Critical remarks on cultural aspects of Asian ghettos in modern Britain (1).

Introduction (2)

Events in Northern towns (Bradford, Burnley, and Oldham) in the summer of 2001 have, once more, shown the existence of a Nazi menace and the threat it poses to ethnic minority communities. The destruction of this threat must be the priority of the British Left and, accordingly, its energies devoted to this task. At the same time, however, analysis needs to be conducted in regard to the dynamics of racial tensions that provides such fertile ground for racists and Nazi organisations. What forces are driving this? How really serious is this development? Is it generalised or restricted to towns and cities with certain characteristics? This article attempts to look at one particular aspect of the above that seems to have been neglected by the Left in Britain: the sprawling Asian ghettos that have arisen and become embedded in the past three to four decades. It is important to note that, in contrast to the major urban riots of 1981 or 1985, the participants of the 2001 riots have almost exclusively been young Muslim Asian men. (3) The aim is to draw conclusions from a phenomenon that is, on the one hand, generating deep alienation and resentment on the part of young Asians and, on the other, attracting systematic harassment and violence by racists. Particular, and critical, attention is focused on Asian cultural practices.

We can start by asking the question: what view should socialists and progressives (or, the Left) take regarding an array of Asian cultural practices and traditions? Indeed, should there be a view on this? The preoccupation up till now has rightly been--and must remain so, for the foreseeable future--with fighting and exposing racism. However, in part, this has led to a reluctance to peer closely into Asian communities. Why has this been so? Largely from the belief that multiculturalism implies cultural differences ought to be respected, and any problems arising within a minority culture, downplayed, so as not to detract from the more important cause of fighting racism. So, there is a very understandable fear that criticising aspects of Asian cultural practices can accentuate negative stereotyping of Asians in general, and give the green light to further racist slanders and attacks. This, however, can lead to undue caution. Moreover, racists do not need any assistance or prompting in pursuing their malevolent agenda. Thus, where bigots and racists make 'cultural' criticisms, the Left should have no truck with these and denounce them for what they are.

But, an important consequence of this downplaying has been that those who are subjected to oppressive aspects of Asian culture against their will (especially girls and young women) are frequently denied a voice and support. At the same time, the grip of progressive thinking--particularly within the ghettos--becomes marginalised which, in turn, weakens the ability to resist racist scapegoating. My contention is that this benign neglect should end and attempts made to provide a critique of practices that should not be impervious to constructive criticism. This is premised on an empathy, understanding, and solidarity with often enormously beleaguered communities. Indeed, the fear of the charge of racism has manifested in a 'defensiveness' on the part of white progressives so that they absent themselves from this debate; but all-too-often Asian progressives have also been hesitant to raise their heads above the parapet and I argue that they at least should not feel paralysed at such a task. Any charge of racism certainly cannot be levelled at them, nor recourse made to 'guilt-tripping' tactics.

Though racism is still rampant, and the race card is still played by the two main parties (so disgracefully over asylum seekers in recent years), the level of generalised racism appears to have declined and ethnic minorities are increasingly considered a legitimate part of society by all mainstream parties (always reluctantly by the Tories). This provides a space to undertake a critique of Asian cultural practices. This is not to diminish the fact of the widespread institutional racism that still exists alongside the 'popular' forms of racism--but the very fact that there is an acknowledgement by the state that institutional racism, and not just in the Metropolitan police, is an unwelcome reality which it wishes, in however a mealy-mouthed fashion, to root out, is a very positive signal to both the ethnic minorities and the rest of society, for it suggests a further marginalisation of overt racism from the mainstream. Though much remains to be done, and there is certainly no room for complacency, nonetheless, real progress has been made: virtually no overt colour bars, a high level of mixing of peoples (much higher than say in American cities), a significant influence of black culture (though not so much Asian--see below) on mainstream society, notably in sport, music, and cuisine, and an increasing participation of black people in television (again, excepting Asians), the arts, and media. This can, to a significant extent, be considered the gains that have accrued after so many campaigns for equality, and struggles against racism.

But when one peers into the life of so many Asians, one finds that there are large numbers who feel enormously trapped by oppressive and repressive practices that are foisted on them from within their own communities. The contention of this article is that cognisance needs to be made of this stark fact, and a laissez faire attitude to an array of practices should no longer be adopted.

It should, at the outset, be made clear that 'Asian culture' is not homogenous, and significant variations do exist. Nonetheless, generalisations are possible owing to the high degree of prevalence in Asian communities--especially in inner city ghettos. My contention is that fundamentally, a good deal of Asian culture is reactionary and antithetical to the aim of the struggle for human emancipation; that is, specifically, to the cause of socialism. Prima facie, this should not be surprising, as cultural practices are not formed in a vacuum but, as Marx theorised, are part of a society's 'superstructure'. Applying this formulation, we can argue that much of Asian culture emanates from economically less developed societies with a superstructure encompassing mysticism, obscurantism, intense fixation on caste and class, oppression of women sometimes to the point of misogyny, lack of individuality, and the shunning of reasoned and critical thinking. Such characteristics were, of course, also prevalent in advanced societies prior to their development, but it is precisely this fact that gives potency to Marx's thesis. (4) In sum, intellectual development in these societies remains grounded largely in pre-enlightenment thinking. (5) An important by-product of the transferral of the culture to more developed societies is that it often results in the young to lead schizophrenic lives, often of great anguish and pain. A particularly shocking statistic reflecting this fact is that the highest suicide rate in Britain is that of Asian girls and women (see below for details).

What is at the heart of the matter is the contradiction between the freedom of cultural and religious expression (which the Left should support) and the freedom of cultural and religious oppression (which the Left should oppose) that often emanate from the former. This paper, therefore, necessarily attempts to set the limits of the former freedoms where they collide with the struggles for liberation in all their forms and, more specifically, where such 'freedoms' can be deemed as no more than the denial of fundamental freedoms to individual members of the Asian community. The crux of my thesis is that not only are much of the various Asian cultural and religious practices antithetical to the notion of liberation but, fundamentally, these often lead to bigotry and divisiveness which, in consequence, also weaken the ability to resist racism and oppression from racists within white society.

Some characteristics of the Asian population

Asians comprise just over half of the total ethnic minority population of just over 4.6 millions in Britain. Table 1 provides the population breakdown of the different ethnic minority groups based on the 2001 census.

Among Asians, there is now quite a marked difference between the different groups, namely, that those from an 'Indian' background are better placed in all socio-economic indicators than those from a 'Pakistani' and 'Bangladeshi' (P and B) background. In regard to school education, Indian girls perform the best of any group: 66 per cent achieve 5 or more GCSEs at A*-C grades. Similar percentages for other groups are: white girls 55 per cent; Indian boys 54 per cent; white boys 45 per cent; P and B girls 37 per cent and (shockingly) P and B boys 22 per cent. There is a similar ethnic spilt in regard to higher education: those most likely to have degrees are Chinese, Indians, Black Africans, and Other Asians--whereas P and B women are the least likely to have degrees (just 7 per cent in 2001/2002). Moreover, P and Bs are the most likely to be unqualified (for men, 27 and 40 per cent respectively; for women, 40 and 48 per cent respectively). (6)

The employment rates of Indian men (at 73 per cent--rather lower than the 80 per cent for white men) and women (at 58 per cent--considerably lower than 71 per cent for white women) is, however (especially for women) much higher than that of Ps and Bs (61 and 55 per cent for men and only 24 and 17 per cent for women). The extremely low employment rates of women for the latter groups, combined with the fact that Pakistani and Bangladeshi men are overwhelmingly in skilled manual and partly skilled work, explains the high level of poverty and overcrowding in these two groups. Here, cultural pressures on Pakistani and Bangladeshi women to marry young, and to stay at home to look after the family clearly has an adverse economic impact. Unemployment rates tend to be higher for all ethnic minorities in comparison with whites, but it is highest for Ps and Bs (whose rate is over twice that of Indians). This group also suffers from low income: an astonishing 68 per cent of whom were living in low-income households after deduction of housing costs. This compares with 30 per cent of Indians and 21 per cent of whites. (7)

Thus, the situation of Asians from an Indian background is moving towards the white average but the same certainly cannot be said of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis--they, along-side in some respects, Afro-Caribbeans, constitute the most deprived groups in Britain. Given this fact, it needs stressing that those cultural factors which impede social and economic advancement, must be resisted.

Origins of the ghettos

The origins of the Asian ghettos lie in the post-war migrations of people from the Indian sub-continent to work in mills, factories, foundries, and public services in various parts of Britain. For reasons of 'choice' (that is, culture, language, religion, ethnicity, regional origin) and 'constraints' (racist councils, landlords, and estate agents) (8), the settlers congregated in certain parts of towns and cities (Hiro, 1992, parts I and II). This offered some security, succour, and protection from at times the harsh racism they were to encounter. The governments of the day (be they Labour or Conservative) failed to make migrants feel welcome and secure; moreover, they failed to make any credible attempts to bridge links with local whites--and encourage the latter to offer a welcoming hand of friendship (Foot, 1965). This gross negligence and irresponsibility has had negative consequences whose effects still linger, regardless of problems of language and customs.

It is important to note, however, that middle class Asians have never been ghettoised in terms of where they live--rather, they head for the suburbs and, as a result, see a much greater mixing of their children with locals. We can, however, postulate that even for middle class Asians, the more 'traditional' the outlook and practices, the greater the reluctance to mix socially with others. But the fact that middle class Asian people choose not to live in ghettos, and ensure their children are not sent to segregated schools, is clear evidence that, at heart, ghettos are a product of poverty and deprivation.

Perhaps the most serious manifestation of ghettos is the creation of segregated schools. In a country where Asians comprise only four per cent of the population, virtually 100 per cent Asian schools is a sign of drastic failures of national and local government policies vis-a-vis migrants. It means that by the age of five, Asian children will struggle with the English language--though not insurmountable, it places a severe handicap in a highly competitive education system. Again, this contrasts sharply with the experience of middle class children who invariably speak fluent English, and with the accent of their locality. Thus, educational attainment of ghetto children tends to be low which, inevitably, has a deleterious affect on their job prospects. Consequently, in an era of manufacturing decline, these children frequently end up working in the ghetto economy--in shops, restaurants, and local trades, with minimal contact with the majority white community. Living in a ghetto leads to a ghetto mentality: one gets the impression that outside 'your area' is considered hostile terrain full of 'demons and dragons'. This leads to insularity and reinforces a further reliance on the network of family and friends within the ghetto.

Cultural aspects of the Asian ghettos

Such insularity and fear of the outside can be a breeding ground for an array of reactionary attitudes and practices, and cement backward, obscurantist, traditions, and beliefs. Thus, pressure to conform strictly to religious and cultural traditions becomes highly oppressive. Ghettoisation not only leads to breaking up links with the dominant white society, but also with other ethnic minorities. In fact, the bigotry and sectarian attitudes that bedevil Asian communities towards each other are invariably a direct importation of these from the Indian sub-continent and are passed down the generations.

The rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India on a disgusting anti-Muslim programme over the past decade and a half with fascist allies such as the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), and Shiv Sena, has accentuated Hindu chauvinism not only in India, but also in Britain. Pakistan, on the other hand, was created as a Muslim sectarian state steeped in intolerance. When the Irish revolutionary socialist James Connolly correctly predicted a 'carnival of reaction' following the partition of Ireland, his powerful description could be applied a forteriori to the partition of India--the repercussions of which are still being felt on the sub-continent and whose malign effects in combination with sectarian, nationalist, politics are akin to a 'communal Chernobyl', polluting Asian communities in other parts of the world.

One consequence of intra-Asian tensions is the creation of 'pure ethnic' ghettos with powerful ethnic, regional, and religious mind-sets, and intolerance of others. (9) So, it is the case that there is often great distrust and animosity between different Asian groups--the ghetto traps these attitudes within its borders; gives succour to them and, in so doing, reinforces itself. Inevitably, therefore, secular, inclusive, politics are marginalised. Such intensely nationalistic and sectarian attitudes permeate all types of activities. For example, it has been noticeable in recent years that support for the Pakistan cricket team has now reached fanatical proportions in England from British Muslim Asians (especially during the 1999 Cricket World Cup and the 2001 Tour). Why should this be so? The answer must lie in the deep alienation of these young men from mainstream society--and one that is accentuated by their ghetto upbringing. Also, the Pakistan cricket team is almost in its entirety a Muslim team so there is a confluence of racial, national, and religious identities that are readily transposed on to a talented cricket team, with the fanaticism being heightened by the fact of there being very few Asian sporting successes.

It is the oppression of women that raises the greatest call not to simply ignore the egregious cultural practices within Asian communities. Examples of the oppressive and repressive treatment of women abound. Leila Ahmed (1992, p. 7) makes the point that could equally be made for most other religions that: 'in establishment Islamic thought, women, like minorities, are defined as different from and, in regard to legal rights, lesser than men'. And it is the 'establishment thought' propagated by uniformly male religious leaders, that tends to dominate religious practice in all major religions. Consequently, many of the oppressive practices are enforced and justified on religious grounds. And given that it is almost impossible for women to reject 'their' religion, they are meekly required to put up and shut up. Some of the oppressive practices are discussed here.

It has been noticeable that in the past decade or so, the wearing of the headscarf (hijab) and the veil by British Muslim girls and women has become highly prevalent (why precisely this is so requires rigorous research, though I make conjectures here). The 'reflex argument' that such 'traditional' practices within minority cultures are an expression, or assertion of cultural, religious, and racial identity and self-pride, in response to a hostile, racist environment, should be resisted. There is certainly some validity to this, but it is likely to apply only to a relatively small proportion of the total. France provides a famous example, where discrimination in nominally secular state schools against Muslims (Catholics and Jews were allowed to wear religious symbols, yet Muslims were not) provoked significant numbers of Muslim schoolgirls to wear the hijab where they had not previously not done so (Parekh, pp. 249-254). This was in the context of heightened racist politics permeating the highest reaches of French politics, at a time of strong showing for the fascist Front National that was campaigning vigorously against 'immigrants', especially French Arabs. Yet, even then, most French Muslim girls and women did not resort to veiling themselves.

But, if a laissez faire approach is taken regarding the veil on the basis of the 'reflex argument', or on the grounds of multiculturalism, then are all cultural or religious practices to be tolerated--including, to take extreme examples to make the point, female circumcision, widow immolating herself on husbands' funeral pyre (suttee), death by stoning for sex outside marriage (zina), amputation for theft (under sharia laws)? If these are deemed unacceptable, then who sets the limits of acceptability, and on what criteria?

The truth, I think, has more to do with plain repression, vis-a-vis women, in many Islamic societies--the practice of veiling, like so much else, is foisted upon girls and women often through a great deal of coercion or emotional blackmail, even to the point of punishment for failure to comply. (10) Even if we acknowledge that some women freely choose to become fully or partially veiled, this cannot be so for girls as young as five--an age where religious and cultural identity has yet to take a strong hold. In (what is a depressing) fact, we might be reaching the stage where girls and women in 'Muslim areas' of British towns and cities find it impossible not to cover their heads should they so choose. For those brave enough to try, they are likely to gain very little support from inside their 'community'. An important democratic right--equality with non-Muslim girls--is, therefore, denied them. The point is reinforced when one looks outside the Islamic religion and traditions: the practice very rarely occurs. One argument often used in defence, if not in justification, is that this is a response to women feeling sexually harassed. Where this is the case, again, it is likely to affect a very small proportion of the total (and would reflect more on the segregation of the sexes that often produces such harassment). But, importantly, it actually represents a defeat for their liberation (in the manner in which black people have to hide from white society in 'no go areas' for fear of harassment and racist attacks). Therefore, veiling for reasons of oppression, is tantamount to an oppressive response to oppression. The practice might also be objected to on medical grounds (though research needs to be conducted on this), which Namazie (2001) suggests include an increase in osteoporosis in women, as well as causing depression, and even suicide. (11)

Boys and young men do not escape either from cultural and religious coercion, for they are also forced to pray, to wear 'traditional' forms of dress, for Muslims, to fast during the month of Ramzaan, for Sikhs to wear a turban, grow 'religious' beards, etc. If there is segregation from the outside world, then within the ghetto, there is a strong element of gender apartheid--not only is the having of boyfriends and girlfriends strongly discouraged, there is often a separation of the sexes in public life and even within family gatherings. The roots of this lie in the role of men and women being characterised by a clear division of labour: the man is the principal earner and head of the household, whereas the woman looks after the home and brings up the children. Even where the woman works, she tends to remain the junior partner. Relationships, therefore, are rarely allowed to flourish on the basis of affection, equality, and mutual respect so that a very deep sexism becomes ingrained, taken for granted, and perpetuated.

A particularly repressive cultural practice that has gained prominence in recent years, is that of forced marriage. The Southall Black Sisters Report on this (2001, P.4) lists what this can involve:

   'physical and sexual violence; threatening behaviour;
   imprisonment; abduction; mental and social pressure,
   including emotional blackmail; restrictions on lifestyle
   such as limitations on movement, association, dress, education
   and career choices; oppressive financial controls;
   and other demeaning, humiliating and controlling
   actions'.

It is important to note that these oppressive practices do not just apply in the case of forced marriages but can, and indeed often are, used in other circumstances. But a woman who breaks free from a forced marriage can expect to be hunted down by 'bounty hunters', private detectives, or organised gangs of networks of men, be intimidated by them and forced to return home, where she will inevitably face further punishment. And she may end up paying the ultimate price for her disobedience: death. This was the tragic fate of Tasleem Begum from Bradford who, after leaving her husband from a forced marriage, was killed by her Brother-in-Law (who, no doubt, in the name of multiculturalism had his sentence commuted from murder to manslaughter on the grounds of 'provocation'--presumably stemming from the 'shame' and 'dishonour' she had brought his family). Scandalously, religious leaders, though not condoning this, asserted that 'according to the Koran, killing this woman was correct' (SBS, 2001, pp. 8, 7). Unfortunately, her case is by no means unique (AsianWomen's groups such as SBS have been at the forefront in exposing these). Suffice it to say that the signal this gives out to women contemplating deviating from the path chosen for them is enormously powerful.

Asian children and young adults are denied access to an array of activities that are readily available to others. Think of the restrictions placed on a young Asian girl or woman: discouraged from playing with boys after a certain age and, when she gets older, certainly not to have boyfriends; not to go to pubs or clubs, or even to leisure centres and swimming pools; discouraged from going to concerts, or to holidays with friends to some seaside resort at home or overseas. She would be told to wear the traditional attire of say Shulwaar and kameez--and be forbidden to wear skirts or shorts, even in sweltering heat. If she were from a Muslim background, she may be told to wear a headscarf outside her home, including in school. In sum, she would be denied various liberties and subjected to restrictions that Western women have for generations fought for and won, and now take for granted. Thus, an Asian girl from a ghetto, fortunate enough to have white or black girlfriends, can legitimately ask why she cannot do all manner of activities her friends can partake in and which, in wider society, are considered so utterly normal. It is for this reason that Asian girls and women (but also boys and men) lead double 'Jekyll and Hyde' lives.

It is this crushing of individuality, and the pressure to conform to pre-ordained norms, that so often leads to a torn existence. It is why problems related to mental health and self-harm abound, and why the rate of suicide for Asian girls and young women is up to three times the average (Bhugra, Desai, and Baldwin, 1999). (12) Research by the Newham Asian Women's Project (NAWP) (1998, p.57) summarised the following as being of particular concern to young Asian women, and which may lead to their self-harm: 'issues around honour and shame; stresses around fragmentation and leading dual lives; the experience of sexual abuse; marital difficulties and domestic violence; high academic expectations; the pressure of unwanted arranged marriages ... socio-economic disadvantage; lack of flexibility around Asian cultural traditions, and a lack of communication with parents'. (13) What is interesting, and perhaps surprising, is that racist abuse and financial and housing problems were considered 'exacerbating factors' to the above; in other words, the bulk of factors which trouble Asian women, emanate from within the family and community, and not from a hostile external environment.

But there is also what may be described as a perverse response by some Asian women to the rights, freedoms, and independence gained by women not just in the West, but the world over: where these are viewed in a derogatory manner, unbecoming for a 'modest' Asian girl or woman. Given that such a view is customarily instilled from a very young age, girls are broken from critical thinking well before they have matured (the same--though not with the same intensity--could be said for boys) and so often end up accepting and justifying the restrictions placed upon them. Bertrand Russell (1987, p. 19) commented upon the 'immensely strong hold of early associations', and indeed it is these early associations or better, commands and threats, that instil such an enormous fear in Asian youngsters that they find it well nigh impossible to cast them aside in adulthood.

Tragically, so many Asian women accept their lot, and gain an inverted sense of righteousness and pride from their restrictions. In so doing, they end up 'internalising their oppression'. Women apologists for their subservience have similarities with the 'Uncle Toms' of slavery for whom ideas of liberation were thought dangerous and to be opposed. 'Uncle Tommery' is explicable if social conditioning, including feelings of guilt, is so powerful that an inability to question even the most repressive forms of the status quo result. In the context of 'culture clashes' and hostility from the majority society (but not just), it can become twisted into a virtue, and brazenly defended. Two examples highlight this graphically. First, the justification of a French Muslim woman taking up the veil, in the context discussed above: 'I feel completely liberated by the veil. As soon as I put it on, I felt as if I'd blossomed. The veil allows a woman no longer to be a slave to her body. It is the belief that a woman can go far through means other than using her body' (Parekh, 2000, p. 252). An even more extreme example of this mentality in modern times is that of Mauritania's ninety thousand slaves for whom '[t]he possibility of rebellion, like the possibility of a world made up entirely of free men and women, is inconceivable among people who have lost their collective memory of freedom' (Burkett, 1997). 'Inconceivable' might be an exaggerated term, but the point is cogently made regarding a shocking fact.

Back in the heyday of feminism in the early 1970s, Kate Millett famously pointed out the vital importance of conditioning and socialisation from early childhood as explanators of the assent given by both sexes to gender inequalities). (14) In a controversial work, this was nonetheless an important insight. Moreover, it applies with even greater force to the current situation of Asian girls and women. Yet, systematic analyses in such a vein in regard to them are few and far between. Instead of an outcry against what is happening to so many Asian girls and women, there has in fact been a deafening silence on the part of those who one would expect to take up the cudgel on this issue, that is, feminists in particular and the left in general. Indeed, what has implicitly been put in practice can be starkly expressed as this: yes, there must be a principled opposition to women's oppression and campaigns for equal rights for women--except in regard to Asian (especially Muslim) girls and women in 'their' communities.

Culture is not static--on the contrary, it constantly adapts, changes, and evolves. Indeed, we can argue that the mixing of peoples greatly energises cultural advancement and social progress, helping to break, on the one hand, the 'Little England' mentality of white people and on the other, similar 'Little nationality' fixations of the settlers--thereby shifting mental and political dispositions in the direction of opposition to bigotry and, in some cases, to a principled internationalist outlook. Indubitably, significant advances have been made in the past 50 years, whereby the culture of Britain has been transformed through interaction with settler communities through music, cuisine, dress, manner of speaking, what might be termed 'generosity of spirit', and the challenging of existing ideas vis-a-vis non-white people. (15) This runs counter to the fear held by some in minority groups that 'their cultures' would simply assimilate away under the tidal wave of the dominant culture. However, it is certainly the case that the 'cultural impact' of Afro-Caribbeans has been highly significant: far more than might be expected from a group constituting not only such a small proportion of the population, but which resides near the bottom of the economic ladder.

What is important here is interaction and mixing of peoples at all levels--not a slavish, adherence to what one believes to be unchanging values and traditions. And, throughout the country there has been a mixing of peoples--with the most profound one being the ever-increasing numbers of inter-racial marriages and partnerships (see below for a discussion of this). But in regard to Asian ghettos, such mixing and interaction is negligible, so that we can consider, in a very real sense, their residents to be virtually imprisoned in a geographical and cultural setting that it has become extremely difficult to break out of.

So, the life of many an Asian child born and brought up in a ghetto might take the following: very little exposure to the English language up till the age of five; little exposure to white people and other minorities in schools that predominantly comprise Asian pupils--hence, friends will also tend to be entirely Asian; little exposure to the major TV channels if the family subscribes to Asian satellite or cable TV stations and similarly, little exposure to non-Asian radio stations. Trips to the cinema might be concentrated entirely on watching Bollywood films, as the larger towns and cities now have cinemas regularly showing these; if not, then there is an endless supply of such films available on video; and listening predominantly to Bollywood music. Culturally, therefore, many Asian children may end up leading lives that approximate much more to their counterparts in Bombay or Karachi than with white or black children living possibly a few hundred yards away. Later in life, they will invariably end up in an arranged marriage to a relative or acquaintance from the same ethno-religious group. The cycle will then start again for the next generation. One might level the charge that this is simply an unfair caricature of reality. Given the lack of hard evidence, this might be so, and one should not deny that aspects of Western (especially black) culture such as hip hop or the mannerisms and language of Ali G do have an appreciable influence, especially on teenage Asian boys (though the same cannot, I think, be said for Asian girls). Nonetheless, one should not be surprised if evidence were to reveal that the scenario painted here obtained in uncomfortably significant numbers.

It might be argued that this is a manifestation of multiculturalism, that at least this way, cultural heritage is preserved and not swamped under the dominant culture. Even if this were true, the difficulty is that it, nonetheless, accentuates the dynamic of ghettoisation, and concomitant problems therein. Moreover, as already noted, contact and interaction between cultures leads to their change and development so that it is often only through determinedly self-imposed isolation and coercion that cultures and customs retain their 'pure form'.

All this contrasts sharply with the situation of Afro-Caribbeans--who are now, indubitably, much more integrated than Asians. A key factor must be the propensity of Afro-Caribbeans to mix with others, above all, with indigenous whites. This is made easier, as noted earlier, by language and cultural similarities but there appears not to be the same intensity of 'exclusion' of others that is so prevalent in Asians. Though this obviously relates to their very different histories, in this regard, Asians have much to learn from their Afro-Caribbean brethren.

In terms of inter-racial marriages/partnerships, evidence suggests that this is gathering pace, but that attitudes to it differ sharply. Overall, the attitude of young people of all groups is much more liberal (Modood and Berthoud, 1997, pp. 315-316). Table 2 shows figures for inter-racial marriages. Thus, 50 per cent of British-born black men and 33 per cent British-born black women have white partners. These figures are far higher than for Asians--for Indians, the respective figures are 19 and to per cent. For British-born Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, having partners from another racial group is probably much less. The 'Total' percentages are much lower as many of those born abroad will already have been married before arriving in Britain, and will also tend to hold more traditional views regarding marriage.

A corollary to such high levels of inter-racial mixing on the part of Afro-Caribbeans may be a loosening of black ghettos. The positive aspects of the mixing of peoples are clear: it accelerates cross-fertilisation of cultures and the creation of new cultural norms, reduces fear of those of a different ethnicity, increases the tolerance of others, and reduces bigotry and racist thinking. This then gives rise to an important political consequence: mixed communities will be much less amenable to the Nazi and racist stereotyping and scapegoating in comparison with segregated ones. So it is that the BNP'S tactics of late have focused on specifically targeting Muslim Asian ghettos that border poor white ghettos. Yet, the deprived white estates (which, as a result, also fail to gain from the mixing with non-whites) have much more in common with the at least equally deprived Asian estates. Rather than uniting, they can fall prey to divisive politics. Thus, high levels of segregation and racial ghettoisation provide fertile ground for such divisions, and the concomitant breeding of suspicion hostility, and scapegoating: the standard fare of racist and Nazi politics.

At the heart of Asian culture is the family and it this institution that explains much of the trajectory in life that its constituent members take, and the reason why the rate of mixing with others is so much lower. Ultimately, it is an economic, welfare, and recreational unit with origins in agrarian, and certainly pre-welfare state, societies. When couples marry, this is in the form of a contract--'love marriages' are strongly discouraged, as is marriage across class, religious, ethnic, or racial boundaries. There is often a great stigma and loss of honour attached to marriages to 'outsiders'. The following remark graphically illustrates the point (the sentiment of which can equally be applied to all Asian groups): '[i]f my daughter wanted to marry someone who was not a Jat sikh, she would be chained up. No one has married outside the Jat Sikh caste in my family' (Modood, Beishon, and Virdee, 1994, p. 73).

In fact, the arranged marriage contract is more between two families rather than two individuals. The newly married couple is never quite independent and becomes part of the extended family network--similar in many ways to the situation in Britain prior to the Second World War. This provides security, support, provision of basic needs where necessary, and a degree of certainty. All in all, therefore, the family acts as a haven in an uncertain and often hostile environment. But it does this at great, often intangible, costs. First, the network and wider 'community', though sealed from outsiders, is rather like a goldfish bowl for those inside it. Consequently, the network systematically acts against individuals obtaining independence--particularly the young, but also the old--so that self-reliance, self-support, selfinitiative are all diminished. Indeed, individuality and autonomous behaviour are systematically discouraged so as to prevent any deviation from the very straight and narrow. There is, therefore, great restriction on the development of intererests in areas not deemed acceptable or familiar so that horizons become constrained and social conservatism becomes deeply ingrained.

The preservation of the family's 'good name' within the community centres around two key principles that help explain so much of the motives of actions by individual members. The first is 'honour' (or izzat--meaning standing in the community) and the second is 'shame' (or sharam). In a sense, the family is akin to a large Japanese company of old: members must be loyal, must not damage its reputation (incur shame), strive to improve its well-being and standing (honour), must be submissive to its senior management (the elders) (16), and membership involves a lifetime contract. Again, there are advantages to this, particularly if the outside environment is hostile and unwelcoming. But, abuses within the family are largely hidden from the outside, and it is women in particular who suffer most from the 'Scylla and Charibdis' of honour and shame. Breaching these principles leads to great hardship, particularly for women hi the ghettos. For those unfortunate enough to be in such a situation, they soon find how few, if any, allies are available and sanctions against them can be severe (SBS, 1994, 2001); outsiders tend to be confronted by a 'wall of silence'.

Alongside the family, religion plays an extremely important role--much more so than for whites and Caribbeans (Modood and Berthoud, pp. 297-308). The famous explanation Marx (1977, 244) provided for religion as being the 'sigh of the oppressed' 'heart of a heartless world', and 'the opium of the people' still provides the most powerful reason for its existence. Yet genuine, religion, 'other-Worldly' feelings stemming from oppression must be contrasted with the strict and coercive enforcement of religious indoctrination that begins at a very young age. Choice on the matter is rarely on offer. The effects of this can be pernicious as independent and critical thinking is excluded; indeed, there is no need for it as all the answers are provided in a religion's texts and rituals. Moreover, to criticise the religion is decreed blasphemous and invariably leads to being rebuked and ostracised. Hence, perhaps for the majority of British Asians, life must be led in accordance with the dictates of the religion: pray, go to temple, mosque, or gurdwara, conform with whatever eating and drinking requirements and taboos are set out, dress appropriately, marry in accordance with the religion, and so on.

In reality, religion acts as a very powerful control apparatus, and religious leaders enjoy respect, power, and influence within 'their' community. Whereas for centuries, religion has been used to justify the politics of rulers as well as of the oppressed, in the modern era, it is above all in 'Islamic' countries that the political use of religion has become so prevalent. Partly this must be related to the failure of secular political movements to offer credible alternatives; the rise of Islamic parties can be viewed as a backlash to this failure. In a similar manner, the rise of Islam in Britain--but, albeit to a lesser extent, also of Hinduism and Sikhism--stems from the inadequacy of the polity, and an education system that has failed to be secular in a principled manner. The privileged position of Christianity within schools has understandably given rise to resentment by adherents of other faiths, so much so that this adherence manifests itself in an even more intense manner--and this intensity is transmitted onto children. Furthermore, for reasons of tradition and custom, parents are driven to impose their religion onto their children as part of their duty and requirement; moreover, not to do so can lead them into the realm of shame and dishonour within the religious community.

Unquestioning loyalty to the faith nestles nicely with the same for family, religious group, and class. There is thus the construction of a powerful edifice within the Asian ghetto that is extremely resistant to outside influence. The more traditional elements, usually the male elders (who like to be portrayed as the leaders of their communities) act zealously in preserving this edifice and rail against the 'corrupting influence of the West' (SBS, 1990, p. 42). The hypocrisy of this is sail-evident. The edifice will crack when their power and influence is broken--alongside the altering conditions of the economy and politics of the ghettos which accelerates this process.

Breaking down the ghettos

Helping to break free from the ghetto requires a concerted inclusiveness into mainstream society in both mental and material terms. Crucially, however, there must be the ending of noxious racism in all its forms, notably in the fields of employment, housing, policing, and other public services, and also in private businesses. Support must be provided to those struggling to shake off the shackles imposed on them; particularly girls and women. True, women's oppression exists in all societies but the differences in degree are marked.

In the West, economic development and the concomitant rise of a high degree of economic independence of women has led to incessant campaigns for equality in all spheres of life; and laws enacted that, in intent at least, outlaw systematic discrimination. Though full equality is a long way from being achieved, the gains have been real and tangible.

Susan Okin persuasively posits a sharp conflict between multiculturalism and feminism (taken to mean women's equality). She contends that ethnic minority cultures invariably deny women equal rights and so allowing minorities special 'group rights' will inevitably cement women's oppression within these communities. Demands for 'group rights' arise where minority groups are threatened with extraction, or their culture is being diluted into the main stream. It is argued that the state should, therefore, accord special privileges to the group as a whole so that its customs are given legal protection even where some of these c]ash with the general law that applies to everyone else (Okin, 1999, p 11, pp. 31-34). As a principle, this casts the net too wide. Minorities can be protected even if no tolerance is shown to their practicing internal oppression. Therefore, at its core, the principle must not only he to protect the oppressed group as a whole, but also its members from oppression within the group, and this collision requires, as set out in the introduction, the curtailing of the freedom of cultural and religious expression. Following from this principle, progressives should not agree to the granting of carte blanche rights to minority groups: yes, these should be afforded full support and protection from racist abuse, threats, and discrimination, but not allowed to conduct oppressive practices in the name of culture, religion, custom, or tradition.

Writing from a socialist perspective, my contention, however, goes beyond Okin's. That is, multiculturalism can, and does, also oppress children, boys, and indeed (albeit to a lesser extent) men. The edifice in Asian ghettos encompasses all these but certainly gives rather more rights to men. But men are strongly conditioned to behave in a sexist manner from a young age: it should always be remembered that in poor or working class families, girls are still considered a liability whereas boys are an asset. Usually, there is some leeway for boys in adolescence and pre-marriage years that rarely exists for girls. Marriage, however, is crunch time., a major transformation takes place, so much so that any previous 'modern' ideas and practices young men may have are rapidly cast aside, and a conservative, conforming, social life is strongly planned for their future, and invariably embarked upon. Often then, in the name of identity and pride, reactionary, oppressive, ideas can take hold and to the common refrain: yes, we are different, proud to be so, and proud to retain our cultural heritage. So it is that the policing of girls is often conducted by their brothers and those girls brave enough to veer away from the well-trodden path are sharply rebuked and brought into line.

The creation and sustaining of ghettos as a phenomenon of self-preservation of minority groups is quite understandable. Safety in numbers within one's own community, and the familiarity and trust this engenders provides a powerful impulse for remaining within the confines of the ghetto. Those trapped within, tending to be the poorest section of society, often take an inverted pride in reactionary ideas and customs combined with the positive view of their racial origin. There is, therefore, a double struggle necessary: the major one against racism in all its manifestations but also one against oppressive customs, with women having the added burden of dealing with oppression within society as a whole. And to this end, there also exist several Asian organisations in Britain bravely campaigning and bringing to the wider public abusive practices in regard to women. A prominent group, the Southall Black Sisters (1990, p. 16) has taken to task the Left's reluctance to join the cause, arguing that multiculturalism (with its tolerance of oppressive practices in the name of 'cultural difference') and anti-racists have 'colluded in practice'; amounting to, in reality, a noninterventionist stance. I think this is an accurate charge.

The key proposition is that those attempting to fight racism must realise that that struggle is weakened, even demeaned, by the pervasive, oppressive practices that are committed within the oppressed community. At the very least there is an anomaly, and it is for those who are the most principled opponents of oppression to point this out, campaign against it where they can, and offer support to whose who are offering resistance. This will not be easy, and there are no ready-made formulae for achieving this. No doubt, mistakes will be made, but better to take this position than abstain. In reality, tensions will be inevitable where, on some issues, for example, campaigning against the recent war in Afghanistan or against racism, the Left unites with the Asian 'community leaders', yet on others, the Left will have to work against them in challenging oppressive practices.

Indeed, campaigning against imperialist wars such as that in Afghanistan war is just the type of joint activity that the Left needs to conduct in a principled manner--but also to defend, and show solidarity with, Muslim groups targeted by racists and sections of the media. Through such joint action, the Left can begin to take up the argument of women's oppression in Islamic societies and, in so doing, begin to pull at least some towards progressive thinking and away from oppressive practices. (17)

To some extent, the fear of a 'dilution of culture' (or, more accurately, its altering through absorbing aspects of others and the creation of new cultural traits) is prevalent in all communities, though it is undoubtedly greatest in Asians and perhaps least in Afro-Caribbeans. Socio-economic advancement, alongside a diminution of racism, is certainly likely to reduce this fear. Nonetheless, the argument needs forcefully to he made that rather than this transformation being something to fear, it is enormously enriching in an increasingly closer and integrated world. Yet, it is clear that out of fealty to the home country and its traditions and customs, there is very great reluctance, and even hostility, to change on the part of first generation Asian migrants. Perhaps this ought to be expected and is certainly quite explicable. But what is rather paradoxical is the manner in which this generation has successfully enforced its norms onto the second generation. As noted earlier, culture is not created in a vacuum, but rather is a manifestation of the level of development of a society; in Marx's terminology, it is part of the 'superstructure' that emanates from the 'economic base'. But what if the cultural superstructure is transposed onto a more advanced economic base (as, for example, in the case of a rural Asian culture and an advanced capitalist base)? We would surely expect the culture to 'adapt' to the new base? However, in Asian ghettos, the cultural superstructure seems almost impervious to change. Why is this so? The reason for the rigid adherence to the culture stems largely from inertia--this is what has always been done, to the extent that it is quite unthinkable and even intolerable to change, even for younger generations. Moreover, a hostile external environment can accentuate this rigidity or even a retreat hack into it by those who have perhaps veered away to a significant extent.

Also, we need to take account of time lags: it may take more than two or three generations for the 'realignment process' to be completed. Furthermore, political factors may also be influential: where there are major struggles challenging the existing order, the casting away of reactionary cultural mores are likely to be more quickly realised. Perhaps, therefore, the cocooning of she younger generations of Asians in their parents' cultural straitjacket is partly a reflection of the grip of conservative ideas during the 1980s and 1990s. It remains a central task of the Left to vigorously challenge conservative policies and ideologies and, by so doing, help the loosening up of this straitjacket. Possibly, the currently blossoming worldwide anti-globalisation/capitalist movement will prove a key force in this.

An example of how not to tackle the problem of Asian ghettos was provided by the shocking opportunism of the supposedly left-wing Labour MP for Keighley, Ann Cryer. (18) Her suggestion to impose immigration controls on Pakistani men chosen for marriage to Bradford's Muslim women on the grounds that the former lack English and 'import poverty', and that this perpetuates the ghettos, was foolish and irresponsible. At the time of intense NF/BNP activity in Bradford that led to the riots in early July 2001, she should have been denouncing their presence and the poison they spread. Moreover, as an MP of the ruling government, she should be calling for a massive injection of resources into all the deprived communities of Bradford, and an end to the racism that permeates every aspect of life. In regard to lack of English on the part of many Asian the solution is obvious: provide English language tuition for those who need it. Only after doing this, could she legitimately have focused on cultural factors that entrench the ghettos. So, rather than calling for an immigration ban on poor Pakistanis, she could give support and publicity to the campaign to end forced marriages that the Home Office has finally been compelled to examine seriously after years of vigorous campaigning by women's groups (see SBS, 2001).

Similarly, the role of the 'community leaders' in Bradford needs to be questioned and exposed. The Bradford Race Review (2001, p. 10)--the survey was conducted before the July riots--came to she following explosive conclusion (and it is one that can equally be applied to 'community leaders' in all Asian ghettos): '[s]o called "community leaders" are self-styled, in league with the establishment key people and maintain the status quo of control and segregation through fear, ignorance and threats'. If this is a powerful indictment against theme then the following finding further adds weight to the argument that the influence of a key section of the leadership, that is, 'religious leaders' is acting directly against the interests of the Asian community: 'There is resentment towards the Asian community by sections of the white community who perceive hostile and mono-cultural religious leaders as [astonishingly] the advocates of segregation' (emphasis added).

These 'community leaders' advocate segregation, not only to ensure that tradition and culture is preserved but also to maintain power, influence, and control in their communities. Many of these leaders will be influential within the mosques. But their influence amongst young men, in Bradford at least, is likely to diminish after the astonishing act of allowing police to place photos of suspected rioters within the mosques, apparently at the request of the imams. Many of the rebellious young men will be shocked by this and begin to question the role of 'self-styled' religious leaders, especially in view of the shockingly long sentences handed out by the courts to many who had voluntarily turned themselves in. Thus, in all unexpected manner, the maintenance by community leaders of 'the status quo of control and segregation through fear, ignorance and threats' as highlighted by the Bradford Race Review, may become loosened.

Actions against cultural oppression

There is a tension and, at times conflict, between autonomy of a family and the desire to protect rights of individual members within a family--especially children. Allowing autonomy however, should not, as already argued, give a carte blanche as to acceptability. Obviously, physical abuse and violence must be disallowed, and the same applies with undue duress, as in intimidation or threats of violence or harm. There must also be firm opposition to an array of customs that fundamentally contradict the rights of an individual and cause great hardship and mental stress; practices which are an affront to the struggle for human liberation. Such customs are many and varied but examples, as already shown, include forced marriages, death for adultery, and dowry payments. However, apart from these severe examples, we cannot advocate interference within the confines of the family.

This inevitably means that coercive, oppressive, practices will continue. Consequently, within ghettos, arguments for a more rounded view of the world, and knowledge of fellow must largely come from outside the conies of the family and 'community'. For children, this is obviously best done in schools, and the importance of secular education in this regard, is paramount. This means that up to the age of eighteen, state education should be what it purports to be: rigorously secular. In practice, this means that the school becomes a religious-free space for children so that they are not artificially divided by the accident of birth of their parents' religions. They thus leave behind religious accouterments at home, and are able to learn in a free, equal, less divisive, and more tolerant environment. Consequent|y, the wearing in schools of religious or 'traditional' items such as the headscarf and veil by schoolgirls under the age of eighteen should be campaigned against with Socialist, and Left parties in general, having this included as a key secular principle in their manifestos. Religious critics will no doubt argue that this represents a type of 'secular fundamentalism' to which the response is obvious: only by all inclusive, religiously 'neutral' (that is, secular and equal) schooling can children obtain a rounded, unbiased, education--one that does not privilege one faith over others. This is an absolutely essential element in the struggle to break down ghettos and ghetto mentality.

Obviously, just as with campaigning for anti-racist legislation, campaigns can be, and indeed are being (currently, around eradication of forced marriages), conducted against some aspects of cultural oppression. Thus, legislation should be advocated only for the sorts of egregious acts, already noted, such as forced marriages, clitoridectomy, polygamy etc. Moreover, ill regard, say, to forced marriages, by outlawing these, there is also an implicit criticism of the system of arranged marriages--which rely, to varying degrees on at feast an element of coercion even when 'voluntarily' entered into. Indeed, for those advocating human emancipation in all spheres of life, arranged marriages should be an anathema. (19) But, this is not to advocate legislation against this practice: on the contrary, the right to arranged marriages should be guaranteed. As in all aspects, however, living in the ghetto makes it almost impossible to create a climate where a challenge to prevailing customs can be made.

Not only should schools be secular, they should also be ethnically mixed. The suggestion by the Labour government to bring in more 'faith-based' schools should, therefore, be fiercely resisted. Such schools entrench ghettoisation, but also largely deny children an understanding of others; cement in them the belief that 'their faith' is superior to all others, and potentially act as a conduit for intolerance. Just as we require schools to be free of racism and racial stereotyping, so we should require them not to privilege one religion over all others. This acts as an important counterweight to the off-intense indoctrination of one faith that Asian children receive at home. Indeed, this is analogous to the influence of racist thinking and language that some white children may receive from their parents. A child's accident of birth should not preclude a broad, critical, tolerant education. Though nominally secular, comprehensive schools may not always reach these goals: nonetheless, they are likely to be far better in the attempt than religious schools. Moreover, in rejecting yet more faith-based schools, a principled opposition needs to be made against existing faith schools (notably, Anglican, Catholic, and Jewish) so that they are phased out. That way, the charge of discrimination does not hold.

Not only should there be an ethnic mixing of school children, the same applies also to adults. Alas, in regard to Asians, this is far from straightforward. Cultural constraints mean that Asians infrequently attend pubs, clubs, leisure centres and swimming pools, sports event, theatre, evening classes, non-Asian concerts, non-Asian cinema, and non-Asian restaurants. Given that colour bars have practically disappeared, it appears that much of Asian social segregation is not so much because of racism, but rather is voluntary. True, there is a gender divide with men partaking in the above activities rather more than women, but the proportional involvement for both sexes is much less than for whites and Afro-Caribbeans. (20) Thus, social mixing needs to be systematically encouraged--particularly amongst young people. Schools, community centres, and civic groups need to be at the forefront of this. Sadly, in making what are rather obvious, even banal, suggestions, the stark reality is that this will not be easy, and will take considerable time. Innovative, challenging, ideas and actions are needed, especially from the young, including blacks, whites, and Asians. If such a dynamic can be created, then so too will struggles against cultural and racial oppression be intensified--and the tide can slowly turn towards inclusiveness, mixing, and de-ghettoisation.

Conclusion

The thrust of this article is that freedom of cultural and religious expression should be defended--but where this becomes oppressive, it ought to be opposed. Particular focus has been on girls and women, for the reason that it is they who suffer most from cultural and religious oppression and repression. A pernicious aspect of the conservative (with small 'c') thinking that permeates all Asian communities is that the rights and freedoms that women in the West have gained over centuries of campaigning and struggle are denigrated as 'corrupting', and unbecoming of 'modest' Asian girls and women. Equally, too, the 'corruption' extends to free and critical thinking, dissent, and opposition to such conservative views. So, it follows from this, that what is most corrupting and to be insulated against, is the call for human emancipation that the Left so proudly advocates.

What the riots in Oldham, Burnely, and Bradford during the summer of 2001 exposed is the 'chickens coming home to roost' syndrome. Poverty, unemployment, deprivation, and institutional racism have combined with oppressive, divisive, cultural practices and politics that buttress them, to create a cocktail that has become ripe for cancerous Nail activity to feed on. This cancer has to be crushed before it spreads, and one element in effectively doing this is the resistance to, and breaking down of, the oppressive cultural practices and segregation highlighted in this article. Indubitably, this will take time, and be fraught with difficulties and contradictions, but for the sake of future generations, the sooner it is done the better.

Table 1: Population by Ethnic Group, Great Britain, April 2001

Ethnic Category             Population in   % of total     % of ethnic
                              (thousands)     population    minority
                                                            population

Black or Black British
Black-Caribbean                    566          1.0         12.2
Black-African                      485          0.8         10.5
Black-Other                        98           0.2          2.1

Asian or Asian British
Indian                            1053          1.8         22.7
Pakistani                          747          1.3         16.1
Bangladeshi                        283          0.5          6.1
Other Asian                        248          0.4          5.3

Chinese                            247          0.4          5.3
Mixed                              677          1.2         14.6
Other                              231          0.4          5.0

All ethnic minority               4635          7.9          100

Source: Census 2001 Summary, ONS, 2003

Table 2: Proportion of Ethnic Minorities having white partners
(per cent)

Caribbean   Caribbean   India   Indian   Pakistani and   Pakistani and
  Men         Women       Men     Women    Bangladeshi     Bangladeshi
                                           Men             Women

                            British-born
50             33         19      10          N/a            N/a

                                Total
32             23          9       5           7              4

Source: British-born figures from Modood and Berthoud (and others),
1997, p. 29; Total figures ONS, 1996 table 2.8 (Caribbeans given as
Black in this report).

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Willem Meijs and anonymous referees for several helpful comments

Notes

(1.) First draft submitted in January 2002.

(2.) The September 11 suicide attacks in New York and Washington, whose impact has been truly enormous, have direct implications for some of the arguments made in this article. One impact has been to focus attention on the Muslim community in the West. I briefly attempt to incorporate some of the implications of this but still wish to address my critique here on the Asian community in general. Though focused on Britain, the thrust of my argument also has direct relevance for Asian ghettos in other Western countries.

(3.) For a discussion of these earlier riots see Hasan, 1999.

(4.) But it also needs reminding that Western states, notably the US, rarely have qualms about supporting regimes that tolerate reactionary practices in their countries (Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Pakistan etc).

(5.) Tariq Ali makes essentially this point with reference to Islam in his Clash of Fundamentalisms, 2002, p. 5.

(6.) Office for National Statistics (ONS), Summary of 2001 Census, 2003.

(7.) Ibid.

(8.) See Lakey, 1997, for a discussion of the 'choice' and constraints' approaches.

(9.) For example, in Bradford, Sikhs and Hindus have been gravitating towards Pudsey, leaving the Asian inner city areas predominantly to Muslims (Bradford Race Review, 2001, p. 9). Moreover, a degree of inter-ethnic sectarianism appears to be taking hold in voting habits. In the Bradford West election in 1997, 61 per cent of Pakistanis voted for Mohammad Riaz, the Conservative candidate, compared with only 35 per cent for Marsha Singh, the winning Labour candidate. By contrast, 74 per cent of Indians voted for Singh, and 23 per cent for Riaz (Anwar, 1998, p. 20).

(10.) Sometimes, it is argued that this is simply analogous to Western women wearing miniskirts (Al-Hibri, 1999, P. 44). The argument is so crass that it does not deserve to be taken seriously: one is a symbol of fashion (now largely outmoded) whilst the other, as mentioned, is asserting a religious/cultural practice largely based on coercion. Even in a society such as occupied Palestine that is struggling against absolute subjugation, practices that are repressive towards women (hence weakening the struggle for liberation) are occurring, as with the notorious 'honour killings' (see Hamzeh, 2001).

(11.) My thanks to Olenka Frankel for pointing out this source.

(12.) Bhugra et al.'s study of suicide amongst ethnic minorities in West London showed that the suicide rate among Asian women reader 30 years of age was 2.5 times those of white women and seven times those of Asian men. Also see Chew-Graham et al., 2002.

(13.) Pressure of conforming to the family's religion can also cause great distress. See, for example, in regard to Islam, some of the testimonies cited on the website of 'The Institute for the Secularisation of Islamic Society' (http://www.secularislam.org/).

(14.) Millett, 1971, pp. 26, 31.

(15.) In many ways Britain is, in this regard, at the forefront in Europe. Look, for example, at the contents of supermarkets now compared with say 30 years ago. True, this is so because the proliferation of different products from across the globe has become profitable; supermarkets do not sell these out of the goodness of their hearts. But, it is also an indication of the willingness of the white population to buy types of foods that their parents or grandparents would not have dreamed of doing, regardless of reasons of availability or cost. In the culinary sense, there has been a real breaking out of the 'Little England' straitjacket. In the same vein, British tourists often consider Indian and Chinese restaurants in Mediterranean resorts as providing 'home food'. This is certainly a healthy sign more ways than one.

(16.) There is an array of terms to describe relationships within a family. Much of this is hierarchical (in some ways analogous to terms used by commononers vis-a-vis royalty or the aristocracy)--so much so that elders within (and not just) a family are given deferential terms, and deferential behaviour and automatic respect (whether it is deserved or not, is never for debate) is to be expected and required. For a flavour of these terms, it is worth browsing through any book written by an Asian novelist dealing with Asian family affairs.

(17.) Clearly, there is much to be said about the impact of the war on Muslim communities in Britain but there is insufficient space here to consider the ramifications of this extremely important issue.

(18.) Following on the footsteps of Cryer, the Home Secretary, David Blunkett, has also made some crass remarks regarding Asians, including that Asian families ought to speak English at home (Guardian, 16 September 2002).

(19.)A seemingly cogent argument in defence of arranged marriages is that they seem to work, whereby the divorce rate that results much lower than that emanating from 'love marriages'. In fact, the argument is bogus. The divorce rate is a product of the changing nature of society and the refusal of women in particular to put up with intolerable husbands, in an era when there has been a major advance in women's economic independence. The divorce rate in previous generations was, as in arranged marriages, minimal. In Britain, Asian women are much les economically independent so do not have any real choice in leaving unhappy marriages. This is compounded by pressures from 'honour and shame' to keep the marriage intact. But, with a rise in their education and economic independence, we can expect the divorce rate also to rise and, at the same time, to see a decline not just in arranged marriages, but marriage in general, slowly to be replaced by co-habitation, as is happening in other communities (Berthoud, 2000). Modood, Beishon, and Virdee (1994, p. 77) suggest that the 'current practice of second generation Asians [broadly supportive of arranged marriages] maybe lagging behind attitudinal changes and represent a 'lull before the storm' as attitudes formed in the context of modern youth culture meet head-on pre-modern forms of family life' (which the TV series Goodness Gracious Me so wonderfully lampooned).

(20.) Participation in sporting leisure activities tends to be less for both Asian men and women in comparison with blacks and whites. However, pakistani and Bangladeshi women partake in much less such activity than Indians. The same applies to young people and various leisure activities. See ONS, 1996, tables 5.17 and 5-18.

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Rumy Husan is senior lecturer in the Development of Emerging Markets, Leeds University Business School, University of Leeds.