Courting and containing the Arab street: Arab public opinion, the Middle East and U.S. public diplomacy.

IN THE AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11, the Arab street became a subject of renewed interest and increased relevance. With the rise and virulence of anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim world threatening to undermine the foreign policy of the United States in a region that is vital to its interests, namely the Middle East, American foreign policy makers have sought a better understanding of the nature and dynamics of Arab public opinion. Similarly, within Arab official circles, the challenges associated with an increasingly pronounced Arab public opinion--traditionally a sensitive and elusive subject--has been unsettling. A street that could flare out of control is a destabilizing force. A street which exerts undesired pressures could be a liability. At the same time, a street that could be moved at will and used as a convenient instrument of realpolitik is a double edged-sword. This dual notion of the Arab street as both irrelevant and dangerous points to an amorphous socio-political entity of cultural complexity that conveniently keeps it mired in an unsettling ambiguity. Invoking key moments in contemporary Arab and Middle Eastern history while focusing on more recent events, this paper delves into the complexity of Arab public opinion by exploring how it is perceived. It also looks at three prevailing understandings of the political relevance of the Arab street: (1) The tendency to celebrate it as omnipotent and liberating; (2) The tendency to view it as submissive and therefore largely ineffective; and (3) The tendency to dismiss it altogether as mythical. A discussion of the sociopolitical underpinning of these three views will help eschew a reductive categorization of Arab public opinion, point out its dynamics and highlight its intricacies--namely that Arab public opinion is a real though subtle force to contend with. The paper concludes with a glimpse at new variables which are likely to influence and shape Arab public opinion in the future.

THE RISE AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE ARAB STREET

An exploration of the nature and dynamics of Arab public opinion is hardly complete without an examination of the referent itself and a commentary on the history of the name. During the latter part of the twentieth century, the terminology used to describe public opinion in the Arab world has changed significantly. The most current term during the (post)-independence era was the "Arab masses." Soon enough, this term--which has the Marxist connotation of class struggle and class politics--gave way to the term "Arab street." (1) The latter brings to mind both the popular anti-colonial sentiments of the 1950s and nationalist ideologies--most prominently pan-Arabism--of the 1960s. Historically, the notion of the Arab street as a cohesive body of public opinion resonated strongly in the era of the revolutionary Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser who commended a huge and sincere popular following and whose political rhetoric and emotional speeches electrified and inspired the masses. (2) During the heyday of Nasser, the term "Arab street," as Gordon Robinson points out, became synonymous with mass public opinion: "The huge crowds Nasser could summon, seemingly at will, provided a source of popular legitimacy and a convenient justification for policies that drew foreign criticism but which Nasser and other Arab leaders did not wish to change." (3) The outpouring of popular protests in support of Egypt and the rise of popular movements in the Levant and Iraq in the aftermath of the 1956 tripartite aggression on Egypt to reclaim the nationalized Suez Canal further transformed Nasser from a president of Egypt to a leader of Arab nationalism capable of arousing the Arab streets in defiance of the West. (4) Facilitating this phenomenal influence is the Voice of the Arabs, a massively popular Cairo-based radio station which--although eventually it turned out to be "a weapon wielded by the Nasser regime rather than a genuinely collective voice" (5)--served Nasser well, beaming anti-imperialist and Arab nationalist rhetoric throughout the Arab world and captivating, if not galvanizing, Arab audiences.

With the Arabs' humiliating military debacle against Israel in 1967, the death of Nasser in 1970, and his successor's peace treaty with Israel in 1979, pan-Arabism went into a state of relative decline. (6) Gradually, pan-Arabism started to recede, giving way to a new era marked by "the phenomenon of 'Islamic politics'" (7) which came to be seen as a bulwark against both radical Arab nationalism and secular communism in the region. This kind of Islamic political revival gained ground and was consolidated by the emergence of two socio-political developments tightly connected with an ideologically-anchored religious order emanating from two brands of Islam (one Sunni, the other Shiite) which made an already fluid state of affairs in the region all the more complex. The former is the ascendancy of Wahhabi Saudi Arabia as a leading conservative oil monarchy and a regional power with considerable clout, positioning itself as the defender of conservative morals through the enforcement of strict Islamic norms while occupying a place of privilege in Muslim ritual and history. (8) The latter is the establishment of a clerically dominated Islamic republic in yet another key player in Middle East politics, Iran, which threatened to "take away the seat of Islam from its traditional place in Arabia, making Persia the new Islamic center of gravity." (9) The Iranian revolution was, in many ways, a unique event in recent Middle Eastern history. In the late 1970's, the same anti-Western sentiment of the previous decade reigned in the brazen streets of Iran. Implacable in the minds of many Arabs and Muslims are the popular upheavals and anti-establishment demonstrations during the Islamic revolution in Iran (10) which brought a direct challenge to many Arab governments. (11) The powerful images of jubilant Iranians in the streets of Tehran celebrating the fall of the pro-American regime of the entrenched Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and cheering the captivating and triumphant homecoming of the exiled Ayatolah Ruhollah Khomeini from Paris at Teheran's airport in 1979 evinced the power that the masses can possess in the Arab and Muslim world, in general, and the Middle East, in particular. (12)

Whether it be Khomeini's theorcratic Iran or Nasser's nationalist Egypt, it is hard to ignore the vulgar connotation in the denomination "Arab street." For Dale F. Eickelman and Armando Salvatore, the use of the term street "imputes passivity or a propensity to easy manipulation and implies a lack of formal or informal leadership." (13) Embedded in such a terminology is a demonization of the Arab masses as an ominous urban crowd (14) that can generate much-feared protests. In fact, the term "Arab street" speaks of a mob mentality. It suggests dangerous masses awaiting to rise up in anger and spill into the streets in response to a particular event or in a violent popular reaction against a particular incident. Such loose socio-political terminology contains within its fold the idea of a reactive, violent and largely irrational public--a dormant human volcano, so to speak, which may erupt at any time. If anything, the undefined and indefinable nature of the street makes it an amorphous entity that is devoid of any sense of order. For Augustus Norton, "not only does the term imply a formless mass of people swayed by the sentiments of the moment and manipulated by autocrats, a modern parallel to "the mob" in revolutionary France or 'the crowd' in nineteenth-century England, but also few nuances of opinion and no need to stratify points of view by class, gender, age or regional or occupational distinctions." (15)

In the West in particular, the Arab street is often invoked as a threatening entity or a brute force. Commenting on the changing nature of activism of the Arab street, for instance, George Tenet writes: "In many places in the Arab world, average citizens are becoming increasingly restive and getting louder. Recent events show that the right catalyst--such as the outbreak of the Israeli-Palestinian violence--can move people to act." (16) Likewise, David Hoffman compares it to a "time bomb of popular discontent" or better yet a "tinderbox." (17) Overall, as David Pollock points out, the name "evokes exotic images of mystery, mobs, and mullahs; it sounds vaguely subterranean, if not sinister; and it is most often regarded in the West with a peculiar mixture of fascination, dismissal and fear." (18) For Asef Bayat, the demonization of the Arab street gained ground precisely because the subjects of such a portrayal bought into their constructed image as the "other." (19) The Arab street, Asef argues, is a concept which sinks well as a subject of Orientalism that Arabs themselves have internalized:

   The "Arab street" has become an extension of another infamous
   concept, the "Arab mind," which also reified the culture and
   collective conduct of an entire people in a violent abstraction. It
   is another subject of Orientalist imagination, reminiscent of
   colonial representation of the "other," which sadly has been
   internalized by some Arab selves. By no simple oversight, the "Arab
   street" is seldom regarded as an expression of public opinion and
   collective sentiment, like its Western counterpart still is, but is
   perceived primarily as a physical entity, a brute force expressed
   in riots and mob violence. The "Arab street" matters only in its
   violent imaginary, when it is poised to imperil interests or
   disrupt grand strategies. (20)

In such a perspective, the Arab masses are often dehumanized in ways which make them particularly threatening.

In recent years, the terms "Arab masses" and "Arab street" started to give way to the more inclusive term "Arab public opinion." In the latter formulation, the Arab street plays a role in the formation of the Arab public opinion--although Arab public itself cannot be reduced to the Arab street; nor does public opinion denote the kind of unabashedness, raucousness and incivility inherent in the term "Arab street." If anything, it resonates well within a Western political register associated with deliberative politics and participatory democracy. The term "public opinion" is more in tune with the call for transition toward democracy and political reform in the region which have made the voice of the public seemingly more relevant. In the 1990's, expectations about economic and political liberalization, along with Western pressure and internal demands for greater involvement in the political process, culminated in a number of elections in the Arab world. As Mohammed El Oifi explains, "the main purpose behind these elections was to bestow some legitimacy on a power that was strongly contested by Islamist parties. It is in the framework of this 'transition towards democracy' that the term "public opinion" acquired a particular pertinence, giving the illusion that citizens can choose among several competing projects in society and that they do play a role in a process which in reality aims at depriving them from their will." (21) As such, the invocation and appropriation of Arab public opinion bestows an air of legitimacy on what are otherwise largely, and in some cases inherently, non-participatory socio-political systems.

SOME POLEMIC AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The nuances in and specificity of the terminology not withstanding, "Arab street" and "Arab public opinion" are used interchangeably throughout this paper as both terms are current within various registers, ranging from academic studies to journalistic writings to Congressional hearings. The terminology aside, the relevance and influence of Arab public opinion has not always been clear. In Western democracies, leaders usually attempt to associate their activities and decisions with public approval to avoid the perception that the public opposes their policies. (22) However, the use of the term "public opinion" in the case of the Arab world is a bit tricky as it assumes a level of involvement and participation that is not always evident. The Middle East teems with autocracies whose survival impels them to widen or narrow the margin of freedom and the bounds of participation in response to social, economic or political exigencies they may find themselves up against. (23) The Western demand for political reform in a region that is largely perceived as disinclined toward democracy has yet to materialize, particularly as political openness often devolves into political entrapments symptomatic of an authoritarianism which can further increase the gap between the ruling elites and their citizens. (24)

The very conception of an Arab public opinion also assumes that the pulse of the so-called Arab street can be reliably measured through opinion surveys or polls as is often the practice in the West. The truth of the matter is that opinion polls are far from being endemic to the region. For Mazen Hashem, "one of the limitations of the structured public opinion gathering in the Arab world is that it misses the space in which Arab political culture develops." (25) The very notion of public opinion assumes a scientific measurement of sorts which is not something traditionally embedded in the autocratic political culture of the Arab world. For instance, there is no institutionally generated information on public opinion. In fact, serious political polling is a relatively recent practice (26) and meaningful public opinion surveys published about the Arab world are scarce and available only irregularly. Not only is there a near-absence of opinion polls, but even the existing ones are problematic. The few existing surveys pose problems of reliability, scientific merit, validity and significance. Likewise, representative samples are not all that representative of the make up of society while valuable survey questions are often tweaked for fear of government reprisals or left out altogether by government censors, not to speak of the authenticity of recorded responses in settings where social control is severe--all of which is suggestive of how difficult it is to conduct (and use) polling in the Arab world. (27)

DOES THE ARAB STREET MATTER?

These difficulties do not necessarily make the question of public opinion moot. Although Western standards and practices for measuring public opinion may not readily apply in an Arab context, public sentiment in the Arab world is arguably measured in other ways. Beyond that, however, there is little agreement among scholars, experts and analysts about the relevance and significance of public opinion to public behavior, domestic issues and foreign policy. Building on David Pollock's classic study The Arab Street: Public Opinion in the Arab World, (28) one may point out three common views when it comes to the reality and potency of Arab public opinion: the exaggerated view which portrays the street as an omnipotent force that is a harbinger of brewing revolutions; the underrated view which laments the silent majority as submissive and acquiescent; and the dismissive view which writes off the Arab street altogether as a myth or a figment of the imagination. A discussion of these three views will help eschew a reductive categorization of Arab public opinion and point out subtle dynamics and intricacies at play. It is a basic contention of this paper that Arab public opinion is in fact a force to contend with--one which exerts a notable though subtle influence on the state of affairs in the Arab world.

The Omnipotent Arab Street

Although not a prevalent tendency, it is not uncommon to come across views that put considerable faith in the Arab street, that has suffers the predicament of the modem Arab world--a legacy of defeat, a sense of helplessness, a politics of division, and a state of repression which give little hope in an unfolding era of economic globalization and steady political openness. (29) Those who espouse this view assume that because the ruling Arab elites have alienated the masses, the specter of popular revolution is always looming in the horizon. Seen from this perspective, the Arab street is continuously simmering and, if provoked, is likely to erupt in the form of a popular revolution that can overthrow despotic governments. Helping ingrain this idea in the political unconscious of the region are notable precedents in recent history which are symptomatic of political unrest in the Middle East, notably the bread riots that swept several Arab countries, the Iranian revolution, the Palestinian Intifada, and more recently the Cedar revolution in Lebanon. Underwriting the Arab street, so to speak, is an "underground" force which cannot be ignored, "[L]atent in its manifestation, dis-institutionalized in its functioning, and transnational in its structures," Mohammed El Oifi writes, "this underground represents an Arab public opinion which gives an outlet to 'popular' anger." (30) Not surprisingly, Arab regimes have learned to pay attention to what the public thinks and to feel the pulse of the street but they tend to do so from a security standpoint rather than a political viewpoint. (31) Keeping a vigilant eye on popular sentiments and appropriating ideological state apparatuses to channel what the masses think are often deemed essential practices for ensuring stability. At times, the invocation of the Arab street is convenient for regimes aiming at maintaining the status quo by suppressing the masses, seeking a justification for increased restrictions on civil liberties or attempting to exploit growing discontent among Arab populations. Not surprisingly, perhaps, with the war on Saddam Hussein's Iraq, speculations were rife among Arab official circles about a presumed Arab street backlash. Thus, while the Iraqi vice president under Saddam Hussein's rule, Taha Yassin Ramadan, warned that the Arab masses would rise up against the American-led coalition forces, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak warned that another Gulf war, particularly when considering the sour mood emanating from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, would lead to chaos as Arab rulers would be unable to curve popular sentiments or contain the fury of the street. (32) This position was echoed by the secretary general of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, who predicted that an attack against Iraq would open "the gates of hell in the Middle East" (33) and trigger a wave of violence in the Arab street. (34)

The Submissive Arab Street

Views such as these have often been dismissed as rhetorical. For example, Daniel Pipes finds the Arab street's oft-invoked proclivity to rise up, take action and overthrow governments when defeated a skewed notion: "This idea that the Arab street will rise up is premised on a counter-logical notion that Arabs (in contrast to other people) when they're defeated are all the more inclined to take action ... and overthrow government." (35) Traditionally, because Arab governments have been successful in molding public opinion and containing public discontent, the Arab street has had only limited success in affecting Arab politics. (36) Arab governments have been particularly successful at influencing the public mood at times of crisis, containing public fury when exasperated, reining in public opinion when it risked flaring out of control, and curbing public demonstrations when they grew too large. Several regimes in the region have survived many major crises and were able to contain public displeasure without resorting to significant government change. (37) For instance, even though the Arab street was generally against the 1991 Persian Gulf war, several Arab governments actively participated in the war against Iraq and were strategically cooperating with the United States. (38) In much the same way the mass demonstrations that erupted in 1991 in several Arab countries were hardly threatening. The prediction in 2003 that the Arab masses would rise up in defiance of any American intervention in Iraq were simply untrue. (39) The lack of massive protest demonstrations throughout the Arab world on a scale witnessed during the 1991 Gulf war is all the more noteworthy when considering the rise of anti-Americanism in the post-September 11 era. (40)

It is from this standpoint that many analysts are dismissive of the Arab street, some invoking its acquiescence while others pointing to its submissiveness when faced with the restrictions Arab regimes have put on it. For example, in his study of Arab public opinion, Shaker Al Nabulsi takes issue with the view that Arab public opinion affects the internal politics or external policies of Arab nations, rejecting the contention that Arab public opinion is as important as Arab oil. (41) For Al Nabulsi, the public in the Arab world hardly have a say about what is happening in their countries given the lack of freedom and absence of dissent in the region. (42) Overall, there is a tendency to view "the framed 'Arab street' [as] largely inactive" (43)--as "fizzling" and "non-threatening." (44) If anything, demonstrations in the Arab world are moderate and revolutions are unlikely. With very few exceptions, there has not been a noteworthy popular uprising in any Arab state in recent history.

The Mythical Arab Street

While for some analysts the Arab street is a force that has been largely pacified, for others it is a fiction that should be discounted altogether. In the absence of democratic institutions and genuine political openness in the Arab world, public opinion is politically irrelevant. For Laurent Murawiec, the nature of Arab governments precludes public opinion. (45) In her view, there is no street simply because un-orchestrated public dissent and demonstration are hardly ever tolerated in the Arab world; "dictatorships brook no politics--they brook no public opinion--no freedom of speech, of association, of the press or anything else." (46) Underlying such claims is the perception that the Arab street is constituted of indifferent and manipulated masses and the assumption that public opinion can have political effects only where there are institutional mechanism which, in the case of the Arab world, are flagrantly missing because of a "democracy deficit." (47)

If occasionally people in some Arab countries are allowed to voice discontent or to demonstrate, it is only "to grumble a little bit--within very clearly marked out limits." (48) More often than not, public opinion in the Arab world reacts to foreign rather than domestic issues. The action and rhetoric of the Arab street are more centripetal than centrifugal; they are more directed toward Israel (denouncing the occupation of Palestine), the United States (the war in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq) and the West (the Danish cartoon and hijab in France) than toward internal matters. (49) According to Murawiec, "the other" is often enough a scapegoat for the ills of Arab society as governments tend to mobilize the masses and put the Arab street on display to speak out in order to divert their attention from local politics or deflect it from focusing on domestic issues:

      So what is the "Arab street?" It is a cliche that has
   gained currency because the Arab dictators wanted to be able
   to project upon the world screen an image of the dangerous
   irrationality, the lurking violence, the explosive potential of
   the self-same population they keep in shackles and poverty ...
   The fabled Arab street is a cul-de-sac. Its pedestrians are
   turned on and turned off at will. If the Arab dictators were so
   keen to listen to the man in the street--or the mob in the
   street, rather--they would not be dictators. (50)

Throughout much of the Arab world, the autocratic systems in place have managed to keep the people under their thumb, denying them "a true voice in their national affairs" while providing an outlet for the frustration of the Arab Street "by allowing, and often encouraging, anti-American and anti-Israeli" protests. (51) Barry Rubin puts forth the same argument. In his view, anti-Americanism has allowed failed political systems in the Middle East region to subside and to carry on; "[B]y assigning responsibility for their own shortcomings to Washington, Arab leaders distract their subjects' attention from the internal weaknesses that are their real problems." (52) Thus, instead of demanding genuine social, economic and political reform which is sorely needed in many parts of the Arab world, Rubin argues, the public focuses on hating the United States. (53) As such, anti-American sentiments have become a mobilizing instrument for some regimes during changing times and conditions which bring them under the spotlight. Understandably, there is a growing concern among official and quasi-official American circles that leveraging anti-American sentiments in pursuit of internal political goals and exploiting the layman's framed opposition to the United States may eventually lead to a decline in American foreign policy support in the future. (54)

A REAL BUT SUBTLE PUBLIC OPINION

However, the dismissive view which sees in the Arab street little more than a myth that is somehow kept alive is not anymore tenable than the exaggerated view which puts too much faith in the revolutionary change the masses can bring about. Nor is the view that repression and disillusionment have made the Arab street irrelevant unproblematic. Although the Arab street comes off as a voice of discontent that is largely unable to turn aspirations into actions, it is not insignificant. A rigorous examination of Arab public opinion needs to highlight its subtle reality, emphasize its dynamic character, recognize its constraints, and acknowledge its complexity. To the extent that it exerts a notable though subtle influence on the state of affairs in the Arab world and has even become for some Western countries--particularly those with a vested interest in the Arab world, in general, and the Middle East, in particular--a factor to take into account when formulating their foreign policies, Arab public opinion is increasingly a force to contend with.

Although Arab governments are seemingly under no obligation to take into account popular opinion, more often that not one can point to a correlation between popular attitudes and sentiments, on the one hand, and policy outcomes, on the other hand--which is tantamount to saying that the influence of popular sentiments on Arab government policies is a real though subtle. (55) A close examination of popular acquiescence and popular protest can help elucidate these dynamics. These seemingly antithetical reactions suggest that the constraints which operate on Arab public opinion do not cancel it or take away its power and influence.

The first argument pertains to the silence of the masses as a form of subversion. In "The Arab 'Street' and the Middle East's Democracy Deficit," Dale F. Eickelman argues that the lack of the public's vocal presence is not necessarily an indication of its inexistence, nor is public silence necessarily consent. In his view, "silence, or apparent acquiescence, is often a weapon of the weak. In some countries of the Arabian Peninsula, a 'politics of silence,' in which audiences applaud with tepidity rather than with enthusiasm, is one of the few forms of public protest available despite the simulacra of democratic reform offered by repressive and authoritarian governments." (56) For Eickelman, inaction should not be interpreted as inertia. Silence and acquiescence can be a form of subversion, manifesting itself as a lack of response which becomes a position that exerts a form of pressure.

The second argument relates to pressure through social protest. During periods of civil unrest, the Arab street has also managed to maintain a non-negligible level of influence. This is the case for instance during the so-called bread riots which Larbi Sidiki discusses at length in "Popular Uprisings and Arab Democratization." Sidiki, puts into perspective the latent political dimension of what are otherwise economically-motivated street uprisings in the Arab world. For him, economic malaise can lead to social unrest, which in turn exerts a societal pressure that is amenable to political changes. (57) In other words, mob activities can trigger rebellions against authoritarian regimes and induce democratic transition. Accordingly, Sidiki makes a correlation between the case of the bread riots which erupted in various Arab nations in the 1980s and subsequent democratic openings or initiatives. (58)

Taking issue with the uniform application of the Western linear model of progression toward democracy which assumes a causal relationship between socio-economic development and democratization or political reform, Sidiki points out the failure of the affluent oligarchical rentier states of the Gulf to democratize. In his view, "wealth has helped contribute to the viability of authoritarianism" (59) by consolidating the providential state and inhibiting the rise of autonomous societal power centers. (60) Conversely, in the less affluent Arab states, the collapse of the bread pact between the rulers and ruled (the democracy of the bread) has contributed to democratic openings. For Sidiki, this correlation is suggestive of the "democratizing functions of violence" (61) and the positive outcome of mob or riot activities. Insofar as they radicalize the street and expose the superficiality of state-initiated political reforms, popular uprisings may be considered as de facto polls or surrogate elections in countries that are lacking in pluralist politics; "[I]n countries where elections have until recently not been a regular practice, bread riots served to express disdain for unjust and authoritarian rule as well as to mediate the public interest and concerns to the rulers," (62) at times engendering some form of political liberalization. Where economic downturns have eroded the providential platform of Arab polities, Sidiki writes, societal pressure which makes the tacit contract between ruler and ruled tenuous has often led to "involuntary relaxation of control from the top in the form of ambiguous politics of renewal--limited participation and contestation--the clear purpose of which has thus far been the survival of the regime." (63)

The foregoing analysis suggests that, when formulating their policies, rulers in the region often take into account street protests as these reveal popular sentiments which may be consequential. (64) As such, Arab states pay close attention to the views of their publics even as they strive to control what the latter think precisely because taking heed of the pulse of the people and the opinion climate in the street becomes part of their survival. (65) Arab governments have been particularly skilled at coping with dissent and have developed the ability to deflect, and co-opt or suppress dissent, especially when deemed threatening. Paradoxically enough, they have also come to recognize the need to be sensitive to public opinion (66)--a force to be taken into account, reckoned with, and if necessary wooed, thus simultaneously courting and containing Arab public opinion. Therein lays the subtle effect of public opinion. While it cannot be said to have a direct or decisive impact, public opinion has the proclivity to affect Arab states' public policy, whether it be in domestic matters or foreign policies. (67)

Furthermore, the extent to which one can posit an all-encompassing Arab street or a uniform public opinion is conceptually problematic. It is true that one may in some instances point confidently to the Arab street, particularly when it comes to the Arab-Israeli conflict as epitomized in the various rallies supporting the Palestinians and the demonstrations denouncing the Israeli occupations at various stages of the conflict. (68) However, the rallying power of the Palestinian issue can hardly serve as a measuring yard stick. During times when it is increasingly difficult to dissociate national issues from foreign policy matters and in places where people living under closed regimes find themselves faced with a seemingly contradictory emphasis on foreign policy, (69) attitudes in the Arab world tend to be filtered through various "supra-state frames of identity." (70) To the extent that the collective Arab political consciousness is greatly shaped by the Arab-Israeli conflict, (71) the mobilizing potential of the Palestinian question has endured in ways which other issues--say anti-Americanism--may not.

Outside this framework, sweeping generalizations about Arab public opinion are hardly tenable which is tantamount to saying that the Arab street is far from being unified, uniform or monolithic. This is so partly because populations in different Arab countries think and react differently. In some instances, the differences inside Arab publics are as significant as the differences between them. (72) In a war-tom country like Iraq, for instance, there are sharp differences between the views of the Shi'ites, the Sunnis and the Kurds. It would be equally misleading to talk about public opinion in Gulf countries without taking heed of their demographic make up (the ratio of the local to the expatriate population in a country like the United Arab Emirates), their historical specificity (the Iraqi invasion in the case of Kuwait) and their ethnic make up (the Sunni ruling minority and the Shi'ite majority in the instance of Bahrain). The same goes for the Levant region as a full understanding of the reaction of public opinion in Amman cannot be oblivious to the hybrid make up of the Jordanian society (Arab Bedouins and Palestinians), nor can one look at the Palestinian public opinion without taking into consideration historical, social, and economic differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Similarly, one cannot judiciously discuss the issue of public opinion in Lebanon without taking into account its confessional pluralism (Shi'ites, Sunnis, Maronites and Druze). The fact that the local has become as important as the regional and the national as relevant as the transnational suggests that there is no single overarching Arab street. (73)

Not only is the Arab street diverse and varies considerably within and among different Arab societies but it also tends to be mutable over time. More often than not, the nature and timing of some issues which preoccupy some countries rather than others leave the Arab street in a fluid state. The phenomenal rise of anti-American sentiments across the Arab and Muslim world in the post September 11 era is a case in point. The fact that, in the past, popular perceptions of the United States were generally positive suggests that Arab and Muslim attitudes toward the United States are shaped by changing conditions--most notably its foreign policy toward and military presence in the Middle East. (74) Conversely, France's opposition to the American-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003 earned it the strongest support among Western nations for its policies within the Arab world, (75) until its controversial ban of Hijab triggered a backlash.

Being attentive to the changing nature and specificity of the "Arab street" is arguably conducive to a better understanding of Arab public opinion. Paying attention to the polyvalent nature of the Arab street though does not necessarily mean segmenting it into self-contained fragments. It is possible indeed to posit different though at times convergent Arab streets. For example, one may point to demonstrations in Jordan against the Israeli incursion in the West Bank city of Jenine, demonstrations in Ramallah against the siege of Ararat, demonstrations in Beirut against the Syrian presence in Lebanon, and demonstrations in Egypt in demand of political reform. At the same time, one may also note sweeping demonstrations from Morocco to Bahrain in protest of the American-led invasion of Iraq or the publication of Danish cartoons defaming the prophet Mohammed. Similarly, the dynamic nature of the Arab street makes it counter-intuitive to lock governments and their publics into predictable antithetical roles or portray them as predetermined categories. In fact, the relationship between Arab governments and public opinion is far from being static. While there may be times when the public have a different view than the leadership, there are also times when there is a rough non-orchestrated congruence between government policy and public opinion. (76) Thus, a particular public may be as weary as its government of the Western pressure to take concrete steps for genuine democratic reform, but for different reasons, the former position emanating from anti-American or anti-imperial sentiments, while the latter is rooted in an anxiety over yielding power that has been traditionally held in a firm grip.

THE BETE NOIRE OF U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 

Having failed to capture the significance of Arab public opinion or engage it seriously, the United States has for decades brushed it aside as irrelevant, opting for influencing Arab governments rather than reaching the masses: When it took Arab public opinion into account, as Marc Lynch put it, it "was only out of fear for overtly provoking the so-called Arab Street." (77) Historically, as Eric Nisbet explains, "the opinions and views of non-elites living in Muslim countries have been of minimal concern to US policymakers.

Because of the autocratic nature of many Muslim governments (most are either traditional monarchies or single-party states) and the lack of democratic institutions, many US policymakers and Middle East strategists have dismissed mass opinion as unimportant and instead have focused only on the opinions and policies of national governing elites." (78) In fact, there has been a pervasive assumption that Arab pubic opinion does not matter and is not relevant. This view is based in part on a related assumption that public opinion in the Middle East does not significantly affect the policies of governments in the region. The assumption is not only that Arab leaders need not take heed of their people's views, but also that they can manipulate the opinions of the public when need be.

September 11, however, marked a shift in the US assumption about and approach to Arab public opinion. With the Middle East at the center of attention, the United States felt an urgent need to address the gap separating it from the Arab world. More than ever before, the United States has become aware of how vital it is to understand the role Arab public opinion plays and how the population in Middle Eastern countries (re)acts when designing its foreign policy. To cope with growing anti-American sentiments in a region that is vital to its interests, to repair the Arab world's perception of its motives and values, and to improve its image in the face of hostile Arab public opinion, the United States has become particularly attentive to public diplomacy efforts. The latter's aim is to understand and influence people of the region in an attempt to persuade them to support or at least acquiesce to its policies. It also aims at reversing the tide of distrust and building a better understanding of America's politics. Such an outreach has been made an integral part of the US foreign policy planning. In the words of a former US diplomat, the United States "is engaged with the Arab street because attitudes matter; words and images have consequences; and, over time, any foreign policy requires the understanding and support of those peoples and nations it touches ... The Arab street can be a formidable factor." (79)

Accordingly, the US administration launched a multi-faceted public diplomacy campaign. In 2001, President George W. Bush initiated the Office for Global Communications to manage the White House's image. From Karen Hughes, the State Department's Undersecretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and Bush's longtime public relations counselor and image maker, to Victoria Clarke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs who presided over the Pentagon's decision to embed more than 500 journalists to accompany the troops during the invasion of Iraq, one can sense the critical role public relations and media diplomacy has come to play in selling America's wars in the region. (80) Previously, the Pentagon hired the Rendon Group, a public relations firm, to help explain its intervention in Afghanistan to global audiences in general and Middle Eastern audiences in particular. The US administration also launched a public relations campaign, led by former Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy, Charlotte Beers, who even considered buying airtime on Al Jazeera in an attempt to improve its public image in the Arab world and win over Arab and Muslim opinion. Likewise, senior US officials appeared on prominent Arab media to explain the American position.

In order to further influence Arab public opinion, particularly within the Middle East, and to convey American principles and values to the Arab world, the Bush administration also launched the shared value initiative and established electronic and print publications, as well as special citizen and journalistic exchanges with Middle East countries, among other initiatives. It attempted to reach out to the Arab and Muslim public directly through ads, documentaries, books, websites, magazines and commercials depicting the life of Muslims in the US. (81) It soon became clear though that such initiatives, exchanges and information programs have not managed to engage a large number of people in the Arab world. With a number of surveys in the region depicting distinct negative views among many Arabs of the United States and its policies, there was a felt need in Washington to reach the masses more concretely and more effectively rather than target just elite opinion makers. (82) Accordingly, the Broadcasting Board of Governors launched in 2002 Radio Sawa, an Arabic language news, information and entertainment station aimed at informing a young Arab audience about the US viewpoints and values in an attempt to change their attitudes toward the United States. This radio station was followed in 2004 by another media initiative--an Arabic language TV station, named Al Hurra, aimed at providing better direct communication with the Arab and Muslim publics. Much like Sawa, Al Hurra was designed to make inroads into Arab public opinion and improve the image of the United States in the Middle East and North Africa region. (83) At least so far, though, these media initiatives have not fared well with Arab audiences or significantly altered negative views about the United States (84) partly because they are widely perceived in the Arab world as propaganda tools and partly because of the fierce competition for audiences in a vibrant Arab mediascape. To what extent US public diplomacy can effectively influence Arab public opinion remains to be seen. In the mean time, Arab public opinion remains the bete noire of the US administration with anti-Americanism still entrenched in the region. (85)

NEW INFLUENCES AND ADDITIONAL VARIABLES

In the twenty-first century, it is hard to study Arab public opinion without reference to a host of interrelated variables which have become increasingly important: the rejuvenated Arab media, the consequential American foreign policy in the Middle East region, and the increased relevance of the Arab diaspora--all of which contribute to the formation of an increasingly complex "Arab public sphere." (86) To start with, the information revolution has had a tremendous impact on a previously self contained region marked by censorship and control. In the aftermath of the 1990 Gulf War, the increased consciousness on the part of ruling elites in the Arab world of the importance of Arab public opinion and the need to exert influence over what Arabs think in an age marked by the flow of information explains in part the heavy investment in satellite media. (87) Yet, to the extent that pan-Arab media generated a discourse that is often autonomous from the power politics of its sponsors, (88) Arab satellite television has become a player to contend with in shaping what Arabs think.

This is all the more significant when considering the timeframe of these dynamics, namely an era marked by globalization and an interconnectedness between local, regional and international politics at the forefront of which are the Arab and Muslim world and the United States. In the post September 11 era, the conflict-ridden Middle East has become the center of attention--being subjected to America's desire to see its own version of a new Middle East, one that is more predictable and more in tune with its interests and in line with the ambitions of its strategic allies in the region. The succession of wars, debacles, and crises in the region along with the nature and pace of change coincided with two significant developments. The former is the revival of Islamism in the region, with those who espouse it positioning themselves as an anti-dote to a perceived religious imperialism made all the more prominent by the clash of civilization thesis that is often promulgated. The latter is the increased relevance of an Arab diaspora which has renewed its links with its Arab roots thanks to the communication means at its disposal, from uncensored live broadcasting to high speed internet connections. It is true that the mass demonstrations that were predicted throughout the Arab world did not materialize and the popular response to the Gulf war was tepid to say the least, but it is also true that there were widespread and often massive high profile anti-war demonstrations in many Western capitals and cities protesting the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, suggesting that in the age of globalization Arab public opinion is no longer geographically bound or territorially defined. If nothing else, these variables contribute to the formation of an increasingly complex Arab public sphere--as distinct from an Arab public opinion--the implications and ramifications of which have yet to be studied.

ENDNOTES

(1.) Mohammed El Oifi, "Influence without Power: Al Jazeera and the Arab Public Sphere," in Mohamed Zayani (ed.) The AI Jazeera Phenomenon." Critical Perspectives on New Arab Media (London: Pluto Press, 2005), p. 74.

(2.) John Kifner, "The New Power of Arab Public Opinion," The New York Times (11 November 2001).

(3.) Gordon Robison, "Whither the Arab Street?," USC Center on Public Diplomacy's Middle East Project (August 2005), <http://www.uscpublicdiplomacy.com/pdfs/Robison_Whither the Arab_Street_Aug23.pdf>.

(4.) Wahid Abdel Meguid, "The Abused Arab Street," Al Hayat (6 November 2002), <http://www.worldpress.org/print_article.cfm?article_id=922&dont=yes>.

(5.) Laura M. James, "Whose Voice? Nasser, the Arabs and 'Sawt al-Arab' Radio", Transnational Broadcasting Studies 16 (2002), <http://www.tbsjournal.com/James.html>. See also Mamoun Fandy, (Un)Civil War of Words: Media and Politics in the Arab Worm (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), pp. 40-42.

(6.) Youssef M. Choueiri, Arab Nationalism: A History (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 205-06.

(7.) James L. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East: A History (New York: Oxford UP, 2005), p. 290.

(8.) Roy R. Andersen, Robert F. Seibert, and Jon G. Wagner, Politics and Change in the Middle East: Sources of Conflict and Accommodation (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007), p. 147.

(9.) Fandy, (Un)Civil War of Words, p. 43.

(10.) William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder: Westview, 2004), pp. 428-30.

(11.) Karen A. Feste, The Iranian Revolution and Political Change in the Arab World (Abu Dhabi: ECSSR, 1996), pp. 12-13.

(12.) El Oifi, "Influence without Power", p. 74.

(13.) Dale F. Eickelman and Armando Salvatore, "The Public Sphere and Muslim Identities," European Journal of Sociology 43 (2002), p. 92.

(14.) David Pollock, The Arab Street? Public Opinion in the Arab World (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, 1992), p. 12.

(15.) Augustus Richard Norton, "The New Media, Civic Pluralism, and the Struggle for Political Reform", in Dale F. Eickelman and Jon Anderson (eds), New Media in the Muslim World." The Emerging Public Sphere (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), p. 20.

(16.) George J. Tenet, "Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World", Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (7 February 2001), <https://www.cia.gov/ news-information/speeches-testimony/2001/UNCLASWWT_02072001 .html>.

(17.) David Hoffman, "Beyond Public Diplomacy: Weapons of Mass Communications", Foreign Affairs 81.2 (2002), <http://www. foreignaffairs.org/20020301 faessay7974/david-hoffman/ beyond-public-diplomacy.html>.

(18.) Pollock, The Arab Street, p. 1.

(19.) Asef Bayat, "The 'Street' and the Politics of Dissent in the Arab World", Middle East Report 226 (2003), <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer226/226 bayat.html>.

(20.) Bayat, "The 'Street' and the Politics of Dissent in the Arab World."

(21.) El Oifi, "Influence without Power", p. 74.

(22.) Herbert Asher, Polling and the Public: What Every Citizen should Know (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1998), pp. 20-21.

(23.) Daniel Brumberg, "Democratization in the Arab World: The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy," Journal of Democracy 13.4 (October 2002), p. 56.

(24.) See Brumberg, "Democratization in the Arab World"; see also Larry Diamond, "Elections without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes", Journal of Democracy 13.2 (2002), pp. 21-35.

(25.) Mazen Hashem, "Understanding the Attitudes of Arabs toward 'America': The Underutilization of Class", Arab Studies Quarterly 27.1-2 (2005), p. 71.

(26.) David Pollock, "Arab Public Opinion", Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia and Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight (3 May 2007), <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/ pdf/Testimony-20070503-Pollock.pdf>, p. 2.

(27.) See Marc Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 66-68; Amr Hamzawy, "The Real 'Arab Street'," The Washington Post, (6 February 2005), p. B7; Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and Foreign U.S. Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); John Zogby, "Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations of the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform", Are we Listening to the Arab Street?, (8 October 2002), p. 104, <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/ cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_house hearings&docid=f:88885.pdf>; Yigal, Carmon, "What Makes the Arab Street Rage: Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations of the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform", Are we Listening to the Arab Street? (8 October 2002), p. 125, <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi_bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_house_hear ings&docid=f:88885.pdf>; Robert Satloff, "Survey Says: Polls and the Muslim World" New Republic Online (30 September 2005), <http:www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=873>; Pollock, The Arab Street, pp. 21-27; Kifner, "The New Power of Arab Public Opinion"; Adam Powell, "No independent Arab Media Exist, Say Arab Journalists", Washington Journal (4 March 2004), <http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/ index.php/newsroom/journal_detail/770/>.

(28.) Pollock, The Arab Street, p. 3.

(29.) Hilal Khashan, Arabs at the Crossroads: Political Identity and Nationalism (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), p. 139.

(30.) Mohammed El Oifi, "L'Opinion publique arabe entre logiques etatiques et solidarites transnationales", Raisons Politiques 19 (August-September 2005): p. 51.

(31.) Gordon Robison, "Whither the Arab Street?", p. 3.

(32.) Gary C. Gambill, "Has Saddam Lost the Arab Street?", Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 5.1 (January 2003), <http://www.meib.org/articles/0301_irl.htm>; Ari Melber, "Debunking the Myth of the Arab Street"; Max Abrahms, "Perspective", National Review Online (26 march 2003), <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=365>.

(33.) "Arab Views", A News Hour with Jim Lehrer (6 September 2002), <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec02/views_9-06.html>.

(34.) Ari Melber, "Debunking the Myth of the Arab Street", Baltimore Sun (31 August 2003), <http://www.topdog04.com/000364.html>.

(35.) Daniel Pipes, "Where's the Arab 'Street'", CNN." Lou Dobbs Moneyline (8 May 2003), <http://www.danielpipes.org/article/1093>.

(36.) Jonathan Schanzer, "The Arab Street and the War: Are Regimes in Control?", The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Watch 729 (21 March 2003), <http://washingtoninstitute.org/watch/policywatch/policywatch2003/ 729.htm>.

(37.) Shibley Telhami, "Public Opinion could Flare out of Control in Arab Nations," San Jose Mercury News (7 April 2002). <http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/telhami/20020407.htm>. See also Michelle Goldberg, "The Arab Street Explodes" (22 March 2003), <http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2003/03/22/arab street/ index.html>.

(38.) Telhami, "Public Opinion could Flare out of Control." See also Salamah Namat, "Les pressions exercees par 'la foule arabe islamique': un myth," Al Hayat (19 January 2002), <http://www.memri.org/ bin/french/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP33402>.

(39.) Gary C. Gambill, "Has Saddam Lost the Arab Street?"; Ari Melber, "Debunking the Myth of the Arab Street."

(40.) David Pollock, "Arab Public Opinion", p. 2.

(41.) Shaker Al Nabulsi, The Arab Street: The Levant and Egypt (Beirut: Arab Studies and Publication Center, 2003), p. 8.

(42.) Al Nabulsi, The Arab Street, p. 9.

(43.) K.P. Stratford-Wright, "Public Opinion, the Media, Informations, Propaganda and the Function of Media Operations, ARRC Journal (Winter 2004), <http://www.arrc.nato.int/journal/winter04/media.htm>.

(44.) Schanzer, "The Arab Street and the War: Are the Arab Regimes in Control", Policy Watch 729 (21 March 2003), <http://www. washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/index.htm#2003>.

(45.) Laurent Murawiec, "Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations of the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform", Are we Listening to the Arab Street? (8 October 2002), pp. 117-20, <http://frwebgate. access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_house_hearings&docid= f:88885.pdf>.

(46.) Murawiec, "Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security," p. 118. See also Namat, "Les pressions exercees par 'la foule arabe islamique'."

(47.) Dale F. Eickelman, "The Arab 'Street' and the Middle East's Democracy Deficit." Naval War College Review 40.4 (2002), p. 45.

(48.) Murawiec, "Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security," p. 118. See also Namat, "Les pressions exercees par 'la foule arabe islamique'."

(49.) Al Nabulsi, The Arab Street, p. 11.

(50.) Murawiec, "Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security", p. 118.

(51.) Joseph Puder, "Examining the Arab Street", The Evening Bulletin (10 August 2006), <http://www.thebulletin.us/site/news.cfin?newsid= 17033423&BRD=2737&PAG=461&dept_id=578325&rfi=6>.

(52.) Barry Rubin, "The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism", Foreign Affairs 81.6 (2002), pp. 73-74.

(53.) Rubin, "The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism", p. 74.

(54.) Government Accountability Office, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: Strategic planning Efforts have Improved, but Agencies Face Significant Implementation Challenges", Testimony by Jess T. Ford before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight House Committee on Foreign Affairs (26 April 2007), <www.goa.gov/new.items/d07795t.pdf>.

(55.) Pollock, The Arab Street, pp. 9-11.

(56.) Dale F. Eickelman, "The Arab 'Street' and the Middle East's Democracy Deficit", p. 39.

(57.) Larbi Sidiki, "Popular Uprising and Arab Democratization", International Journal of Middle East Studies 32 (2000), p. 79.

(58.) Sidiki, "Popular Uprising and Arab Democratization", p. 86.

(59.) Sidiki, "Popular Uprising and Arab Democratization", p. 88.

(60.) For a corrective view of this formulation in more recent years, see Tom Pierre Najem and Martin Hetherington (eds), Good Governance in the Middle East Oil Monarchies (London: RoutledgeCurson, 2003).

(61.) Sidiki, "Popular Uprising and Arab Democratization", p. 89.

(62.) Sidiki, "Popular Uprising and Arab Democratization", p. 89.

(63.) Sidiki, "Popular Uprising and Arab Democratization", p. 80.

(64.) Pollock, The Arab Street, pp. 9-11.

(65.) Pollock, The Arab Street, pp. 3-9.

(66.) Ross, "Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security," pp. 12-13

(67.) Telhami, "Arab Public Opinion and the Gulf War," pp. 437, 451.

(68.) Amany Radwan, "Anger on the Arab Street", Time (5 April 2002), <www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,227255,00.html>.

(69.) Dale F. Eickelman, "The Arab 'Street' and the Middle East's Democracy Deficit", p. 46.

(70.) Furia and Lucas, "Determinants of Arab Public Opinion on Foreign Relations," p. 603.

(71.) Shibley Telhami, "Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security," p. 53.

(72.) David Pollock, "Arab Public Opinion", p. 2. See also Anthony Shahid, "Across Arab World, A Widening Rift", Washington Post (12 February 2007), p. A 1, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2007/02/11/AR2007021101328.html>.

(73.) Pollock, The Arab Street, pp. 11-12.

(74.) Mark Tessler and Dan Corstange, "How Should Americans Understand Arab and Muslim Public Opinion Attitudes: Combating Stereotypes with Public Opinion Data from the Middle East," Journal of Social Affairs 19.76 (2002), pp. 13-34.

(75.) Shibley Telhami, "What Arab Public Opinion Thinks of U.S. Policy", The Brookings Institute (12 December 2005), <http://brookings.edu/fp/saban/events/20051212.htm>.

(76.) Pollock, The Arab Street, p. xii.

(77.) Marc Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, pp. 56-57.

(78.) Eric C. Nisbet, Matthew C. Nisbet, Dietram A. Scheufele, and James E. Shanahan, "Public Diplomacy, Television News, and Muslim Opinion," Press/Politics 92 (2004), p. 14.

(79.) Ross, "Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security," pp. 6-7.

(80.) Marcello Foa, "Latest Coup from the 600 Experts of the Media War: The U.S. Communication Strategy", European Journalism Observatory, <http://www.ejo.ch/analysis/publicrelations/SpinCasaBianca_en.html>.

(81.) Nisbet et al, "Public Diplomacy, Television news, and Muslim Opinion," 2004, pp. 15-17.

(82.) Harold C. Pachios, "Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations of the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform", Are we Listening to the Arab Street?, (8 October 2002), p. 22, <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/ cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_house_hearings&docid=f:88885.pdf>.

(83.) Nisbet et al, "Public Diplomacy, Television News, and Muslim Opinion," 2004, 15-17.

(84.) Mohammed El Nawawy, "US Pubic Diplomacy in the Arab World: The News Credibility of Radio Sawa and Television Al Hurra," Global Media and Communication 2.2 (2006): p. 188.

(85.) See Zogby International, "Arab Nations 'Impressions of America' Poll," (19 April 2002), <http://www.zogby.com>. See also Shibley Telhami, "Arab Public Opinion: A Survey in Six Countries," San Jose Mercury, (16 March 2003), <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/sadat/pub/oped/Arab%20public%20opinion%20a%2 0survey%20in%20six%20countries.htm>; Shibley Telhami ,"Arab Public Opinion Survey," (2003), <http://www.bsos.umd/sadat/pub/survey2003.htm>; and Robert Younes, "Arab Public Opinion of U.S. Takes a Nosedive," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 22.4 (2003): p. 73-75.

(86.) Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public.

(87.) Fandy, (Un)Civil War of Words, p. 45.

(88.) Mohammed El Oifi, "Faire de la politique par les medias dans le monde Arabe", Maghreb-Machrek 912 flail 2007), p. 83.

Mohamed Zayani is Associate Professor of Critical Theory at the American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates.