Cultural awareness and WOT.

A tense encounter with a frenzied crowd in Najaf during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I began spiraling out of control with no apparent way out of direct conflict. The US Army battalion commander then ordered his troops to "Take a knee, point your rifles at the ground and smile." Next, he ordered them to "Stand, turn your backs on the crowd and walk away."

His informed directives saved lives. In the Arab culture, a blank face indicates hostility while a smiling face conveys friendship. The Soldiers' turning their backs on the crowd showed trust. Because of their commander's knowledge of Arab culture, the Soldiers were able to defuse this dangerous situation.

CNN caught this now famous incident on tape and aired it, hailing these Soldiers as "heroes of war" who saved American and Iraqi lives by demonstrating their valor and restraint. The commander of that unit, 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry (2-327 IN), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), then Lieutenant Colonel Christopher P. Hughes, clearly made his command decision based on cultural intelligence. (1)

Military commanders increasingly are becoming aware of the critical link between cultural intelligence and success in the contemporary operating environment (COE). For Field Artillerymen serving in FA, maneuver or other nontraditional units in the War on Terrorism (WOT), cultural awareness enhances their ability to conduct operations with Arabs or other foreigners. This is especially true not only for commanders at all levels, but also for those who serve on fire support teams (FISTs) and as fire support officers (FSOs) and effects coordinators (ECOORDs), coordinating and conducting nonlethal effects, such as information operations (IO) and civil-military operations (CMO).

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Even so, we at the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, still hear the argument that training for the unit mission allows little or no time for cultural awareness training. Another argument is that "War is war! We are in WOT to keep terrorists off US turf!"

This article discusses the importance of cultural awareness training for WOT, the needs and priorities of the Iraqi people in comparison with Americans', and techniques to demonstrate cultural awareness and most effectively execute the mission. Some of these basic techniques include identifying leaders, respecting elders and socializing with Arab contacts.

If we listened to our military transition teams (MiTTs), border transition teams (BTTs) and special police transition teams (SPTTs) returning from Iraq and Afghanistan, we clearly would hear the message that cultural awareness training is important. They say that cultural training would have better informed them and facilitated their missions--but training was either nonexistent or deficient before they deployed.

For example, see the article "So, You're Going to be on a MiTT. What Do You Need to Know?" by Captain Jared R. Kite, et al, in the November-December 2006 edition. This article discusses the team's lessons learned in Mosul and the relevance of "soft cultural skills" to their mission.

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TRADOC's Operations Order (OPORD) 05-123A for Professional Military Education (PME), October 2005, identifies cultural awareness training as one of TRADOC's top three training initiatives. In response, the Culture Center developed a training support package (TSP) to teach units about Iraqi and Afghan values, beliefs, behaviors, norms, ancient history, culture and religion. The ultimate goal is for this training to make Soldiers more aware of cultural differences and treat the Iraqis and Afghans with dignity and respect, making the Soldiers more effective in WOT deployments.

The fact is that cultural awareness enhances Soldiers' understanding of Arab insurgents and noncombatant population and facilitates situational awareness in both lethal and nonlethal operations. Situational awareness translates into more informed decision making, ultimately saving Soldiers' lives. Some of the benefits of cultural awareness training are outlined in Figure 1.

Culture within Context and by Comparison. While visiting the TRADOC Culture Center in the fall of 2006, now Colonel Hughes emphasized that, for any area of the world, identity is culture. Within any culture, knowing the people is the "center of gravity" for influencing the people--the goal of any counterinsurgency.

Colonel Hughes discussed "Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs" (2) and revised the hierarchy to compare the Iraqi and US cultures, as shown in Figure 2 on Page 24. The hierarchy on the left for Iraq is the more traditional hierarchy. Iraq is a nation with a recently deposed dictator and an infant democracy, so the figure shows a natural progression of the people's concerns and time spent to secure first their physical needs (food, shelter, water and clothing) and then to feel safe. People must satisfy these basic needs before they can move on to socializing and establish enough confidence and status, or esteem, to self-actualize--become creative, independent self-starters who can maximize their human potential.

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In comparison, the hierarchy for the United States is on the right in Figure 2. Although this hierarchy shows the same progression of people working their way up through securing their physical needs to the ultimate of self-actualization, the classic "pyramid" shape of the hierarch is inverted. This shows the diminished amount of time, concern and effort necessary for Americans to attain their basic needs before progressing through the hierarchy to self-actualization.

The difference is that the US has an abundance of wealth and infrastructure and a mature system of rights established by our Constitution and laws that are established and enforced by our federal, state and local governments. Also, the US does not have tribal or religious leaders or foreign insurgents fighting each other on American soil for control of our country. Without understanding the different needs of the Iraqi people, Americans easily can misunderstand Iraqi priorities.

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Figure 3 takes the same Iraqi hierarchy of needs and lists the Coalition Force's progression of military objectives beside those needs, leading to the goal of a free and independent Iraq. Note that the Iraqis' need for securing food, water, shelter and safety call for the most Coalition Force support (time, energy and dollars) and make the Iraqis most vulnerable to coercion by insurgents--most vulnerable to insurgent acts of violence. Only when the Iraqis' (or any people's) needs are met at the lower levels will they be able to move up the pyramid.

Understanding the Iraqi culture within the context of the people's priorities and vulnerabilities allows Soldiers and their leaders to understand situations in Iraq more accurately.

Identifying Leaders. Soldiers can use some practical techniques to demonstrate their cultural understanding, allowing them to more effectively accomplish the mission. A colleague of mine, Bassam Almesfer, a native of the Gulf Region, served as a language and cultural interpreter for the US Marines in Iraq during OIF II. Bassam shared the following scenario relating the relevance of cultural awareness to operations in theater. (3) To paraphrase what Bassam said ...

We were on a routine trip to Najaf with three vehicles and nine Soldiers when we encountered an Iraqi vehicle carrying 12 personnel armed with AK-47s. The situation quickly intensified when we surrounded the vehicle and requested all to step out of and away from the vehicle. The gunmen refused and pointed their weapons at us. Our Soldiers proceeded to the "ready" position as well.

As the situation escalated, I spotted a gentleman stepping out of the back of the truck wearing a headpiece that denoted him as a cleric--the person of influence in the truck. Ignoring the increasingly tense situation, I requested permission to speak with him as a sign of respect. I approached the cleric with the utmost respect and explained that we had no intentions of harming anyone; however, we wanted to remove their weapons and have the local authorities check them out.

I respectfully asked him to help us stabilize the situation and, in turn, stated that we would provide security for his journey to his destination. Surprised by the offer, he then ordered his men to put down their weapons. We escorted him and his personnel to their destination.

The story spread like wildfire, and we became known as the good people who had ensured the cleric's safety.

This incident laid the foundation for establishing a relationship with the cleric, and we were able to secure his cooperation on many other matters in the area for months to come. As a result, we conducted visits to the area with ease and communicated with many people in and around Najaf.

The key points are that we identified the leader and treated him with respect: called him "Sir," asked him for permission to speak to him, were profusely apologetic about the difficult situation and escorted him to his destination safely. This culturally informed approach allowed us to build a long-term relationship that proved beneficial to our mission.

Showing Elders Respect. Bassam Almesfer also described visits to neighboring villages where he took extra care to stop and extend greetings to elders in the area. He taught Soldiers within his sphere of influence to take extra care when they saw elders and always to treat them with respect as a demonstration that the Soldiers recognized the dignity of the elders in the tribal system and honored them. As a result, Americans gained the villagers' trust and were able to consult with the elders frequently. The elders used their power and prestige to help the Soldiers conduct more effective missions.

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Iraqi elders are the "hidden jewels" of the operational area. In their villages and tribes, they have the final word and can influence many by their status and power.

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Taking Time to Socialize. Arabs are firmly entrenched within a system of allegiances. They follow a code of honor and are loyal to family, tribe and (or) clan with Islam permeating their everyday lives--on every level from personal to political. Their primary concerns move in concentric circles from within their home, family, elders and family/tribal honor and pride.

To build trust and relationships that can facilitate change and the success of their operations, Soldiers and leaders must get to know their Arab contacts within the context of these strong influences. Therefore, it is worthwhile to invest time just sitting in coffee shops with locals and talking about the village, the tribe, the weather or whatever they choose to discuss.

When the locals know Soldiers and leaders are coming to the market to drink tea instead of always "conducting operations," then the atmosphere is more relaxed and people get to know the Soldiers and become more responsive and helpful. Unhurried time spent with Arabs establishes a highly valued bond and a level of trust that only can be earned.

It is critical that Soldiers and leaders have trusted local sources of information to help them ferret out insurgents in a neighborhood or be forewarned of ambushes on "the only paved road in town." By respecting leaders and elders and taking the time to get to know the people, Soldiers and leaders build trust and create loyalty in the Iraqi people, their leaders and interpreters.

On the other hand, using fear as a tactical tool to get information does not establish trust or create loyalty. Sometimes in WOT, Soldiers must use fear to interrogate known terrorists or Iraqis caught attacking Coalition Forces or innocent Iraqi citizens. But as a rule, trust and loyalty that go both ways is critical for Iraqis to feel safe and help units accomplish their missions.

Even though the political climate is changing, people in the Middle East have chosen to remain the same for hundreds of years. Their cultural values, beliefs, norms and behaviors continue to play a fundamental role in real-life situations throughout the region. By being culturally aware and investing time in the locals, Bassam Almesfer's Soldiers fostered friendly relations with locals and had no life-threatening incidents in their area of operations (AO) on either side for more than a year and one-half.

Other Tactical Techniques. At the tactical level, there are many things Soldiers and leaders can do to build relationships and influence the people in counterinsurgency operations. Here are a few of them.

* Know the customs, mores, religion and culture of the people in your AO.

* Always show respect when approaching locals and smile--especially for the most valued members of their culture: elders and leaders. Do this regardless of whether they are clean or dirty, barefoot or well dressed. With this approach, locals will be more willing for you to search them without offense and (or) provide information.

* Learn key Arabic phrases and use them to open communications with the Arab people. Understanding how to use language within the framework of cultural application is critical.

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For example, before asking a question or making a request, say "Min Fathalk,..." or "Lau Samaht,...." These mean "If you please" or "If I may ask." They are signs of respect and widen the pipeline of communications.

Arabs favor using religious expressions because Muslims integrate religion into their everyday lives and language. Phrases such as "In-sha'Allah," meaning "if God is willing"; "Al Hamdu Lillah," meaning "thank God"; and "Mashaa Allah," meaning "with God's blessing" will help Soldiers to connect with Arabs.

* Understand that Arabs have a different sense of time than Americans, which often causes Americans to see them as "undependable." When an Arab says, "In-sha'Allah," something may or may not get done--only "If Allah wills it."

* Never tell locals what you want them to do without first asking what they need.

* Learn to identify key personnel based on their culture; political, tribal or religious affiliations; and their economic and financial status.

* Learn to evaluate the political effectiveness of Arab leaders in your AO, both formal and informal.

* Know persuasion techniques and how to conduct the negotiation process.

* Know the basic differences between Sunnis and Shiites and which sect influences which part of your AO.

* When training Iraqi soldiers or policemen, Sunnis and Shiites should be together in squad-sized elements and forced to rely on one another. Genghis Khan did this to make rival tribes he conquered integrate and assimilate into one people--and it worked.

* When training host nation soldiers or police, use cross-cultural skills to guide and mentor them.

Ignoring a people's culture leaves Soldiers and leaders ignorant of the broader negative consequences their actions can have and of the broader positive effects their cultural awareness could have on accomplishing the mission. The mission is to move the Iraqi people up the Maslow's hierarchy toward security and total independence.

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Dr. Dorothy Guy Bonvillain works for General Dynamics Information Technology and is under contract with the Army as a Training Developer and Instructor for the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. In related experiences, she served as the Educational Outreach Coordinator for the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC; Program Manager for the National Council on US-Arab Relations, also in Washington, DC; and has lectured on Saudi Arabian Culture for the Foreign Service Institute in Rosslyn, Virginia. In the Middle East, she was a Special Consultant to the Minister of Education in the Sultanate of Oman where she led an Arab research team to document traditional Omani handicrafts; and Executive Assistant to the Superintendent of the US National Parks Service in the Asir Region of southwestern Saudi Arabia. She has a Ph.D. in Educational Administration/International Education from the American University in Washington, DC. Her email is dorothy. [e-mail].

Endnotes:

1. Colonel Christopher P. Hughes, former commander of 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I, shared some of his experiences in Iraq with the staff, students and Soldiers at the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, on 30 October 2006.

2. Abraham Maslow discussed his hierarchy of needs in "A Theory of Human Motivation," Psychological Review (Volume 50, Number 4, 1943), 370-396.

3. Author's interview with Bassam Almesfer, currently a Training Developer and Instructor in the TRADOC Culture Center, December 2006.

By Dr. Dorothy Guy Bonvillain

RELATED ARTICLE: TRADOC Culture Center

The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) created the Culture Center in 2004 at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. This initiative established the center and Fort Huachuca as the proponent for cultural awareness training.

The center consists of a training and development team and a mobile training team, the latter that conducts training throughout the Continental US (CONUS), as well as an institutional team that conducts culture training at the Military Intelligence School, also at Fort Huachuca. Together they have trained thousands of Soldiers and leaders throughout CONUS and in Europe.

In June 2006, the training and development team completed a FY07 training support package (TSP) that includes more than 300 hours of cultural training and a 40-hour train-the-trainer program on Iraq and Afghanistan as contemporary nation states. The TSP is for units and other TRADOC schools. The TSP answers four training questions: What is "culture"? What is American culture? What is the culture in the contemporary operating environment (COE)? and What is culture's impact on military operations?

Additional TSPs are under development for cultural awareness for the Horn of Africa, Iran, China, Sub-Saharan Africa and other strategic countries or regions.

The TSP is accessible online at http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/main.asp. To schedule the train-the-trainer course at your duty station, call Bill Hargis at Fort Huachuca via commercial [phone] or email him at [e-mail].

RELATED ARTICLE: Cultural Awareness Readings

1. Jason B. Baker, "Winning Hearts with Cultural Awareness," Soldiers (58, July 2003), 29, available online at http://www.army.mil/soldiers/jul2003/july03textall.html.

2. Brian Beckno, "Preparing the American Soldier in a Brigade Combat Team to Conduct Information Operations in the Contemporary Operational Environment" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College or CGSC), 2006, available online at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA451276.

3. Constantine Emilian Beleaga, "The Role of Cultural Understanding and Language Training in Unconventional Warfare" (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School), 2004, available online at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA429682. Document call number is M-U 42525 B428r.

4. Raymond Bingham, "Bridging the Religious Divide," Parameters (Autumn, 2006), 50-66.

5. Elizabeth E. Bledsoe, "The Use of Culture in Operational Planning" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC), 2005, available online at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA436485. Document call number is M-U 42022 B646u.

6. Richard R. Burgess, "Cultural Links: Foreign Area Officers Help Forge Relationships between U.S. Forces and Indigenous Populations," Sea Power (48, November, 2005), 22-24, available online at http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/nov05-22.php.

7. Jennifer V. Chandler, research paper, "Why Culture Matters: An Empirically Based Pre-Deployment Training Program" (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School), 2005. Document call number is M-U 42525 C455w.

8. Scott D. Chowning, "The Clash of Cultures" (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College), 2003. Document call number is M-U 43122 C552c.

9. Michael L. Davidson, research paper, "Culture and Effects-Based Operations in an Insurgency" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC), May 2005, available online at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA437568. Document call number is M-U 42022-2 D253c.

10. Sandra I. Erwin, "U.S. Military Training Fails to Grasp Foreign Cultures, Says Rep. Skelton," National Defense (88, June, 2004), 16, available online at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2004/Jun/US_Military.htm.

11. Barbara G. Fast, "Always Out Front," Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (31, January-March 2005), 2-7, available online at http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/mipb/article.asp?articleID=424&issueID=25.

12. Seth Frail, "Perceptive Protocol: Top 10 Cultural Faux Pas," Airman (50, Spring 2006), 28-29.

13. Thomas Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York, NY: Anchor), 1990.

14. Daniel Goleman, Social Intelligence: The New Science of Human Relationships (New York, NY: Bantam Books), 2006.

15. Colin S. Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," Parameters (Winter, 1984), 26-33.

16. Remi Hajjar, "The Army's New TRADOC Culture Center," Military Review (November-December 2006), available online at http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/NovDec06/Hajjar.pdf.

17. Jeff D. Hudson and Steven A. Warman, research paper, "Transforming the American Soldier: Educating the Warrior-Diplomat" (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School), 2000, available online at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA435524. Document call number is M-U 42525 H885t.

18. Efraim and Inari Kaish, The Empires of Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1999.

19. Jared R. Kite, Christopher L. Matson and Richard A. McConnell, "So, You're Going to be on a MiTT. What do You Need to Know?" Field Artillery (November-December 06), available online at http://sill-www.army.mil/FAMAG/index.asp.

20. Bernard Lewis, The Middle East: A Brief History of 2000 Years (New York, NY: Touchstone Books), 1997.

21. Brett G. Lewis, research paper, "Developing Soldier Cultural Competency" (Carlisle PA: Army War College), 2006, available online at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA449393. Document call number is M-U 39080-537 L6732d.

22. Maxie McFarland, "Military Cultural Education," Military Review (85, March-April 2005), 62-69, available online at http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/MarApr05/macfarland.pdf.

23. Montgomery McFate, "Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of Their Curious Relationship," Military Review (85, March-April 2005), 24-38, available online at http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/MarApr05/mcfate.pdf.

24. Robert B. Nett, "Ambassadors to the World: Cultural Awareness for Americans in Uniform," Infantry (94, November-December 2005), 18-19, available online at https://www.benning.army.mil/magazine/2005/2005_6/09_pf04.pdf.

25. Margaret Nydell, Understanding Arabs: A Guide for Modern Times (Boston, MA: Intercultural Press), 2005.

26. Raphael Patai and Norvell B. De Atkine, The Arab Mind (Long Island City, NY: Hatherleigh Press), 2002.

27. Matthew C. Paul, "Tactical Questioning," Infantry (95, January-February 2006), 22-25, available online at http://www.trackpads.com/magazine/publish/article_1640.shtml.

28. Joseph Pepper, Jr., research paper, "Winning the Counterinsurgency Fight in Iraq: The Role of Political Culture in Counterinsurgency Warfare 2003-2006 in Iraq" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC), 2006, available online at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA450481. Document call number is M-U 42022-2 P4241w.

29. Ralph Peters, "The Hearts-and-Minds Myth: Sorry, but Winning Means Killing," Armed Forces Journal (144, September 2006), 34-38, available online at http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/09/1947271/.

30. Barak A. Salmoni, "Beyond Hearts and Minds: Culture Matters," Naval Institute Proceedings (130, November 2004), 54-56.

31. Robert H. Scales, Jr., "Culture-Centric Warfare," Naval Institute Proceedings (130, October 2004), 32-36.

32. Andrew W. Stewart, research paper, "Friction in U.S. Foreign Policy: Cultural Difficulties with the World" (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College), 2006, available online at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB706.pdf.

33. Michelle Tan, "Cultural Awareness Training to Become Mandatory October 1," Army Times (67, 18 September 2006), 27.

34. George A. Van Otten, "Culture Matters," Military Intelligence (31, January-March 2005), 30-37, available online at http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&an=18530537.

35. Timothy R. Williams, research paper, "Culture--We Need Some of That! Cultural Knowledge and Army Officer Professional Development" (Carlisle, PA: Army War College), 2006, available online at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA448821. Document call number is M-U 39080-537 W7271c.

Cultural Awareness--
* Protects and saves lives--American and host national.
* Enables Soldiers and leaders to accomplish their tasks and missions
  more effectively.
* Produces long-term relationships versus short-term gains.
* Improves diplomatic relations by decreasing social blunders.
* Enables a more seamless unit replacement process (relief-in-place) in
  country.
* Reduces operational costs and the loss of equipment.
* Increases overall situational awareness and effective decision making.

Figure 1: Benefits of Cultural Awareness