Deadly force: a 20-year study of fatal encounters. (Research Forum).

Around 9:45 p.m. on a late August evening, neighbors in a small rural Minnesota town called police to report that a 42-year-old former patient of a mental facility who lived with his 75-year-old father was indiscriminately firing shots. Attempts to negotiate with him to come out of the house lasted over 3 hours. The father eventually exited the residence and told officers that he would go back in and get his son. As a deputy rushed forward to escort the father to safety, the son turned on a doorway light and suddenly appeared. He shot the deputy twice with a .357-caliber revolver from a distance of 1 to 2 feet. Two officers returned fire, killing the man at the scene. Although wearing body armor, the deputy died later from one round that struck him below the vest.

This actual incident illustrates two events that law enforcement officers never want to experience--attending the funeral of a fellow officer and taking the life of a person while acting in their official capacity. While losing a fellow officer is a heartrending tragedy, causing the death of someone often has equally devastating consequences. When a shooting results in the death of a citizen, emotions erupt from the community, media, the victim's family, and the law enforcement profession. People take sides, and everyone seems to have an opinion. While officers have the responsibility to protect members of society and swear an oath to carry out their duties, occasionally, they must resort to the use of deadly force when circumstances call for it. At that time, often within a split second, officers must draw upon their experience and training, in many different disciplines, to make the right choice. That quick decision may result in years of criminal or civil legal proceedings and forever alter the officers w ho found it necessary to use deadly force.

METHODOLOGY

During the 20-year period of 1981-2000, the state of Minnesota experienced 78 incidents where officers, while acting in their official capacity, used deadly force that resulted in the deaths of 80 citizens. The author personally interviewed many of the officers in those incidents to obtain their rank, experience, caliber of firearm, and firearm training requirements, along with the type of weapon used by the offender and the impact of the investigation following the incident. The author also reviewed investigative files and photographs, as well as media reports, to determine--

* the feelings and needs of the officers involved in such acts;

* the conditions, such as time of day or officer assignment, that increase the possibility of the need to use deadly force;

* better methods to prepare officers through training for such an event; and

* the relationship between the assignment, experience, training, age, and sex of the officers involved in such incidents.

Officer Composition

The study was restricted to peace officers in Minnesota. In 2000, Minnesota had 8,949 sworn officers: 8,125 males and 824 females. (1) Information in the study related to the small population of 148 officers (six officers were involved in two separate shootings) who fired weapons during those 20 years at 80 individuals who subsequently died.

Term Definitions

For purposes of the study, deadly force relates to the force that an actor uses with the purpose of causing, or that the actor should reasonably know creates a substantial risk of causing, death or great bodily harm. The intentional discharge of a firearm in the direction of another person, or at a vehicle in which another person is believed to be, constitutes deadly force. (2) Peace officer describes an employee or elected or appointed official of a political subdivision or law enforcement agency who is licensed by the board and charged with the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of the general criminal laws of the state who has the full powers of arrest, including the Minnesota State Police, agents of the Division of Alcohol and Gambling Enforcement, state conservation officers, metropolitan transit police officers, and the Department of Corrections' Fugitive Apprehension Unit officers. (3) Great bodily harm denotes bodily injury that creates a high probability of death or causes serious permanent disfigurement, a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or other serious bodily harm. (4) Reasonable refers to any action that is fair, proper, just, moderate, or suitable under the circumstances. (5) Firearm means a weapon, especially a pistol or rifle, capable of firing a projectile and using an explosive as a propellant. (6)

OVERVIEW OF OFFICERS INVOLVED

The research determined that 140 male officers and 8 female officers fired weapons during incidents that resulted in the deaths of 80 individuals. Three officers were off duty, but in uniform, when the incidents occurred. One female officer and one male officer were providing security at private business establishments. The third off-duty officer, a male, was in his personal vehicle when an individual ran past shooting at other people. The shooter turned his weapon toward the officer, who immediately shot and killed the suspect.

One hundred thirty-seven of the officers involved were Caucasians, five were African-Americans, two American Indians, two Asians, and two Hispanics. The average age was 34 years and 11 months. The oldest officer was 59, and two at age 23 were the youngest. The age of 28 was the most frequent, with 15 officers at that age, followed by 14 officers at age 33.

Level of Experience

The experience level of the officers proved significant. Most of the officers were not "rookies." The average experience at the time of the event was just under 10 years, including law enforcement experience in other states or in the military police. However, one officer had only 5 days on the job, while another had only 4 months, but had been a community service officer with the same agency for 3 years. Two officers, with 30 years each, had the most experience.

Type of Assignment

Uniform patrol represented the overwhelming type of assignment of the officers. However, a variety of other assignments also occurred. Four officers were assigned to a moving surveillance of convenience stores when a robbery occurred. A high-speed chase resulted, and all of the officers fired their weapons. One perpetrator was killed, and the other was wounded. While serving civil papers at a financial institution, another officer encountered an armed individual on parole for bank robbery. One officer purported to be a pizza deliveryman in an attempt to gain access for a search warrant to a residence where narcotics were sold. When the "doorman" at the residence displayed a weapon, the officer shot and killed him. An officer involved in a decoy role accidentally fired his weapon during an arrest of a man who had committed a felony. In another incident, a detective was eating lunch when a citizen came running into the restaurant and announced a robbery at a nearby bank. The robber shot at the officer who retu rned fire, killing the subject. Another bank robber led officers on a long, high-speed chase. Throughout the chase and subsequent encounter, six officers from four different agencies fired at the robber.

Only one tactical team was involved in a fatal shooting from 1981-1990. During the last 10-year period, tactical teams were involved in seven shootings. Two of these were regional-type teams that responded to specific incidents.

Agency Breakdown

Of those involved in fatal shootings, police departments employed 122 of the officers, whereas 22 were sheriff deputies. Three Minnesota State Patrol officers and one officer from the Department of Natural Resources fired their weapons. One hundred eighteen of the officers involved came from the 7-county Minneapolis/St. Paul metropolitan area. Larger organizations, specifically the Minneapolis and St. Paul Police Departments, had a higher frequency of shootings. Just over one-half, 79 officers, were with departments employing more than 100 officers.

Weapons Used

During the years covered by the study, Minnesota peace officers routinely used three types of weapons in the performance of their duties--a revolver, a semiautomatic handgun, and a shoulder-type weapon. The standard weapon into the mid-1980s was the .38- or .357-caliber revolver. Later, the semiautomatic handgun gained popularity and now constitutes the issued weapon for almost all departments. Initially, the 9-millimeter was the most common; however, more recently, some departments have begun using .40- and .45-caliber handguns. The typical shoulder weapon, a .12-gauge shotgun loaded with 00 buckshot, was employed in all except one shotgun shooting, where rifle ammunition was used in the shotgun. Additionally, tactical teams used 9-millimeter shoulder-type weapons. However, one officer on a tactical team used a .308-caliber sniper rifle to shoot a person wanted for an armed robbery after a prolonged barricade incident, and a deputy fired a .223-caliber rifle during another shooting. Three officers changed w eapons during incidents. In two situations, officers had difficulty ejecting spent rounds from shotguns and changed weapons. The third officer changed weapons after firing all of the rounds from his shotgun.

Extent of Firearms Training

Familiarity with the weapon did not appear to pose a problem with any shooting. Only the two incidents involving a shotgun revealed a problem with the weapon not functioning properly. That problem entailed ejecting the spent shell and appeared related to the stress of the incident. Two accidental discharges of weapons resulted in death. One involved a shotgun used in a decoy type of assignment, and the other occurred when the officer slipped on a wet running board climbing into a stolen truck.

Most agencies were very prudent with firearms training. Over one-half of the officers interviewed had trained with their weapons within 2 months of the shootings. One officer had trained approximately 36 hours before the event, while another officer had not fired his weapon for over a year. Most agencies required their officers to qualify with their weapons quarterly, whereas a few agencies stipulated that their officers shoot every 2 months. Also, most departments had some form of decision-based, or "shoot/ don't shoot," training.

Number of Officer Casualties

One officer lost his life during the incident described at the beginning of this article. In addition, one officer fatally shot an individual who had killed an officer from a nearby jurisdiction approximately 2 hours earlier during a traffic stop.

Six officers involved in shootings were physically injured. One officer had glass and lead fragments hit him, and another had minor glass cuts. Only one of these officers required medical attention at a hospital. An officer from the Minneapolis Police Department suffered a serious physical injury when he was stabbed twice in the neck from behind before shooting his assailant. He recovered and later returned to duty. Assailants who later were killed injured three St. Paul officers. On one occasion, the assailant wrestled an officer's weapon away from him and shot one officer in the foot and another officer, wearing a ballistic vest, in the chest. The officer shot in the chest grabbed the cylinder of the revolver so it could not turn. The officer who had lost the weapon regained possession at that point and fatally shot the offender. A man shot another St. Paul officer in the hand and chest with a .45-caliber handgun. The officer managed to return six shots that killed the individual. An innocent bystander sta nding behind the officer was hit in the leg by one shot from the assailant. All of the injured St. Paul officers recovered and returned to work.

CONDITIONS AT THE SCENE

Research showed that several factors influenced conditions at the scene of the shootings. These included the demographics of the individuals slain and the weapons they brandished, the number of officers involved, and the dates and times that the shootings occurred.

Demographics of Individuals Slain

Officers shot 50 Caucasian and 18 African-American individuals. The remaining 12 consisted of 5 Native Americans, 5 Asians, 1 Cuban, and 1 Iranian. The average age of those killed was 32 years and 8 months. Two individuals at 13 years of age (the same incident) were the youngest, and the two oldest were 65 years old.

Weapons Brandished

Officers faced a variety of weapons. Forty-two suspects confronted officers with firearms--34 used handguns and 8 employed shoulder-type weapons. Twenty suspects wielded knives or edged weapons, and four utilized vehicles as weapons. In addition, two officers shot two suspects accidentally. A most significant part of the research revealed that, because some of the shootings took place in poorly lighted areas, 21 officers shot 12 suspects who appeared armed with deadly devices, such as handguns, knives, or other lethal weapons.

This last category raises important questions that the criminal justice community must consider. Can officers afford to wait for suspects who appear armed when in actuality they are wielding a nonlethal replica weapon, pellet gun, starter's pistol, or paint gun? Can officers, who have to react in a split second, wait for individuals charging them with a knife, screwdriver, pry bar, or other type of instrument that appears to them as a lethal weapon? What should officers do when a person drives a vehicle, a very large and dangerous weapon, at them? How can officers know the mental state or purposeful intentions of the driver? Further research into these deadly situations must be conducted to discover ways to help officers who find themselves in these circumstances.

Conversely, examples of incidents where individuals were armed with more than one weapon or showed considerable intent to harm the officers involved included one suspect who pointed a shotgun at officers and was shot, but then pulled a handgun. Two individuals, one in rural Minnesota and one during a metropolitan area bank robbery, used .223-caliber rifles to begin shooting at officers and then changed to 9-millimeter handguns. Two individuals were shot when they attempted to obtain officers' service weapons. One succeeded and shot two officers; however, the weapon was retrieved and used to fatally shoot the person. Another took an officer's handgun, but was shot by that officer, using his shotgun, and aided by two other officers. These situations illustrate the need for officers to remain vigilant in the performance of their duties to ensure the safety of the citizens they serve and themselves as well.

Number of Officers

The number of officers at the shooting scene varied somewhat; however, just over one-half of the incidents (40 of the 78) had only one officer firing a weapon. Two separate events occurred where only one officer shot a weapon and two individuals died. Twenty-two situations involved two officers firing their weapons; seven incidents had three officers; and five had four officers. Two incidents involved five officers, and the remaining two had six officers firing their weapons.

Dates and Times

The day of the week with the most shootings represented an interesting finding. Wednesday had the most shootings with 24. Saturday, Sunday, and Monday each had 10 shootings. One officer commented that he believed that Wednesday was high because most burglars and armed robbers commit their deeds during the week and usually at night. Most know that weekends have more officers on duty for the heavier number of calls into neighborhoods for parties and domestic disputes. Burglars and robbers do not want officers accidentally coming across them during their illegal activity. Wednesday also represented the day of the week with the second highest number of officers killed due to criminal action (108) for the 10-year period, 1990-1999. Friday was first with only two more officers (110) killed. (7)

The time of day, however, proved unsurprising. Twenty-six of the shootings, just under one-third, occurred during the 4-hour period from midnight to 4 a.m. With the addition of the 4 hours before midnight, over one-half of the shootings occurred during that 8-hour time period. This also was consistent with the time of day when most felonious line-of-duty officer deaths occurred. (8)

POSTSHOOTING ANALYSIS

Of course, every case was classified as a homicide and investigated thoroughly. Usually, the larger departments, such as those in Minneapolis and Saint Paul, had their respective homicide units investigate the shootings. In 1999, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA), the investigative branch of the Minnesota attorney general, investigated two shootings by the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD). The Hennepin County Sheriffs Department investigated two shootings by MPD in the city of Minneapolis in 2000. One MPD shooting in 2000 occurred in Saint Paul, and the Saint Paul Police Department's Homicide Unit investigated that case. Smaller police departments typically had the BCA and the residing county sheriff conduct the shooting investigation. Sheriffs departments had the BCA investigate. When requested, the FBI conducted a separate investigation to determine whether a civil rights violation occurred. Additionally, every case in the 7-county metropolitan area went to a grand jury proceeding, wit h no charges being brought against any officer. Many prosecuting attorneys in counties outside the metropolitan area routinely decline prosecution without grand jury participation. Some families of deceased individuals received civil awards. Three cases went to trial with no money being awarded.

Officer Reaction

Most officers felt that they were well prepared tactically for the shooting. By contrast, the majority of officers commented that they were not prepared for the psychological impact upon themselves, their families, and their departments after the event. Most officers believed that fellow officers supported them after the shootings; however, some were upset at the administrators of their departments. Those few officers thought that the administrators were worried more about the image of their departments than the wellbeing of their officers. Some officers described "flashbacks" on occasions where they responded to a similar situation or when they drove past the location where the incident occurred.

One officer stated that he was very satisfied with his agency. He was given a different weapon, completed his interview with representation, donated mandatory blood samples, received explanations of administrative procedures, and had his fiance brought to the office--all within 2 hours of the incident. Officers from other jurisdictions in the same shooting told him later that it took their agencies most of the day to sort out everything. It was a complete opposite and negative event for them.

Six of the officers were in two different fatal shootings. One officer was in his second shooting 16 years after the first one. One officer was at a different agency 5 years after the first shooting. During the second event, he and another officer fired simultaneously at a man who had just killed his mother and stabbed his father. One of the officers in a shooting death in the 1980s recently commented, "I'd quit [law enforcement] if I had another fatal shooting."

Other than through retirement, seven of the officers left the law enforcement profession. One officer began a new career in a field that he had worked in part time prior to the shooting. Two officers had to leave as existing medical conditions became worse and made them unable to continue in law enforcement. Another officer left a department in a dispute over a separate matter. Four officers (three males and one female) quit as a direct result of the shooting incident. Two of the four continued working for a period of time before leaving their agency. In addition to these seven officers, one officer later died of a heart attack while on duty.

Suicide by Cop 

The exact number of deaths through suicide by cop, or officer-precipitated suicide, proved somewhat difficult to determine. Some were rather obvious--the person who had given his son a suicide note when he released him and had no live rounds in his weapon. Others, however, remained enigmatic as to whether they fit the characteristics of suicide by cop. One individual was walking down the street listening to music with headphones. He had a weapon in his hand. Witnesses called the police, and two officers confronted him. Witnesses over a block away could hear the officers yelling at him to "put the gun down." The individual walked toward a young boy and pointed the weapon at him. Officers shot and killed him. Although the weapon was an authentic-looking replica, the subsequent investigation could not determine if this was an officer-precipitated suicide. It also remained difficult to determine the motivation of someone under the influence of alcohol or other drugs who charged an officer with a knife or club wh en the officer was pointing a firearm at the attacking person. Overall, the study revealed that 17 of the 80 shootings reviewed possibly were suicide-by-cop incidents.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The author discovered several significant issues relating to the use of deadly force as a result of the study. Through personal interviews with officers involved in such situations, he established four recommendations.

First, an agency other than the department of those officers firing their weapons should investigate the fatal shootings. A large metropolitan department should have the county sheriff, state investigative agency, or another nearby large department that routinely investigates homicides conduct the investigation. This is not a reflection of competency or integrity of the officer's department, but, rather, an attempt to eliminate any question of partiality or cover-up.

Second, firearms training should include more low-light and artificial-light shooting. The officers interviewed also indicated that training scenarios of actual deadly force situations are more believable and beneficial. The use of wax or paint bullets in these scenarios allows officers to determine the effectiveness of cover and accuracy of shots fired. While computer-generated videos are excellent, a person provides a life-size target and is more realistic. This training also should include all types of weather extremes as most agencies do not train when it is raining or snowing.

Next, all officers involved in a shooting death should have one mandatory consultation with a professional counselor. Many officers expressed concern that if they asked for counseling, the word would spread among their departments that they were having "problems." The need for counseling apparently is viewed by many officers as "not being strong" or not acting "like an officer should act." Fortunately, this belief is changing. Agencies should not only provide officers with this service at no cost but also any of their family members requesting to attend.

Finally, the use of nonlethal weapons during some situations needs to increase. The development of such weapons has advanced in recent years. (9) Training and the use of such weapons should expand, especially in situations where officers confront individuals armed with weapons, such as knives or clubs, that these subjects could use in close proximity to the officers.

CONCLUSION

The use of deadly force remains an issue of great concern for the law enforcement community. This study of Minnesota peace officers offers a variety of interesting findings, some surprising and some expected. All may contribute to reducing these tragic events.

The study showed that officers in large metropolitan areas were involved in approximately 75 percent of the shooting incidents. Over two-thirds of the shootings took place outdoors. Most shootings occurred between the hours of 8 p.m. and 4 a.m., and the majority happened on a Wednesday. Having more than one officer present did not appear to deter offenders from continuing their actions. The type of weapon displayed by officers did not seem to discourage the suspects. Officers with a shoulder weapon did not have a greater effect making the person stop than those with a handgun. Officers overwhelmingly felt prepared tactically for the shooting, believing that their training with a firearm was very adequate. However, the psychological trauma following the shooting appeared the most devastating. One officer summed it up best when he said, "All officers should have training and knowledge concerning the postshooting experience. All officers need to know that when you pull that trigger, your department and family a lso are pulling it."

Number of Officers at Shooting Scene

Number of Officers         Number of  Number of Fatalities
Involved in Each Incident  Incidents    in Each Incident

6                              2               2
5                              2               2
4                              5               5
3                              7               7
2                             22              22
1 (*)                         40              42
Totals                        78              80

(*)Two separate events occurred where only one officer fired a weapon
and two individuals died.

Endnotes

(1.) Statistics obtained from the state of Minnesota POST (Police Officer Standards and Training) in St. Paul.

(2.) Minnesota Statute Annotated (M.S.A) [sections] 609.066, subd. 1, 2000.

(3.) M.S.A. [sections] 626.84, subd, 1 (c) (1), 2000.

(4.) M.S.A. [sections] 609.02, subd. 8, 2000.

(5.) Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., (1985), s.v. "reasonable."

(6.) The American College Dictionary (1997), s.v. "firearm."

(7.) U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted. 1999 (Washington, DC, 2000), 20.

(8.) Ibid., 19.

(9.) For additional information, see Ed Nowicki, "Lethal Force Options," Law and Order, September 2001, 18-20; Sid Heal, "An Evaluation of Less-Lethal Munitions," Law and Order, September 2001, 88-93; and "IACP's Less Lethal Force Options Course," Law and Order, September 2001, 95-99.

RELATED ARTICLE: Suicide by Cop

While determining some suicide-by-cop situations remains difficult, these two incidents from the study demonstrate how two individuals created confrontations with police officers to bring about their own demise.

On a hot July day, police located a 49-year-old fugitive driving his vehicle. Accompanied by his 14-year-old son, the fugitive started a chase and shot at the officers. He fled to a large warehouse where his wife worked. Police evacuated 120 employees from the building; however, the man kept his son as a hostage for 10 hours before releasing him. The boy had his father's hat, glasses, wallet, and--unknown to police at the time--a farewell letter. SWAT teams entered the building after hearing one shot. After a long search, they located the man lying on his back with his weapon, a .44-caliber revolver, in his hand resting on his chest. SWAT members yelled at the man to surrender, but received no response. Suddenly, he sat up and turned the weapon toward the officers. Five of six officers responded by shooting and killing the man. The man's weapon was empty; he had fired all of the cartridges.

A woman entered a 24-hour convenience store/gas station at 3 a.m. in mid-October. She announced a robbery to the store attendant and claimed to have a gun in a crumpled brown paper bag that she pointed toward him. Because the outline of the bag resembled a handgun, he gave her the money that she demanded. She told him to call the police and then waited to hear him report the robbery before she left the scene. Officers responded and located her a short distance away. They repeatedly asked her to drop the bag that she was pointing at them and show them her hands. She screamed words to the effect "you want to see the gun, I'll show you the gun." She charged toward an officer using a metal garbage dumpster for cover. Two officers fired, killing the 35-year-old woman who once had been a reserve officer. The brown paper bag contained a hairbrush.

Mr. Brubaker, a retired FBI special agent, currently works for a private firm in Minneapolis, Minnesota.