Crouching tiger, hidden Islam: China's islamic minorities have been almost invisible behind centuries of repression. Beijing's lukewarm support for the war will cool yet further if it leads to a revival of separatist hopes.

In the context of the almost universal wave of sympathy which accompanied the immediate aftermath of the attacks on the US World Trade Centre and Pentagon, Beijing's offer of condolence was a relatively cool response. Although it did not hesitate to condemn terrorism and pledge to share intelligence, it has insisted that the effort must be multilateral and involve the United Nations Security Council over which it holds veto power. But as one of only six countries which border Afghanistan, its resigned engagement with the international community over the issue is indicative of its ambivalent position -- just how far it will assist in the effort is yet to be borne out.

While Chinese students crammed chat lines to express their exultance over America being brought down a notch, the attacks seemed to confirm Beijing's rhetoric concerning US hegemony. In order to quell the frenzied response of its populace, Beijing moved quickly to limit reportage of the events in its national media. Party leaders could not ignore the propensity for the events of 11 September to spill over into China's domestic affairs, highlighting the hypocrisy of such rhetoric by turning the spotlight on its own troubled province of X'injiang. Although the international `war on terrorism' provides some justification for Beijing's eight-year crackdown on nationalist cum Muslim separatism; a lessening of secrecy surrounding upheavals in the province would mark a clear departure from Chinese policy.

The encroachment of US military in the geostrategically significant Central Asia is yet another concern for Beijing, which has for the past ten years been locked in fierce competition with Russia, Iran and Turkey for influence over the newly independent and relatively unaligned states. China's main strategic interests are economic, with the resurrection of the `Silk Road' via rail from Kashgar in Xinjiang to Mashhad in Iran and through to Europe, as well as the construction of oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia which would see it released from its dependence on the Middle East. Paramount to the achievement of these goals is political stability for which, so far, Beijing's prescription has been to pour millions of yuan into the region in an attempt to bolster economic development and galvanise acquiescence to Chinese interests. Whether US intervention in the region will bring stability will remain unclear for some time. For China, however, the prospect of having the United States gain control of its backyard when it already has military bases in South Korea and Japan is of dire concern.

Beijing is more embroiled in the `war on terrorism' than it cares to admit. In 1996, Russia, China and three of the secular Central Asian states -- which for the most part are still controlled by the administrations of the soviet era, and heavily dependent on their larger neighbours -- Tajikistan, Kazakstan and Kyrgystan came together for the first of what was to become the annual Shanghai Five summit. The main thrust was to promote co-operation, both economically and with regard to borders and border control. Signatories also committed themselves to extradite nationals operating from havens beyond borders. Last held in July and now called the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation the group has been joined by Uzbekistan and its focus is now overtly to fight international terrorism, religious extremism and national separatism. The action is largely a response to Xinjiang and Chechnya.

The Turkic-speaking Muslim Uighurs of China's Xinjiang, who identify strongly with their neighbours across the steppe, accuse Han-dominated Beijing of imposing its own hegemony. Rich in minerals and estimated to hold one-third of China's oil resources, the province has since its annexation in 1950 become a scene of ethnic brawling, uprisings and, more recently, Islamic militancy culminating in three bomb blasts in Beijing over the spring of 1997.

Xinjiang, or `new dominion', is China's western-most province, bordering India, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgystan, Kazakstan, Russia and Mongolia. Referred to as East Turkestan by its ethnic Uighur inhabitants, it is approximately the size of Queensland and historically marks the crossroad of the Persian, Chinese and Turkic empires. It was incorporated by the Qing Dynasty during the eighteenth century, setting the stage for some forty revolts until a widespread Turkish uprising brought independence in 1862. As the `Great Game' began to take hold during the nineteenth century, Britain supported the Qing Dynasty, which recaptured the province in 1884. In 1944 the Republic of East Turkestan was established but enjoyed only five years of independence before its government was wiped out in a mysterious plane crash while travelling to negotiate its status with Beijing in 1950. Military force then saw the province re-annexed with support from the USSR to the newly declared People's Republic.

The independence movement, which was harshly suppressed during the Mao era, gained momentum under the loosening of cultural control throughout the eighties under the policies of Deng Xiaoping. The breakup of the Soviet Union, which set free its Central Asian brethren, provided a further fillip to its aspirations and provided hope for autonomy. The movement remained severely fractured, however, and still today operates through multiple organisations.

For Uighurs, the list of grievances is long and bitter. Although the policies of Deng Xiaoping saw the construction of more mosques and circulation of the Koran, since 1998 these were rescinded and Koranic schools are outlawed. The state-sponsored relocation of Hah Chinese into the province has seen the Uighur population shrink from approximately 70 per cent in 1950 to just 49 per cent today, while the Han population has risen from five to now 38 per cent of the total of seven million people. Xinjiang is a state of virtual apartheid in which Han Chinese overwhelmingly hold the industrial, bureaucratic or top-level employment while the Uighurs are concentrated in the agrarian sector. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, which sprang out of the army and now administers the province responsible for such diverse interests as schooling and prison camps, is composed of 97 per cent Han Chinese. In 1964 the Chinese government began nuclear testing at Lop Nor, a decision which is estimated to have resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths.

When China encouraged the Uighurs to fight alongside the Mujahideen against Soviet forces during the Afghan War twenty years ago, it, like the US, seriously miscalculated the extent to which Islam would come to dominate affairs in both the region and the world. Up until then, what was essentially an anti-colonial ethno-nationalist movement became further fractured with the addition of militant Islam.

Uighur militants are thought to have spent time in training camps in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan and Chechnya -- forming relationships which have seen the flow of arms and drugs into China. Other Uighur nationalist groups have fled across borders, and joined militant groups as far away as Turkey and have even been found to have joined the Chechnyan jihad.

At home things are worse. The Chinese government has responded to repeated outbursts of car and bus bombings, protest rallies, assasinations of Chinese sol diers and terrorist activities -- which have become routine throughout Xinjiang -- with a heavy army presence, public executions and mock war parades. The `strike hard' crime campaign, which has been reactivated to suit party objectives, has been the cover for what are to be thousands of arrests and executions of Uighurs in a country where religious practice must be approved by officials or considered counter-revolutionary.

Beijing's position, then, is to accommodate its foreign enemy number one to achieve what are primarily domestic objectives. This may even go as far as allowing US military onto its territory in Xinjiang -- a proposition and loss of face which would have been unthinkable only a month ago. For the time being, Chinese influence in Central Asia will remain checked by the United States. For Xinjiang, the situation is even bleaker. With the planned migration of displaced Hah Chinese after the Three Gorges Dam Project, and with the weight of the international community justifying the crushing of Uighur independence aspirations due to Islamic association -- thereby further fueling the downward spiral of repression and resistance -- the prospect of peace in Xinjiang looks less likely than ever.

Angela Fennell is a Melbourne-based freelance writer.