Cristoforo Landino and Coluccio Salutati on the best of life.

AN IMPORTANT ISSUE IN THE study of fifteenth-century Florentine humanism is whether or not later Quattrocento humanists advocate a withdrawal from public life and abandon the "civic" humanism of Salutati, Bruni, and the early Quattrocento humanists.(1) There is no lack of studies on this question using the categories of vita activa and vita contemplativa.(2) In broad terms, the early fifteenth-century Florentine humanists, reacting against the medieval scholastic world view, are seen as advocating the supremacy of the vita activa though still valuing the vita contemplativa, while the midfifteenth-century humanists, under the influence of the Medici and Marsillo Ficino's Platonic studies, are considered to have reversed the earlier emphasis on the "civic" outlook for the supremacy of the contemplative life and a withdrawal from public affairs.(3)

Cristoforo Landino is often cited as a prime example of these later "uncivic" humanists, and h's Disputationes Camaldulenses (1472) is given as evidence for this position.(4) Eugenio Garin, for example, argues that Landino urges a withdrawal from public affairs for a contemplative life. However, Arthur Field in his recent study of the Platonic Academy in Florence holds that Landino is concerned with politics and seeks to influence the Florentine political structures.(5)

Field in particular argues that Landino values social involvement and through his writings and lectures in the Florentine Studio he institutionalizes Ficino's Platonic studies and aids political stability and Medici control in Florence. Field holds that Landino seeks to give poetry a philosophical basis by mens of the allegorical interpretation of poets. According to Field, through the use of allegorical interpretations Landino instructs his students in the morals of Ficino's Platonic philosophy, with the goal that they will avoid political ambitions opposed to the Medici. In regard to the Disputationes, Field concentrates on the second half of the work, arguing that it is an allegorical account of the ascent of the soul and not a defense of the contemplative life. However, Field's examination does not place Landino's thought in the larger context of the philosophical traditions with which Landino is conversant.

I agree with Field that Landino emphasizes social involvement and the Disputationes describes the soul's ascent, though I do not think the work indicates a strong ideological support for political control by the Medici. Whereas Field examines primarily the text of the Disputatioties, I will consider the philosophical tradition on which Landino relies in book I of the work in relatlon to the categories of the active and contemplative lives. I will show that Landino's terminology has been misunderstood and consequently his views on social involvement misinterpreted. I will argue that Landino follows Thomas Aquinas for his views of the best life and his use of Thonias places him in a philosophical tradition adopted by Coluccio Salutati. Based on these points, I will argue that there is not as strong a discontniuity between Landino and the earlier Florentine humanists regarding a civic outlook as has been generally accepted. Moreover, I will show that Landino's views have similarities with those of his contemporary thinkers, notably Ficino and Pico. In this way the philosophical context in which Landino is writing reveals his relation to earlier and later Florentine humanists and leads us to reevaluate his status as an "uncivic" humanist teaching Ficino's Platonism in support of the Medici.

The Disputationes Camaldulenses is among Landino's best known works. Briefly stated, it is a dialogue ill four books concerning the best life (book I), the highest good (book 2), and an allegorical interpretation of the first six books of Virgil's Aeneid (books 3 and 4).

If one reads the title to book I found in the first printed edition of the Disputationes, "Christophori Landini Florentini Ad Illustrissimum Federicum Principem Urbinatum Disputationum Camaldulensium Liber Primus De Vita Contemplativa Et Activa Feliciter Incipit" ("From Christophorus Landinus of Florence to the most illustrious Federicus Prince of Urbino, book i of the Camaldulensian Disputations concerning the contemplative life and the active life auspiciously begins") several lines later one will read Landino's description of the work as the sermones, "quos Leonem Baptistam Albertuni . . . de duplici quod proprium hominis sit vivendi genere atque de bonorum malorumque finibus etiam ex divino Maronis poetae figmento habuisse meminerim" ("which I remember Leon Baptista Alberti to have held colicernnig the twofold genera of living which is proper to humans and concerning the ends of good and evil and the figments of the divine poet Maro [Virgil]"). From these statements, one naturally assumes that the "duplici vivendi genere" to be discussed in book I are the "vita contemplativa et activa" of the title, aii assuniptloii that is misleading. Nowhere in the Diqputationes does Landino use or discuss the phrases "vita activa" or "vita contemplativa," nor are the phrases used in the title Landino originally gave to book I.

The first printed edition of the Disputationes, made ca. 1480 by Nicolaus Alamannus of Florence, has some corrections perhaps made by Landino.(6) However, the original manuscript (now in the Vatican), the one corrected by Landino and sent to Federicus of Urbino, has the title: "Christophorl Landini Florentini ad illustrissimumFe dericum [sic] Urbinatum principem Chamaldulensium disputationum liber primus contemplatio an actio preferenda sit feliciter incipit."(7) ("From Christophorus Landinus of Florence to the most llustrious Federicus Prince of Urbino, book I of the Camaldulensian Disputations, whether contemplation or action is to be preferred, auspiciously begins.") The index to the Biblioteca di Urbino, compiled at the time of Federicus, lists the manuscript received from Landino as having the same title as the Vatican manuscript.(8)

The title in the published edition of "De vita contemplativa et activa"--which has become the title for most later editions, including the modern critical edition - leads the reader into an assumption that the original title should not do. Landino's original title to book I, given in the Vatican manuscript, of "Contemplatio an actio preferenda sit" should not lead one to assume that the later statement "de duplici vivendi genere" refers to the vita activa and vita contemplativa. In fact, one should recognize that Landino's real intention in book I is to determine whether action or contemplation is better for attaining the summum bonum (the subject of book 2). In the Disputationes, Landino does not consider action and contemplation (and speculation) to be genera vitae. Rather he considers them to be categories of the ascent of the soul to God, and he uses other terms for the vitae.(9)

In the Disputationes, Landino holds there to be two genera vitae, otium and negotium. The modern reader needs to recognize that there is a crucial distinction between otium/negotium and action/ contemplation. For Landino, the former terms refer to modes of life, studious learning or civic involvement, while the latter terms refer to operations of the mind.(10) One can be very involved in negotium and be contemplative, and one can be very otiosus and be far from contemplation.

Landino shows at the outset that the "duplici vivendi genere" are otium and negotium by his praise of Federicus, whom he says has excelled in both the otiosa vita and the negotiosa vita.(11) Landino pralses Federicus because even though busy with governing his city negotium), Federicus still sets aside time each day for otium. At the beginning of the dialogue proper, the character Leon Baptista Alberti recommends to another character, Lorenzo de'Medici, this practice of uniting both modes of life, saying that it is the best method by which our souls can acquire virtues, return to their origin, and have true understanding of ourselves and others.(12)

Based on this distinction in Landino's terminology, we can properly understand Alberti's statement of the problem of the disputation in book I: "And since you ask it, I propose to dispute both genera of life, and so I will proceed first to each one individually, then I will compare them between themselves, so that although in this life in which we live, we then finally hold most perfect the one that unites them both, yet which one is more excellent will appear first."(13) Using the Ciceronian "in utramque partem" method of discussion, Landino in book I argues that the best life unites otium and negotium while acknowledging that otium is superior to negotium when the two modes are compared.(14)

The philosophical source for Landino's views on the best life gives us an insight into his relation to earlier humanists. In the dialogue of book I, the character Alberti closely follows Thomas Aquinas's discussion in the Summa Theologiae, 2a-2ae, questions 179-82.(15) However, Thomas titles his discussion in the Summa Theologiae "De vita activa et contemplativa," and although Landino relies upon Thomas's arguments, there is a notable difference in their terminology. Landino does not refer to actio, contemplatio, or speculatio as vitae; rather he says they are munera.(16) Moreover, where Thomas uses the term contemplatio, Landino generally uses speculatio, with the result that Landino more often compares action to speculation than action to contemplation. This aspect is particularly important not only because it follows a distinction Thomas makes in the Summa Theologiae, 2a-2ae, question 180, article 4 between two types of contemplation, one dealing with divine truths and one dealing with divine effects, but also because this distinction was important for Coluccio Salutati. As I will show, for Salutati the contemplative life is superior to the active life, but the speculative life is not. However, while he also relies on Thomas, Landino argues not only that contemplation is superior to action, but that speculation is also. The reason Landino reaches a different conclusion than Salutati is due to the fact that Landino is concerned to show that the soul ascends from action to speculation to contemplation.(17)

The allegorical interpretatioii of Virgil in books 3 and 4 of the Disputationes shows that Landino relies on methods and ideas used by Coluccio Salutati in his De laboribus Herculis.(18) Besides using the De laboribus, it is also possible that Latidino was led to study Thomas Aquinas on the active and contemplative life through other writings of Salutati. While Salutati is certainly not a Thomist, there are two significant instances Salutati is works where he argues for the superiority of the contemplative life over the active life, a notion that seems out of place in the overall nature of Salutati's civic outlook, but both on closer inspectioii are related to Thomas.

In his arguments for the superiority of the law in the De nobilitate legum et medicinae, Salutati distinguishes contemplation from speculation and says that this distintion is also made by "others."(19) Salutati states that the life of coiiteniplatioii is superior to the active life but does iiot discuss the coiitemplative life beyoiid this. Rather his discussion in the De niobilitate inlvolves speculation, which he says is the study of truths, and not contemplation, which is the end of all actions and eternal perfection.(20)

Salutati takes this distinction between contemplation and speculation from Thomas's Summa Theologiae, 2a-2ae, question 180, article 4 ("Utrum vita contemplativa solum consistat in contemplatione Dei an etiam in consideratione cuiuscumque veritatis"), and question 182, answer 4 ("Utrum vita activa sit prior quam contemplativa"), and so is able to hold that the contemplative life is superior to the active life, though the speculative life is not. As a comparison of the texts shows, Salutati follows Thomas, although he abridges Thomas's arguments:

Summa Theologiae, 2a-2ae, question 180, article 4 (That there are two types

of contemplation)

(Obj. I) It would seem that the contemplative life consists not only in the

contemplation of God, but also in the consideration of any truth.

(Resp.) I answer that, as stated above (a. 2), a thing may belong to the contemplative

life in two ways: principally, and secondarily, or dispositively.

That which belongs principally to the contemplative life is the contemplation

of the divine truth, because this contemplation is the end of the whole

human life. Hence Augustine says in De trinitate (1.8) that the contemplation

of God is promised us as being the goal of all our actions and the everlasting

perfection of our joys. This contemplation will be perfect in the

life to come, when we shall see God face to face, wherefore it will make

us perfectly happy: whereas now the contemplation of the divine truth is

competent to us imperfectly, namely through a glass and in a dark manner.

Hence it bestows on us a certain inchoate beatitude, which begins now and

will be continued in the life to come . . . Since, however, God's effects

show us the way to the contemplation of God Himself . . . it follows that

the contemplation of the divine effects also belongs to the contemplative

life.

Summa Theologiae, 2a-2ae, question 182, article 4 (Whether the active life

both precedes and follows the contemplative life)

I answer that, a thing is said to precede in two ways. First, with regard to

its nature; and in this way the contemplative life precedes the active, inasmuch

as it applies itself to things which precede and are better, wherefore

it moves and directs the active life . . . Secondly, a thing precedes with regard

to us, because it comes first in the order of generation. In this way the active precedes the contemplative life, because it disposes one to it.(21) De nobilitate legum et medicinae

Nor am I unaware that many use indifferently and almost as synonyms these two terms, speculation and contemplation. But contemplation as it is preferred to action is diverse from speculation. For in this sense it means the end of all action and the eternal perfection of joy, which is never able to be achieved in this life, but is achieved in heaven, when God will be all in all and we will not see in a mirror darkly, but as He is. In which sense I admit the active precedes the contemplative in time, while the contemplative incomparably precedes in merit and in reason. But if you posit contemplation as it is only the speculation on truth, I say it precedes the active life neither in reason nor in time. This speculation is a certain kind of action, not preferable according to virtue of operation neither in matter nor in merit. So that what is read among others and what we ought to say always ought to be assumed according to this distinction in every case of this kind, but for now it suffices to have reviewed this little aspect concerning the habit of speculation and to pass on to certitude of knowledge.(22)

It is interesting what Salutati has done with Thomas's distincjtion between the two types of contemplation. The first type of contemplation, that which pertains to divine truths and is perfected in a vision of God, Salutati calls "contemplatio." The second type of contemplation, that which deals with divine effects, Salutati calls "speculatio." Salutati then says contemplatio corresponds to that which precedes and is preferable to the active life, while speculatio corresponds to that which follows the active life.(23) Based on this distinction from Thomas, Salutati is able to discuss the superiority of the active life to the speculative life without having to defend the contemplative life. Salutati is quite consistent in his use of terms throughout the De nobilitate, comparing the "vita activa" to the "vita speculativa," not the "vita contemplativa."(24)

In his letter to Peregrino Zambeccari, Salutati again discusses the active and contemplative lives, giving the superiority to the latter but recommending the former as preferable.(25) The section in which Salutati discusses the superiority of the contemplative life is again based on Thomas, as was the case in the De nobilitate. Salutati gives seven reasons why the contemplative life is superior to the active life, following Thomas's Summa Theologiae, 2a-2ae, question 182, article I ("Utrum vita activa sit potior quam contemplativa"). While the list of arguments is ultimately based on Aristotle's discussion in the Nicomachean Ethics, book 10 (1177a 19-1178a 7), Salutati uses Thomas rather than Aristotle, though he somewhat rearranges the arguments.(26) The fact that Salutati takes his arguments from Thomas is shown by his statement at the end of the list that although the contemplative life is superior, the active life is to be followed for the necessities of brotherly love, using Aristotle's statement from the Topics as an example. This example is not used by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, book 10, but it is the same example Thomas uses to make the same point at the end of his list in the Summa Theologiae.(27)

Although in this letter Salutati goes on to show that the active life precedes the contemplative life on earth and follows it after death, and that the two lives are necessarily mixed, neither points being held by Thomas, it is important that the arguments Salutati has used both in the De nobilitate and in the letter to Zambeccari on behalf of the superiority of the contemplative life are from Thomas's discussion in the Summa Theologiae. Based on the evidence that Landino studied Salutati's work for his allegorical interpretation of Virgil, it is also probable that Salutati's use of Thomas for comparing the active and contemplative lives, or perhaps a tradition of using Thomas that existed in humanist circles, incited Landino to study Thomas's work and incorporate it more thoroughly than Salutati had.

While Salutati uses similar terminology as Thomas, Landino always changes Thomas's wording so as not to call action, speculation, and contemplation vitae. A comparison of a text of Landino and Thomas will show how Landino rewords Thomas, maintaining the basic argument from the Summa Theologiae, but using munus to make action and speculation mullera vitae (functions of life) rather than genera vitae:

Summa Theologiae, 2a-2ae, question 179, article I, response Wherefore every living thing gives proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and to which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to consist in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in sensation and movement; and the life of humans in their understanding and acting according to reason . . . Accordingly, since certain humans are especially intent on the contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on external actions, it follows that a human's life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative.(28)

Disputationes

For so they define that something lives, both what it is in itself and to what

it is inclined by its nature. If we take it to be as such, we never speak concerning

the life of humans, that the body either grows strong, or that the

body from little to proper size increases, or that it produces another like

itself--for these functions of life are not proper to humans but are in common

with shrubs and trees--nor again that a human either senses or

moves--for how are these different from animals?--but we say that a human

understands, what indeed he has by the mind, to which, when you

depart from humans, you will find in no other living thing. For it is the

characteristic of the mind to act with reason and to speculate on truth. For

which reason, the other functions of life, belonging no more to us than to

other living things, being excluded, we say that the life of humans, since

a human is rational, lies in acting and speculating.(29)

In the first section of book i of the Disputationes, Landino has the character Alberti take up the question of whether action or contemplation is to be preferred. Landino explains that the mind progresses from the level of material, created things (action), to the level of divine things (contemplation), and so contemplation is more perfect than action. One leaves behind the body and the cares of negotium and, "inflamed with love of celestial things," ascends to the divine where the mind is perfected in the munus of contemplation.(30)

Moreover, Alberti asserts that speculation is also preferable to action since that part of the mind that speculates is both concerned with incorporeal things rather than the senses, and it is superior to that part of the mind that deals with actions.(31) Just as speculation is preferable to action, so the virtues produced by speculation are better than those produced by action, and speculation is more beneficial society than action.(32)

The character Alberti defends the value of the munus of speculation by following the arguments in Thomas's Summa Theologiae, 2a-2ae, question 182, article I, presenting the same arguments Thomas gives, though changing the terminology. For example,

Summa Theologiae, 2a-2ae, question 182, article I, response

Sixthly, because the contemplative life consists in leisure and rest, according

to Ps. 45:11, "Be still and see that I am God" . . . Eighthly, because

the contemplative life is according to that which is most proper to a human,

namely his intellect; whereas in the works ofthe active life the lower powers

also, which are common to us and brutes, have their part.(33)

Disputationes

Add to these, that we speculate in studious leisure and quiet. For which reason

it is rightly said: "Be still and see, that I am God." For we act not without

noise and tumult. For Mary sits in studious leisure, Martha considers

everything in hastiness. . . Mary, only by the mind, which is immortal and

is weakened by no contagion, carries out her function. Martha, without

the senses, which depend on the body and easily fall into corruption, and

which we have in common not with God but with beasts, accomplishes

nothing.(34)

According to Landino, just as "speculamur in otio," so we contemplate God best when we have ceased from negotium. Both action and speculation are good, but speculation is preferable since by it we ascend to our highest good, the cognition of God.

While Landino holds that the life of otium is superior to negotium, he does not advocate a withdrawal from political and social responsibilities for a life of continual otium. Following the in utramque partem method, Landino has the character Lorenzo de'Medici oppose Alberti, arguing for the superiority of the life of negotium from a social and political perspective.(35) These arguments are of three types: that negotium corresponds best with our nature, that it helps us overcome vice more easily, and that it serves others. Lorenzo admits that ideally the otiosus discovers truth needed by all people who benefit by the laws and institutions he studies, but in practice otiosi, like wealthy people who hoard their treasure, keep knowledge to themselves. The best example for life is the wise prince who excels in both genera of life. Along with examples of ancient rulers, Lorenzo says Federicus is a negotiosus who is also able to learn and speculate without becoming an otiosus, and so benefits many people with his knowledge, virtues, and administration.(36)

In the concluding section to book I, Alberti responds to the arguments of Lorenzo. For Alberti, the person who is occupied constantly in negotium is niot to be despised, but since amid the concerns of negotium one must spend so much time acting rather than contemplating, and since contemplation is to be preferred to action, the life of otium has a certain superiority to the life of negotium. Because they are better able to provide knowledge needed by all, some of those who devote themselves to investigating things are far more beneficial than many who engage solely in actions.(37) Both genera of life are praiseworthy, but otium is more conducive to speculation and so more beneficial to the individual and the other citizens than negotium.(38)

To counter Lorenzo's examples of ancient rulers, Alberti says that the best example of one who lived both modes of life is Cicero. Cicero gave Rome great service as a consul and senator and his actions deserve immortal praise, but Cicero has been of more benefit to more people by his investigations and writings after he left public life. His De legibus and De republica examine the whole of civil life, its institutions, and laws. While his public actions benefitted the Roman citizens, these writings and his other works benefitted both his own and future times.(39)

Alberti ends the discussion in book i by concluding that the otiosus can return to negotium to care for the needs of others and help govern the city, and indeed such an effort is worthy of the highest praise,(40) but if this return is not needed or if it is not an available option, the otiosus should be useful to society in other ways (as Cicero was).(41) As he stated at the outset of book I, Alberti concludes that the best life is the one that unites otium and negotium, though keeping more in otium if possible, and that enables the soul to engage in contemplation and speculation to a greater extent than action. Otium and negotium are as the sisters Mary and Martha respectively, in that both are together in one house and both play important roles, but Mary is closer to God.(42)

Although I will not extend my analysis here to include books 3 and 4 of the Disputationes, Landino's allegorical interpretation of Virgil's Aeneid, there is a notable passage in book 3 that is particularly relevant for Landino's political views. As I mentioned previously, Landino is generally taken to advocate a withdrawal from civic responsibilities. In book 3, Landino has the character Lorenzo assert that each mode of life is opposed to ambition and the desire for the power of ruling (imperium).(43) Alberti agrees, saying that to achieve contemplation one should leave actions behind, though he does not discuss the genera vitae. However, from what Landino says here and in other passages, it is clear that what he opposes is not civic involvement but the ambition by one person for political imperium, which he associates with vice.(44) Moreover, he encourages those who do engage in speculation to be involved in shaping the laws and policies.(45) These statements by Landino show that he is interested in political involvement by the educated elite and does not encourage their withdrawal from society or the concentration of political power in one person.

A brief comparison of Landino's terminology with that of Ficino and Pico is helpful for placing Landino's work in the context of late fifteenth-century Florentine thought concerning the genera vitae. Ficino considers there to be three genera vitae, the active, the contemplative, and the pleasurable.(46) However, he is not always consistent on this position. In the De felicitate (1474), which has been taken as a reply to Landino's portrayal of his views on the will and the intellect in the Disputationes,(47) Ficino does not mention the active or contemplative life but does speak of negotium and otium in a way quite similar to Landino.(48) Elsewhere, Ficino speaks of the ociosa vita, but he is not consistent in this terminology.(49)

Pico's Oration on the Dignity of Man (ca. 1486) has interesting uses of otium and munus.(50) Concerning the life of divine creatures, he speaks of setting aside action in order that "in contemplandi ocio negoicabimur."(51) He says that he has always been so desirous of knowledge that he has set aside private and public concerns and given himself completely over to "contemplandi ocio."(52) Concerning munus, Pico speaks of the munus, or gift, of immortality and of wisdom.(53) However, similar to Landino, he also speaks of contemplation and the "munera actionum" in the context of the ascent of the mind to the divine.(54)

While Ficino and Pico at times use a terminology similar to Landino, the extent to which Quattrocento humanists' debates regarding the proper life and the operations of the mind were conducted in terms of otium, negotium, and munus has not been fully studied, yet as seen in these passages from Ficino and Pico, the issues considered by Landino regarding the modes of life continued to be debated in the Florentine intellectual community.(55)

There are several conclusions we should draw from this analysis of the Disputationes. First, contrary to the opinion that Landino is speaking of the vita activa and the vita contemplativa, he is actually speaking of the lives of otium and negotium and the superiority of the munera of contemplation and speculation to action. This is more easily recognized if one is not misled by the traditional title of book 1, but rather reads the book from the perspective of the original title. Moreover, Landino employs the Ciceronian in utramque partem method, holding that the mode of life of otium is superior when compared to negotium, yet has his characters Lorenzo and Alberti conclude that the best life unites the two modes, Lorenzo from the perspective of the superiority of negotium, Alberti from the perspective of the superiority of otium. Landino does not consider the modes of life nor the munera to be mutually exclusive, but interdependent. Second, as was suspected by Eugene Wolf in 1919, a suspicion that has rarely been discussed since, Landino in the Disputationes is heavily indebted to Thomas Aquinas for the content of his philosophical thought.(56) In this regard there is a notable similarity between Landino and Salutati, namely that they both rely on the same parts of Thomas's Summa Theologiae and his distinction between contemplation and speculation. For Salutati the vita contemplativa is superior to the vita activa, though the vita speculativa is not. However, according to Landino both the munera of contemplation and speculation are superior to action, yet all are interdependent. As he states at the outset, Landino ultimately sees otium and negotium, as well as action, speculation, and contemplation, not as mutually exclusive but as needing to be united for the greatest benefit to oneself and others. While Landino recommends the life of otium as superior and more conducive for obtaining the highest good, he also realizes the positive functions of the life of negotium. He considers that humanists have a social responsibility for administering and shaping laws, yet should avoid the vice of imperium. In this respect Landino maintains an important aspect of Salutati's civic spirit.

(1) For a good survey of "civic" humanism, see Rabil, 1:141-74. See also Stinger. For a recent study of mid-century humanism and politics, see Field. (2) Vickers, 1985; and Kristeller. (3) See, for example, Garin; Brucker; Skinner, 113-28; and Martines, 303, who says he does not include Landino and Ficino because they "so clearly belong to the later fifteenth century, or at all evens to the period after 1455 or 1460." For a somewhat different view, see Kristeller and Field. (4) Landilio, Disputationes Camaldulenses. All references will be to this edition. For a review of the literature concerning Landitio's Disputationes, see McNair, 1991, 20-68, to which I would now add Patterson, 62-81, who sees republicanism in Landino's works. (5) Field, 231-68, For a recent reevaluation of the Platonic Academy, see Hankins. (6) Landino, Disputationes Camaldulenses, ix-xvii. (7) Ibid., xvii. The history of the publishing of the Dispitationes is discussed by Lolie, xvii-xxx. The later published editions are all ultimately dependent on the first published edition. According to Lohe, the Vatican ms. and the first printed edition are based on the same archetype, while the other three mss. are based on a different archetype. The question of why the titles of the Vatican and the printed edition are different is not discussed by Lohe. I have not found any reason given in Landino's letters nor have I seen any contemporary mention of the title. Nevertheless, except for the title to book I, none of the variants within the body of the Disputationes between the ms. and the printed edition involve the use of "vita activa" or "vita contemplativa." In sum, while the altered title remains a mystery, the reader should be aware that the different titles can lead one to understand the entire work in different ways and the Vatican title best represents Landino's original intention. (8) Ibid., x, "Christophori Landini Florentini Camaldulenses disputationes ad Illustrissimum Federicum Urbinatium principem. Quarum liber primus Continet. An contemplatio an actio praeferenda sit. Secundus liber de Summo bono. Tertius liber in Alegorias Virgilii. Quartus Liber in Idem. Codex ornatissinius Seraturis Argenteis in Viridi." (9) For Landino's understanding of the soul and its ascent, see McNair, 1991. (10) Regarding otium, see especially Vickers, 1990. See also, Vickers, 1985; and Tinkler. For Salutati and otium/negotium, see Bonnell. (11) Disputatioties, 7-8: "In otiosa autem vita et letterarum studio quis non novi te a teneris annis ita versatum esse, ut, cum puerilem doctrinam per summam a ceteris rebus vacationem mira aviditate conbibisses, nullum deinceps tam negotiosum tibi tempus fuerit, quin quotidie partem aliquam occupationibus subtraxeris et variarum doctrinarum studiis impenderis? . . . nemini iam mirum videri possit, si veluti in pace iustissimum, in bello fortissimum et in utroque sapientissimum omnes te praedicant, ita et in litterarum otio doctissimum iudicent. Cui igitur potius eum librum, in quo de utroque vivendi genere disputatur, dedicare debui quam tibi, qui ita utrunque amplexus sis, ut in utroque excellas?" (12) Ibid., II, ALBERTI: "Tanien et tua et rei publicae permulti interesse arbitror, ut . . .quodcunque otii publico negotio subtrahere licuerit, id omne huc conferas et procul ab urbanis tumultibus vel tecum ipse vel potius cum huiuscemodi doctissimis iisdemque tui amantissiinis viris ea inquiras ac disputando assequaris, quibus animi nostri in suae originis ac divinitatis cognitioneni inducuntur. Nemo einem nec se nec rem publicam recte admisitrabit, nisi prius et iis virtutibus, quae vitam moresque emendant, animum ab omin corporea labe expiaverit et iis, quae rerum maximarum cognitionem praebent, illum iam purgatum ita illustraverit, ut quid ipse, quid reliqui homines sint, ad quam rem a summo deo producti recte noverit." (13) Ibid, 13: "Et quoniam id quaeris, ita de utroque vitae genere disputandum censeo, ut prinio singula seorsum prosequar, deinde ea ita inter se conferam, ut, quanvis in hac qua vivimus vita eum tum demum absolutissimum credamus, qui utrunque coniunxerit, tamen, utrum excellentius sit, in primis appareat." (14) For the in utramque partem method, see Marsh. (15) Lohe gives indicatioiis of Landino's reliance upopn Thomas in the addenda to the index for his edition of the Disputationes. All English translations of Thomas in this article are from, Summa Theologica 2 (New York, 1947). See also Tugwell, 534-85. Wolf first examined Landino's use of Thomas but this use has rarely been discussed since. (16) For an examination of Landino's terminology in the Disputationes, and the few exceptions regarding the term vita, see McNair,. 1991, 193-300. (17) Landino, Disputationes, 20-21 ALBERTI: "Contemplationem vero video a nostris diffinitam perspicacem et firmum animi in veri cognitione intuitum . . . Speculari autem, si divum Augustinum audias, a speculo deductum putabis. Evenit enim verum nosse cupientibus, ut in iis qui a causis manant effectibus ita veritatis simulacra quaedam intueamur, ut in speculo corporum nnagities intueijiur." Note here that contemplation is intuitive while speculation is deductive. (18) Field, 249-50. Lohe in his index to the Disputationes, 272-73, indicates 67 references to or borrowings from Salutati's De laboribu's Herculis in books 3 and 4. For Salutati, see Witt. (19) Salutati, 1947, 38. Neither Kahn, Bonnell, nor Kessler, 91-103, discuss this distinction being inade by Salutati. Bonnell argues that Salutati considers otium and negotium to be inodes of life, and the active and contemplative lives to be stages in the interior ascent of the soul. I will not take up Bonnell's argument here since I am more interested in Salutati's use of Thomas. I would only point out that, following Bonnell, Salutati's order of ascent would be from speculative to active to contemplative. (20) Leonardo Bruin generally seems to hold that the contemplative life is inore divine than the active life, following Aristotle, but that the active life is more proper to man. In a letter to Lauro Quirini, Bruin writes. "Neque contemplativa propria est hominis vita, sed activa. Non enim, qua homo est, contemplatur, sed qua est divinum aliquid, ac separatum. Justiciam vero, ac temperantiam, et fortitudinem, ceterasque inorales virtutes exercet ut homo. Itaque illa est proprie vita hominis, quae per inorales virtutes agitur." Mehus, 2:135-36. See also the translation of this letter in Griffiths, 293-99. However, in this same letter Bruni states that since the contemplative life is more divine than the active, it is likely to be happier (Mehus, 2:136-37; Griffiths, 294): "Non enim omnes, qui contemplativam) sequuntur vitam, felices dicimus, nec omnes qui activam. Sed cum quaeretur, utrum activa, et negociosa vita aptior sit ad felicitatem, vel otiosa vita in contemplatione rerum posita, docet Aristoteles multis rationibus in hac vita quieta et ociosa felicititem inagis existere, non quod activam vitam felicitate privet, sed quod hanc praeferat, et anteponat, quasi divinae similiorem." As seen from this passage, Bruni uses "contemplativa" and "otiosa" interchangeably, as he also does with "activa" and "negociosa." In other writings, Bruni also equates "attiva" with "civile", and "oziosa" with "quieti": "Ma volgendo carta e dicendo le ragioin del Petrarca, si puo rispondere al primo argomento della vita attiva e civile: che il Petrarca fu piu saggio e prudente in elegger vita quieta ed oziosa." Baron, 1969, 68; Griffiths, 99. This use of terms is also evident in Bruni's letter to Pope Eugenius IV concerning the translation of Aristotle's Politics: "Cum igitur duae sint (ut ita dixerim) vitae--una negotiosa et civilis in agendo reposita, in qua iustitia, temperantia, fortitudo ceteraeque morales virtutes dominantur; altera otiosa, contemplationi vacans, in qua sapientia et mens et scientia ceteraeque intellectivae virtutes locum habent . . .", Baron, 72-73; Griffiths, 159. In this letter, as elsewhere, Bruin says he intends to discuss the two lives more in a longer work, but he never seems to have (21) Thomas, Summa Theologiae, 2a-2ac, q. 180, a. 4: "(Obj. I) Ergo videtur quod ad vitam contemplativam pertineat non solum divinam veritatem, sed etiam quamlibet aliam contemplari.

"(Resp.) Respondeo dicenduni, quod, sicut iam dictum est, ad vitam contemplativam pertinet aliquid dupliciter: uno modo, principaliter; alio modo, secundario vel dispositive. Principaliter quidem ad vitam contemplativam pertinet contemplatio divinae veritatis, quia huiusmodi contemplatio est finis totius humanae vitae. Unde Augustinus dicit in I De Trin., quod `contemplatio Dei promittitur nobis actionum omnium finis, atque aeterna perfectio gaudiorum.'quae quidem in futura vita erit perfecta, quando videbimus eum `facie ad faciem'; unde et perfectos beatos faciet. Nunc autem contemplatio divinae veritatis competit nobis imperfecte, videlicet `per speculum et in aenigmate'; unde per eam fit nobis quaedani inchoatio beatitudinis, quae hic incipit ut in futuro continuetur. Sed quia per divinos effectus in Dei contemplationem manuducimur ... inde est quod etiam contemplatio divinorum effectuum secundario ad vitam contemplativam pertinet."

Summa Theologiae, 2a- 2ae, q. 182, a. 4: "Respondeo dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur esse prius dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum suam naturam. Et hoc modo vita contemplativa est prior quam activa, inquantum prioribus et melioribus insistit. Unde et activam vitam movet et dirigit ... Alio modo est aliquid prius quoad nos, quod scilicet est prius in via generationis. Et hoc modo vita activa est prior quam contemplativa, qui disponit ad contemplativani." (22) Salutati, De nobilitate leguni et medicine, 36-38: "Nec ignoro niultos indifferenter et quasi synonimis uti duobus istis terminis, speculatione et contemplatione. Sed contemplatio prout active prefertur aliud est a speculatione. Hoc enim sensu dicitur omnium actionum finis et eterna perfectio gaudiorum que nuniquam perfici potest in via, sed perficietur in patria, cuni erit omnia Deus iii omnibus et non videbimus per speculum in enigmate, sed prout est. Quo quidem sensu fateor activam precedere tempore, sic incomparabiliter et ineritis et precellere ratione. Sed si contemplationem sumpseris, prout solum est speculatio veritatis, active vite dicam nec ratione nec tempore preferendam. Ipsa quidem speculatio quedani actio est, operationi tamen secundum virtutem nec re nec meritis preferenda. Ut que leguntur apud alios queve dicturi sumus semper sint secundum distinctionis huiuscemodi ritionem ubilibet assumenda, nunc autem sufficiat hec tantula de speculationis habitu rettulisse et ad scientie certitudinem accedamus." (23) In a letter to the Bishop of Siena., Leonardo Bruni shows that he adheres to a similar distinction, namely that the life of otiumi precedes the life of negotium by nature but follows it it, time. "Quod autem te, et optime contentum, et in quiete constitutuni significas, ob id te longe beatiorem puto, quam in magnis rebus agendis, magnisque negociis oppressum caterva hominuni intuebar. Ocia enim negociis longe sunt praeferenda, cum haec finis sint, illa ad finem. Negociamur enim, ut ociemur, et bellum gerimus, ut in pace degamus." Mehus, 1:129. (24) The places where Salutati does use "contemplatio" in the De nobilitate are in references to Augustine, though when restating Augustine in his own words, Salutati makes a notable change. In quoting from Augustine De civitate Dei 8, Salutati, 178, says, "`Itaque cum studium sapientie in actione et contemplatione versetur, unde una pars eius activa, et altera contemplativa dici potest . . .' Hec Augustinus, ut agnoscas sapientiam non solam esse speculationem, sed ex activa contemplativaque componi." But note how Salutati, 188-90, restates this quote later: "Nec quem moveat quod superius dixerim, imo dicentem allegaverim Augustinum, sapientie studium activa vita speculativaque componi." (25) Salutati, 1896, 25-307. This letter has been translated by Ronald Witt in Kohl and Witt, 93-114. For a discussion of Salutati on the active and contemplative life, see Witt's introduction to the letter, 81-92. (26) Compare Salutati, 1896, 305, and Thomas, Summa Theologiae, 2a-2ae, q. 182, a. I, resp. Salutati uses all nine of Thomas's arguments for the superiority of the contemplative life. (27) Thomas, Summa Theologiae, 2a-2ae, q. 182, a. I: "Secundum quid tamen et in casu, est magis eligenda vita activa propter necessitatem praesentis vitae. Sicut etiam Philosophus dicit in III Top., quod `philosophari est melius quam ditari, sed ditari melius iiecessitatem patienti.'" Salutati, 1896, 305: "Ipsa tamen activa quam fugis suscipienda est tam exercitio virtutis quam necessitate caritas. Etenim, sicut dixit Philosophus, melius est philosophari quam ditari, sed non magis eligendum necessariis indigenti. Melior est contemplativa, fateor; non tamen semper nec omnibus eligibilior." (28) Summa Theologiae, 2a-2ae, q. 179, a. I, resp.: "Et ideo unumquodque vivens ostenditur vivere ex operatione sibi maxinie propria, ad quam maxime inclinatur; sicut plantarum vita dicitur in hoc consistere quod nutriuntur et generant; animalium vero in hoc quod sentiunt et moventur; hominum vero in hoc quod intelligunt et secundum rationem agunt ... Quia ergo quidam homines praecipue intendunt contemplationi veritatis, quidam vero intendunt principaliter exterioribus actionibus, inde est quod vita hominis convenienter dividitur per activani et contemplativam." (29) Landino, Disputationes, 14: "Eo enim aliquid vivere dixerunt, quod et suum sit et ad quod sua sponte prolabatur. Hoc si ita esse volumus, nunquam iccirco hominem vivere dicemus, quia aut corpus alat aut ex tantillo ad iustam magnitudinem erigat aut alium sibi similein producat - haec enim vitae munera non sua ac propria sunt, sed cum segetibus arboribusque communia--neque rursus quia aut sentiat aut moveatur--qui enim hoc a brutis different?--sed quia intelligit, quod quidem a mente habet, cuius, cum ab homine discesseris, nullum animans particeps invenias. Mentis autem est et ratione agere et verum speculari. Quapropter reliquis vitae muneribus, quae non magis nostra quam ceterorum animantium sunt, exclusis vitam hominis, qua ratione homo est, in agendo ac speculando versari dicemus." (30) Ibid., 16, ALBERTI: "Videmus enim, quanvis exiguus illorum numerus sit, sed videmus tamen nonnullos, qui quibusdam veluti umbris atque imaginibus eorum, quae in sensus nostros cadunt, admoniti caelestium rerum tam ardenti amore inflammantur, ut relictis curis negotiisque omnibus, cum hactenus sensu corpora et imaginando corporum similitudines percepissent, deinceps ipsa ratione corporum naturam, intellectu incorporeos quidem, sed tamen creatos spiritus ac demum intelligentia id, quod increatum est, intueantur. Mirificus omnino progressus et per quem iis quae diximus additamentis animus noster paulatim ex molestissimo corporis carcere se subtrahens et ad supera erectus ex infima materiae faece ad divinitatis usque culmen ascendit. Quapropter vere universum locum concludemus, si contemplandi munus circa verum versari dicimus, quando quidem vero ipso mens humana perficitur atque absolvitur." (31) Ibid., 36, ALBERTI: "Quis enim, modo hominis naturam propinquius intueatur, non videat nihil in nobis mente excellentius esse? At mentis non agere est, sed speculari, et ea quidem speculari, quae in se solam cadant, nullo autem sensu percipiamur. Quapropter cum veri investigatio eius partis sit, quae in nobis divinissima est, cum circa ea versetur, quae penitus incorporea in nullum sensum cadunt, nonne erit actionibus praeferenda?" (32) Ibid., 41-42, ALBERTI: "Mens autem, quae aeterna est, pabulum et veluti nutrimentum non actionem, sed speculationem quaerit . . . Eo igitur excellentior erit veri inquisitio, quia et quas diximus in actione versari virtutes procreat illisque ad res agendas opitulatur et praeter id eam divinitatem attingit, ad quam illa aspirare non valet. . . . Quapropter et ad communem societatem conservandam et ad duos illos humanae tranquillitatis hostes superandos multo efficacius hae virtutes nobis proderunt, quae in veri cognitione versantur, quam illae quae in rebus agendis laborant . . . Nam cum omni corporea contagione liberi in naturam suam animi nostri redierint, neque societas erit expetenda neque hostes formidandi cessabitque actio, cum interim speculatio magis magisque corroboretur."

(36) Ibid., 32. (37) Ibid. 39-41, ALBERTI: "Quod si acrius urgebitis, citabo aliquem ex iis, qui in rebus investigandis vehementer profecerunt, qui non reverebitur asserere se in eo vivendi genere vel solum longe magis rei publicae prodesse quam multi simul ex iis, quos quotidie in foro et in senatu versari videtis. . . . Quis enim iuste vivere poterit, nisi prius quid iustum sit et iustum quod sit naturae nostrae consentaneutii esse proptereaque ageiiduni nieiite investigaverit? Quae quidem ratio et in fortitudine et in temperantia latissime patet. Non possunt igitur sine mentis investigatione ea perfici, quae circa actiones adhibentur." (38) Ibid... 42, ALBERTI: "Quae cum ita dicantur, non tamen cessams alterum vitae genus, si cum omni virtute agatur, maximis laudibus extollere. Verum maiores gratias his viris habendas censebinius, qui per suniiiiuni otium ea excogitariilt atque invenerint, quibus veluti norma quadani vestri illi patroni ad rem civilem administrandam utantur. Adde quod latius serpunt et longe pluribus prosunt quae per otium inveniuntur quam quae in negotio aguntur." (39) Ibid., 42-44, ALBERTI: "Quapropter ex his sic universus locus regere, sin stulti erunt, qui praesint, aut ipse illorum vicem obire aut eos meliores reddere tentaturum; quodsi neque ipse admittetur neque illi meliores fieri patientur, rediturum ad se aliaque ratione hominibus profuturum. " (42) Ibid., 47, ALBERTI: "Sorores enim sunt, sub eodem tecto habitant Maria atque Martha. Ambae deo placent: Martha ut pascat, Maria ut pascatur. Ambae bonae, sed alter laboriosa, altera otiosa, ita tamen, ut neque labor flagitium neque otium desidiam pariat. Quapropter haerebimus Marthae, ne humanitatis officium deseramus. Multo tamen magis Mariae coniungeniur, ut mens nostra ambrosia nectareque alatur. Illa enim paulatim in dei cognitionem ascendimus, in qua qui summum bonum consistere ignorat, eum se suamque originem ignorare facile crediderim." For Landino's use of the figures of Mary and Martha and his reliance on Thomas Aquinas in his interpretation of them, see McNair, 1091, 217. (43) Landino, Disputationes, 158-60, ALBERTI: "Nunquam enim ad veram contemplationem deveniemus, nisi prius ipsa, ut christianorum verbo utar, sensualitas non modo extincta, verum etiam pernitus sepulta in nobis fuerit . . . nihilo minus, cum in conspectu Italiae iam sit et in limine paene speculandi constitutus animadvertatque non posse in rerum divinarum cognitionem deveniri, nisi humana haec omnia contemnat, nititur ille quidem rein perficere, sed appetitus, qui nondum rationi subiectus sit, omnino repugnat falsisque argumentationibus persuadet non esse aut negligendos honore aut imperia reliquenda. [LORENZO to ALBERTI]: Si enim manentibus Troiae Troianis [Juno, the symbol of the desire for honor and rule! irascebatur, cur deinceps iisdem illis in Italiani enavigantibus adeo hostili animo adversatur? an fortasse, qui utraque vita ambitioso et imperii cupido adversa sit? [ALBERTI]: Isthuc ipsum, inquit Baptista. Ambitionis enim dea olim Aeneae irascebatur, qui voluptatibus delinitus nihil honorificum quaereret, nunc autem rursus irascitur, cum videat illum ad altiora quaedam erectum ea, quae ceteri mortales in admiratione habent, omnino contemnere." (44) Landino particularly associates imperium with libido and cupidita, which he considers to be the sensitive appetite uncontrollel by reason. Both libido and cupiditas have an Augustinian background, but Landino does not have Augustine's emphasis on the need of divine grace to overcome them. For imperium, see also Disputationes, 27: "Nam et imperandi et habendi cupiditas, quae duo mala ad omne nefarium facinus mortales impellunt. . . "; 155: ". . . maximum nullum ex innumeris variisque vitiis esse, a quo etam ii, qui ad quaeque excelsa eriguntur, aegrius liberentur quam ab honorum imperiique cupiditate"; 185: "Libido imperandi"; 1994 "regnandi inquam cupiditate delinitus"; 195: "Assuetus enim potestatibus atque imperio vir et dulcedine captus non sine difficultate discedit, sed cum verum bonum ab eo, quod falsa opinione bonum putatur, discernere potuerit, illud tandem antepoint"; 210-11, "Ambitio enim, quae, ut in Iunone ita in bellicoso viro exprimitur, quemadmodum Troiae et voluptati adversabatur, sic et speculationi, quam sibi praeferri aegre patitur, adversabitur. Est autem es dea natus Achilles, quia divina queadam generositas in animis nostris est, quae nemini parere, omnibus autem imperare velit. Haec si recta ratione excolatur, veram fortitudinem parit, sin autem contra rationem elata opmnia in suam libidinem convertere tentet, ambitionem creat et regandi cupiditatem"; 226-27: "Quapropter erit eadem inanis quaedem gloria--sunt enim summo odio digni, qui virtutem negligunt, unde solida expressaque manat gloria, honores vero ac reliqua virtutis insignia sectantur--quam qui in vita civili res agregias adoriuntur in primis captare consueverunt. Hi enim non recti honestique amore, sed gloriae cupiditate laborant, quam dum assequi cupiunt, et rem publican saepe perdunt et in summum civium odium incidunt...Si enim caritate patriae magis quam cupidine gloriae moverentur huiuscemodi viri, beatissimae omnimo essent civitates, quibus illi praeessent"; and 228: "Nisi insana guaedam famae cupiditas, cum gloriam in iis rebus guaererent, quae stolidissimum vulgus stupescere quidem cogant, sapientes autem ad iustissimam indignationem summumque odium concitent. At nemo, modo ipse non sit, huiuscemodi viros bonos dixerit." However, Landino does praise Federicus for his virtuous imperium: "Ego enim, cum memoria ea repeto, quae in imperio tuo temperando divina quadam sapientia excogitasti, quae etiam summam iustitiam administrasti...." For Landino's Disputationes in the Epideitic tradition, see Kallendorf, 1983, and 1989, 129-69. (45) Landino, Disputationes, 181: "Carthaginem vero e loco superiore cernunt, quoniam, ut nudius guoque tertius disputatum est, nunquam optimis institutis et legibus temperata erit es republica, nisi qui illi praesunt cuncta, quae aut praecipiunt aut prohibent, ad eorum, quae per rerum magnarum speculationem viderint, regulam ac norman sapientissime dirigant." See also, 185: "Praestat enim nobis ad veram sapientiam proficisci quam in actionibus versari, sed rerum administratio a sapientibus si deseratur, actum sit de rebus humanis oportet." (46) Ficino, 1975, 449: "Profecto pro triplici vitae genere scilicet contemplative, activae, voluptuosae..." Ibid., 481-83: "Tres esse vitas nemo ratione vivens dubitat: contemplativam, activam, voluptuosam." (47) Wadsworth. (48) Ficino, 1962, 662-65. "Nequaquam, operationes enim moralium virtutum, seu temperantiae, fortitudinisque, negotiosae atque laboriosae sunt. In labore autem non est finis ille quem quaerimus, sed in quiete, negociamur enim ut otiemur, et bellum gerimus, ut in pace vivamus" (662). (49) In ibid., 671, Ficino says in a letter to Andrea Cambinus: "Quod autem subiungis tibi in eiusmodi ocio humana allatim suppeditari, divina nequaquam, hoc equidem non mirari possum. Nam caetera, ut scis, cum et extra nos, et alicubi solum posita sint. motu, negociis, labore quaeruntur, divina vero cum et intra nos isnt, et ubique, quiete, ocio tranquillitate comprehenduntur. Quamobrem si re vera ociosus es, ut ais, nihil minus habes, quam humana, quae humana, quae nimium negociosa sunt omnia, nihil rursum magis habes, quam divina.... quotiens ad illam rite convertit. Convertitur autem ad illam suapte natura tanquam divinus cum primum ab ea humanortum negociorum perturbationibus avertitur...Satis iam religiosus es, ut arbitror, si per ocium solutus ab infimorum curis summorum tranquillitati per naturam es religatus." In a letter to Lorenzo de'Medici dated 1490 (Ficino, 1962, 919; 1975, 481-83), which is also an appendix to the Philebus commentary, Ficino uses different language: "Tres esse vitas, nemo ratione vivens dubitat, contemplativam, activam, voluptuosam, quoniam videlicet tres ad felicitatem vias homines elegerunt: sapientiam, potentiam, voluptatem. Nos autem sub sapientiae nomine quodlibet liberalium artium studium religiosumque otium intelligimus. Sub appellatione potentiae auctioritatem in gubernatione civili pariter atque militari divitiarumque affluentiam et splendorem gloriae negotiosamque virtutem comprehendi putamus." (50) Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, 1968, 26-85. For an English translation, see Cassirer, 223-54. (51) Pico, 34: "Igitur si atuosae vitae inferiorum curam recto examine susceperimus, Thronorum stata soliditate firmabimur. Si ab actionibus feriati, in opificio opificem, in opifice opificium meditantes, in contemplandi ocio negociabimur, luce cherubica undique corruscabimus.

(56) Although I will not discuss it here, Landino's Disputationes, book 2, relies heavily on Thomas's Summa Contra Gentiles, book 3. See McNair, 199I, 222-43; and Lohe's addenda to the Disputationes, 263-64. For Landino's use of Albert the Great, see McNair, 1993.

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