Creation and employment of strategic reserves.

Evgenii Ivanovich MALASHENKO, was born in 1924; joined the USSR Armed Forces in 1941; during the Great Patriotic War, platoon commander, reconnaissance company commander, chief of intelligence at a naval infantry rifle brigade, a rifle division and an airborne division; after the war, graduated from the M.V. Frunze Military Academy and the Military Academy of the General Staff; served as deputy chief of staff at a corps, army and military district; chief of an operations group at the Special Corps in Budapest, in 1956; chief of staff of the main military advisor in Egypt after the six day Arab-Israeli War of 1967; chief of staff of the Trans Carpathian Military District, deputy chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, staff member of the Defense Ministry Central Office, advisor at the Center for Operational and Strategic Studies of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

War experience, especially the experience in the Great Patriotic War, shows the importance of strategic reserves. During the years of the Great Patriotic War, reserve fronts and armies were formed, including tank and air reserve as well as reserves of the arms and branches of services, and reserves of materiel (arms, ammunition, fuel and lubricants, etc.) were created. During the initial period of the war (June 22, 1941 through November 18, 1942) alone, five reserve fronts were formed, 30 army commands in the Ground Forces, 367 rifle divisions and more than 830 other units and combined units of various branches of service. (1)

The use of strategic reserves helped to compensate for the shortfalls and mistakes resulting from the lag in putting the Soviet Armed Forces on combat alert ahead of the outbreak of the war, to close breaches in the defense front, to reinforce the advancing forces, and to reconstitute and replace combat losses. The commitment of strategic reserves was a major factor in the success of operations carried out in the most important sectors.

In the postwar period, the organizational development of the Armed Forces and the adoption of nuclear missiles for operational service made a substantial impact on the character of warfare and the use of strategic reserves. Movement forward and commitment of troops into battle required the implementation of effective measures to protect them against nuclear weapons, reconstitute their operational effectiveness, march (move) under their own power over long distances, and engage enemy forces from the line of march.

In those years, the Soviet Union with its numerically strong and powerful Armed Forces was able to create and deploy strategic reserves on the theater of military operations to engage and destroy any aggressor. Today, for various reasons, not least the downsizing of the Armed Forces, Russia is not in a position to do that.

In modern conditions, due to the changing character of warfare and the extensive use of high tech, state of the art weapon systems, the creation, deployment and use of strategic reserves is becoming a pressing and rather complex problem. Its resolution is complicated by, among objective economic reasons, the shortfalls and inadequacies in the elaboration and development of theoretical propositions and concepts for the use of strategic reserves, which do not quite measure up to the conditions of modern warfare. Scientific resolution of this major problem requires a systemic approach toward the study of a whole complex of interrelated matters. They are as follows:

* First, the growing role of strategic reserves and the need for a different approach to their creation are predetermined, on the one hand, by the existing threats to Russia's national security; the fact that a possible adversary has combat ready, strong forces armed with modern weapons; and the probability of the outbreak of armed conflicts with the use of highly destructive, above all precision-guided weapons; on the other hand, by the limited capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces to repulse aggression and build up efforts with ready (available) reserves.

* Second, all types of armed conflicts objectively require reconstitution and redeployment of troops in repulsing possible acts of aggression from different directions across the country's vast territory. Today, however, troops are insufficiently trained and prepared for such actions due to their low mobility and poorly developed infrastructure on the theater of military operations, which is vulnerable to enemy firepower.

* Third, there are increased requirements on the employment of strategic reserves with the use of new, more effective methods of operation and combat actions that have not as yet been duly reflected in our military theory and practice due to the general lag in precision-guided weaponry and information technology.

So, the creation and employment of strategic reserves is becoming an important theoretical and practical problem.

Today, there are potential external and internal threats to Russia's military security, while in some sectors they are in fact growing. (2) At the same time, their level is not very high. A worsening of the situation in some parts of the world, the CIS countries or in border regions, however, could also create a direct threat to Russia's national security, including the outbreak of large-scale armed conflicts near Russia's state borders, affecting its interests.

Another source of concern is that many countries are building up their armed forces, arming them with new, modern weapons, and increasing their military spending. For example, the Pentagon's budget in 2006 will be at $408 billion. (3) Elements of NATO's military infrastructure are approaching Russia's state borders. (4) Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been taking advantage of the changes that have occurred in the military-strategic situation, striving to preserve its leadership in the world and strengthen its positions in the Balkans, the Middle and Near East by provoking local wars there. All of this is a source of great anxiety and concern, requiring a pragmatic approach toward ensuring Russia's national security.

The character of future wars and armed conflicts is hard to predict, but it will differ substantially from wars of the past. Consider the military operations by the United States and its allies against Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. Military-political objectives in those operations were achieved by delivering strikes with sea and air based precision-guided weapons.

It is the view of the present author that possible wars in the first quarter of the 21st century will see an extensive use of precision-guided weapons of various basing types as well as IT assets. Such a war could start with air/space operations. Massive strikes with long range precision-guided weapons will be delivered against a country's armed forces, industrial installations, infrastructure and civilians, which would seriously affect the strategic deployment of the armed forces, the mobilization and regrouping of troops, and the entire course of warfare. A decisive role will belong not to the numerous groups of ground forces but above all to precision-guided weapons and IT systems. At the same time, as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, the massive use of precision-guided weapons and the achievement of air superiority do not eliminate the need to conduct mopping up operations, consolidate success and attain specific military-political objectives where the key role will be played by ground forces.

The Creation of Strategic Reserves

The diversity of wars and armed conflicts calls for new approaches toward the problem of creating and using operational-strategic forces (troops) and strategic reserves.

Russia's geopolitical situation is unique. It occupies a vast territory with a total border length of 64,000 km: No other country in the world has such a long border. It has extremely rich natural resources. The main deterrence against aggression are nuclear weapons. At the same time, they can hardly be used in armed conflicts and local wars that break out in border regions or within the country. Furthermore, nuclear weapons can only be used as an effective deterrence if there are combat ready general-purpose forces. All of this requires, in addition to nuclear weapons, operational forces (troops) and highly mobile strategic reserves to repulse possible acts of aggression in all strategic sectors of operation.

Under current military doctrine, these forces are comprised above all of permanent readiness (alert) units and combined units of various branches and arms of service, their basic component being mixed arms units and precision-guided weapon complexes.

In addition to permanent readiness forces (troops), reserve forces (troops) are created and deployed in strategic sectors of operation. These can include: a combined-arms reserve group (permanent readiness units, airborne units, Missile Forces and Artillery units, Air Force units); in maritime sectors, a reserve group of naval forces as well as a reserve force under central command (special purpose units of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff; EW, CBR, technical and logistic support units).

Today, military districts have a small and clearly insufficient number of permanent readiness combined-arms divisions. Their number is due to increase somewhat in the foreseeable future, however.

The optimal composition of forces in the main strategic directions should feature a highly mobile reserve element (for reinforcement purposes). Air Force groups can be reinforced mainly by redeploying front and army aviation from other Air Force formations.

It is the view of the present author that a strategic reserve group should comprise combined-arms units and independent units from various branches and arms of service.

The Role of Strategic Reserves, Their Composition and Formation

The uncertainty of the military-political situation in the world, the remaining threats to Russia's national security, its vast territorial expanse, and the limited numerical strength of forces deployed on theaters of operation enhance the importance of strategic reserves. Experience shows that the downsizing of the armed forces has always been accompanied by a building up of reserves, designed to preserve the combat capability and operational effectiveness of the armed forces and ensure national security interests.

Strategic reserves in future wars will be among the principal means for the Supreme High Command (SHC) to impact on the course of armed conflicts, operations, and war as a whole. Strategic reserves are designed mainly to reinforce theater forces (troops); in armed conflicts, to repulse aggression, close breaches in defense, deliver counter strokes and defeat the aggressor.

The creation of strategic reserves and their configuration is one of the important tasks for the organization and development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The composition of strategic reserves will be predicated on the general composition of the Armed Forces and military reserve capabilities (available mobilization manpower resources and stocks of arms and military equipment) and will be established under a plan for the operational employment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Strategic reserves should include Mobile Forces that can be rapidly redeployed to directions of threat. Mobile forces should be built on combined-arms formations as well as formations and independent units of arms and branches of forces deployed according to mobilization plans in the first order of priority. Mobile forces should also include airborne formations, air assault units, front and army aviation units, mobile missile complexes of the Air Defense and Missile and Artillery Forces, and special purpose (special task) and EW units.

Airborne formations are especially important since they are the most combat ready and air transportable, and can be quickly airlifted over long distances. They have sufficient firepower and striking power and should, in the opinion of the present author, be a multi-purpose (multi-role) component capable of accomplishing preemptive maneuver in any direction and area of operation.

Combined formations and units of the Mobile Forces, designed to reinforce troops protecting the state border, should have capability to rapidly deploy to sectors of threat, create screening forces (e.g., air mobile defense) along the enemy's lines of movement, and effectively engage enemy troops and special purpose units and forces.

In internal armed conflicts, the Mobile Forces should be ready to ensure the deployment of a joint group of forces (troops), effectively engage illegal armed formations, and combat sabotage and terrorist acts by extremist forces.

In operations under special conditions and in remote areas, the Mobile Forces can include mountain rifle and other special purpose units.

The Mobile Forces will need considerable air support from aviation that can either be made organic to them or placed under their operational command.

An interesting and enlightening article by Col. Gen. V.I. Popov in the Military Thought journal (5) addresses the problems of creating the Mobile Forces, offering an original view on the purpose and composition of the Mobile Forces.

Another basic component of strategic reserves should be army corps, comprised of reduced strength combined-arms formations and units, subject to mobilization and deployment in the first order of priority.

In an internal armed conflict, it is essential to have in reserve joint groups of forces (troops), including combined-arms formations and units of the Interior Troops of the Internal Affairs Ministry, the Federal Security Forces, the Ministry for Affairs of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Elimination of Natural Disasters (MChS), etc.

Preparation and accumulation of mobilization resources is becoming an important task. Recently, there have been some difficulties with the mobilization and deployment of troops due to the planned annual downsizing of mobilization resources. The current training and mobilization system is outdated and obsolete, not effective enough, and does not ensure the training of the required number of reserve officers or the accumulation of mobilization resources.

Implementation of the program for putting the Armed Forces' manpower acquisition on a contract based system does not remove the need to maintain and modernize the mobilization reserve system. The new approach to manpower acquisition in the Russian military cannot as yet meet the problem of accumulating the required manpower mobilization resources. Furthermore, superior as a professional military might be, it will not be able to fight in a protracted, long drawn-out war. This will require a substantial number of well-trained personnel to replenish the losses, which is impossible without creating substantial mobilization resources.

The need to provide troops (forces) with well-trained mobilization manpower resources highlighted the problems involved in the transition to a new system of personnel training and resource accumulation. In this context the idea of creating a reservist training system for the Armed Forces on a voluntary/contract basis, put forward in an article published in Military Thought, (6) is noteworthy. The authors of the article point out that transition to this system will help to train reserve officers and have a permanent organizational core force for the rapid mobilization and deployment of reduced strength formations and units.

The staffing of military units with voluntary/contract reserve officers or on a mixed manpower acquisition principle (contract servicemen and servicemen called up from the reserves) helps to reduce the time of deploying combined formations and units to wartime staffing levels and ensuring their readiness to perform assigned missions and objectives. This approach will make it possible to effectively deal with the problem of accumulating mobilization resources to staff combined formations and units, including those designated for strategic reserves.

The introduction of contract service in the Russian Armed Forces and the proposed reduction of draft service should be accompanied by an increase in the number of persons subject to military service obligation in the reserves of the RF Armed Forces.

It is expedient that enlisted personnel and NCOs on contract service assume an obligation for a subsequent two or three year service in the Reserves of the Armed Forces, which will help to increase the number of reservists. They should receive monetary compensation and be entitled to some social benefits for their reserve service.

Today, the Supreme High Command does not have appropriate reserves in the main strategic directions. It is the view of the present author that in order to create sufficient strategic reserves, it is necessary to prepare reserve army corps in the military districts, designed to perform missions in armed conflicts on any scale. Mobilization and deployment of combined formations and units of various arms and branches of service as part of strategic reserves should be given a higher priority. Furthermore, each military district should have one or two such combined-arms formations (units).

The numerical size of strategic reserves in peacetime and in wartime is determined by the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces.

Responsibility for the preparation and training of reserves should be entrusted to the Main Command of the Ground Forces. Their deployment should be based on core garrisons (combined units, reduced strength units, and arms and military equipment storage depots).

All combined-arms formations and independent units designed to operate as strategic reserves should be prepared for rapid air lifting by military transport aviation, movement forward under their own power over long distances, and transport movement by rail and sea (river) transport facilities.

Both in past wars and today, the availability of aviation reserves is one key condition to success in an armed conflict. A strategic aviation reserve should be created in peacetime and maintained in constant combat readiness. Its composition will vary depending on the established numerical strength of the Air Force, the provision of new air complexes, and the specific combat tasks assigned. In any case, it should be able to effectively perform missions assigned to it. To this end, Air Force formations and units of the Supreme High Command Reserve should be given priority in the provision of new air equipment, while flying crews should have excellent combat skills and receive systematic flight training under special programs taking into account the specifics of combat action in different strategic sectors.

Redeployment of troops and movement of strategic reserves on the theater of operations in armed conflicts today is becoming a complex problem.

Effective use of Supreme High Command Reserves will to a very large degree be contingent on their timely redeployment (movement forward) and arrival to a strategic sector (theater of operations). Redeployment can be by rail, under their own power, or by mixed mode whereby troops march under their own power while heavy equipment and hardware is carried by rail, air, sea or river transport facilities.

With the outbreak of hostilities, the enemy's air and missile strikes can destroy major transport nodes, bridges, airfields and seaports, which will greatly complicate regrouping and redeployment of troops, requiring more time. The main method of regrouping and redeployment of troops in these conditions will be their movement forward (advance) under their own power as well as by rail along the sections that have not been destroyed by enemy strikes.

Regrouping and redeployment of reserves is planned by the General Staff of the Armed Forces with the participation of representatives from the Transport Ministry and other government agencies and departments concerned.

Priority in organizing transport movement is given to the condition of communication lines, the degree of their destruction, the possibility of different transport modes being used, and the time that it takes to redeploy troops to designated areas.

Movement forward of combined formations and units under their own power is accomplished by day marches up to 300 km, each division as a general rule being assigned one specific route, less often two routes. Transport movement by rail is planned, taking into account the extent of the damage. Airlifting of combined-arms formations and units will be contingent on the number and type of military transport aircraft provided for the purpose.

A special role in the transport movement of troops is assigned to military transport aviation. Its capability to airlift combined-arms formations and units as well as military equipment and hardware can be effectively tapped with a diversified network of airfields. In organizing airlifting operations, it is important to take into account the availability of air fields in the embarkation and disembarkation areas. It is advisable to use all available air fields regardless of their command or departmental jurisdiction, taking into account their capability to land a particular type of military transport aircraft.

Unfortunately, military transport aviation has rather limited capabilities. The situation is made worse by the fact that many aircraft are well past their service-age limits with a shortage of spare parts and funds provided for maintenance and repairs. The introduction of the national Global Satellite Navigation System GLONASS is being unjustifiably delayed. It should be stressed, however, that certain shifts for the better have emerged in some areas. (7) The combat readiness and operational effectiveness of military transport aviation are badly impaired by the fact that poor compensation compels increasing numbers of young military personnel to get discharged to the reserves.

Deployment of Air Force Strategic Reserves to the Theater of Operations

The use of Air Force strategic reserves builds on such aviation characteristics as high mobility and maneuverability. So Air Force formations and units as part of strategic reserves should, already in peacetime, be prepared for deployment and maneuver to maximum distances with refueling in mid-air or at intermediate (stage) air fields, in difficult weather conditions, both in day time and at night. Along the possible flight routes, it is expedient to designate refueling airfields (regardless of their departmental jurisdiction) with sufficient supplies of fuel, lubricants, and other materiel.

Methods of redeployment of Air Force reserves can vary depending on the prevailing situation in strategic sectors of operation.

During the period of threat preceding outbreak of war, Air Force reserves can be moved to preplanned areas in advance, as a rule by mixed mode. The bulk of command and control, technical and logistic support assets as well as personnel should be moved by rail (sea, river) transport, while forward support teams should be airlifted by military transport aircraft, and combat aircraft by flight echelon. Depending on the distance from one strategic sector to another, it will take between two and 10 days to accomplish the transport movement of Air Force reserves by this method.

The course of combat operations may require the immediate employment of Air Force strategic reserves. In this event, Air Force formations and combined units as part of the reserve can be airlifted without logistic, communication and command and control units (subunits); combat aircraft with their crews, by flight echelon, and a part of combat service and support personnel, by military transport aircraft. The duration of redeployment in this event does not exceed two to three days. It should be taken into account that all round support for redeployment of reserve forces should be provided at active airfields with available air assets and means. It is important to note here that successful use of strategic air reserves will to a very large degree be dependent on the conditions of airfield basing, available supplies of fuel and lubricating materials, ammunition (especially guided missiles and air bombs) and the availability of stable command and control and navigation systems.

Redeployment of strategic reserves requires a better organization of the theater of operations in peacetime: keeping all elements of infrastructure in constant readiness, expanding communication and fuel and energy capacity, improving transport support capability, preparing deployment routes, and providing protective shelters.

The U.S. military-political leadership considers the military redeployment system as a key element of the country's strategic security. To this end, the Military Airlift Command was established, comprising military transport and mid-air refueling tanker aviation. Military transport aviation is capable of airlifting a large number of troops, weapons and combat equipment to any theater of operations within a short time span. (8)

Methods of Employing Strategic Reserves

The operational-strategic situation that develops as a result of enemy aggression can immediately require a reinforcement of troops conducting combat operations, their redeployment, and the use of strategic reserves.

Reserves redeployed to the theater of operations are placed under the command of strategic sector force commander and used in accordance with his decision. They should interact with the forces and assets used by the SHC Headquarters--the Strategic Missile Forces and Long Range Aviation.

An internal armed conflict can also necessitate the reinforcement of troops operating in a conflict area (e.g., the use of troops to conduct combat operations in Chechnya). In reinforcing the troops deployed on the theater of operations, priority should be given to mobile forces that are used to isolate (block) a conflict area, take control over key targets and installations, and effectively engage the main forces of illegal armed formations. Restoration of public order is ensured jointly with units and formations of the Interior Ministry Troops, the FSB Border Troops, and GRU special task forces based in the area.

Should the military-political situation aggravate, the redeployed reserves, jointly with the core forces, should prevent the expansion of the conflict and its escalation into a local war.

The United States and its allies actively used precision-guided weapons in the local wars that they started in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. In Iraq, in 1991, they launched 300 cruise missiles and flew 80,000 sorties within a space of just one month. (9) In the course of their aggression against Yugoslavia, in 1999, about 500 cruise missiles were launched and about 5,000 sorties flown during the first month. In the war against Iraq, in 2003, they used about 1,000 cruise missiles. (10)

In local wars, reserve components were used alongside regular army units. For example, in the war against Iraq, in the operation to liberate Kuwait in 1991, 200,000 reservists were called up for active service (as is known, in addition to regular forces, the United States has the National Guard and organized reserves with a total numerical strength of 835,000 men). In the war against Yugoslavia, in 1999, a joint NATO force was formed. In 2003, more than 35,000 U.S. servicemen were airlifted from the United States to Iraq. (11)

The character of combat action in local wars has changed substantially. Combat operations are conducted over large territories with decisive objectives and principal goals achieved through the use of long range precision-guided weapons. In such a war, it will be necessary to counter precision-guided weapons not only with air and missile strikes, but also by widely using new warfare techniques and methods based on modern, cutting edge technologies.

A local war will be waged, as a general rule, within the borders of conflicting states by groups of forces deployed in a conflict area. They can be reinforced with additional troops and assets redeployed from other sectors, partial strategic deployment of armed forces, and the use of strategic reserves.

The use of strategic reserves will include the deployment of troops in a given sector, organization of combat action, countering the enemy's precision-guided weapons and effectively engaging its forces. Depending on the prevailing operational situation on the ground, strategic reserves can be used to reinforce troops, deliver counterstrokes, and destroy the enemy.

Under certain conditions, a local war can grow into a regional or a largescale war. Foreign experts believe that such wars will be characterized by precision engagement, or "the ability of joint forces to locate, survey, discern, and track objectives or targets; select, organize, and use the correct systems; generate desired effects; assess results; and reengage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo as required, throughout the full range of military operations." (12)

Of course, the main target in a war with precision engagement will be precision-guided weapons and information support systems. The character of combat action will change and with it the use of strategic reserves.

The air defense system should have sufficient capability to repulse the enemy's air strikes and prevent its aviation from operating in the air space.

Depending on the prevailing situation, strategic reserves can be used to reinforce troops deployed on the theater of operations, close breaches in defense, conduct mobile defense operations, deliver counterstrokes, and cover exposed sectors (directions) of operation. They can participate in effectively engaging the enemy and inflicting a decisive defeat on enemy forces by exploiting offensive success with the use of precision-guided weapons.

Strategic reserves in modern armed conflicts will be committed into action as soon as they arrive at the theater of operations, without waiting for their full concentration, in order to avoid losses from massive strikes with the enemy's precision-guided weapons. Units and formations should be capable of quickly redeploying in sectors that are unexpected for the enemy, covertly advancing to designated areas, delivering massive strikes against enemy troops and important targets, and deliver air, missile and artillery strikes on the enemy's redeploying reserves.

The main methods of action by strategic reserves can be as follows:

-- long range air and air strikes against enemy troops, command and control posts, nuclear and precision-guided weapons delivery means, nuclear power stations, and other hazardous installations on enemy territory;

-- raiding and assault action by front and army aviation as well as air mobile forces;

-- raiding, highly maneuverable actions by formations, units, forward detachments, and mobile groups;

-- dropping (landing) air (naval) assault groups and special task units behind enemy lines; and

-- the struggle for supremacy in the information sphere.

In analyzing the employment of strategic air reserves, it is essential to realize that their creation and preparation in wartime, as was the case during the Great Patriotic War, is no longer a viable option. Industry is not in a position to fully compensate for the combat losses of aircraft, while military schools cannot train proficient flight personnel to operate modern aviation complexes within a short time span. All of this should be taken into account in planning and using strategic air reserves within the sortie requirements as established by the Supreme High Command Headquarters. There should be no haste in making the decision to use aviation (without reconnaissance, with organization of close interaction and synchronization of efforts, and without all-round preparations for the performance of a specific combat mission), including its use in secondary sectors of operation.

In the course of combat action, air reserve formations and units should organize close interaction with Air Force units on the theater of operations and troops operating in the main sectors of operation. Their principal efforts should be concentrated at decisive periods by delivering massive strikes against the main groups of enemy troops, enemy reserves on the march, and in staging areas.

The confines of the present article do not allow for even brief consideration of other problems, in particular the methods of conducting combat action and exercising effective command and control of troops (forces). At the same time, it should be noted that information support for commanders and headquarters staffs, the provision of information about the situation on the ground (the position of own troops and enemy troops) in the interest of ensuring a timely and effective engagement of enemy targets acquires special importance today.

Information support for a combat operation will comprise a target specific implementation of measures and activities to provide military command with information about the situation on the ground as well as to impact on the enemy's information system with the simultaneous protection of own information system.

Technical innovations in command and control should go hand in hand with innovative thinking, which is ensured by high training standards, force packaging, indoctrination, and the retention in the RF Armed Forces of well trained, decisive and strong servicemen, capable of achieving success.

Summing up the aforementioned, it should be stressed that in the changing conditions of warfare, the importance of strategic reserves will grow even more. They should be one of the key elements of strategic forces, created in peacetime, and designed to perform a diverse range of missions. Their creation should be part of a comprehensive force development and organization program. At the same time, it is important to remember that the views on the composition of reserve forces, methods of their creation and employment will substantially differ from those in the past.

A certain part of strategic reserves should be created well in advance, including mobile forces on permanent combat readiness, as well as army corps, comprised of combined-arms formations and independent units, and formations and units of different arms and branches of service subject to mobilization and deployment according to mobilization plans as a matter of priority with the Reserve of the Armed Forces based on a contract system.

The use of strategic reserves will consist in delivering strikes with long-range weapon systems (missiles and aviation) against important targets, precision-guided weapons and information support system, and conducting exploitation ground operations.

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, together with other troops, should be ready to repulse and destroy any aggressor, to conduct decisive actions with any scenario of the outbreak of wars or armed conflicts amid the massive use of precision-guided weapons, including weapons of mass destruction. (13)

In conclusion, it should be noted that the study of problems involved in the creation and employment of strategic reserves in future wars is acquiring a major theoretical and practical importance.

NOTES:

1. Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna 1941-1945. Entsiklopedia, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1985, p. 689.

2. "Voennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii," Krasnaya zvezda, May 12, 2000.

3. Krasnaya zvezda, November 25, 2000.

4. Krasnaya zvezda, November 19, 2000.

5. V.I. Popov, "O kontseptsii sozdaniya Mobilnykh sil," Voennaia mysl', No. 11, 2005, pp. 51-60.

6. V.F. Fedorov, A.V. Pogorelov, O.Yu. Kobyzev, V.A. Bayborodin, "K voprosu sozdaniya novoy sistemy formirovaniya i komplektovaniya Rezerva VS RF na dobrovolnoy osnove," Voennaia mysl', No. 1, 2005, pp. 49-59.

7. Krasnaya zvezda, November 17, 2005.

8. I.V. Kudishin, Voenno transportnaya aviatsia zarubezhnykh stran, Astrel Publishers, Moscow, 2001.

9. G.A. Mikhaylov, Amerikanskiye vzglyady na problemu vedeniya boevykh deystviy na TVD, Institut SShA i Kanady RAN, Moscow, 2000, pp. 43-45.

10. M.A. Gareev, "Uroki i vyvody iz voyny v Irake," Voennaia mysl', No. 8, 2003, pp. 68-76: G.A. Mikhaylov, op. cit.

11. G.A. Mikhaylov, op. cit., pp. 45, 54.

12. Edinaya perspektiva-2020, Transl. from the English, Moscow, 2000, pp. 16-17 (Joint Vision 2020, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington DC, June 2000).

13. "Aktualnye zadachi razvitiya Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii," Krasnaya zvezda, September 11,2003.

Lt. Gen. Ye.I. MALASHENKO (Ret.)

Candidate of Historical Sciences