Counterstrike at the NTC: reversing negative trends.

The CD brought back from the suspected insurgent's house included several digital movie clips, obviously filmed by the enemy or one of his supporters. Complete with Arabic martial music and the recorded voice of the photographer, the clip on the captured CD included a short film of an insurgent 120-mm mortar team attacking the coalition unit's forward operating base (FOB). The crew fired six rounds from the town in less than two minutes and simply vanished.

Worst of all, Soldiers viewing the captured movie knew the enemy had gotten away while they still struggled with the losses of that attack. The only good news was this attack took place at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California--not Iraq.

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Recent experiences at the NTC have shown a mixed bag of results in winning the counterstrike fight. Since March of 2004, the NTC has conducted stability and support operation (SASO) mission readiness exercises (MREs) for units deploying to the war on terrorism, replicating the full spectrum of enemy activities found in Iraq. Units undergoing this training routinely struggle "to get the upper hand" in the counterstrike fight against the insurgency. No unit in recent memory has defeated the enemy indirect fires "system" decisively, even for a short time.

We have seen several negative trends in the counterstrike fight that contribute to the challenge. This article is about reversing those trends and providing some insights on achieving the desired effects in the counterstrike fight.

Conversational and unclassified evidence from the combat zones indicate that many of these same trends exist in deployed units and create the same challenges in combat.

There is no "silver bullet" in winning the counterstrike fight. However, there is a single concept that commanders must keep in mind: the counterstrike fight can be successful only if the maneuver commander takes ownership of it, directs a proactive approach, includes combined arms and joint forces, is offensive-minded and includes both lethal and nonlethal components. This approach is the true focus of this article.

Our article lists the most common counterstrike negative trends at the NTC. The solutions to these trends are a combination of lessons learned, doctrine and procedures gathered from units with recent combat experience. They highlight the basics of our counterstrike doctrine and combine both reactive and proactive actions while maximizing the tenets of the offense. They also emphasize the Army model of "See first, understand first, act first." Commanders seeking a proactive, offensive-oriented, lethal and nonlethal, joint and combined arms approach to counterstrike should consider the following seven trends when creating their counterstrike systems.

1. Units at the NTC struggle to fully integrate a lethal and nonlethal, joint and combined arms approach to counterstrike. Maneuver commanders who emphasize winning the counterstrike fight supervise its execution and allow their staffs to integrate effects to achieve that goal. Without the commander's focus, units struggle to successfully integrate all the elements of combat power protection, leadership firepower, maneuver and information.

Successful units develop combined arms operations that integrate deliberate information operations (IO) and civil military operations (CMO) by using a well developed targeting cycle. The targeting cycle must analyze the enemy as a system to identify where the unit can apply the elements of combat power.

There are several key parts of any indirect fire system. At their simplest, they are shooters, terrain, resources and weapons, command and control ([C.sup.2]), observer and target. Without any one of these parts, an insurgent indirect fires system soon will fail.

As part of their targeting cycle, units "attack" these parts with lethal and nonlethal effects, addressing each as a single target or target set. A running estimate and a routinely conducted commander's update ensure the commander is comfortable with the plan to address each target. Feedback from the commander during the update ensures the staff is working toward his desired end state by maximizing the effects of all available assets.

Successful units at the NTC take the commander's intent and devise an approach that focuses lethal and nonlethal options simultaneously against a single target and all targets in the enemy fires system. No element is ignored, and effects are mutually supporting.

The most important point is best illustrated by a line from an old movie: "If you talk the talk, you must walk the walk."

Units that fail in the counterstrike fight don't support their nonlethal operations with lethal options when required and vice a versa. Units fail if they use only one option or use them sequentially vice simultaneously. The same is true for units that do not integrate combined and joint capabilities into the lethal fight.

The combined arms approach to the lethal fight must gain the most from all available forces. The most successful units at the NTC synchronize the counterstrike fight daily and plan a suite of options to respond to attacks through Field Artillery and mortar fires, close air support (CAS), combat patrols, stationary observation points and attack aviation. Successful units also use a well-thought-out intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) plan that identifies and targets enemy shooters before they shoot and tracks them after they engage friendly forces.

Finally, FA battalions often are experts at counterstrike but lack the resources and [C.sup.2] to execute the counterstrike fight in an insurgency. Once again, the counterstrike fight responsibility rests with the maneuver commander, and he must direct and resource it. At the NTC, brigade commanders who assign the task to their FA battalions and fail to support and resource its execution, fail in their counterstrike fight. On the other hand, brigade commanders who take on the mission and resource their counterstrike fight and provide C2 routinely reduce the enemy's capabilities at the NTC.

2. Units normally are reactive, not proactive. Although a well rehearsed and responsive combined arms and joint lethal counterstrike capability is a part of the solution, units must prevent as many attacks as possible through proactive measures. This is tough when good radar sections don't acquire all the enemy indirect fires and the enemy avoids our reactive responses to his attacks.

Army doctrine is offensive-oriented, encouraging us to dominate battlespace by retaining the initiative. Good units use terrain and pattern analysis combined with IO to develop the times and places they can interdict the enemy and prevent his attacks. This analysis gives them information dominance in their areas of operations (AOs) and allows them to act first by denying the enemy terrain, resources and sanctuary through a lethal and nonlethal combined arms approach that takes the initiative away from the enemy.

Units cannot win this fight simply by passing it to Field Artillerymen and allowing them to react to the enemy from a FOB. Everyone in the BCT must be involved, and everyone must leave the FOB--get out and "make it happen"--to dominate the BCT's battlespace.

Successful units use every attack and every contact with or capture of enemy indirect fire personnel or resources to update their pattern analyses and determine likely enemy activities in their AOs. Using a terrain analysis software product provides a pattern analysis that visually displays times and locations and may allow the unit to predict the next attack, the enemy's travel routes and likely ammunition cache sites.

This product is only adequate if units leave it to the targeting officer and S2 to employ. However, if units involve the entire staff and are proactive, they get better results.

One of the best proactive measures starts as a reaction. Effective units conduct an after-action review (AAR) of every acquisition, even those that may be false--every contact with indirect fires, every nonlethal operation and every response to an attack by maneuver, an ISR platform or reactive fires.

They use these AARs or a story-board concept to look at the system and provide an analysis "picture" that gets better with every contact. By developing a better understanding of the enemy's shortcomings or the opportunities he presents, units can rapidly take away his initiative and dominate the battlespace.

3. Units do not understand the limitations or technical aspects of counterstrike radars. At the NTC, we often see a new warrant officer leading a newly formed radar section. These great Soldiers try their hardest but simply do not have the technical expertise to maximize their radars' performance.

Even strong radar sections that are well trained and technically proficient usually struggle with higher headquarters that over centralize tactical and technical control of the radars and (or) refuse advice from the radar section leaders. As a result, the Q-36 radars are not emplaced to guarantee a high percentage of acquisitions while reducing ground clutter. See the NTC site in the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) section of Fires Knowledge Network (FKN) on the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) for instructions and illustrations on how to position radars.

The key shortcoming we see at the NTC is units don't understand the dead space in the area believed to be covered by the radar beam. The average radar section does not understand track volume, manual terrain following, enemy weapons ballistics, ground clutter reduction and how the shelter uses the parameters entered into the computer. Again, our NTC site on FKN discusses solutions for these technical shortcomings.

During the last year, too many radar sections at the NTC did not understand how to use the radars to acquire the majority of the rounds fired at them. The radar sections will acquire rounds successfully only with a detailed understanding of these technical aspects.

Again, one of the best ways to improve is through an AAR for every missed or false acquisition. This allows the unit to correct shortcomings in the radar set up, identify changes in enemy attack patterns and maximize the capability of the radar system.

A software solution also is available for all Q-36 and Q-37 radars, called the FireFinder position analysis system (FFPAS). This system allows units to visualize radar coverage in three dimensions and see shortfalls. Sections that use this software can make amends quickly to faults in their site analysis that create dead spaces the enemy can use as sanctuary.

FFPAS facilitates the sighting and set-up of a radar before it occupies a new position. The software determines radar coverage at a particular location by assessing the radar's ability to locate different types of enemy weapons. FFPAS can perform in minutes calculations that require significantly more time when done manually.

FFPAS can perform a computer analysis of the radar's performance against probable enemy weapons locations and aim points. This allows the operator to assess the radar's sighting and set-up based on battlefield intelligence in a variety of scenarios. The rapid analysis of this computer-based system allows the radar section leader to quickly analyze alternative positioning sites and evaluate potential radar coverage.

4. Units do not rehearse their counterstrike plan to standard (it's not just a clearance-of-fires drill). Most units at the NTC do not rehearse their counterstrike plans from sensor to responder; if they do, it is rarely to standard.

Often we hear "Why do we need to rehearse with all the practice we're getting dealing with incoming?" The answer at the NTC is that the enemy can engage and displace in less than three minutes while most units take longer to respond with fires and even longer with ISR or maneuver forces. The solution is frequent combined arms rehearsals exercising the entire reactive system from sensor to responder.

A good rehearsal starts as a surprise and is initiated by one of the brigade's senior leaders, ensuring it gets the respect it deserves. The rehearsal must be truly combined arms, lethal and nonlethal, and not centered on fire support elements (FSEs) and FA batteries.

Experience shows that rehearsals are some of the best training because they identify shortcomings and allow improvements in responsiveness. The rehearsals should include clearance of fires approval authority, if needed, so units understand how they get permission to fire. Great rehearsals include friction so units are prepared for the possibilities they may face during their responses.

Finally, an AAR after every rehearsal ensures improvement every time.

5. Clearing fires is not easy, and approval to fire is often retained too high in the chain of command. Too many units retain clearance of fires at the highest level. This is due largely to a misconception of what is happening in theater. Although there are cases where this is required, most deployed units have the approval authority at too high a level.

The real purpose of clearance of fires is to prevent fratricide and limit collateral damage. "Waking up a senior leader in the middle of the night" takes time and does not always limit collateral damage and avoid fratricide.

Only detailed battle tracking and collateral damage checks in accordance with clear commander's guidance allow a timely reaction. With clear commander's guidance, anyone can clear fires; without it, the commander, in effect, removes a critical piece of the counterstrike fight--the ability to respond quickly.

Establishing pre-cleared or "no maneuver" areas over known or likely enemy firing points also hastens the counterstrike process. These areas must be based on thorough pattern analyses, advanced legal reviews and the commander's guidance.

Successful units in the counterstrike fight have a clearance-of-fire drill that is completed by the battle captain, including standard techniques and Falcon View or a similar software program to check rapidly for clearance from structures and potential collateral damage. If the enemy fire point of origin (POO) plots in a pre-cleared area, it is shot immediately.

At the NTC, successful units establish procedures that speed responses and often achieve response times of less than two minutes.

6. Units do not conduct AARs or analyses when they fail to acquire or interdict the enemy. As a result, most units are reactive. Most units take no action to determine why they missed incoming rounds. This also is true when units' quick-reaction forces or patrols fail to gain contact with the enemy in indirect fire attacks. The result is they seldom get better at defeating the enemy.

A good AAR or analysis will lead to discovering new enemy tactics and techniques, can determine if the unit has technical or tactical radar employment problems or can show the unit response is just too slow.

Knowing these critical facts allows units to take measures to correct the shortcomings or to find ways to defeat the new enemy tactics and techniques proactively.

7. Essential repair parts stockage list (ERPSL) management is generally very weak. In the last year, 100 percent of the ERPSLs brought to the NTC for rotation have been incomplete. The unit and radar section leaders don't know what parts are on hand because they rarely have conducted a proper inventory. Finally, the parts on hand are not stored properly: good parts and non-mission capable (NMC) parts are stored together and unmarked. These problems cause long down-times for radars as repair parts are not on hand or are difficult to find in the radar sections.

Given the cost of a full ERPSL, it is expensive to fix this problem. The cost itself is sometimes the problem. Some units cannot afford a full ERPSL and wait for something to go down before they order a part. Often the decision to maintain a full ERPSL is made above the brigade level. Either way, most units' Class IX budget can't afford a full ERPSL.

While this works in garrison, it will not work in combat. It results in Soldiers' lives being at risk and the enemy gaining new-found freedom of action while our Q-36 and (or) Q-37 radars are deadlined.

The solution is to invest in a full ERPSL in accordance with Army regulations; inventory, mark and store it to standard; and place the proper command emphasis on this vital logistical requirement. The FA and the Army must address this as a force protection issue.

Reversing these negative trends gains an advantage over the enemy. The offensive-oriented, proactive, joint and combined arms, lethal and nonlethal approach is the only way to win the counterstrike fight. Commanders who address counterstrike to break these trends will set the conditions for dominating their battlespace and improving force protection.

Lieutenant Colonel James L. Miller is the Senior Fire Supporter (Wolf 07) at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California. In his previous assignment, he commanded 1st Battalion, 15th Field Artillery (1-15 FA), part of the 2d Infantry Division in Korea. Also while in Korea, he served as the Chief of Fire Support for the Combined Forces Command (CFC). In the 3d Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia, he was the Chief of Plans and Exercises in the G3 and Battalion Executive Officer and Brigade Fire Support Officer while assigned to 1-10 FA. He commanded the 1st Howitzer Battery, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in the Gulf for Operation Positive Force, a follow-on to Operation Desert Storm. He holds two master's degrees.

Chief Warrant Officer Three Michael A. Harp is the Senior Radar/Targeting Observer/Controller (O/C) at the NTC. He deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom as the Targeting Officer for the 3d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in the 4th Infantry Division. Chief Harp served as a Radar O/C with the 393d Regiment (Training) at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and as a Radar Technician and Brigade Targeting Officer while assigned to 2-320 FA, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky. As an enlisted Soldier, he has held every position from Multiple-Launch Rocket System Crewmember to First Sergeant. He is a graduate of the Joint Aerospace Command and Control Course and Joint Firepower Control Course, both at Hurlburt Field, Florida, and the Information Operations Course at the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group in San Diego, California.

By Lieutenant Colonel James L. Miller and Chief Warrant Officer Three Michael A. Harp