies, 1995), Table 5.

(15) I administered an original comparative elite survey to bureaucrats mid legislators in Taiwan (1999) and South Korea (2000). The self-administered paper survey was distributed to all legislators in the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan and the National Assembly in Korea. In terms of the bureaucratic sample, two groups of bureaucrats were targeted in each administration. In Taiwan, the survey was randomly distributed to the Department of Health (DOH) 'Small Group on Health Policy' as well as in three divisions of the Bureau of National Health Insurance (BNHI): finance, medical affairs and planning/evaluation. In Korea, the bureaucratic sample consisted of officials from the National Health Insurance Corporation's (NHIC) 'Integration Committee' and the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) 'Health Insurance Division'. The survey, which comprised over 60 different attitudinal and network/contact measures, was administered in Chinese and Korean. The total sample size from both countries was 249 respondents, 133 from Korea and 116 from Taiwan. Subsequent references to the survey data will be cited as 'Author Survey'.

(16) See Gerardo Munck, "Review Article: Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Politics (April, 1994).

(17) Taiwan Statistical Data Book (Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan, 1999), p. 16.

(18) In contrast, heavy industrial workers in South Korea typically earned 40 percent more than the average wage of a manufacturing worker and over 60 percent more than the traditional light manufacturing worker. David Dollar and Kenneth Sokoloff, "Industrial Policy, Productivity Growth and Structural Change in the Manufacturing Industries: A Comparison of Taiwan and South Korea," in Joel Aberbach et. al., eds., The Role of the State in Taiwan's Development (M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 19.

(19) Wu Yu-Shan, Comparative Economic Transformation: Mainland China, Hungary, The Soviet Union and Taiwan (Stanford University Press, 1994); Chih-Ming Ka and Mark Selden, "Original Accumulation, Equity and Late Industrialization: The Cases of Socialist China and Capitalist Taiwan," World Development, vol. 14, no. 10/11 (1986); Shirley Kuo, Gustav Ranis and John Fei, Taiwan Success Story: Rapid Growth With Improved Distribution in the Republic of China, 1952-1979 (Westview Press, 1981).

(20) Erik Thorbecke, "Agricultural Development," in Walter Galenson, ed., Economic Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan (Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 176.

(21) Gordon Hou-Sheng Chan, "Taiwan," in J. Dixon and H.S. Kim, eds., Social Welfare in Asia (Croom Helm, 1985).

(22) Tun-Jen Cheng, "Distinctions Between the Taiwanese and Korean Approaches to Economic Development," Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 22 (1993) and "Political Regimes and Development Strategies: South Korea and Taiwan," in Gary Gereffi and Donald Wyman, eds., Manufacturing Miracles (Princeton University Press, 1990). See also Karl Fields, "Strong States and Business Organizations in Korea and Taiwan," in Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, eds., Business and the State in Developing Countries (Cornell University Press, 1997).

(23) Thomas Gold, "Civil Society and Taiwan's Quest For Identity," in Stevan Harrell and Huang Chun-Chieh, eds., Cultural Change in Postwar Taiwan (Westview Press, 1994), p. 50.

(24) Hagen Koo, "The Middle Classes in the East Asian Newly Industrialized Societies: Issues, Preliminary Findings and Further Questions," in Michael Hsin-Huang Hsiao. ed., East Asian Middle Classes in Comparative Perspective (Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 1999).

(25) Chen-Kuo Hsu, "Ideological Reflections and Development in Taiwan," in Joel Aberbach et al., eds., The Role of the State in Taiwan's Development (M.E. Sharpe 1994).

(26) Shelley Rigger, "Mobilizational Authoritarianism and Political Opposition in Taiwan," in Garry Rodan, ed., Political Oppositions in Industrializing Asia (Routledge, 1996); Linda Gall Arrigo, "From Democratic Movement to Bourgeois Democracy: The Internal Politics of the Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party in 1991," in Murray Rubinstein, ed., The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present (M.E. Sharpe, 1994).

(27) Mark Irving Lichbach, "An Evaluation of 'Does Economic Inequality Breed Political Conflict' Studies," World Politics (July, 1989).

(28) Hsieh and Niou, "Salient Issues in Taiwan's Electoral Politics".

(29) Cited in Ku Yeun-Wen, Welfare Capitalism in Taiwan p. 190.

(30) The 1994 Social Image Survey (Taipei: Sun Yet-Sen Institute, Academia Sinica, 1994)' p.108 [in Chinese].

(31) Fang Wang, Support For a New Welfare State in Taiwan: Social Change, Political Dynamics and Public Opinion (Ph.D. Dissertation, Sociology, University of Chicago, 1997), p. 322.

(32) Peter Evans, "The Eclipse of the State? Reflections of Stateness in an Era of Globalization," World Politics, vol. 50 (October, 1997).

(33) Author Survey.

(34) Yun-Han Chu, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1992), chapter 4.

(35) A Labor Party was formed in 1987. However, its influence was minimal, given its exclusive geographical base in the south and the common perception that the Labor Party was sympathetic to the Chinese Communist Party and thus unification with China. See Yu-Shan Wu, "Marketization of Politics: The Taiwan Experience." Asian Survey, vol. 29, no. 4 (1989).

(36) Alan Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization (M.E. Sharpe, 1994).

(37) Bi-Khim Hsiao, "Taiwan's Political Transformation Entails Search For New Ideologies," Taipei Times (September 6, 1999), p. 9. For a fuller analysis into the emerging party system in Taiwan, see Shelley Rigger, From Opposition to Power: Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (Lynne-Reinner, 2001).

(38) Herbert Kitschelt et. al., Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation (Cambridge University Press, 1999); Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments," in Lipset and Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voting Alignments: Cross National Perspectives (Free Press, 1967); Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Joseph Lapalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton University Press, 1966).

(39) Herbert Kitschelt, "Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment," in Paul Pierson, ed., The New Politics of the Welfare State (Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 277 [emphasis added].

(40) Tse-Min Lin, Yun-Han Chu and Melvin Hinich, "Conflict Displacement and Regime Transition in Taiwan: A Spatial Analysis," World Politics, vol. 48, no. 1 (1996); Emerson Niou and Peter Orsdeshook, "A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Republic of China's Emerging Electoral System," International Political Science Review, vol. 13, no. 1 (1992).

(41) Interview with Hong Chi-Chang, DPP Legislator (December 15, 1999).

(42) A total of 1,665 ads were collected and over 27,000 phrases were coded for this study. See Dafydd Fell, "Party Platform Change in Taiwan's 1990s Elections," unpublished manuscript, 2000.

(43) Author Survey.

(44) Rigger, From Opposition to Power, pp. 165-167.

(45) Author Survey.

(46) Author Survey.

(47) Yin-Wah Chu, "Labor and Democratization in South Korea and Taiwan," Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 28, no. 2 (1998).

(48) Wong, "Resisting Reform".

(49) Seventy-seven percent of legislator respondents (n=43) indicated that they met with societal group leaders at least once a month to discuss policy matters. Author Survey.

(50) Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1994). For an application of Tarrow's conceptualization of 'opportunity structures' and social movement mobilization in the area of labour policy, see Ikuo Kume, Disparaged Success: Labor Politics in Postwar Japan (Cornell University Press, 1998).

(51) See Hung-Mao Tien, ed., Taiwan's E