DOCUMENTS ON AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1937-49: Indonesia 1949.

DOCUMENTS ON AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1937-49: Indonesia 1949. Edited by David Lee. Barton (Australia): Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 1998. xxv, 673 pp. (B&W photos.) AU$117.50, cloth. ISBN 0 644 38629.

THIS, the last of three volumes, documents Australian Indonesian policy 1947-49 and contains 546 documents. Of particular interest in relation to Indonesia's current situation, the first free election in fifty-five years, and the present focus on East Timor's ties with colonial Portugal and Indonesia, they provide an indispensible account of the period that shaped Australia's engagement with the "near north." Reference biographies and "Holders of Certain Appointments" assist the reader, while photographs of the dominant players bring the period to life. Cables, aides-memoire, letters and minutes from official files give vivid impressions of the multinational officials involved. Australian T. K. Critchley, faced with an alien culture, demonstrates perspicacity and indomitable perseverence in proposing creative solutions to seemingly insoluble impasses.

The Republic of Indonesia declared its independence from the Netherlands 17 August 1945. On the signing of the Linggadati agreement, Australia recognized Republican de facto, authority over Java, Sumatra and Madura. The UN Security Council created a Committee of Good Offices after the first 1947 Dutch "police action." The January 1948 Renville Truce Agreement was terminated by the second "police action." Bent on creating more federal (puppet) states, Dutch administrators coveted Republican land and blockaded Republican ports. The army and die-hard colonials could not accept the changing situation.

At Nehru's 1949 New Delhi ministerial conference dealing with the Indonesian issue, Australian officials staunchly upheld the United Nations and influenced the Working Paper calling for an end to hostilities, withdrawal of Dutch troops from Republican territory, resumption of discussions, the formation of an interim government and the holding of elections. The Security Council's 28 January resolution called the continued occupation of Republican territory incompatible with good relations and a just and lasting settlement. It replaced the Committee of Good Offices with the UN Commission for Indonesia. Republican leaders remained sequestered on Bangka under harsh conditions, Sukarno and Hatta were not allowed to return to Djokjakarta until July. Meanwhile, the BFO (the Federal Consultative Assembly) were influenced by Republican confidence and military achievements. Mutual concessions resulted. Beel, the recalcitrant High Representative of the Crown, was unwilling to admit that the Republic was a political ent ity with forces still resisting the Dutch. Later, Lovink and Van Royen proved somewhat less difficult. Allegations of cease-fire infringements multiplied. The Committee struggled to obtain unbiased assessments from Dutch-influenced military observers, while the Australian government strove to get relief and educational supplies to Indonesians. Press control and detentions increased as deep, wide nationalism surfaced. Finally, pressure from the United States (to Asian distress, European nations declined to influence the Netherlands), and prolonged consultations about the Republican takeover, the evacuation of civilians and Dutch military, the arming of a police force and the structure of the new government led to the Hague Round Table.

In the Netherlands, the Dutch public recalled 350 years of guidance of Indonesia's development, the press emphasized Republican unreadiness to take over government, exaggerating minor clashes, and the conference proceeded at a snail's pace. Hatta, aware of the Dutch psychological problem, was eager to return home since delays at the Hague risked disillusion, increased guerrilla activity and potential reprisals. With the debt issue solved, and the resolution of the New Guinea issue postponed, the final plenary session took place 2 November. In Batavia, the Bill passed 71-29. On 27 December in Amsterdam, Hatta saw Queen Juliana sign Acts transferring sovereignty. In Batavia, Lovink's handover to the Sultan was timed to coincide. The next day, to tremendous ovations, President Sukarno took up residence at the Palace.

Georgetown University, Washington, D.C,. U.S.A.