Decisive fires, decisive victory: 1-9 FA in OIF.

What enabled such a small force to have such devastating effects on the battlefield in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)? At every instance where success was in question, US forces simply destroyed the enemy's will to fight.

US forces had three key advantages that led to their consistently and decisively defeating the Iraqi forces. These were a technological superiority that enabled our forces to see, understand and act more quickly with confidence; and a thoroughly ingrained determination to accomplish the mission with the means at hand. It was this triad of technology, training and mission focus that enabled the US military, with help from its Coalition partners, to make short work of the Iraqi Army.

While technology and training were essential to the destruction of the enemy, it was by far the soldiers' and leaders' initiative, innovation and determination in the face of adversity that enable our forces to deploy, attack 500 miles across Iraq, rapidly strike into downtown Baghdad and then hold out until the corrupt and despotic regime of Saddam Hussein crumbled.

From my position in an M109A6 Paladin battalion in direct support (DS) of the 2d Brigade of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3d ID), I witnessed the overwhelming and cumulative effects of individual efforts, united in purpose, against an enemy reliant on a centralized and restrictive decision-making process. Even thought the Iraqi forces outnumbered and outgunned us, the American soldier made the difference: it was a one-sided fight.

This article reports and assesses the important actions, hard work and initiative of individual soldiers and leaders so their story won't get lost in the praises of superior technology.

Crossing the Border. Our forces determined the time and place of the attack. The plan had the 2d Brigade moving to its attack positions on 19 March with two days allocated for preparations before crossing into Iraq. 1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery (1-9 FA) was to fire in a 3d Division Artillery (Div Arty) preparation (prep) to destroy enemy observation posts along the border before the division attacked.

Everyone in the battalion expected the prep to occur on the evening of 21 March. Strategic intelligence regarding the location of key Iraqi leaders resulted in air attacks beginning a day early. This pushed everyone's timeline one day forward.

Losing that final day created some angst at the battalion level, but there was no reason to delay. 1-9 FA had established adequate communications with the Div Arty, the guns were in position, we had meteorological data and survey, and the Div Arty had already pushed 176 rounds of high-explosive (HE) ammunition forward for immediate consumption.

1-9 FA fired a battery six-rounds at each of our targets with excellent effects. Attack aviation and infantrymen then cleared the area of the remaining enemy. The attack had begun, and the 3d ID started across the border.

Assessment. Beginning the attack a day early was not without cost. At higher levels, critical logistical and command and control ([C.sup.2]) infrastructure were not fully in place. Leaders at all levels lost an opportunity to conduct detailed checks/inspections and had to modify their plans.

The decision to attack early brought with it unanticipated elements of friction. Problems with ammunition and maintenance parts and the synchronization of efforts that units experienced days later were the result. The division had to slow its tempo of attack as soldiers and leaders developed innovative techniques, accepted additional risks, and worked and fought through hard, sleepless nights to overcome the cost of the early movement.

Leaders must make decisions quickly to take advantage of fleeting opportunities. All decisions have a cost. It is the soldiers' initiative, creativity and dedication to accomplishing the mission that gives US Army leaders the agility to make dynamic decisions with certainty of success.

Movement to Objective Rams. The 2d Brigade had little contact with the enemy during the first two days of the operation. The brigade focused on moving to Objective Rams. This was a large staging area in the desert southwest of An Najaf and more than 300 miles from the Kuwaiti border. (See the map on Page 3.) Seizing Objective Rams would enable attack aviation to execute operations in the vicinity of Karbala while the 3d Division pushed forward essential supplies to continue the attack.

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1-9 FA's movement to Objective Rams took 35 hours along a narrow dirt road through the Iraqi desert. The battalion followed the lead maneuver Task Force (TF) 1-64 AR to the southern edge of Objective Rams at 2200 on 22 March.

The brigade was in contact with enemy dismounts, mortars and paramilitary forces operating in sport utility vehicles. The battalion immediately established security and a firing capability with howitzers along the road. We chose these positions because the adjacent terrain was too muddy and broken to support the occupation of the guns. There was a gap of several kilometers between TF 1-64 AR and 1-9 FA with reports of hundreds of enemy dismounts operating between the units.

TF 1-64 AR faced heavier enemy resistance than anticipated, and the brigade decided to mass close air support (CAS) with direct and indirect fires on enemy strongholds. While maintaining the highest level of security possible, 1-9 FA fired missions to allow TF 1-64 AR to clear enemy bunkers and destroy forces in zone. These fires, along with the CAS and direct and indirect fires from maneuver, destroyed the enemy strongholds and enabled TF 1-64 AR to neutralize enemy resistance in zone until TF 4-64 AR arrived to help secure Objective Rams.

Assessment. When 1-9 FA arrived at Objective Rams, it was dark and the soldiers were tired. The 35 hours of continuous stop-and-go movement along the unimproved dirt road combined with the anxiety of facing the unknown had a discernable effect on the soldiers. Added to this was the unanticipated contact with a determined, organized enemy force and a several-kilometer gap between the lead maneuver task force and the battalion. 1-9 FA had the challenge of establishing a firing capability in highly restrictive terrain very different than that of the open deserts on which the battalion had trained and the knowledge that the next maneuver task force would not arrive for several hours.

The situation was tense, but the soldiers and leaders understood it and acted effectively. The howitzers, fire direction centers (FDCs) and command post vehicles quickly occupied positions as they could along the road. Within minutes, cannons, CAS and ground maneuver elements focused their complementary and reinforcing effects on key Iraqi positions and denied the enemy the opportunity to seize the tactical initiative.

This was a meeting engagement. The brigade had no fire plan and entered action from the march. With the added elements of darkness, uncertainty and fatigue, the brigade's tactical risks were high.

If it had not been for the soldiers and leaders acting independently to make critical decisions based on their shared understanding of the situation, it is likely the brigade's attack would have stalled. Instead, at first light, the brigade moved forward 16 kilometers to complete the seizure of Objective Rams ahead of schedule.

Karbala and the Attack Across the Euphrates. After the brigade seized Objective Rams, the tempo of operations slowed considerably as the division executed shaping operations while pushing forward the forces and materials necessary to penetrate the enemy's defenses around Karbala. During the next nine days, the 2d Brigade conducted limited attacks in zone to support the 3d Division's shaping operations.

On the morning of 2 April, the 2d Brigade received orders to move north of Karbala. The brigade was then to attack across the Euphrates River to destroy the Iraqi Army's Medina Division while seizing the intersection of Highways 1 and 8 south of Baghdad at Objective Saints. The purpose of this attack was to deny enemy forces the ability to reinforce Baghdad from the south.

2d Brigade was to follow the 1st and 3d Brigades through a narrow pass west of Karbala, referred to as the Karbala Gap. 2d Brigade was then to pass through 1st Brigade in the vicinity of a bridge crossing the Euphrates to continue the attack.

2d Brigade saw an opportunity to begin its move early and avoid the congestion at the Karbala Gap. The brigade moved east of Karbala.

1-9 FA began its move six hours earlier than planned, taking the route east of Karbala. The lead elements of the brigade had intermittent contact, and the movement was neither swift nor smooth. During the movement, the brigade's leadership determined that the route east of Karbala was not suitable. The brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT) began searching for a bypass. This process took several hours during which 1-9 FA halted and established security along a canal road east of Karbala.

The brigade could not find a bypass and decided that TF 1-64 AR and 1-9 FA should turn south and then west to move through the Karbala Gap. The brigade then would reorganize at an attack position before attacking the Medina Division.

It was dusk as TF 1-64 AR started moving south. Several kilometers along the route, the task force came into direct fire contact with a company of BMPs. 1-9 FA's main body rolled through this area directly behind TF 1-64, taking intermittent small arms fire as secondary explosions went off in the burning hulks.

Near the rear of 1-9 FA's convoy, there was a break in contact that resulted in four ammunition trucks missing the turn south. These vehicles continued along a canal road until that road became impassable. The battalion ammunition officer realized the trucks had gone the wrong way and returned to get them. The battalion's leadership decided to keep the main body moving to the attack position and send the executive officer (XO) back to help the trucks link up with the main body.

1-9 FA arrived at the attack position on the morning of 3 April after more than 20 hours on the road. Despite the move taking significantly longer than planned, there was no change to the time of 2d Brigade's attack. The battalion refueled and immediately went into the attack across the Euphrates. During the 30-minute stop in the attack position, the battalion refueled as mechanics conducted emergency maintenance and repaired two [C.sup.2] vehicles and a howitzer.

As the battalion moved through the Karbala Gap, the XO was trying to get the misdirected ammunition trucks back up with the main body, TF 1-30 IN, the task force responsible for the area around Karbala, told the XO that the route 1-9 FA's main body had taken was no longer clear of enemy. Through further coordination, the XO learned that a platoon from TF 2-69 AR was conducting a raid to the north toward the attack position. The XO and the ammunition trucks followed the platoon raid until the platoon came into significant direct fire contact. Then, with an escort from TF 2-69 AR, the XO's element bypassed the enemy and moved to the attack position.

The ammunition trucks arrived at the position approximately 30 minutes after 1-9 FA's main body had departed. The XO then followed where he could and linked up with the battalion trains later on 3 April.

For the attack across the Euphrates, 1-9 FA followed TF 1-64 AR to a position along a road six kilometers to the west-southwest of the intersection of Highways 1 and 8. The terrain in the position area was heavily irrigated farmland, and the battalion had to occupy, nonstandard firing positions along the road.

As the battalion's lead elements were clearing the position for occupation they captured 11 enemy infantrymen along with their small arms, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and mortars. 1-9 FA fired 15 missions from the position area DS to the brigade's successful attack to seize the intersection of Highways 1 and 8, known as Objective Saints.

Assessment. The movement through Karbala and the subsequent attack across the Euphrates did not go as planned. The long halts and the changes in the route during movement resulted in confusion, frustration and fatigue. The battalion passed through unsecured areas at night followed only by a brief pause before heading into the attack. The amount of control the battalion's leaders could exercise on the long column from the radios in their vehicles was minimal.

Despite these difficulties, the battalion was in position and fired for the brigade's main effort as it attacked the objective. Technology and training certainly aided the battalion in accomplishing its tasks, but it was soldiers' initiative and their unflagging will to succeed that ensured 1-9 FA could provide effective fires at the critical place and time.

Attack of Baghdad. 1-9 FA's final major combat action was during the attack to seize key governmental infrastructure in downtown Baghdad. The brigade planned this attack as a raid to show that US ground forces could attack the most prestigious symbols of Iraqi power at any time they pleased.

On the morning of 7 April, 1-9 FA executed a series of 16 targets in support of the brigade's raid into Baghdad. To maintain suppression directly ahead of the lead maneuver element, the battalion lifted and shifted its fires to the next target at the direction of the TF fire support officers (FSOs). The fires supported maneuver as planned, and the brigade quickly seized its objectives in downtown Baghdad.

The brigade commander determined he had enough combat power to retain the objectives in Baghdad for as long as he could provide fuel and ammunition for his tanks. With the approval of division, the brigade commander had his forces remain in Baghdad, and the focus of the fight shifted to maintaining the lines of communication (LOCs).

While the maneuver task forces were fighting in Baghdad, a missile hit the brigade's tactical operations center (TOC), killing several soldiers and wounding more. The missile attack severely degraded the brigade's ability to provide [C.sup.2].

1-9 FA's TOC took responsibility for controlling and clearing fires in the brigade's zone. The battalion also sent six FA ammunition support vehicles (FAASVs) to help secure the brigade TOC and provided medical assistance for the injured.

At this point, the fight for the LOCs began in earnest. The lead maneuver forces of the 2d Brigade had moved into Baghdad more quickly than Iraqi units could respond. As the bypassed Iraqi units were able to grasp the situation, they conducted frequent but uncoordinated attacks against US forces securing the highway. These attacks continued throughout the day.

1-9 FA fired 24 missions in support of TFs 3-15 IN and 2-7 IN during their battle for control of the LOCs, and many of these were danger-close fires. The battalion also fired 10 counterfire missions against artillery and mortar targets trying to disrupt 2d Brigade's operations. 7 April ended with TFs 1-64 AR's and 4-64 AR's controlling key enemy infrastructure in Baghdad, TFs 3-15 IN's and 2-7 IN's controlling the highway south from Baghdad and 1-9 FA in position and firing DS to the brigade.

Conclusion. During this war, operations seldom went as planned. In each action, some element of friction severely threatened our chances of success, whether the friction was generated by the enemy, the terrain or ourselves. It was during these moments of difficulty and doubt when the advantages of technology and training were not quite enough that individual soldiers and leaders took matters into their own hands and mastered the challenges.

The Iraqis had many advantages in this war. They had a military with a vast numerical superiority that had personal knowledge of the terrain. They fought from well-prepared defenses arrayed in depth, and they had a thorough understanding and control of the populace. What they didn't have was the tactical or operational agility to use these advantages to even temporarily seize the initiative. We seized and held the initiative.

It was the soldiers' and leaders' willingness to act and their determination and innovation--shaped and directed by the objective and commander's intent--that magnified our capabilities, minimized our vulnerabilities and allowed us to utterly crushed the Iraqi military's will to fight.

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth D. Gantt commands the 1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery (1-9 FA), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia, and deployed the battalion to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom. In his previous assignments, he was the Deputy Director of the Operational Plans Directorate (J7) and Chief of the Combat Plans Branch (J33) of the Operations Directorate (J3) with US Forces in Japan. Other assignments include Battalion Executive Officer and S3, 2-82 FA, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; Assistant Operations Officer for the Division Artillery, also in the 1st Cav; Middle East Political-Military Analyst in the Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC; and UN Military Observer assigned to the UN Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East. He commanded a firing battery in 1-14 FA, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart. He holds an MA in Near Eastern Studies from Princeton University.