Decentralized fires in Afghanistan: a glimpse of the future?

The 1st Brigade, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) of the 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom III (OEF III) from December 2002 until August 2003. It deployed with its direct support (DS) battalion headquarters, 3d Battalion, 319 Airborne Field Artillery Regiment (3-319 AFAR); one six-howitzer 105-mm battery; and two mortar batteries, each with four 120-mm mortars crewed by Field Artillerymen.

The enemy, theater and mission were challenging for the paratroopers of the Gun Devil Battalion. The dispersed and elusive enemy, the distances between units of up to 300 kilometers and the mission required Redlegs to operate in an extremely decentralized mode.

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As frustrating as this decentralization was for the senior leaders of the battalion, battery leaders and fire supporters found it both demanding and rewarding. Operating in a nontraditional and equally nondoctrinal manner for many missions demonstrated the flexibility of the artillery and our junior leaders.

More importantly, OEF III could be a glimpse of the future of the light artillery in support of distributed, noncontiguous operations. This article provides lessons learned in Afghanistan and notes the missions and capabilities the artillery must have to remain relevant in the low-intensity fight.

Organization for Combat. 3-319 AFAR deployed to Afghanistan as a hybrid battalion composed of a tactical command post/administration and logistics operations center (TAC/ALOC) element, two mortar batteries, a countermortar radar (Q-36) section and an understrength M119A2 105-mm howitzer battery. A total of 280 personnel of the authorized battalion strength of 449 (including fire supporters) deployed.

Due to a theater-level force constraint, 40 percent of our assigned strength and 12 howitzers were left behind at Fort Bragg along with the battalion executive officer (XO) and headquarters and services battery (HSB) commander.

The battalion's organization was a legacy of previous rotations. We relieved the 1-319 AFAR. Its organization for combat, in turn, was based on experiences during OEF I. The Rakkasan Brigade Task Force (TF) from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) deployed with its forward observers (FOs) and organic mortars, leaving its DS artillery battalion behind at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

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During OEF II when the 82d Airborne Division assumed the mission in July 2002, deploying artillery support was a "tough sell" and, consequently, low in the competing demands for airlift space into theater. A rough compromise was established: our sister battalion deployed one six-howitzer firing battery with crews for four sections and two firing batteries, each with four 120-mm mortars. The mortar batteries deployed as additional mortar platoons under the infantry battalion TFs. This was a last-minute compromise to get firing assets into the fight. A special mobile training team (MTT) from the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, trained Redlegs on the mortars.

Our battalion followed the legacy organization and fell in on the equipment in theater but brought a more robust personnel structure and a TAC and skeleton ALOC for our headquarters. (See Figure 1.)

Our experiences at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, before deploying were invaluable; that rotation forced us to increase the number of personnel within the mortar battery to be able to operate autonomously. The 26 personnel allocated an infantry battalion mortar platoon that is organic to the infantry headquarters company (the model we organized around), was not enough to allow the battery to take care of itself during most operations. After the JRTC rotation, we expanded the mortar battery to 35 personnel.

Much of our headquarters battery and four complete gun sections remained at Fort Bragg along with all of our heavier transport trucks.

A look at the numbers deployed tells the story of capability provided at a price. Stripped of most of our headquarters, the battalion could not sustain itself in the field and, as a consequence, had to set up headquarters permanently on Kandahar Airfield. The TAC/ALOC became the logistical hub for FA operations throughout southeastern Afghanistan during OEF III. We deployed the S3 and an assistant S3 along with small numbers of other staff sections to support our batteries while based in fixed locations. (See the map in Figure 2.)

While we retained the ability to move a TAC to the field for operations, logistically we could not sustain a field headquarters for any length of time. Our ammunition platoon did not deploy from Fort Bragg, leaving all ammunition operations to the ammunition platoon sergeant at Kandahar and an ad hoc detail whenever 105-mm and 120-mm ammo was needed.

Our ability to move paratroopers, guns or ammunition was limited to what aircraft the brigade could allot. Essentially, this made the artillery battalion headquarters' mission one of support vice command and control ([C.sup.2]) for the duration of the deployment. The FA battalion headquarters served as a force provider, not a [C.sup.2] node. Because of these limitations, we never deployed an FA TAC out on an operation while in country.

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Our 120-mm batteries were manned by howitzer crews from two firing batteries who had been trained on the standard M120 120-mm mortar fielded to mechanized infantry battalions. This weapon is a fine addition to the firepower of an infantry TF with its increased range of 7,200 meters and significant firepower, but it is a step in the wrong direction for the artillery.

Still, our crews were able to master the weapons drill easily, and the system's portability (approximately 400 pounds) made it a choice indirect weapon for lift-constrained air assaults. Our paratroopers did a magnificent job of manning the systems during many operations, and our infantry companies grew attached to their responsiveness and firepower, but the weapon is just a larger variant of the other mortars already available to infantry battalions. Our experience was that an organic infantry mortar platoon already does this job well; there is no need for FA to take over the role.

For firepower and range, the M119A2 was more than the M120's match, except in weight. We chose the 105-mm howitzer when we needed range, lethality and the most accuracy.

A small but significant portion of the battalion's leadership was tied up with the mission as the airfield support TF (ASTF). The battalion commander served as the ASTF commander and was assisted by the battalion command sergeant major. Essentially, the ASTF was the garrison staff for the Kandahar Airfield, providing installation-level management for the day-to-day activities and freeing the brigade commander to focus on combat operations. This responsibility required approximately 70 percent of the FA battalion commander's time. Targeting boards, mission analysis or other parts of the military decision-making process (MDMP)--even rehearsals--often competed with ASTF demands.

FA Operations. Our operations in Afghanistan were in three categories: large operations (TF-plus); firebase or forward operating base (FOB) support (Shkin, Orgun-e, Asadabad and FOB Salerno); and logistical support (via helicopters) from fixed installations (either Kandahar or Bagram). These operations were conducted with minimum essential equipment and, for artillery operations at least, below modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) strength. The primary limiting factor was the number of rotary-wing aircraft available to support either long-term operations in a province or routine life support at the particular firebase.

Major Combat Operations. During eight months in Afghanistan, Combined Task Force (CTF) Devil conducted more than 18 major operations of various durations: from 10 hours to three weeks. During this flurry of constant combat operations, 3-319 AFAR supported missions with a wide variety of assets inserted into the operation by ground assault convoy (GAC) or air assault. Often a combination of both was used.

Because the FA battalion could not support itself in the field and usually could not justify the space on aircraft during an air assault, 3-319 FAR began attaching assets DS to maneuver battalions. Most of these operations were a single battalion fight with some brigade direction with little need for an FA TAC. The fire support officers (FSOs) learned to step up and perform some of the basic [C.sup.2] functions for the firing unit, and our commanders and XOs learned to work within a maneuver battalion.

During early operations in January and February 2003, such as Operation Mongoose, we inserted a pair of 120-mm mortars by air into the Adi Gahr mountain range 50 kilometers southeast of Kandahar Airfield and supported cave clearance operations. We soon learned that air assaulting mortars with ammo and a single gator for transport into the area of operations (AO) was insufficient to support the maneuver force or to reposition without outside help.

During overall operations, the firing elements grew enough to be effective in support of the force. However, the altitude and weather often forced us to choose different methods of getting mortars and howitzers into and out of the fight.

For example, during Operation Viper in February and March, we inserted a two-gun package of howitzers and a two-gun mortar platoon to support the clearance of the Baghran and Baghni valleys 100 kilometers northwest of Kana. The mortars air assaulted in with a pair of gators, and the howitzers with their prime movers were loaded internally into CH-47Ds (Chinooks) and inserted into the AO. Due to constant moves along these tough valleys in the Helmand Province, C Battery (105-mm) had trouble maintaining the pace of the anti-tank company ground movement and other air assault assets; the large amount of howitzer ammunition had overloaded the trucks (we only brought two). The B Battery platoon of mortars also experienced difficulty in repositioning with just gators for transport and had to rely on help from the maneuver battalion's supply and transport (S & T) platoon.

After Operation Viper, we slung the howitzers out of the operation under UH-60L Blackhawks and ground assault convoyed the prime movers out of the valley and back to Kuwait Air Base several hundred kilometers away.

For a few operations, we deployed a full battery of mortars and a battery (-) of howitzers, but the standard package for long-distance operations became 120-mm mortars and a two-gun howitzer package.

Despite the large number of operations, firing was limited. Overwhelming firepower and force on the ground occasionally yielded large caches of ammunition and equipment but little contact with the enemy. Emergency resupply was prepositioned either at an intermediate firebase or at Kandahar, but an emergency never arose during our time in theater.

Most of the M119 missions were either presence illumination or show-of-force high-explosive (HE) missions to demonstrate resolve to a sometimes recalcitrant local population.

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Firebase Support. For most of our tour in Afghanistan, the majority of our firing units were stationed at firebases throughout the country, providing fires in support of maneuver forces, Special Forces or other government agencies (OGAs). At times during the spring and summer, we had mortars or artillery stationed at Firebases Shkin and Orgune on the Pakistani border in support of 3-504 PIR and Special Forces, a battery supporting operations at FOB Salerno just north of Khowst for a few months and mortars supporting 2-505 PIR at Asadabad in Kunar Province near the Pakistan border.

During our rotation, two Q-36 Fire-finder radars were positioned at the various firebases to mitigate the indirect threat from 107-mm rockets launched by either BM-12 (Type 63) and BM-1 systems or simply propped on a rock or angle iron and detonated by timer. Rockets were the most common threat and pattern analysis was key to determining a launching pattern and our vulnerable times, although casualties due to rockets were nonexistent during our deployment. When a radar and howitzers were stationed at a vulnerable base, they reduced the rocket attacks significantly.

At Shkin Firebase in particular, the infantry TF faced a multi-faceted threat of anti-Coalition militant (ACM) ambushes, mines and the ever-popular rocket attacks. Most of our contacts and casualties came from attacks at Shkin with the ACMs quickly filtering across the Pakistani border to attack a patrol or launch rockets and moving quickly back to their sanctuary with relative impunity.

After a particularly bad ambush in April, the TF applied a combined arms approach to the contacts and rocket attacks during the spring and early summer. The enemy suddenly discovered the superiority of our infantry when combined with accurate indirect fires. Every contact thereafter was treated to a good mix of infantry, both mounted and dismounted, and a healthy portion of HE rounds from the 105-mm howitzers. ACM attacks tapered off after a number of rough contacts.

But not all of our infantry companies had this combined arms experience at the hottest firebases, and some bad lessons persisted. Continuing to stress combined arms warfare to our young company commanders and platoon leaders in all training and operations is an absolute must. As the Chief of Infantry Major General Paul D. Eaton said in an interview, "the first thing we [infantrymen] need to do is call for indirect fire ... by reflex" ["Indirect Fires First--The American Way of War," July-August 2003].

The bottom line: we need to fight as a combined arms team.

Logistical Operations. Everything logistical in Afghanistan was by fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft. Combined Joint Task Force-180 (CJTF-180) supported the various firebases throughout the AO by using a series of resupply rings with resupply conducted by helicopters.

Each firebase was supported with mail, ammunition and perishables based on color-coded rings flown by CH-47Ds or UH-60Ls out of either Kandahar or Bagram. All FA resupply operations hinged on these ring aircraft, considering how far apart firebases were from each other and from Kandahar. Items for firebase support either waited for the regularly scheduled ring or, if important enough, were flown in on a separate mission request.

For major operations, the prepositioning of systems and infantrymen began weeks beforehand and required great thought and coordination. Emergency resupply requests bumped other lower priority cargo off the ring aircraft but rarely rated a separate mission. On only three occasions in eight months did the artillery rate a special air mission request: one for emplacing howitzers and the Q-36 at a threatened firebase and two for emergency howitzer ammunition resupplies during critical contacts. Everything else rode out to the firebases by the rings or did not go at all. We were totally dependent on the ring system of resupply.

Impact and Issues. Operations supporting OEF III raised several important issues. In our combat experience in Afghanistan, too much of the light community has learned that it's easy to leave the FA behind.

Deploy with all assigned equipment and personnel. Having a cap placed on the number of soldiers deployed on a mission has a definite impact on operations. Instead of stating a desired capability, the Army has listed the number of personnel allowable and then figured out what missions can be accomplished within that strength. If the assets deployed are too low, this assumes the enemy won't fight or influence friendly actions.

An example of this in Afghanistan was placing a limit on the number of cannon crewmembers. MTOE strength for an M119 crew is seven. The Gun Devils could bring only six-man crews for our howitzers. While occupying FOB Salerno, C Battery not only was responsible for manning howitzers, but also for manning guard towers that surrounded their portion of the perimeter. With the addition of a few more details, crewmembers were being pulled away from their guns.

This is significant when you add in the task of maintaining a "hot platoon" for 24-hour operations or when missions demanded a two-gun package to support a maneuver operation. Attimes, degraded gun crews were down to four men.

At Fort Bragg or the Combat Training Centers (CTCs), we don't train that way. We need to deploy just as we train--with all our troops and equipment.

Light artillery units need to stay light. Our howitzers need to be light enough to be slung by UH-60Ls or internally loaded or slung by CH-47Ds. Lack of lift aircraft often prevented the Gun Devils from getting howitzers into the fight in Afghanistan while a lighter system was employed, which may or may not have been the best system for the specific mission.

As the weather in Afghanistan warmed and missions were conducted at high elevations, the lift capacity of rotarywing aircraft diminished. The road network throughout Afghanistan is extremely poor with streambeds often passing for trails. Large vehicles had a difficult time negotiating the narrow streets, tight turns and the often remarkably tough terrain. Our systems must be prepared to insert into such a theater, one way or another.

We need long-haul communications. This deficiency had a significant impact on how the battalion prosecuted the fight in country. The Gun Devils had crews of 120-mm and 105-mm sections several hundred kilometers away from the battalion tactical operations center (TOC) with very limited and, in some cases, no communications. Communication was through digital non-secure voice telephone (DNVT), secure Internet protocol net (SIPRNET), my Internet relay chat (MIRC), Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBC[B.sup.2]) or Iridium phones.

Practically speaking, the battalion couldn't command and control its assets and had to rely on reports from fire supporters in the infantry battalions for ammunition resupply and other information. This is not a good way to integrate into the combined arms team.

Junior leaders can do the job. Afghanistan taught us that our junior leaders can handle the tough missions. Lieutenants, young sergeants and our enlisted soldiers demonstrated competencies and talents that are often unappreciated, over supervised or neglected in garrison. Battery XOs were often in charge of a platoon of guns at a remote firebase or operated as the senior artillerymen supporting a maneuver operation with no oversight by the battalion or battery commanders. Specialists and privates first class served as platoon forward observers (FOs) with great results. These young Redlegs stepped up and met challenges head-on.

Senior leaders Armywide need to challenge soldiers by giving them more responsibilities and less micro-management. All they need is the intent and some guidance with follow up.

We need more enlisted tactical air controllers (ETACs). During OEF II, TF Panther had approximately nine ETAC teams. When CTF Devil assumed the mission in January, only six ETAC teams were on hand along with their brigade air liaison officer (BALO) and air liaison officers (ALOs). This package is a standard brigade tactical air control party (TACP), but we rarely see it outside of combat.

For example, at a JRTC rotation in September 2002, our brigade only had the BALO and a single ETAC team. With robust deployments to Kuwait for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), we had lost some of our TACP assets.

Our TACP professionals were excellent, but there were not enough of them. During a major operation, planners usually allotted an ETAC to each of three maneuver companies with the BALO at the battalion TOC. Once the routine firebase ETAC support was added, we ran out of ETACs before we ran out of missions. Additionally, two ETACs always supported the quick reaction force (QRF) at Kandahar and Bagram, further limiting the number of forward air controller-qualified personnel.

As several recent interviews, columns and articles have stated, in the short term, we must train fire supporters to serve as terminal controllers for emergency close air support (ECAS) and, in the long term, train them as universal observers to control joint fires as a supplement to ETACs. The second part of the solution is to provide company fire support teams (FISTs) at least one AN/PRC-117F for long-distance communications with aircraft and as an additional satellite capability.

We need precision-guided munitions. We need precision-guided munitions for our lightweight cannons to restrict collateral damage and protect populated areas--considering the rules of engagement (ROE) we face in modern combat scenarios.

At Firebase Orgun-e, the enemy launched multiple rockets at Coalition Forces that could not engage him because the launch sites were in populated areas. A global positioning system (GPS)-guided projectile for our light howitzers using targeting information from a Q-36 would have been effective.

Army Airspace Command and Control ([A.sup.2][C.sup.2]). While we were in Afghanistan, [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] for simultaneous execution of air and artillery missions was not executed, mainly by choice. During many operations, due to the lack of enemy opposition, maneuver forces and Army aviation chose the easy way to deconflict airspace: either guns shoot or aviation flies, one at a time.

In home station training and at the CTCs, [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] is not a challenge because of the restrictive safety regulations and the inability to replicate complexities. Aircraft follow their routes and stay away from the gun-target line, attack aviation stays in its battle positions and all players know and understand the maximum ordinate for indirect systems, especially in a scripted live-fire exercise.

The problem is that the control measures and "range" regulations in training don't exist in a combat zone. Early in OEF III, indirect fire was shut down to execute an air assault or allow a [C.sup.2] aircraft to land because we did not set up procedures to facilitate those joint operations.

After a while we developed [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] deconfliction matrices as a goal for the FSO and aviation elements to deconflict airspace other than by altitude or formal and informal airspace control areas (ACAs).

Each FSO also carried a quick-reference card with the maximum ordinate of each type of round by charge (Figure 3), so with the ETAC, he could determine the mean sea level (MSL) altitude above which to keep fixed-wing. The FSO overlaid the matrix on his map to help keep the firing assets and Army and Air Force aircraft separated.

The high elevation we operated at in Afghanistan made this critical as FSOs had to clear all fires above 10,000 feet MSL through the USAF TACP. We operated at 7,000 feet elevation for long periods of time; that, in effect, meant all indirect fires had to be cleared through the Air Force. Careful planning was necessary to set the preconditions for this type of coordination; early on, it was either not done or not done well.

Another part of the problem was that pre-assault fires were not used because of ROE considerations (identify the hostile intent before engaging the target) and the fact that our maneuver elements never encountered a hot landing zone (LZ). We attribute the latter to the amount of friendly combat power incoming during major operations--we had no need to fire in conjunction with an air assault. Therefore, there was no pressing need to deconflict air and artillery.

These procedures and restrictions could teach maneuver commanders they cannot use or don't need to use artillery in conjunction with aviation--the wrong lesson to impart. Future conflicts may not present as many cold LZs as OEF III did.

Although conditions have changed with the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) Artillery (minus) out of Fort Drum, New York, now supporting operations in Afghanistan, we can learn from OEF III. We must ensure we continue to improve indirect fire operations for all allied and US servicemen in demanding theaters, such as Afghanistan. First, we must train as we fight--be prepared to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of conflict.

3-319 AFAR did provide critical fire support, and the timely fires of our Gun Devils saved soldiers lives. But we did not set our Infantry brethren up for success as well as we could have.

            Max Range     Max Ord Low     Min Range     Max Ord High
Ammo        (Meters)   (Meters)   (Feet)  (Meters)    (Meters)   (Feet)

HE (M1)
Chg 1        3,500       591      2,000     2,500      1,723      5,700
Chg 2        4,000       642      2,200     2,500      2,077      6,900
Chg 3        5,000       931      3,100     3,000      2,526      8,400
Chg 4        6,000     1,018      3,400     3,500      3,161     10,500
Chg 5        8,000     1,792      6,000     4,000      4,076     13,500
Chg 6        9,500     2,431      8,100     5,000      4,924     16,300
Chg 7       11,000     2,346      7,800     6,000      6,198     20,500

HE (M760)
Chg 8       13,500     3,210     10,600*

RAP (M913)
Chg7/RO     20,000     7,129     23,600    11,500     12,330     40,700

*Combat Emergency Situation Only

Legend:   Chg = Charge          Max = Maximum          RO = Rocket On
          FT = Firing Table     Min = Minimum
          HE = High Explosive   RAP = Rocket-Assisted Projectile

Figure 3: Maximum Ordinate Cheat Sheet for the 105-mm Howitzer. All data
was extracted from "Firing Table (FT) 105-AS Table G."

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis D. Tewksbury commands the 3d Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment (3-319 AFAR), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, which redeployed in August from Operation Enduring Freedom III (OEF III) in Afghanistan. His previous assignments include serving as the Executive Officer to the Vice Director of the Joint Staff at the Pentagon and as Assistant Fire Support Coordinator (AFSCCOORD) for the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) at Fort Drum, New York. Also at Fort Drum, he was the S3 for 2-15 FA. In other assignments with the 82d Division, he was the S4, Commander of Headquarters and Services Battery and a Battalion Fire Support Officer (FSO), all with 1-319 AFAR. He holds a Master of Administration from Central Michigan University.

Major Joel E. Hamby is the S3 of 3-319 AFAR at Fort Bragg. He served as both the Combined Task Force Devil FSO and 3-319 AFAR S3 during OEF III in Afghanistan. In previous assignments, he was the Brigade FSO for the 1st Brigade, 504th Parachute Infantry Brigade, 82d Division; Fire Support Observer/Controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana; and Commander of B/1-320 FAR, 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Also in the 101st Division, he was an Aviation Battalion FSO, Battalion S2 and Company FSO. He holds a Master of Arts in Liberal Arts from Louisiana State University and a Master of Military Studies from the Marine Corps University at Quantico, Virginia.

By Lieutenant Colonel Dennis D. Tewksbury and Major Joel E. Hamby