Critical incident management in the ultimate crisis.

"I've learned that emergencies can only be managed by people at the site. They can't be managed back in Washington."(1)

"Expect the unexpected and be prepared to adjust accordingly. The importance of limiting those things that any executive should attempt to do in the time allowed, and the importance of carefully choosing one's battles, is implicit in the fact that some of the toughest of those battles will be chosen for you."(2)

- Government officials following the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power facility.

These two observations also could apply to other catastrophic events, including terrorist attacks, that have plagued the United States for the past several years. The International Association of Chiefs of Police defines a disaster as an incident that threatens to or actually takes lives, causes substantial risk to property or the well-being of the community or a segment of that community, or requires a commitment of resources beyond those normally available.(3) Such incidents may become more frequent and deadly as criminals and terrorist groups exploit the availability of chemical substances, biological agents, and nuclear materials to construct weapons of mass destruction. Reasons for accessibility include the increased volume and types of substances produced, the failure of security systems to protect the materials, the transfer of prohibited weapons to irresponsible governments. or the proliferation of various materials to countries that previously did not perceive a need for sophisticated weaponry.

The criminal use of chemical, biological, or nuclear materials could result in a disaster unparalleled in U.S. history, and test the government's ability to avoid panic, disorientation, and loss of confidence in ensuring the public's safety. The specter of terrorist acts with catastrophic consequences remains of great concern to those individuals charged with combating such attacks. Leaders in the public emergency response and management sectors may face situations that could consume their processes, procedures, and capabilities. Emergency personnel may exhaust their experience, devotion, training, and capability attempting to protect the public from potentially catastrophic and devastating consequences. What critical incident management procedures are available for dealing with such incidents?

UNDERSTANDING THE FEDERAL ROLE

Within the federal government, systems exist that will respond to assist local, county, and state governments in mitigating the impact of a threat or actual misuse of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

* The FBI serves as the lead federal agency for resolving a crisis perpetrated by a malevolent element in a WMD incident occurring within the United States and its territories.

* The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) supports the FBI by coordinating consequence management (e.g., evacuation planning or search and rescue efforts) of a WMD incident. However, because crisis and consequence management may occur at the same time and require close coordination, the FBI remains the lead federal agency until the attorney general transfers that role to FEMA.

* The U.S. Department of State is the lead agency in coordinating U.S. resources in response to a WMD incident in a foreign country should that government request such assistance.

* The U.S. Department of Defense provides specialized technical resources to assist in the mitigation of WMD devices or the consequences of their misuse, to supply logistical support to other federal responders, and to furnish additional assistance as defined by the situation and directed by the President.

* The U.S. Department of Energy provides technical and scientific assistance to locate hidden nuclear material; to diagnose a suspected, improvised nuclear device; to plan the disablement of a nuclear yield or radiological dispersal device: and to advise local authorities on the hazards and effects.

* The Public Health Service and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention respond with technical and scientific personnel and equipment to assist in the mitigation of the health concerns that could arise from various aspects of WMD misuse.

* Other federal agencies will respond with personnel and resources if the threat or attack requires their unique resources or jurisdictional authority.

Because criminal misuse or the threat of misuse of chemical, biological, or nuclear materials on a domestic target poses the ultimate management challenge for public safety agencies and government leaders, these federal responders will complement, and in many cases supplement, the resources of cities, counties, and states. While managing this multiagency response proves difficult, good planning, practice, and patience make it achievable.

MANAGING THE CRISIS

Generally, two ways exist to manage a crisis. One involves ignoring the need to define a command structure before a crisis occurs and then being forced to create such a structure during the incident. This route requires that onsite command or management personnel create a working incident structure while simultaneously attempting to manage the crisis. The risk of creating additional crises in the midst of managing one is almost guaranteed. The second option involves defining the incident command, coordination, communication, and operational direction.

The unified command and control of the incident, the setting of strategic and tactical goals, and the integration of resources from all responding agencies determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the government response. Therefore, the most pressing question for emergency management professionals is how they can direct resources from many agencies of different disciplines at all levels of government in a meaningful and coordinated way to address a potential technical disaster and maintain the confidence of the citizens who may become the victims. At the same time, these professionals face additional crisis management difficulties, including changing management objectives, differing value systems, political harassment, too little data, too much data, poor data-handling methods, little planning, insufficient time to learn, confusion, and fatigue.(4) What should these crisis managers do'?

The Incident Command System

The Incident Command System (ICS), which many fire, police, and emergency management agencies have used since its inception in 1970, may hold some of the answers. The ICS requires planning and practice on the part of the participating agencies. Unfortunately, it is impossible for the various emergency response agencies at all levels of government to develop and practice plans with one another to address the uncountable scenarios in the thousands of different venues across the United States. However, an application of ICS to accommodate different levels of response represents an alternative to this maze of potential pairings of responding agencies. Through a well-developed ICS. state and local governments can alert their state, local, and county response agencies and deploy them under the predefined ICS, thus ensuring that a unified command and response team immediately begins to address the crisis and its consequences.

The Joint Operations Center 

In response to a domestic misuse of weapons of mass destruction incident, a presidential directive designates the FBI as the lead agency of all federal resources. To facilitate this responsibility, the FBI employs a joint operations center (JOC), a concept similar to that of the state-level ICS. This center coordinates interagency operational and support needs of the deployment and manages joint agency public information and media interaction. The federal agencies that respond to such incidents have worked with the FBI in exercises and drills based on the JOC concept. Commanders from the various responding federal and state agencies converge as a joint operations command coalition to address critical decisions regarding incident resolution. The FBI designates a special agent in charge (SAC) to convene and head this command group. The SAC may recommend technical and scientific actions with potential catastrophic consequences to higher federal authority as required. The SAC also maintains a direct line of communication to the FBI director and the attorney general. The critical interfacing and coordinating of state and local operations with federal operations, and vice versa, occur through the various elements of the JOC. A close working relationship of all levels of government in this type of crisis management is not an option; it is essential.

The ICS and JOC Interface

How does the JOC interface with the state and local ICS? Unification of command and integration of operations is critical. Specialized federal technical and scientific resources can rely on the FBI, including its personnel with whom they have practiced, for a single format of decision making that remains the same no matter which community hosts the incident. The local FBI office where the incident occurs holds the key to managing deployed federal personnel and resources and organizing the JOC. Already familiar with state and local resources, these FBI offices must become acquainted with the ICS response plans for those states or communities within their regions. This melding of command and control resources builds a bridge between the federal JOC and the state ICS.

Moreover, the responsibility for initiating familiarization briefings and training programs at all government levels in this type of crisis management rests equally with state and FBI officials in the various regions. The designated incident commanders of the state or local ICS and the SAC of the JOC should work together through exercises and drills prior to a real test of their capabilities. The success of melding federal technical and scientific resources, which are unknown to local and state responders, with state and local personnel and resources will occur only through the management skills of the state ICS incident commanders and the SAC. For example, the management of the Oklahoma City bombing incident illustrates how the meaningful use of multiagency resources succeeded because of planning, preparation, and joint alliances. The former Oklahoma City chief of police noted the importance of establishing relationships with federal authorities and the local fire chief before a crisis because of the difficulty in doing so once the crisis begins. The federal and local response will become a unified incident command at the time of a crisis only with cooperation and preplanning on a local level between state ICS and FBI commanders. Predetermination of roles and responsibilities, crisis training and exercising of personnel, and a desire to prepare for the unfathomable will permit this melding of FBI and local crisis management resources. A federal report emphasizes this point in two statements: "Unified command...is essential...to avoid chaos and coordinate tactical activities" and "[t]he issue of who is the primary agency in charge is not to be determined on the emergency scene."(5)

CONCLUSION

Preparation for managing a weapons of mass destruction incident first requires an appreciation of the magnitude of the potential consequences. When all involved responding agencies have that awesome outcome in full focus, they will understand the truly essential elements of planning, training, cooperation, liaison, resource definition, and coherent public policy implementation. Therefore, crisis managers cannot wait for such an incident to occur to perfect a process for handling the next one. They must manage the first event intelligently and with a meaningful application of resources and leadership at all levels of government.

Endnotes

1 "Crisis Management: 10 Key Lessons from the Three Mile Island Experience," Public Affairs Review (1985): 26.

2 Ibid.

3 Critical Incident Management course, International Association of Chiefs of Police, Alexandria, VA, 1991.

4 Robert Kupperman, Facing Tomorrow's Terrorist Incident Today (Washington, DC: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1977).

5 Report of the Joint Fire/Police Task Force on Civil Unrest (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency and the U.S. Fire Administration, 1904).

Mr. Carlson, a certified protection professional of the American Society for Industrial Security and retired FBI special agent, currently serves as a member of the technical staff working on counterterrorism and criminal use of nuclear materials issues at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Mr. Carlson is a member of the IACP.