Crisis in Maluku: from religion to nationalism.

Between 1999 and 2002 the Maluku islands were divided by a purportedly bitter religious/ nationalist struggle that left over 5,000 people dead and approximately 500,000 people displaced. After two years of relative calm, this inter-communal violence recently reappeared as open warfare.

The conflict was sparked on 25 April, the date marking the founding of the Republic of South Maluku (Republic Maluku Selatan [RMS]) by the islands' relatively small independence movement. Initially low-key, events escalated when police detained twenty-four people involved in hoisting RMS flags. Independence supporters protested outside police headquarters, and the pro-Indonesian onlookers--predominantly Muslim--started throwing stones at RMS protesters. Some reports claim that the pro-Indonesia side initially focused their anger at the police, believing that the police were protecting the RMS separatists.

The conflict escalated further, and by the next day ten people were dead and sixty were wounded. Widescale damage was caused to Ambon City by rioters, and the UN building was razed to the ground. Parts of the Christian University of Maluku were also torched, along with approximately 200 houses in the Christian neighbourhood of Batugantung. By the third day, 26 people were dead and 180 wounded. Christians, disembarking from a ship in the predominantly Muslim harbour area of Ambon, were also attacked--purportedly whilseIndonesian soldiers looked on.

Feeling victimised by the Muslim population and the security forces, Christians, who did not support the RMS, protested outside the police headquarters on 28 April. Since the conflict started, there has been an ongoing rumour that 10,000 Laskar Jihad fighters were on their way to the province. By 30 April, the Bishop of Ambon was so concerned that he issued an SOS to the international community calling for help in ending the violence. He stated:

We herewith appeal to the United Nations and all nations ... if the violence cannot be stopped, to help and evacuate those Ambon people that want to live in peace, to places outside Ambon, outside the Moluccas or even outside Indonesia where they can live without fear or disturbance.

The conflict between the Christian and Muslim populations of Ambon has been made worse by the apparent emergence of a nationalist-separatist movement. The separatist issue is an interesting development. Historically, the RMS was important because Christian Maluku was one of the few provinces that supported the Dutch colonialists against Indonesian nationalists in the late 1940s. With Dutch help, Ambon declared its independence as the Republic of South Maluku--but Ambonese nationalist-separatism has not been a strong current in Maluku politics since the 1950s.

The Maluku Muslim population has grown through the transmigration program that occurred during the Suharto period. Initially the Muslim migrants were isolated and relied on the Indonesian government for support. However, over time, the Christian inhabitants have lost power and influence to the Muslim migrant population.

The chaos of 1999-2002 has been interpreted as a conflict which originated in Muslim dependence on the Indonesian government and the increasing disenfranchisement of the Christian population. Although religion remains the basis for group affiliation in the conflict, there is a core difference between the violence of 2004 and the violence in 1999.

In December 2000, the International Crisis Group (ICG) released a report on the Maluku conflict that gave very little attention to the RMS separatist movement. The few references to the RMS were of a purely historic nature. The ICG account attributed the violence to differences over religion, and Christian human-rights reports coming out of Maluku during 2000 hardly mentioned RMS.

There has thus been a change in the nature of the conflict from religious-sectarian violence to nationalist-separatist violence, with the Christians being presented as the RMS separatists while the Muslims are portrayed as Indonesian nationalists. Responding to the violence being framed as a nationalist-separatist conflict, many Christians refused to be identified as separatists. The aforementioned protest outside the police HQ was essentially based on the national affiliation of the Christian population. Fearing that they would become the targets of state violence, the Christian protesters were pledging support for Indonesia and, therefore, appealing for Indonesian government protection.

C.J. Bohm, a Maluku Christian human-rights reporter claims that:

The skirmishing is not between those who fight for Moluccas independence and those who defend the undivided republic of Indonesia. The RMS adherents are just a small group of several hundreds who never take up any arms, whereas the attackers cannot be identified as the Muslim community.

He continues:

Why are Christians seen as RMS supporters? Muslims become infuriated when confronted with an RMS show. Christians just shrug and go on with their business. In the eyes of Muslims, they should be infuriated as well!

On 29 April, the Christian neighbourhood of Kudamati, in Ambon City, released a statement on their position in the conflict. They 'rejected all separatism' and 'refused to be stigmatised as RMS adherents'. Furthermore, they 'asked the military and police to deal with the conflict according to the law' and 'asked the central and provincial government to take appropriate steps to end the conflict'.

The recent introduction of the separatist issue does not appear to have come from the Christian side. It was first raised in January 1999 by the national media. However, in these early reports RMS is discussed as a secretive movement allied to the Christian cause. By September 2000, Muslim agitators were using the labels 'RMS' and 'Christian' as interchangeable alternatives. Some Christian militias also chose to identify themselves with the Republic of South Maluku.

Although the present conflict appears to be focused around the separatist issue, it is not clear whether it is a spontaneous independence struggle or something else again. There are strange inconsistencies in the latest round of violence. For example, more Muslims than Christians have been killed, although the Christians are meant to be the persecuted ones.

Added to this is the role of snipers, who are responsible for most of the deaths. Highly trained snipers are shooting victims between the eyes and their role indicates institutional support of this violence, the probable intention being to provoke the local population into perpetuating the violence. The use of the Styer SSG-69 rifles by the snipers, which according to reports in the Jakarta Post are widely used by sniper units of the Indonesian Military and Police Force, suggests that the source of institutional direction is the Indonesian security forces.

There are many reasons why the security forces could be orchestrating the violence. Thamrin Amal Tomagola, an Ambon expert at the University of Indonesia, maintains that it is probably connected to the presidential elections. Violence is thus an attempt to undermine presidential candidate Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and vice-presidential candidate Yusuf Kalla, both of whom were involved in the peace deal that ended the 1999-2002 conflict. More separatist struggles could help the cause of presidential candidate Wiranto, campaigning on a strong unitary line.

Others blame pro-RMS elements in the Maluku police force. On 6 May, the Provincial Police Chief, Brigadier General Bambang Sutrisno, was replaced by Brigadier General Aditya Wrama, reportedly because of Sutrisno's poor performance in dealing with RMS celebrations on 25 April. It was rumoured that he was accused of being a RMS supporter. Since day four of the crisis, the police have focused their attention on arresting RMS supporters. Whatever their reasons, we can say that the violence is undoubtedly supported institutionally--with the purpose of dividing the population.

The present violence in Maluku has potentially more long-term ramifications than the violence that occurred between 1999 and 2002. At that time, the issue was religion and its subsequent control over local civil authorities. The separatist issue was not strong in the political rhetoric. The implication of this was that both sides supported the authority of the Indonesian government. In 2004, with the emphasis on RMS separatists, this is no longer the case. The conflict is being framed as a nationalist-separatist war based on religious differences. This has the potential to change the dynamics and make conflict resolution more difficult if institutional elements successfully tie the Christian population to the RMS separatists. There is the possibility that the Indonesian government will lose its legitimacy to negotiate a resolution and the conflict will become a separatist war between Christian Ambonese and the Indonesian government. If this happens, the crisis in Maluku could become another Aceh, West Papua or East Timor.

Gareth Knapman is a postgraduate researcher with the Globalism Institute, RMIT, Melbourne.