Deconflicting army aircraft and indirect fires: brigade-level [A.sup.2][C.sup.2].

Day Six of the fight. It has been a nasty one with horrible weather, rough terrain and lots of casualties. The guerrillas are hugging us close and wreaking havoc on our lines of communication.

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The most damaging loss to the brigade combat team (BCT) has been the destruction of the platoon of UH-60s and two Kiowas--40 crew and passengers dead or wounded and $20 million-plus in equipment destroyed during the last 72 hours. The worst part of it is, we shot them down accidentally with our own indirect fires.

Sound like a freak occurrence? Not at Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, rotations. The typical aviation fratricide at the JRTC takes one of two forms: over-flight of a unit (FA, mortar) while it is firing and flying through the sheaf of an indirect mission as it is being delivered on a target.

A typical over-flight incident involves assault and utility aircraft conducting resupply missions inside the airhead forward operating base (FOB). These aircraft operate without formal constraints (routes/corridors), even though they fly to and from the same four locations all week; they are lulled into a sense of security because the firing units are quiet most of the time. When the artillery does fire, their tactical operations centers (TOCs) validate that they are clear of the impact point, but the TOCs never think to check the origin points. Eventually, the pilots' luck runs out.

In a typical terminal effects incident, a ground company commander or fire support officer (FSO) clears a fire mission for ground elements and forgets the Kiowa Warrior orbiting overhead or does not clear the Kiowa Warrior to a realistic minimum distance from the indirect fire sheaf. The high volume of fire delivered in small areas at the JRTC coupled with the use of variable time (VT) as the preferred fuze lead to a high probability that a helicopter inside the sheaf footprint will be damaged or lost.

The cause of these incidents is that 90 percent of the BCTs don't plan for Army airspace command and control ([A.sup.2][C.sup.2]) inside their areas of responsibility (AORs)--they just take the plan division gives them. They don't plan standard-use Army aviation flight routes (SAAFRs) or air-corridors to deconflict air and ground operations in intensiveuse areas for aircraft conducting repetitive resupply missions or transiting to and from combat operations in their AORs. They don't plan restricted operating zones (ROZs), restricted operating areas (ROAs) or informal equivalents to keep aircraft outside the surface danger area around firing units. Finally, they don't establish fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs), airspace control measures (ACMs) or clearance-of-fires tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for the Kiowa Warriors in support of the close fight in their AORs.

The average brigade S3 air literally takes the division [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] annex and publishes it as his own with no additions or refinements for the requirements of his AOR. Most FSOs don't know the dangers presented by the lack of an [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] plan or the doctrinal measures to correct them.

The average pilot is flying with a map that has outdated (or no) maneuver graphics, has no FSCMs or firing-unit locations posted on it and no ACMs. The pilot believes that, essentially, there are no constraints on his actions and no threat to his activities from friendly operations. He has received only a minimal situational awareness briefing before taking off and has no idea of the likely friendly maneuver or fires operations (and thus high-threat areas) for that day. He also has no visibility of active firing units and target areas because he is not monitoring the fires net. He is unaware, unconstrained and unafraid.

The failure to create and enforce effective [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] plans at the brigade level has three basic causes. First, most brigade senior leaders and staffs don't understand [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] requirements and don't know they are responsible for planning and coordinating [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] at their and their subordinates' levels. Second, combat arms leaders are not taught [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] doctrine and techniques in our schoolhouses. Third, based on this lack of leader knowledge, units fail to integrate realistic [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] training and events into their home-station training. This, in turn, leads to a lack of awareness of the dangers and required [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] corrective techniques needed in combined arms operations in combat

A number of useful field manuals and joint publications are available to guide brigade and lower level staffs to create [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] plans--fire support elements (FSEs) should keep them handy and review them regularly. (See Figure 1.)

FM 3-52 Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone clearly states that the brigade staff performs [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] at the brigade level and below. It further states, "Since no formalized [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] element exists at brigade, the brigade staff extracts information from various sources to perform [A.sup.2][C.sup.2]. The brigade commander may form a brigade [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] element from the air defense artillery [ADA] liaison officer [LNO], the brigade FSO, the air liaison officer [ALO] and the Army aviation LNO (when he is not present, the S3 air performs his duties)."

When a brigade is operating semi-autonomously as part of an early-entry force and (or) receives insufficient detail in an [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] plan from higher, it must assume responsibility for the [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] planning that its higher headquarters normally would perform. Brigade staffs are responsible for the planning (or refining) and executing [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] within their AORs.

While all ACMs should be (and in some cases are required to be) forwarded to a higher headquarters for approval, the brigade can enforce ACMs below the coordinating altitude as informal measures until approved by higher--ACMs such as routes, corridors and firing battery ROZs. Bottom line: the brigade always submits the [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] plan and modifications to higher headquarters for approval and inclusion, but it doesn't wait for approval before taking control of its airspace.

In this article, we offer TTP for brigade-level [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] planning for small-scale contingencies (SSC) to help units translate the doctrinal guidance in Army and joint [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] manuals into viable, executable plans for both training and combat.

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

Deconflicting Aircraft in the AOR. The brigade staff deconflicts aircraft conducting logistics and assault operations inside the AOR using air corridors built on a network of air control points (ACPs). To do this, the staff first links the routes from the division or joint task force (JTF) logistics nodes to the brigade logistics nodes.

Next the staff links the brigade nodes to battalion nodes as well as to planned or potential future assault and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) landing zones. ACPs and routes should be constructed to provide the most direct route from node to node while remaining outside the surface danger zone around artillery and mortar units and avoiding areas where large volumes of indirect fire are likely to be delivered, according to plan. To eliminate aviators' concerns that repetitive use of a small number of corridors might increase their risks of ambush, the staff provides a number of alternate corridors and periodically alters which ones are active.

Figure 2 shows a typical [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] plan given to a brigade by the 21st Division at the JRTC. It consists solely of two division-directed SAAFRs linking assets in the division rear area to the edges of the brigade AOR. Figure 3 shows the various brigade and battalion nodes connected by air corridors and connected to the division SAAFRs at the brigade boundaries.

[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]

Deconflicting Air Operations Around Major Firing Units. During many stability operations and support operations (SOSO)/counterinsurgency operations, FA batteries and, to a large extent, battalion mortar platoons remain fairly static for long periods. They occupy hardened firebases distributed across the AOR.

This predictability lends itself to deconfliction using ROZs/ROAs. Assuming a coordinating altitude of 300 feet above ground level (AGL), the trajectory tables for the weapon determine the average range and highest charge expected to be fired that distance from the battery at which a projectile fired at low angle will "climb" above 300 feet AGL on its trajectory toward the target. That distance, plus additional safety factors as desired, becomes the radius of the circular ROZ around the firing unit. The minimum altitude is surface. and the maximum altitude is the coordinating altitude of 300 feet AGL. This ROZ is closed to all fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft operations. The same basic principle applies to mortar positions.

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In the example shown in Figure 4, a 105-mm battery is firing Charge Five at a range of seven kilometers. Both the target and the battery are at the same altitude, which is near sea level.

According to the data from the trajectory tables, the projectile will pass above 300 feet AGL (approximately 100 meters) within the first 500 meters of the trajectory. Based on this, the brigade can construct a circular ROZ with a 500-meter radius that has a minimum altitude of surface and a maximum altitude of 300 feet--the coordinating altitude.

In this example, the angle of fall of the projectile as it nears the target is just slightly steeper than its angle of departure from the tube. That means the brigade can use the same rough 500-meter radius cylinder to envision the danger area along the gun-target line at the terminal end of the trajectory, using informal airspace coordination areas (ACAs) around the target. Dimensions will vary based on several factors.

Deconflicting Attack Helicopters in SSCs. This is a little more complex. If the aviation task force (AV TF) has been given its own AOR, such as between the airhead line and the coordinated fire line (CFL) or in a security zone in the defense, and a tactical task to accomplish (i.e., screen), then its parent headquarters must clear fires within that AOR. No special ACM/FSCM are required at the brigade level inside the AVTF AOR in this case, but the aircraft should be restricted to air corridors when transiting to and from their AOR and other locations.

When attack helicopters are placed under the tactical control (TACON) of another battalion task force and operate inside that subordinate unit's AOR (i.e., in and around the terminal effects pattern), additional measures are required. First, when flying inside another unit's AOR, the aircraft must maintain a communications link with the unit that owns the AOR (battalion, company, etc.). When TACON to that subordinate unit, the aircraft's primary net should be either the controlling unit's command or fires net and the aircraft should execute movements only under the positive control of the supported unit. To affect this control, commanders and FSOs should first use existing graphic control measures (GCMs), such as phase-lines (PLs) and company/platoon boundaries, to separate aircraft from the effects of fires.

When indirect fires are requested, aircraft can be ordered easily to move beyond the effects range of the system by directing them to "Stay east" of a certain PL or outside of a specific unit's AOR until end-of-mission. Informal control measures, such as an informal ACA, can achieve the same end state, but they carry a higher risk of error in repeated use because not all leaders and aviators will have the same graphics posted to the same degree of fidelity on their maps.

Figure 5 shows the integrated [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] plan for a brigade AOR using a combination of ACMs and FSCMs to deconflict indirect fires from aviation.

Controlling/Deconflicting Measures for Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). Additional formal and informal measures help control and deconflict indirect fires and attack helicopters in high-intensity operations concentrated in small areas, such as MOUT. Two techniques, the holding area (HA) and the Kiowa Warrior cross, enable the combined arms attack of targets in village fights as well as in live fire at the JRTC. Both are examples of time and lateral separation techniques for executing the formal and informal ACAs described in Appendix D of FM 3-09.4 Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Heavy).

In the HA technique, the FSO determines that attack helicopters and indirect fires cannot safely conduct simultaneous attacks on a small objective due to terrain, foliage and (or) enemy air defense capabilities. During the military decision-making process (MDMP), he and the aviation LNO decide to use time separation in the form of HAs to facilitate the attacks. Together, they select four one-kilometer-in-diameter circular HAs for the aircraft located outside the effects area (and off the gun-target line) of the planned targets in the objective.

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To ensure these HAs are protected from unintended attack by indirect fires, they are further designated as ACAs and built into the advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS).

All HAs are distributed as part of the brigade's GCM/ACM/FSCM plan in the brigade operations order. In this case, the HAs are roughly two kilometers from the target area or approximately 60 seconds flying time at 60 knots.

[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]

As the attack unfolds, the ground commander, through his FSO, sequences indirect fires and attack helicopter fires into the objective. As he prepares to deliver indirect fires using an "At My Command" mission, he orders the attack helicopters to occupy one or more of the HAs. Once the aircraft have reported occupation of the HAs, he issues the command to fire to the firing unit. At the report of "Rounds Complete" (plus time of flight), he clears the helicopters to depart the HAs and conduct their attack on the objective in accordance with previous guidance.

[FIGURE 6 OMITTED]

The Kiowa cross technique divides up the battlespace around a high-intensity objective into sections and then assigns a letter or number to each section. (See Figure 6.) This provides a number of formal control measures in a small space to facilitate moving aircraft quickly and efficiently from one area to another and separating them laterally from the effects of fires. Attack helicopters can operate in one quadrant of the "cross" while indirect fires are delivered just outside the risk estimate distance (RED) in another portion of the cross. Where possible, the "arms" of the cross should be placed on easily identifiable terrain (roads, waterways, etc.) so they can be explained to aircrews and ground observers.

In Figure 6, the battalion FSO in control of fires for the attack on this village needs to attack a strongpoint in the northeast portion of the city (Target AF2001). Because of the size and complexity of the target (one T-72 tank being used as a pill-box, exposed troops at heavy machine gun positions on the roof opposite the tank and a heavy machine gun position inside the second story of a high-rise building), he uses multiple fire support assets to achieve his commander's desired effects. The FSO chooses to attack the target with a combination of 105-mm howitzer and OH-58D fires.

Thinking ahead, the brigade FSO and ALO created a circular control measure during course-of-action (COA) development and imbedded it into the brigade's larger GCM plan. They divided the circle into a cross with four quadrants labeled A through D. The radius of the circle is 500 meters, and it is valid from the surface to the coordinating altitude (300 feet). The gun-target line of the supporting battery is roughly south to north (indicated by the arrow in Figure 6), and the unit is firing standard ammunition at roughly one-third of its maximum range. The battery has met the five requirements for accurate, predicted fire and had adjusted on this target as part of harassing and interdicting fires earlier in the battle. Additionally, it fires using a converged sheaf (all rounds aimed at the same central grid of the target).

Using a probability of incapacitation (PI) of 0.1 percent, the battalion FSO determines that the proper RED for this mission is 175 meters (see FM 3-09.4. Appendix A, for a complete discussion of REDs). The FSO does a quick plot on his map and cross overlay and determines the terminal trajectory and RED of the sheaf as it impacts (depicted by the 350-meter-diameter circle over the target) potentially will affect quadrants A and B. Based on this determination, the FSO (with the concurrence of his commander) "closes" A and B to helicopter use during the fire mission and advises the commander to have the helicopters conduct their simultaneous attacks from battle positions outside of those two quadrants.

Because the FSO devised a simple, standardized control measure, he quickly could separate artillery and attack helicopters in space but deliver their effects in a simultaneous, combined arms manner.

[A.sup.2][C.sup.2] within a brigade's AOR is the responsibility of the brigade S3 and staff. Failure to take responsibility could result in predictable, avoidable and unacceptable casualties in combat. The staff must be willing to accept the challenge and commit to finding workable real-world solutions based on doctrinal and TTP references.

* FM 3-09.4 Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Heavy) (Jan 90)
* FM 3-52 Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone (Aug 02)
* FM 3-52.1 ICA[C.sup.2] Multiservice Procedures for Integrated Combat
  Airspace Command and Control (Jun 02)
* Joint Pub 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
  (Jul 95)

Figure 1: Publications to Guide Brigade and Below Staffs in Creating an
Army Airspace Command and Control ([A.sup.2][C.sup.2]) Plan (Online at
http://www.train.army.mil)

By Lieutenant Colonel Daniel A. Pinnell and Majors Victor S. Hamilton, AV, and Michael T. Oeschger

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel A. Pinnell is the Senior Brigade Fire Support Observer/Controller (O/C) for the Fire Support Division, Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana. He commanded the Operations Detachment, 6th Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Battalion (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and in Central Africa; a Tactical PSYOP Company in the 9th PSYOP Battalion (Airborne), also at Fort Bragg; and B Battery, 2d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery (B/2-8 FA), 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington. He takes command of 1-76 FA in June as the Army stands up the battalion as part of the 4th Unit of Action (UA) in the 3d Infantry Division (Unit of Employment, or UE) at Fort Stewart, Georgia.

Major Victor S. Hamilton is the Brigade Comand and Control Aviation Liaison Officer (LNO) at the JRTC. While stationed with the 25th Infantry Division (Light) at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, he commanded an Attack Helicopter Company in the 125th Aviation Regiment and served as Assistant Division Aviation Officer and 2d Brigade's Aviation Officer. Prior to that, he was the Aviation Officer for the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), Fort Bragg.

Major Michael T. Oeschger, until recently, was the Senior Aviation Fire Support O/C at the JRTC. Currently, he is a student at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He commanded A/3-319 FA and the Advanced Airborne School, both at Fort Bragg, and the 10th Field Artillery Detachment (Target Acquisition), 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Fort Drum, New York. He served as the Fire Direction Officer for 2-17 FA, 2d Division, in Korea; and Fire Control Officer for the 82d Airborne Division Artillery, Fort Bragg.