DOCC: Sustaining Corps Deep Operations Proficiency.

The corps deep fight is the corps commander's primary fight. His ability to shape the enemy before the enemy enters the divisional areas of operations (AOs) depends on his staff's ability to plan, coordinate, synchronize, execute and assess deep operations. The high rate of personnel turnover combined with ever-improving technologies in the various battlefield operating systems (BOS) on an uncertain battlefield demands rigorous, sustained training for all members of the corps deep operations coordination cell (DOCC).

This article focuses on how III Corps determined the corps battle rhythm for deep operations; the organization and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) of Team DOCC; and the automation and technology the DOCC needed to be most effective. III Corps refined and tested its tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) for deep operations and trained Team DOCC during three major exercises in a five-month period.

According to draft FM 100-15 Corps Operations, the DOCC is not an organization. Rather, it is a cell that brings elements of the corps staff together to exchange ever-changing, pertinent information that enables the corps commander to focus his assets to accomplish his purpose for deep operations. A disciplined battle rhythm; proficient, cohesive staff members; and an organization with effective information management systems are critical.

III Corps has unique challenges. Its headquarters is at Fort Hood, Texas; its aviation brigade is in Korea; and its corps artillery is at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. This distance between key elements, combined with high personnel turnover, intensifies the need for detailed, up-to-date TACSOPs as well as rigorous training during the few times it is able to bring the entire Team DOCC together.

III Corps' participation in Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL), an exercise in Korea last December; Phantom Destroyer, a corps exercise in preparation for the 4th Infantry Division's Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Warfighter exercise; and, finally, Phantom Fighter, the 4th Division Warfighter provided opportunities to train deep operations and build on our existing TACSOPs.

III Corps Battle Rhythm. The corps deep operations battle rhythm is the centerpiece of deep operations. The battle rhythm is linked to the air tasking order (ATO) planning cycle and divisional battle rhythms. (See Figure 1.) It allows the divisions limited although adequate time to provide their input and gives the corps predictable gates for the planning and execution of phases.

Figure 2 lists the principal members of Team DOCC. Each staff element is involved in the corps' military decision-making process (MDMP), so all members understand the operational plan and generally understand how the corps commander intends to use deep operations to influence his fight.

Team DOCC's mission is to develop and synchronize the detailed plans required to execute the deep fight, using its deep operations MDMP. This begins with the Pre-Targeting Meeting.

Pre-Targeting Meeting. This meeting at 0600 is chaired by the corps artillery deputy commanding officer (DCO). He serves as the DOCC chief throughout the planning phase.

During the Pre-Targeting Meeting, the corps staff begins its intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) as applied to four separate map sets: 0 to 24 hours, 24 to 48 hours, 48 to 72 hours and 72 to 96 hours. The staff first assesses the enemy capabilities that can affect the corps and divisional areas of operations (AOs) during the current deep fight (0 to 24 hours) as well as in the next 48,72 and 96 hours.

The Pre-Targeting Meeting begins with the G2 targeting officer's assessment of the enemy situation. He includes unit locations and strengths, using predictive and confirmed battle damage assessment (BDA) and enemy courses of action (COAs). This assess phase of the continuous decide, detect, deliver and assess ([D.sup.3]A) targeting methodology is the first critical step in the next round of deep operations planning.

Additionally, Team DOCC wargames enemy COAs. It also updates the corps high-payoff target list (HPTL), the collection focus and the tasks and purposes for the current night's fight--as well as 48, 72 and 96 hours out.

The Targeting Meeting. The meeting is at 0800 and also is chaired by the corps artillery DCO. Team DOCC reviews the updated HPTL and current ATO. The ATO tells the team which deep targets were approved for attack by USAF assets, lists the approved air routes, allocates close air support (CAS) assets and lists the approved pre-planned Army tactical missile system (ATACMS) targets. This helps the team develop and wargame possible COAs and determine which HPTs they will recommend for attack, using the remaining corps assets, such as attack aviation and the multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) with its extended-range munitions.

Each division liaison officer's (LNO's) ability to articulate his division's deep operations plan is critical as the corps staff attempts to maximize the combined and often supporting effects of both the corps' aviation brigade and division deep attacks. The assignment and timing of targets and supporting assets, as well as airspace deconfliction, are essential elements of the corps' deep operations plan.

The collection manager then refines the current collection plans and develops plans to support future target acquisition and tracking requirements. Through this process, targets are selected and detection assets are allocated and employed. The DOCC is responsible for confirming and validating the collection manager's plan to detect the various HPTs.

During the Targeting Meeting, Team DOCC develops its staff recommendations on what targets to detect and how to attack those in line with the commander' s guidance and intent. The team then validates and, if necessary, refines recommendations for the current deep fight; finalizes recommendations for the next 48 hours; refines its concept for 72 hours out; and develops an initial concept for deep operations 96 hours out. This results in the deep operations decision briefing.

The Corps Commander's Decision Briefing is at 1200 and the next step in the deep operations battle rhythm. Team DOCC, led by the corps artillery commander and DCO, briefs the corps commander to review that night's deep operations and get his approval of the next 48-hour deep operations plan, the 72-hour refined concept and the 96-hour initial concept.

Team DOCC briefs weather, projected enemy and friendly situations, most significant threats, the HPTL, tasks and purposes of deep operations and the collection focus for each ATO (24, 48, 72 and 96 hours). Additionally, the team briefs specific attack plans for the first three ATOs--air interdiction (AI), CAS, artillery or attack aviation--plus electronic warfare (EW), information operations (10) and psychological operations. The 72-hour concept approval is critical as it enables Team DOCC to formally submit its ATO nominations for incorporation into the integrated tasking order (ITO), which is determined 72 hours before execution.

Synchronization Meeting. The corps artillery chief of staff chairs the Synchronization Meeting at 1500 and serves as the DOCC chief throughout the synchronization and execution phases of deep operations (detect and deliver functions of [D.sup.3]A). During the Synchronization Meeting, Team DOCC uses the relevant map boards at the decision briefing to conduct a detailed map rehearsal of the current and next day's deep operations. Each team member briefs his portion of deep operations and makes final adjustments to the deep operations synchronization matrix.

The meeting begins with the deep operations planner briefing that night's deep operations. The corps aviation brigade LNO and division LNOs then brief their deep operations and are followed by each Team DOCC member briefing how his staff element is supporting those operations.

A critical piece of this is airspace deconfliction. Corps and division air routes and deep operations are posted and briefed. The aviation brigade and division LNOs, in concert with the corps Army airspace command and control ([A.sup.2][C.sup.2]) manager, verify the corps aviation brigade and division air routes and the times the units will use the routes. Additionally, they identify potential conflicts in those cases where routes intersect. This is critical as attack times often change during execution.

If and when the deep attack times change, the DOCC coordinates the requirements for those attacks before they begin. The LNOs pass the requirements to their units, and the DOCC continues to monitor the deep operations execution to affect other coordination, as necessary.

Additionally, the EW officer (EWO) and aviation brigade LNO verify the times and locations of lethal and non-lethal suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) support.

The collection manager discusses which collection assets will be focused on which targets and how unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will support the aviation brigade route and target area reconnaissance. It is imperative that the collection manager understand the DOCC's information requirements and that the G2 targeting officer and FA intelligence officer (FAIO) can pass the information to the DOCC in real time to support the attack of designated targets.

After the Synchronization Meeting, the staff and major subordinate commands (MSCs) coordinate with their respective sections for the current deep operations plans while the executing units complete their rehearsals. The analysis and control element (ACE) is focused on producing the targeting information to support the decision to execute deep operations (target identification and UAV route reconnaissance for attack aviation units).

Once those critical information requirements (CIRs) are satisfied, the aviation brigade commander conducts a Go/No Go briefing with the corps commander or, if he is unavailable, the corps executive agent for deep operations, the corps artillery commander. There are many different formats for the Go/No Go briefing. III Corps' format focuses on identifying enemy air defenses along routes and the target area, the availability of lethal and non-lethal SEAD, target fidelity, combat power and weather limitations.

Once the corps commander approves the deep attack by corps attack aviation, the DOCC execution van is manned and prepared to monitor the execution of the deep attacks. Figure 3 on Page 14 depicts III Corps' DOCC set-up during the execution phase of deep operations.

Key Lessons Learned. During the three exercises, the III Corps DOCC learned a lot about designing information products, taking advantage of technology to upgrade automation systems and devising TTP to more responsively meet the needs of the corps commander and his staff in deep operations.

* Information Products. In the first exercise, the DOCC modified existing status boards, coordination and execution matrices and reference cards. These tools are a product of operational experience, and there is no "right" solution. Different commanders and staffs prefer different formats and have unique information requirements. The key is that new teams inevitably will go through this process; tackling the design of information products early will enable the team to get on with refining or developing deep operations TTP.

For example, our DOCC status board included a map depicting the deep attack targets on the current ITO, a list of fire support coordinating measures (FSCM); the deep attack schedule (cross-forward line of own troops, or XFLOT, and who, what, Go/NoGo in time sequence); corps artillery status of ATAGMS and extended-range MLRS shot and on hand; FA organization for combat; the corps HPTL; the corps commander's CIRs; battle rhythm time lines for Fort Hood and Korea; and the intelligence synchronization matrix.

* Automation Tools. This was another area the DOCC assessed and updated. This ranged from upgrading newer, more powerful computers and color printers to adding an all-source analysis system (ASAS) feed to give the DOCC the same operational picture the corps commander sees in his tactical command post (TAC CP).

* Maximizing Technology. Team DOCC found manually updating four sets of maps a monumental task. While maintaining the manual maps is a necessity in the event of a catastrophic power outage, the process cannot keep pace with systems such as ASAS--giving the corps commander a slightly different picture than through the DOCC.

III Corps Artillery purchased a digital projector and 100-inch screen to project the ASAS picture in the DOCC during the execution phase. This significantly improved the DOCC's ability to portray a rapidly changing battlefield in real time.

Because the corps TAC was in Korea and the corps main CP at Fort Hood, we conducted our briefings to the corps commander via secure video teleconferencing (VTC). Additionally, we passed information tools, such as the products listed for the DOCC status board, over the tactical local area network (TACLAN) by posting them to the DOCC web site. The TAG printed the information products and passed them to the corps commander at the start of each briefing.

VTC proved to be invaluable as it allowed planners to brief and answer the corps commander's questions from any location while getting his immediate guidance and decisions. Simultaneously, the corps aviation brigade and division staffs could view the decision briefing, thereby enhancing information flow throughout the corps.

* Detecting and Tracking Targets. Although not a fielded Army system, the automated deep operations coordination system (ADOCS) software was great for locating artillery formations, which were often the number one HPT. ADOCS provided the counterfire officer a picture of where enemy artillery fires were coming from by depicting rays from their points of origin to their points of impact. This enabled the counterfire officer and corps artillery G2 to provide the DOCC and aviation brigade higher quality target locations and descriptions (based on ranges and locations).

The DOCC often was able to direct UAVs over the known artillery locations to verify the type of artillery formations and pass the targeting information to the aviation brigade commander for deep attack. When attack aviation assets were not available, the DOCC was, in some cases, able to divert AI to those targets.

Team DOCC refined its TTP for detecting and tracking other deep targets as well, based on the nesting of all target collection systems. These include Q-37 Firefinder radar, UAV, the joint surveillance and target attack radar system (JSTARS), airborne reconnaissance low (ARL), long-range surveillance teams (LRSTs) and special operations forces (SOF). The result was more lethal effects in the deep fight.

* Jump-DOCC Operations. For the second exercise, Team DOCC had to conduct jump-DOCC operations at the TAC CP while the corps main moved. This training forced all team members to relook their bulky, heavy equipment and assess the best time to jump the DOCC without interrupting the corps' battle rhythm. (See Figure 4.)

Again, improved technology provided lighter flat-screen monitors, laptop computers and a compact, portable color printer. These tools enabled the jump DOCC to quickly set up and begin operations out of two standard integrated command post systems (SICPS) collocated with the TAG CP.

The jump DOCC was highly mobile and required only a couple of hours to set up and break down. The jump DOCC used many of the staff officers already located in the TAC CP to perform the duties of their counterparts in the corps main throughout the planning and execution phases. The personnel who had to move from the main CP to the TAC CP during jump operations are listed in Figure 4.

Team DOCC also determined that the best time to conduct battle handover between the DOCC and jump DOCC was immediately after the Commander's Decision Briefing or just before the next Pre-Targeting meeting. This enabled one of the shifts to set up and prepare to assume control of deep operations while the current shift sustained the corps battle rhythm. The primary consideration in determining DOCC hand-over time was battle rhythm rather than main CP movement time, providing a seamless transition.

* Briefing and Rehearsing Off Manual Maps. Using a manual map does not ensure automated systems, such as the airmobile defense warning system (AMDWS) and the advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS), have the same information. When the DOCC conducted its pre-combat checks before execution, it sometimes found air routes and FSCM absent from those databases or final refinements not yet posted.

To minimize this problem, the DOCC connected its various feeds to its monitors during the planning and synchronization meetings, thereby enabling the staff officers to display and verify the information was entered correctly before and during the synchronization meeting and Go/No Go briefings. This greatly reduced the number of instances where the staff had to enter the information at the last minute before execution.

* DOCC's ASAS Feed. The ASAS feed was a shared feed from the G3 current operations section. While this provided a better real-time picture of the battlefield, the DOCC was unable to customize the shared feed with detailed deep operations graphics it needed. Thus, the DOCC obtained its own ASAS program.

* LNOs Checklist. During the second exercise, Team DOCC developed a better checklist of information requirements from the division LNOs--especially to cover divisional changes during execution, such as a division failing to cross the FLOT at the expected time. As with corps operations, division operations often change as commanders fight the enemy, not the plan. The DOCC added periodic plan verifications to the checklist, causing the divisional LNOs to contact the divisional DOCCs to verify time lines, engagement areas and units.

* Robust [A.sup.2][C.sup.2]. Changes to the plan during execution also highlighted the need for a robust [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] cell, not only during planning and synchronization, but during execution as well. While having an aviation officer in the DOCC during execution helps, the DOCC needs a 24-hour-capable [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] cell that is fully staffed to coordinate and disseminate changes to airspace management.

* Corps Artillery G2 in the DOCC. The corps artillery G2 was in the DOCC throughout execution. This improved Team DOCC's ability to assess effects on deep targets. He managed the UAV, JSTARS and ADOCS feeds to help locate and assess targets. He was also the DOCC's executive agent for BDA and provided the DOCC chief periodical updates on target strengths. This enabled the team to re-direct attack assets against targets requiring further attrition and also let the DOCC know when it could stop servicing various targets, thereby enabling it to direct attack assets against other HPTs.

The DOCC chief worked with the ACE to develop cumulative BDA and passed that information to the planners for their use in refining the next day's deep attack plans during the Pre-Targeting Meeting. This helped close the loop in the [D.sup.3]A targeting methodology.

* DOCC-ACE Intelligence Focus Disconnects. Occasionally, in the first two exercises, the DOCC and ACE lost their combined focus during execution for a couple of reasons. As the corps met its objectives for various targets (destroy, neutralize or suppress), the DOCC did not always focus the ACE on the next target set. The ACE continued to focus valuable collection resources on the serviced target rather than on the next target. In other cases, the ACE diverted collection assets to another area of the battlefield without notifying the DOCC. The diversion was to develop intelligence on other target indicators detected during the battle. This hindered the DOCC's ability to determine whether or not to attack some of the scheduled deep targets.

During the last exercise, the DCCC designed procedures to prevent this disconnect. The corps artillery G2 reviewed his BDA with the ACE chief once he believed the corps met its objective for each deep target. Together they recommended to the DOCC chief whether or not to continue servicing that target and which target the corps should focus on next. In turn the DOCC chief passed his recommendations to the corps artillery commander who made the final determination with the G2 targeting officer and (or) the ACE chief present. This ensured the conscious and seamless transition of the corps' intelligence focus throughout the corps' deep fight.

Additionally, the G2 targeting officer and (or) the ACE chief briefed the DOCC chief on the current collection focus and his assessment of the enemy's capabilities once an hour. The DOCC chief confirmed or denied whether or not the DOCC and ACE were in synch and made adjustments at that time. This TTP proved to be extremely effective in ensuring the DOCC and ACE sustained their collective focus throughout the final exercise.

Conclusion. While the purpose of deep operations remains constant, technological improvements throughout the corps often affect the manner in which the DOCC can plan, coordinate, synchronize, execute and assess the deep fight. The speed and quantity of information can quickly overload the commander and staff unless information management systems are developed and implemented in concert with the improvements to technology.

Just as our TACSOPs will provide the framework for conducting deep operations, exercises allow the DOCC to use newer technologies to develop new information management TTP. As a result, current and future teams will be better able to preserve peace by being prepared for war.

Lieutenant General Leon J. LaPorte has been the Commanding General of the hid Armored Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, since August 1998. In his previous assignment, he served as an Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans at the Pentagon. He commanded the 1st Cavalry Division, also at Fort Hood, and, previously, served as the division's G3 during Operations Desert Shield and Storm in the Gulf and as the Commander of the division 's 3d Greywolf Brigade at Fort Hood.

Brigadier General Guy M. Bourn has commanded the hid Armored Corps Artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, since March 2000. Previously, he served as a Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. He commanded the 17th Field Artillery Brigade, part of the lIld Armored Corps Artillery, and served as the Fort Sill Chief of Staff. He also commanded the 3d Battalion, 29th Field Artillery, part of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Hood.

Colonel James C. Boozer, Sr., is the Deputy Commanding Officer of the hId Armored Corps Artillery, Fort Sill. He commanded the 1st Battalion, 77th Field Artillery (Multiple-Launch Rocket System, or MLRS), part of the 75th Field Artillery Brigade, lIld Armored Corps Artillery, and served as S3 of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery, Germany. Colonel Boozer is scheduled to assume command of the 214th Field Artillery Brigade, lIld Armored Corps Artillery, at Fort Sill in August.

Lieutenant Colonel (Promotable) David A. (Al) Schneider is the Chief of Staff of the Illd Armored Corps Artillery at Fort Sill. He recently commanded the 2d Battalion, 18th Field Artillery (MLRS), part of the 212th Field Artillery Brigade, also in the Illd Armored Corps Artillery. He was the Brigade S3 and S3 of the 5th Battalion, 18th Field Artillery, both in the 75th Field Artillery Brigade. Among other assignments, he served as a Staff Officer in the Off ice of the Chief of Staff of the Army at the Pentagon.

Figure 2: Team Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC)

Corps CG

Corps Artillery CG

Corps Artillery DCO, CofS, G2, G3

Deep Ops Planners (Corps G2, G3)

[A.sup.2][C.sup.2]

EWO

AFSCOORD 

Air Force LNO

Corps Aviation

Corps ACE Chief

* Collection Manager

* Targeting Officer

Corps Chemical Officer

Corps Engineer Officer

Corps G3 (Information Officer)

Staff Weather Officer

SOCCE

Corps Air Defense Officer

Corps Aviation Brigade Planner

LRS Company Commander

Corps SJA

MSC and Flank Unit LNOs

Legend:

[A.sup.2][C.sup.2] = Army Airspace Command and Control

AFSCOORD = Assistant Fire Support Coordinator

CofS = Chief of Staff

DCO = Deputy Commanding Officer

EWO = Electronic Warfare Officer

LNO = Liaison Officer

LRS = Long-Range Surveillance

SJA = Staff Judge Advocate

SOCCE = Special Operations Command and Control Element

MSC = Major Subordinate Commands

Joint Targeting School

Targeting is not just an Army concept. Each service has developed its own doctrine and targeting methodologies. With the revision of FM 6-20-10 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Targeting Process, the Army and Marine Corps use the decide, detect, deliver and assess ([D.sup.3]A) targeting methodology. However, the Air Force and Navy targeting methodologies evolved from the Air Force's air tasking order (ATO) cycle. And as the services try to conduct joint operations, targeting problems occur at the operational and strategic levels of war.

The Joint Targeting School in Virginia Beach, Virginia, addresses joint targeting problems and provides joint targeting training. The school offers three courses in the theory and application of the joint targeting process. The instruction is for intelligence, operations and planning officers, warrant officers (WOs) and NOOs who are involved in targeting on combatant command or joint task force (JTF) staffs. For Field Artillerymen, the school's curriculum applies to fire supporters in corps and division fire support elements (FSEs), deep operations coordination cells (DOCOs), battlefield coordination elements (BCEs) and those on joint staffs in the J2, J3 and J5 sections.

Historically, the Army has had the fewest attendees among the three services. Most of our Army graduates have been WOs and intelligence officers. The Joint Targeting School offers the following courses.

Joint Targeting Staff Course (JTSC). The JTSC is a tree week course on the application of the six-step joint targeting cycle: determine objectives and guidance, develop targets, conduct weaponeering, apply weapon-target match to the force, execute the plan and assess the effects.

To request a seat for one of the courses or coordinate for a MTT, call the school Quota Control Coordinator at DSN 4920276/0277 or commercial at [phone]/0277. The fax is DSN 492-0280 or commercial [phone]. For more information, view the Joint Targeting School web site at www.jts.damneck.navy.smil.mii.

Joint Targeting Application Course (JTAC).

JTAC is a two-week study of the weaponeering step of the joint targeting cycle. Students receive training on the air-to-surface and surface-to-surface methodologies necessary to match weapons to targets.

Joint Battle Damage Assessment (JBDA). The JBDA course is one week and focuses on the last step of the joint targeting cycle: combat assessment. JBDA examines the concepts and theory associated with combat assessment and the functions of a BDA cell at the operational or JTF level.

Mobile Training Teams (MTT): Between sessions of the in-residence courses, the school offers a one-week version of the JTSC and a slightly modified JBDA course to provide introductory training on the joint targeting process to unified commands and eligible JTF staffs.

Major Gregory P. Fenton, FA

Joint Targeting School, Virginia Beach, VA