Correcting corrections: de-reifying the new Israeli historiography.

RE-WRITING HISTORY IS A UNIVERSAL act. Nations rediscover their past and rewrite their biographies. History is far from being etched in stone. This was neither accidental nor random. The world and nations change and historiography changes with them.

In the history of the state of Israel, it is possible to distinguish two regimes and ideologies that were products of local, regional, and global forces: 1. Ben Gurionism, characterized by state regulated militarized economy associated with a degree of collectivism; and 2. Market Zionism, characterized by a neo-liberal economic outlook entailing an outward expansionist deregulated economy, individualism and a highly conservative ideological outlook. Each regime is discerned in this synopsis as a complex matter of politics, economics and culture.

Each global, regional, and local structural change shaped Israel's class structure leading to political, economic, and cultural transformations. The transformation into the second Israeli regime is associated with the rise of a new Israeli elite group or ruling class, whose character and ideological conservatism, coupled with the neo-liberal economic outlook, shaped the second regime and provided the conditions for, among many things, the rise of the Israeli New Historiography.

For the purpose of explaining the new historiography, the following pages include a discussion of the major trends in Israeli economic history and the corresponding political transformations, as well as a discussion of nationalism and master narratives intended to illuminate the re-invention of Israel within the context of the new regime. At the end, an attempt will be made to consolidate these developments with the rise of new historiography and locate it within the second Israeli regime.

BACKGROUND

Starting with the late 1980s, the rise of the phenomenon known today as "Israeli New Historians," began correcting flaws that deeply saturated the official Israeli narrative, which profoundly shook the founding myths of Israel. (1) The rise of the new historiography suggests a variety of questions. In addition to the question of its political utility and implications, as an intellectual phenomenon, the study of the new historiography entails a philosophical issue as well. Both issues are necessarily related. Any view concerning the possibility of political implications is based primarily on a philosophical understanding of this phenomenon and vice versa. In addition to advancing a colorful account of history, the new historians illuminate the new historiography itself, which in turn offers a conceptualization of history.

The forceful expulsion of Palestinians, an early revelation of the new historiography, needed neither tangible verification nor decades' old archival evidence. To most Palestinians, they were the living proof of that Israeli past. However, the political utility of the new historiography was appealing: Israel was "confronting its past" (2) and the new historians were exposing Israel's original sins.

While the past cannot be undone, many thought that perhaps the new historiography could at least make Israel reconsider the future. After all, Israel's heroic image of the past, an Israeli David defeating an Arab Goliath, the purity of arms, and the founders' constant quest for peace with the Arabs, was shattered and replaced by the image of a colonizer outnumbering his victims, eager to expel, ethnically cleanse, and massacre the native Arabs, and rejecting every peace initiative to recognize his existence. If facts revealed by Israeli scholars cannot create a moral, if not a cultural shock that would at least weaken Israel's resolve and force her to make peace with the Arabs, nothing can.

The "Oedipus the King" finale-like scenarios where Oedipus takes responsibility for the knowledge he acquired (he took the shoulder-pins from his mother's dress and blinded himself) was not only optimistic but also rather unrealistic. Even the "tearful assassin" weeping over the bodies of his victims fell short a scenario. For even when Morris (3) discovered a classic tearful assassin in Yousef Nachmani, he merely admired him as a "key to understanding Zionism and its Success." (4) "The two faces of Zionism" doctrine, (5) delineating that "Zionism has always had had two faces: a constructive, moral, compromising and considerate aspect; and a destructive, selfish, militant, chauvinistic-racist one," proposed by Morris does not really explain anything. It does not explain most of the shootings that were done without weeping, nor the history of Zionism. At best, it is a simplistic view of both Zionism and history.

Naive, colorful scenarios of the political utility of the new historiography were erroneously based on misunderstandings of the new historiography and a flawed comprehension of the Arab-Israeli struggle. (6)

Such baseless optimism is true of some Palestinian and Arab views as well. Tom Segev noted that "most Israelis have yet to internalize their share of the responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian tragedy and until they do so, there's no chance for peace." (7) However, most people have yet to internalize the implications of the hundreds of years old Galilean or Darwinian views, which challenge the deep anthropocentrism and sources of racism and sexism. Most importantly, it's not really an issue of realizing the validity and soundness of certain historical facts that alter people's conducts. While most Americans recognize the brutal injustices done to the Natives and African Americans, racism is still deep-rooted in the unquestioned institutional structure and social arrangements of American society.

Israel's liability for Palestinian suffering and the immorality of its actions were not the motivation behind any revision of Israel's history or a generative force underlying the emergence of the new historiography. To assume that reduces history to morality and misplaces agency in archives and academe in lieu of real social historical forces. Palestinian misery has been a pawn in Israel's local economic, social, and political antagonisms, just as the two other subjects reconsidered by the new historiography--the Holocaust, and the politics of Labor Zionism.

Although interlacements between global, regional and local developments led to Israel's social and political antagonisms, as this paper shall demonstrate, the new historiography was an Israeli affair par excellence. It has been part of an Israeli debate on the social, political, and economic order commenced in the aftermath of the 1948 war.

To be sure, the historical and intellectual utility of the new historiography by far surpasses its assumed political utility. A better understanding of this phenomenon might reflect on methodological and philosophical positions, one of them held by the new historians themselves regarding their movement. Comprehending this movement allows for reflections on the inner workings of the Israeli society as well as the new Israeli elite and regime.

Aside from archival evidence, most facts revealed by the New Historians about Israeli history, no matter how dramatic they were made to sound, were common knowledge to most Palestinians, Arabs, and others acquainted with the Palestine question. The new historiography, a movement that attempted to rewrite Israel's political past may be a relevant indicator in assessing the impact of structural transformations in Israeli society on perceptions of the Arab-Israeli struggle. Other cultural fields (art, media, literature, etc.) that were also transforming might have been equally useful. However, the new historiography was favored due to its open criticism of Israel's immoral past by Israelis as well as access to most of its publication in many languages.

THE NOT REALLY NEW HISTORY

Antecedent to the rise of the new Israeli historiography was the release of classified archives. This perception is captured in Morris and is accepted by most of the new historians who stress the role of newly released archives and documents. (8) Benny Morris, coining the terms, "new historians" and "new-old historians," proposes a perception that is "rooted in the narrow Israeli historiography," (9) as if the question of new historiography was merely an Israeli question.

Another type of reification is apparent in the views of other new historians who neither share Morris' conservative ideological outlooks nor his methodology. Illan Pappe, recognizing important academic development of historiography in the world, (10) advanced a view that relates the rise of new historiography to methodological innovations. Arguing, as Pappe did, that new historiography is a product of a dialogue with Nouvelle Histoire is superficial. It is true however, as Pappe argued, that similar to trends in European historiography, new historiography writes new social categories in history (e.g., workers, peasants, and women). Nonetheless, going beyond the false and illusionary abstraction of "population" or "nation" presented as categories of undifferentiated mass, and addressing structurally situated parts, is a methodological shift that the new historiography did not actually embark upon. (11) The inclusion of these categories as agents of history should be structurally grounded, otherwise they would remain false abstractions just as nations and populations.

Archives, documents and methodological innovations are not the only references to history. Even if we entirely dismiss the Palestinian narrative in all its forms, including an impressive scholarly work and political literature that embarked on the political-philosophical development throughout the world, the new historiography's revelations was always present in Israel itself and the world at large.

Heretical trends in Israeli sociology since 1967 that accepted the "colonization paradigm" not only rejected Israel's mainstream exclusivist "national sociology's" paradigm, but also the founding myths of Israelis themselves. (12) Dissenting political views such as those held by the Matzpen group, an offshoot of the Israeli communist party, articulated an "explicit colonization outlook" of Israel as early as 1962. (13) Neither Matzpen nor the demurring trend in Israeli sociology consulted the archives, although some sociologists benefited from the archives later. (14) Additionally, certain critical views of the Israeli colonial scheme by prominent scholars such as Maxime Rodinson, who argued Israel was a settler-colonial state, have always existed. (15) As a matter of fact, some of the most eloquent critical views of Zionism came from Jewish scholars from a variety of perspectives throughout the world. (16) Noam Chomsky, Hannah Arendt and later Norman Finkelstein are only three of many.

To conclude, as Morris, Shlaim and others did that declassifying Israel's archives led to a recognition of the flaws of Israel's traditional and official narrative, is misleading. At best, it's a conceptual miscarriage. This view does not explain neither the methodological differences between the new historians nor their varying views, and even debates, on similar topics. (17) Nonetheless, the question remains: what are the generative forces underlying this phenomenon? To answer this question, it is necessary to historically situate this phenomenon.

Although one may acknowledge that the new historiography is an attempt to demythologize history as it is in the biblical discourse, what is needed is historical, not merely a political critique of mythology. It is necessary therefore, to go beyond the political critique of historiography and political institutions (e.g., Jewish state) to a critique of the state and institutions themselves.

The new historians' mode of critique of Israeli society delimits the Israeli-Palestinian historical debate producing an ahistorical debate. It is a debate about incidents or script interpretation, which may continue endlessly. (18) While debating arguments and different versions of the same incidents is necessary, it should not consume historians and drive them away from the core issue. Massalha's outstanding eloquent work challenged some new historians' conclusion (e.g., Benny Morris on transfer) showing a continuity and development in the Palestine account. (19) An additional investigation describing the Israeli new historiography is another level of the debate. This paper regards the new historiography as an intellectual representation and expression of the current era, and the new historians as the intellectual force aiming at creating a break with the past and representing a new order (organic in the Gramscian terminology).

REINVENTING ISRAEL

In addition to the relevance of history, philosophy, political-economy, sociology and other disciplines, the topic of historiography enfolds significant connection to the rich field of nationalism. Thus, nationalism and master narratives partially hold an answer to the debate regarding the rise of the new historiography.

Existing debate regarding nationalism and its future trajectories (20) and the intriguing quality it seems to have, warrant a basic cerebral understanding of this phenomenon and its available literature suffice the short excursus into historiography that is pursued in this synopsis. Nationalisms, we are told, are not a fixed phenomenon, rather they differ in relation to the historical contexts in which they arise and maneuver.

Nationalism is also contingent upon changing social forces themselves, rendering nationalism as well as master narrative fields of struggle between and within antagonistic social forces. In this sense, nationalism, in addition to being raise and imaginary, as Benedict Anderson holds, is also flexible and always in flux. Nations not only imagine themselves, as Anderson argued, invent their traditions, as Hobsbawm maintained, and narrate their identities, as Bhabha contended, but also re-imagine themselves, re-invent their traditions, and re-narrate their identities. (21)

For historical, political and economic reasons, varying national master narratives have been the accounts of the elite whose changing character seem to have been influenced significantly by an expansion of world capitalism as the traditional Marxist thesis goes. (22) Thus, in every stage, elite bestirred themselves again, sometimes radically and irrevocably altering among other things, master narratives that reinvent nations and cultures.

Hobsbawm's outstanding survey of the history of nationalism, Nations and Nationalism Since 1788, advances such a thesis suggesting that the course of capitalist development rendering imperialism, or world capitalism, ever stronger, eventually pulverizes the constraints and limits of national markets that capitalism gave rise to in the first place. Hobsbawm takes this thesis further concluding that nation-states, once a key agent of historical development, ceased to be vectors of history. From this understanding of the changing character and historical contingency of nationalism, the basis and the value of national master narratives becomes not only necessary but also expected. Nationalism, being first and foremost the primary unit of political organization elites exploit to advance class interests, employs a seemingly universalistic category, which germinates conditions and enfolds the forces that spearhead its transformation.

Questioning the Israeli traditional narrative and rewriting the history of Israel cannot be seen to take place outside the historical development of Israel. The transformation of the Israeli elite's character and the development of capitalism on a world scale, are interrelated. In fact, the momentous reception and debate that accompanied the rise of the Israeli new historiography stems from the transformations within Israeli society and its elite and not from arguments and revelations that were not really "new."

Contrary to some misconceptions that characterized the new historiography as an aspect of left wing strategy to undermine Israel, the ramifications of new historiography in Israel were actually highly conservative. While the traditional narrative, described by the highly conservative right wing as the Mapai (labor Zionism) narrative, undermined political opposition by blaming them for the few recognized immoral practices in the traditional narrative (e.g., blaming the right wing paramilitary for the Deir Yasin massacre), the right wing post-Zionists accept the new historians' conclusions to undermine the political and economic model adopted by labor Zionism since the establishment of Israel in 1948, (23) and advocate an alternative model.

Despite the many characterizations of the period that witnessed the rise of the new historiography (post-Zionism, end of Zionism, etc), the right wing Zionism acceptance and employment of the conclusions of the new historians, the decline of Labor Zionism, and the existing methodological and ideological fissures between the new historians are not an isolated transformation in the Israeli elite, or, as Michel Warschawski characterized it, the rise of a new Israeli elite. (24) Together with the debate, a new regime and a new ideology were unfolding in Israel. A highly conservative neo-liberal regime advocating deregulating the economy, free market, privatization, individualism, outward expansion, and a conservative social agenda was replacing the old labor Zionist regime characterized by state regulation of the economy and some degree of collectivism and secularization.

This process has been wrongly and simplistically characterized as a conflict between two visions of Israel within Zionism that existed from the beginning; namely between Herzlian Zionism, after Herzl, whose view "combined conservatism, idealism, private enterprise, and Jewish religion," (25) and Ben-Gurionism, after Ben Gurion and labor Zionism, whose view combined materialism, collectivism, and secularism. The revival of Herzl's view, depicted by Gutwein as a reconciliation between Adam Smith and Edmund Burke in the current debate, is part of reconstructing the Israeli collective memory based on a neo-liberal conservative western model, while at the same time holding that it's the real Zionism that was hijacked by the Ben Gurion labor vision of Zionism.

In reality, however, Ben Gurion is merely a symbol resembling state building and state regulations that have become constraining and limiting for the new Israeli elite with the rise of a global market economy and neo-liberalism. The history and the conditions surrounding the development of Zionism contradict the claim that a dispute regarding the role of the state and state regulations has always existed in the manner posited by the right wing. Zionism not only exalted the state, similar to other Eastern and Central European nationalisms, but Israel also "inherited the ethnic principle of membership and never adopted the alternative liberal-territorial principle." (26) It is helpful to consult the writings of G. Hegel on the state, which can be used as a reference to the conditions of Eastern and Central Europe, to realize that Herzl's vision, as it is being characterized by the right wing post-Zionists, was really immature and insensible.

Israeli elite transformation from what has been called Ben Gurionism to what is called Market Zionism (Ben Gurion's vision vis-a-vis Herzl's vision) produced a new Israeli regime characterized by social conservatism and neoliberal economies. The new Israeli regime is related to Herzl in the same fashion that the German nationalism is related to David and Solomon. Hegel's observation in "The Positivity of the Christian Religion" regarding David and Solomon living in the German popular imagination while Germany's traditional heroes slumber in learned history books comes very close to some of the contemporary characterizations of nationalism based on customs and traditions, as well as to the claim of Herzlianism being the original vision of Zionism. Christianity "extirpated the German national imagery," says Hegel, "as shameful superstition as a devilish poison," replacing it with an imagery of a nation that is not only strikingly different in climate, laws, and culture, but also with a past that has no connection to German history. (27)

To be sure, the transformation of Israeli regime and ideology did not occur in a vacuum, rather both regimes and ideologies correspond with local Israeli and global transformations that created the new Israeli elite and a new Israeli system. They were not a product of doctrinal debates within the proponents of Zionism. The process manifested itself with privatization, liberalization of the economy, and outward expansionism replacing the old regime of protectionism, state regulations, and militarism.

Some views exonerate the major global powers and global milieu from any responsibility of the ensuing struggle, and instead of perceiving the structural interlink between the global and local, insist that local factors are primarily responsible for the making of the conflict (28) saying that the new historians' revelations are mere fabrication of Israeli history. (29) To say that interlacements between the global, regional and local developments shaped the Middle East and the Palestine question since the beginning is hardly a new argument. Global transformations have long been associated with developments in the Arab-Israeli struggle, as the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Balfour Declaration, post-World War II arrangements involving the creation of Israel, and the socialist bloc's collapse in the run-up to Oslo all demonstrate. Therefore, the association between the global structural transformation (development of global capitalism) and the Arab-Israeli struggle will be emphasized.

SITUATING THE NEW HISTORIOGRAPHY

The re-invention of Israel and the re-writing of Israel's biography by the new historians is historically associated with the rise of a new Israeli elite and a new Israeli regime. The economic outlook and political strategies that characterized the first regime was reinforced and justified by the construction of an Israeli collective memory and a historical account that has been discredited by the new historians.

Israel's economic and political history seems to support and comply with the view proposed by Hobsbawm regarding the transformation in the nature of nationalism, elites, and nation-states following the expansion of global capitalism that overcomes the limits of nation-states' frameworks and transform them. The following discussion of Israel's economic history and its political ramification is intended to show that a new political-economic regime was unfolding in Israel since the mid 1980s. The summary below separates Israel's economic and political history into two periods based on trends in Israel's economy that gave rise to a transformation in political strategy.

Israel's Economic History

The notion of periodizarion is rooted in the Marxist tradition of examining capitalist development. Not only that Marx's own work involves such a theoretical distinction, but later Marxist intellectuals have also employed such a notion to explain capitalist transition. (30) While one might agree with the thesis, the employment of several different indicators to distinguish one period from the other is perhaps debatable. Antonio Nigri's thesis, for example, lacks an emphasis on class struggle and instead it employs both the "social organization of labor" and the new model (regime) of accumulation as main principles in identifying the characteristics of the new epoch. (31)

Although many studies deal with the economies of the Middle East, (32) the goal of this paper here is to demonstrate the structural interrelationship between the global and local processes in the case of Israel on one hand, and the transformation in social and cultural forms on the other hand. Many theorists have argued that the economic history of Israel has undergone two major significant structural changes since the 1948 war. These changes involved considerable shifts in both the role of the state in, and control of, the economy and the privatization of the economy and its integration in global capitalism.

Yoav Peled argued that "Israel moved from being a highly intrusive state engaged in intensive mobilization and control of societal resources, to economic, cultural and political liberalization." (33) Economic liberalization, leading to the downfall of the Histadrut, labor Zionism's main institution, undermined the labor Zionism's hegemony.

Nitzan and Bischler propose a thesis to explain the role of global structural forces on what they call the initiation of the process of reconciliation between Palestinians and Arabs and Israel. (34) The thesis distinguishes between two stages in the Israeli economic history. Each of these stages is characterized by a distinctive regime of differential accumulation of capital exceeding the average rate of profit for the economy. The first, from the establishment of the state in 1948 until the mid 1980s, is characterized by "militarized economy by large government deficit, heavy dependency on the US, and intense stagflation." (35) The second, starting in the late 1980s manifests itself politically by the Middle East political process and is characterized by "move towards ... regional integration, economic growth, and declining military spending." (36) The fact that serious changes in the pattern of global accumulation took place is a phenomenon that was addressed and noticed by various scholars. (37)

Differential accumulation, following Nitzan and Bichler, (38) takes two modes. The first is by raising the depth of accumulation-maintaining profit margins above the economy average. The second is by the breadth of accumulation- expanding market share. Prior to the mid 1980s, Israel's economic structure was "characterized by a combination of corporate concentration and stunted growth gave rise to military Keynesianism." (39) Under these conditions "corporate concentration is typically maintained and enhanced by expanding the depth of accumulation: the large corporations try to raise their profit margins above those of smaller periphery firms and the ensuing profit competition often culminates in stagflationary spiral." (40)

After the mid 1980s, the core corporations switched to the breadth of accumulation. The dramatic world changes allowed for the development of the peace market model that expresses the new mode of differential accumulation. Therefore, instead of competing over profit margins, the differential increase in profits may be achieved by swift penetration of new markets, hence increasing market share. Usually, this mode of differential accumulation is accompanied by falling military spending, disinflation, and revived growth.

Peled characterized this process by arguing that pre 1980, the state in Israel "'engaged in intensive mobilization and control of societal resources, both directly and through the Histadrut (General Labor Federation)." (41) After the 1980s, the government's liberalization program of the economy prepared for the 1990s conflict between a neo-liberal wing and a welfare-oriented wing regarding dismantling the public sector economy, and the success of the former.

In political terms, a transformation took place in Israel in which the shift from the politics of war [1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1978, and 1982], to the politics of peace characterized Israeli politics. The politics of war, as the new historians showed, was not motivated by survival as stipulated by the traditional Israeli propaganda. Many new historians have argued that Israel has been stronger in every stage of the struggle. (42)

The liberalization process led, among things, to the evolution of civil society in Israel, and to cultural and political transformations. Historiography is one of these areas that responded to the structural transformation. This turn in Israel's history is "linked to the changing nature of capital accumulation and corporate concentration, both in Israel and the US ... With the evolution of modern capitalism, the leading firms are increasingly driven not to maximize their profits but rather to beat the average. Specifically they seek to achieve 'differential accumulation.'" (43) Differential growth in profits simply indicates a growing share of the total capitalized assets or concentration of capital. Therefore, the goal of accumulation to the main firms means a quest for rising corporate concentration or a growth in capitalized assets.

The First Stage: Profitability and Military Bias

In the first stage, which lasted until the mid 1980s, military bias characterized the Israeli economy, which was enforced locally and globally (See table 1 and 2). "The Israeli military bias has been affected by pressures emanating from growing corporate concentration, as well as by the country's role in the superpower confrontation." (44)

This first stage consists of two phases, where in the first phase the differential accumulation manifests itself in military bias, which contributed to the general well being of the economy (see figure 1). In the second phase, however, emphasis on the differential accumulation did not play the same role in serving the overall economy and the interaction with the micro economy decreased.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

Military Keynesianism has been a historical solution to the rising "degree of monopoly [that] created a tendency for the societal surplus to rise while at the same time limiting the extent to which this surplus could be 'offset' by profitable investment outlets." (47) Such a solution resulted in "rising military spending and a more aggressive foreign policy as a means of maintaining aggregate prosperity and high employment." (48)

In Israel, which resembled to a striking extent the American case in its market structure and military spending, two theses explain the two phases of the first stage. First, what is called a Marxist thesis of military Keynesianism, that is, the counter cyclical use of military spending to achieve macro economic goals, may have been adequate for the 1950s and 1960s "when rising defense spending came together with overall economic expansion." (49) The growth of Israeli military industry and military spending in the early stage, from the establishment of the state until the late 1960s, was part of an overall economic expansion.

In the next phase military bias moved from playing a macro economic role, through serving the overall economy until the late 1960s, into concentration and centralization in the military industry, which rendered it less practical and less beneficial in serving overall economic goals. The second phase, in particular, provided fertile grounds for a right wing political system.

World conditions in the early 1970s enhanced military bias in Israeli economic development. Israel's occupation of Arab land in the aftermath of the 1967 war, and due to the increasing oil revenues, the Middle East countries became the world's largest importer of arms. These conditions hindered the possibility of raising the profit margins of big firms above the economy's average through other modes of differential accumulation.

In addition to direct state control of societal resources, in this stage, the Histadrut, labor Zionism's main institution that played a central role in pre-statehood Zionist colonization, controlled an economic empire "encompassing, at its height, agricultural, manufacturing, construction, marketing, transportation and financial concerns, as well as a whole network of social service organizations." (51) Until the 1990s, the Histadrut controlled "about 25 percent of the economy and employed about 25 percent of the labor force. About an equal share of the economy, plus virtually all land, was owned directly by the state." (52)

The growth of the core businesses in Israel gave rise to a cohesive ruling class that influenced and manipulated "tax rates, subsidies, executive compensations, and most importantly, profits." (53) The small economy, to the contrary, did not act as a single bloc.

The ramification of this duality was a heightened process of differential accumulation. While the core groups of the big economy began their ascent during the 1960s, it was "since the 1970s that their differential accumulation became apparently clear: between the mid 1970s and the mid 1980s, when stagflation, military spending, and current account crises undermined the earnings in the small economy, profits for the core groups soared" (54) (See Figure 2).

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

The nature of the first stage of Israel's economic history suggests significant implications to the Arab-Israeli struggle. The Israeli economic structure until the late 1970s generated aggressive foreign policy; war and hostilities were the only possible form of relationships with the Arabs. The traditional Zionist historical account justified such politics. It was possible to do so only through manipulating myths that attributed a special value to Palestine and claimed special connection between Jews and Palestine. At its core, the traditional account employed concepts of rights of chauvinistic nationalism such as historical, religious, and natural. The Von Rod's claim that the Bible is a history book clarifies the theological perspective and represents the basic instinct of the biblical discourse and traditional account. (56)

The Second Stage: Peace Market

The second stage in the history of Israel's economy represents the development of political economic structure surrounding both the development of the new historiography and the Middle Eastern political process. It started in the middle 1980s and is distinguished by "retrenchment for the big economy, followed by a shift toward an open 'peace economy.'" (57) The basic requirement to adjust to the new order is the removal of border barriers [with the Arabs] and further liberalization of the economy and society.

A combination of global, regional and local factors undermined the Israeli war economy leading to the transition to the new regime. The globalization of ownership, the new conditions, especially after the gulf war, altered the Israeli role as the Imperialist watchdog in the region. Growing internal limitations on the core Israeli conglomerates, coincided with the international transition, making it difficult to keep the profit margins above the economy's average. The Palestinian popular Intifada (uprising) also transformed the occupation project of the West Bank and Gaza Strip from what Nitzan and Bichler called "political and business gold mines" into a "net burden."

The transition to a new mode of differential accumulation in the world market appeared inevitable. Israel is not a unique case, and again similar to the transition all over the world, the Israeli business elite also realized that the old order had finally reached its limits. The new path was fairly clear. The path to growth (i.e., breadth of accumulation) meant the end of the war economy. What was needed was liberalization, "flexible" labor markets, lower trade barriers, open borders and capital decontrols.

The beginning of the second stage involved an intensive conflict within the ruling elite leading to liberalization of the economy and an undermining of state control and regulations. The process began with the Lekud party's rule in 1977. The 1985 unity government's economic plan "the Emergency Economic Stabilization Plan" (EESP), to deal with inflation prepared the grounds for liberalization.

Even when the Labor Party re-captured power on its own in 1992, the struggle to liberalize the economy and dismantle the Histadrut continued, this time inside the party itself. A "momentous struggle developed between its neoliberal wing (aided by Labor's smaller, more clearly liberal sister party, Meretz) and its welfare-oriented wing, whose power base was in the Histadrut ... After a brief struggle, the health-care system was nationalized in 1995, causing the Histadrut membership to decline by two-thirds and opening the way for a private health-care industry to develop." (58)

To be sure, with Israel entering a new period in its history and as structural transformations were taking place, transformations in politics, culture, academia, and of course historiography were occurring. It is possible, for example, to see the political transformation by looking at the party composition of the Israeli Knesset since the early 1990s, which tended towards more representation of the neo-liberal right wing oriented parties. (59)

THE THEMES OF THE NEW ISRAELI HISTORIOGRAPHY

Both Israeli historical accounts, traditional and new, as well as other intellectual and cultural forms, serve a quest for a particular form of differential accumulation. The new historiography may be located within a particular mode of capital accumulation. More accurately, the new historiography was made possible as soon as the mode of accumulation was shifting towards "peace markets" and the big businesses attempted to exceed the profit margins of the economy by increasing their market share.

The development of Israeli new historiography and its main themes are intellectual responses to the structural economic transition both in Israel and the world. The requirements of the new direction of the Israeli economy are obviously expressed by the new Israeli historiography. By dismissing the principle foundations of Israel as mere myths, the new historiography's criticism of Israel's traditional political, economic, and social order was in essence, proposing an alternative. Within the context of Israel's political, social and economic antagonisms, the new historiography conclusions side with the rising neo-liberal forces interested in liberalization, privatization, and open borders. Israel's traditional account, to the contrary, supported purity, closure and ghetto-like mentality, and anti Arab sentiments.

Many themes comprise the core of new historiography and show the concern with local and international conditions. The new historiography is one expression of the crisis of Israeli society that resulted from the transformation of its political economic structure. This crisis brought to the discussion unresolved issues such as identity, race, democracy, equality, social class, secularization/religion and the state in Israel, the Arab-Israeli struggle, the meaning of the Holocaust, etc.

All these expressions of the crisis are expressions of a structural process. The development of Israeli society brought to the surface these unresolved issues. The same conditions that made it possible to keep these issues hidden and unresolved are now bringing them to the light. The political economic structure of early Israel (1950s-1980s) faced political, social, and economic obstacles as it transformed. These obstacles could only be dealt with through settling the unresolved issues. In other words, the unfolding of the new Israeli political-economic order would lead to addressing the following unresolved issues:

1- Reach a political settlement with the Arabs as a prerequisite for removing the border barriers and expanding their markets and market share.

2- Address the character of the state of Israel and further enhance the secular liberal character of the state. This is not only a response to the economic transition, but the social and cultural as well.

3- Shift the emphasis in economic production from an emphasis on a war economy to the most profitable production, peace market, by dominating as much share as possible in the regional and world market.

4- Open its borders for foreign investment.

The Israeli new historiography primarily dealt with two areas. The first is Israeli affairs, which also may be divided into different arenas such as the Israeli culture, social politics of Labor Zionism, and the Holocaust. The second is concerned with the Arab-Israeli struggle. It is note worthy to say that what is common to all these themes or arenas of new historiography is that they fit the framework of the new conditions and can be employed against the old Israeli order. All these themes as well, represent a political critique of the state, not the abstract state or historical or human critique, and sees it responsible, at least partially, for the current problems within Israel and between Israel and the Arabs.

In the following paragraphs, a short outline of some trends in the Israeli new historiography is intended to reflect on the relevance of the conclusions of the new historians and the rising new order in each arena. The summary primarily asserts the critique of the old order and its symbols.

ISRAELI AFFAIRS

Two main issues constitute the core of the new historiography that is concerned with Israeli affairs:

Social Politics of Labor Zionism

Labor Zionism led the Yishuv and later the state of Israel until the 1977 when the Likud party took over. Criticizing the politics of Labor Zionism is actually a critique of the Israeli traditional order. Labor Zionism has been described as a socialist movement similar to the strange combination of socialism and nationalism that was a recurrent phenomenon in Eastern and Central Europe where Zionism developed.

Contrary to the traditional discourse, the new historiography comments on and reports discrimination of Labor Zionism against Arabs, Sephardic Jews, women, and even age categories. Ze'ev Sternhell criticized Labor Zionism's slogans of equality as mere ideological instruments for the mobilization of the nation. (60) Ram addressed the new historiography's critique of the structure of education and military service. New historians have shown that educational and military systems reproduced inequality and limited the Sephardic Jews' choices, captivating them in the lower strata. (61) The standard of critique is the standard itself that was set up by Labor Zionism for the Jewish state (i.e., equality).

The Zionist Culture and the Holocaust

Although both Zionist culture and the Holocaust are usually discussed separately or as different issues, the Holocaust is discussed within the framework of "Israeli culture." Cultural perceptions of the Diaspora Jews, the centrality of Israel to Jews from Ben-Zion Dinaburg and on, and most importantly the issue of identity are elements of the Israeli culture that shaped the Israeli position from the Holocaust. At the same time, the Holocaust itself contributed to the process of Israeli culture construction.

Krakotzkin argued that the cornerstone in the construction of Israeli identity was subjecting the Jewish history and Jewish culture to the mainstream Zionist discourse. At the same time, the Zionist discourse negatively portrayed the Diaspora Jews, while positively characterizing the immigrants (the centrality of Israel and the negation of the Diaspora). (62) Segev considered this view in his assessment of leadership actions towards the Diaspora Jews. The Yishuv's leadership did not pay much attention to the butchering of Diaspora Jews in the Holocaust preferring instead to focus on the immediate task of establishing a Jewish state. No preference was given to the lives of the European Jewries. (63) For Zionists, immigration represented the central ring in the chain for the success of their project in Palestine. The Diaspora Jews represented a kind of anti-Zionism for them. One may see Herzl's response to the French Jews following the changes brought by the French Revolution, "if all of or any of the French Jews protest against this scheme [Jewish State] on account of their own assimilation, my answer is simple: the whole thing does not concern them at all. They are Jewish Frenchmen, well and good! This is a private affair for the Jews alone." (64)

The Israeli cultural discourse was shaped by the Zionist colonial project, which meant not only the negation of the Diaspora Jews, but also the Arabs of Palestine. Recurrent statements to this effect are common in the Israeli culture, "a land with no people for a people with no land," "there is no one to talk to," and "Israel is an integrated society." The negation of the other, even the negation of Diaspora Jews, in the biblical discourse reflects the nature of Zionism and the conditions of its development in Eastern Europe. This type of nationalism, as Sternhell argued, demands for itself what it denies the others. (65) The notion of historical and natural rights has been specific to this type of nationalism. (66)

Segev shows how Israeli attitudes towards the Holocaust, and even its survivors, which was characterized by regret and shame of Diaspora Jews who did not resemble the "new brave Zionist man." They did not resist, but rather were led to gas chambers like sheep. The Holocaust was characterized by silence. Segev's review of the Jewish newspaper coverage of the Holocaust shows that it was reported in the back pages. (67)

As time went by, the Israeli interest in the Holocaust grew. There are a number of explanations, both political and cultural, for the current intensity of involvement with the Holocaust. According to Segev, Zionism and Israel need the Holocaust not because of the Arabs, but also because the majority of the "Diaspora Jews" refuse to live in Israel. It is needed because it 'supports' the Zionist claim that if they had a Jewish state during World War II, the disaster would not have happened. (68)

On the cultural level, Zionism embarked on creating a "new man" and the Holocaust provided an important common element for this new identity. "The new man that Zionism wished to create would be the opposite of the persecuted and submissive old Jew." (69) Yet, the Holocaust itself represented a defeat for the Zionist movement. The majority of world Jewry did not go to Palestine before the war, while that was still an option. Furthermore, the similarity between Israel and the traditional Jewish communities increased. "The country was isolated, set apart from its surroundings. Its religion, culture, values, and mentality were different. It lived in insecurity.... Like members of the Jewish communities elsewhere, members of the Jewish community of Israel have a dual identity. They are both Israeli and Jewish. They represent no new man." (70) In other words, Zionism created a super ghetto in the Middle East to substitute for the mini ghettos of Europe.

Segev's arguments fall clearly in support of the political economic transition (peace with the Arab world, democracy, secularization, openness, etc.). He employed the Holocaust against the state and the old order. He also reported that both Mapi and the revisionists were fascinated with the Nazis, and used negotiations with them as propaganda material against each other. (71) It is not, therefore, Labor Zionism by itself but the Japotensky's followers (i.e., the Likud Party) who were symbols of the old regime.

Segev's critique of Ben-Gurion which maintained that he had knowledge about Nazi plans and exerted no effort against them and Taveth's defense of Ben Gurion do not represent a historiography's conflict. Ben-Gurion's priority was the state, not the German Jews. In a meeting of the central committee of Mapi, Ben-Gurion declared that the Mapi members do not decide the fate of Europe, and anything that happens there should be dealt with as a mere natural disaster. (72)

Criticism regarding the way the Holocaust was handled targets the Israeli traditional order. The Holocaust was not only ignored, it was considered history. Segev reports that in December 1942 a special organization was established to help the victims in collecting compensation. At the same time, the Jewish national fund was discussing building a statue for the Holocaust victims. In the US, similar Jewish organizations became active in collecting compensation in 1941.

Ben-Gurion started contemporary discussions about the Holocaust when he demanded compensation from Germany. He assumed that Germany wanted to move beyond its history, and the new Israeli state needed financial assistance. The other goal, according to Segev, was to make Germany recognize the state of Israel as the representative of world Jewry. The traditional order and leadership is criticized for favoring the state over the lives of the European Jewry. The old order is also criticized for recognizing the Holocaust only in its utility to the order.

To the contrary, the traditional discourse generated only improper lessons from the Holocaust, says Segev. What the Israelis learned from the Holocaust, "as it is taught in schools and fostered in national memorial ceremonies, often encourages insular chauvinism and a sense that the Nazi extermination of the Jews justifies any act that seems to contribute to Israel's security, including the oppression of the population in the territories occupied by Israel in the Six- day war." (73) The exploitation of Jewish suffering, characterized by Finkelstein as an industry (74), exceeds the character of Ben-Gurion or even the Yishuv. It's a product of Israel's colonial character that could not and cannot resolve the Jewish question. It created a Palestinian question.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI STRUGGLE

Certain issues discussed by the new historians confront and negate dominant myths in the old historiography about the Arab-Israeli Struggle. The most relevant of these myths are the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem, the Arab rejection of recognizing and making peace with Israel, and the David and Goliath myth. In each of these, the state and the old order are criticized.

The traditional historiography, and the official discourse, claim that Zionists made efforts to reconcile with the Arabs, who rejected the partition plan. Additionally, the Arabs launched a war, in 1947-1949 to stop the Zionists. The Arabs, so goes the old story, "were politically and militarily assisted in their efforts by the British, but they nonetheless lost the war. Poorly armed and outnumbered, the Jewish community in Palestine fought valiantly, suppressed the Palestinian gangs, and repelled the five invading Arab armies." (75) In the course of the war, the Arabs (says the old history) voluntarily relinquished their homes expecting to return once the Arab armies had proved victorious. The refugee problem was thus created.

Almost all of these claims have been debated not only by Arabs, but by the new historiography. Israel turned down peace initiations proposed by Arab countries. (76) Shlaim argued that the original Zionist plan was to establish a Jewish state in all of Palestine. He added, the acceptance of the partition plan was merely tactical and not a change in the Zionist strategy. Ben-Gurion viewed the partition plan as merely a beginning. In a comment on the suggested 1939 partition plan he wrote "I am certain that we will be able to settle in all other parts of the country, whether through agreements and mutual understanding with our Arab neighbors or in other way." (77) In a letter addressed to his wife he indicated the intention to "establish a Jewish state at once, even if it is not in the whole land. The rest will come in the course of time. It must come." (78) Furthermore, Shlaim commented on the partition plan, of November 29, 1947, by referring to a "conspiracy" between King Abdullah of Jordan and the Yishuv leadership to partition Palestine among them. While Jordan conquered the eastern part of Palestine, now called the West Bank, the Yishuv would be left alone in its efforts to build a Jewish state. (79)

Although the new historians do not agree on the role of Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt in the 1948 war, they all agree on the role of Jordan. Morris reported that Jordan and Syria suggested peace initiations and recognition of Israel since 1949. Flapan says that all the Arab states involved in the war, Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria, did not plan to destroy the Israeli state.

The second myth refuted by the new historiography was the myth of David and Goliath. The old history claims that the Arabs outnumbered the Jews and were better armed than the Yishuv. Flapan, Morris, Pappe, and Shlaim all reject this analogy. Morris puts it very simply, "The stronger side won." (80) As Morris says, the map showing a minuscule Israel and a giant surrounding sea of Arab states did not and, indeed, for the time being, still does not accurately reflect the military balance of power. Morris drew a real picture and overturned the traditional David into a modern Goliath, "[d]uring the first half of the war (December 1947- May 14, 1948), the Yishuv was better armed and had more trained manpower than the Palestinians." (81) As days went by, when the famous operation Dani in July was carried out, "the IDF had sixty five thousand men under arms, and by December it had eighty to ninety thousand-outnumbering its combined Arab forces at every stage of the battle." (82)

Finally, the refugee problem constitutes not only the core of the present struggle but one of the most debated issues in the Arab-Israeli struggle and historiography. The old historiography claims that the Palestinian Arabs fled their homes at the order of the Arab leadership in order to facilitate destroying the Israeli state. Ben-Gurion is usually associated with comments reflecting the inhumane character of the old order. His comment on the 1937 Bill Committee that surveyed Palestine for two states (Arab and Jewish) was that "the principle of transfer of Arabs from the suggested areas ... may provide us [Jews] with something we never had even when we ruled ourselves during the first and second Temple." (83) Morris goes on, the first and may be the most decisive step, from Ben-Gurion's point of view, is "preparing ourselves to carry out the principle of transfer, since the Arabs won't give up their land voluntarily. Therefore, we have to force them by force." (84)

CONCLUSION

New historians reject the traditional account of Israel's history. However, the proponents of the new Israeli order do not represent a more humane order. The new historiography's critique is an instrument of the new order. It does not target the colonial structure of the state of Israel, but focuses instead on a political critique of the old order.

The second Palestinian Intifada against Israeli colonialism represents resistance to a new political and economic order that enslaves Palestinians. The neo-liberal order brought about the phenomenon of the New Israeli Historiography. In an interview with Haaretz (Friday Magazine, January 9th) and his "Right to Reply" in Haaretz (January 24), Benny Morris justified and defended the immoral actions of Israel in the expulsion and murder he helped unmask. Morris's reaction indicates that Israel, once again, is going through structural transformations giving rise to the old military Keynesianism. An investigation of the new Israeli historiography in the "new new" era, would explain Morris's reactionary views.

ENDNOTES

(1.) The tem Founding Myth of Israel is the title of Zeev Sternhell book (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

(2.) This is the subtitle of Benny Morris' article "The New Historiography: Israel Confronts its Past", in Tikun, 3/6, 1988, Pp. 19-23 & 99-102.

(3.) Benny Morris, Correcting a Mistake? Jews and Arabs in Palestine/Israel, 1936-1956 (Israel: Am Oved Publishers, 2000).

(4.) Cited in Gideon Levy, "Exposing Israel's Original Sin" (Jerusalem: Haaretz. 2 November 2000).

(5.) For Morris' claims see Gideon Levy, "Exposing Israel's Original Sin" (Jerusalem: Haaretz. 2 November 2000) review of Morris' Correcting a Mistake: Jews and Arabs in Israel/Palestine 1936-1956 (Israel: Am Oved Publisher. 2000).

(6.) For example Morris and Pappe both assume that new historiography will encourage the struggle for better society and for peace. See Daniel Gutwein, "Left and Right Post-Zionism and the Privatization of Israeli Collective Memory", in Anita Shapira and Derek Penslar, Israeli Historical Revisionism from Left to Right (London: Frank Cass, 2003) p. 17.

(7.) Tom Segev. "A History Lesson" (Jerusalem: Haaretz, 29 June 2001). Cited in Cheryl A. Rubenberg, The Palestinians in Search of A Just Peace (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003) P. 1.

(8.) Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). "The New Historiography: Israel Confronts its Past", in Tikun, 3/6. 1988, Pp. 19-23 & 99-102. "The Expulsion of Palestinians and the Birth of the Refugee Problem: Israeli Documents" (Amman: Dar Al-Jalil, 1992) (In Arabic).

(9.) Daniel Gutwein, "Left and Right Post-Zionism and the Privatization of Israeli Collective Memory," in Anita Shapira and Derek Penslar, Israeli Historical Revisionism from Left to Right (London: Frank Cass, 2003) P. 16.

(10.) Ilan Pappe, ed. The Israel/Palestine Question: Rewriting Histories (London: Routledge, 1999)(Introduction Pp. 1-7).

(11.) See Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy (New York: Vintage Books, 1973) In particular see "The Method of Political Economy", pp. 100-8.

(12.) See Uri Ram, "The Colonization Perspective in Israeli Sociology", in Ilan Pappe, The Israel/Palestine Question: Rewriting Histories (London: Routledge, 1999) Pp. 55-80.

(13.) Ibid., P. 58.

(14..) For Example Gershon Shafir and Barukh Kimmerling. See Ibid.

(15.) Maxime Rodinson, Israel: a Colonial Settler State? (NY: Monad. 1973). See. Uri Ram, "The Colonization Perspective in Israeli Sociology" In lllan Pappe, The Israel/Palestine Question: Rewriting Histories (London: Routledge. 1999), Pp. 55-80.

(16.) Adam Shatz, ed., Prophets Outcast: A Century of Dissident Jewish Writings about Zionism and Israel (NY: Nation Books. 2004).

(17.) A comparison between Illan Pappe and Benny Morris would reveal significant methodological differences, their views of historiography, and views of Zionism.

(18.) For example Nur Masalha's critique of Benny Morris. See, Nur Massalha, "Expulsion of Palestinians: The Concept of 'Transfer'" in Zionist Political Thought 1882-1948" (Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991); also found in Journal of Palestine Studies XXI, no. 1. (Autumn 1991), pp. 90-97; Nur Masalha, Minimum Arab and Maximum Land: The Israeli Transfer Policy in Action (Ard Akthar Wa Arab Akal) (Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies. 1997); Norman Finkelstein. Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict (NY: Verso. 2003).

(19.) Ibid.

(20.) For example: John A. Hall and I.C. Jarvie, ed., Social Philosophy of Ernest Gellner, (Amesterdam: Rodopi B.V. 1996); Ernest Gellner, "Reply to Critics", in New Left Review. I (221): 81:118. 1997); Balakrishnan Gopal, "The National Imagination", in New Left Review, I (211): 56-69. 1995; E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1788 (London: Verso, 1990); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991).

(21.) Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (London: Cambridge University Press,1992); Homi Bhabha, "Nation and Narration" (London: Routledge, 1992); Uri Ram, "Postnationalists Pasts: The Case of Israel," in Social Science History, 22/4: 513-545, 1998. p. 513-4.

(22.) See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1998); For critique of this thesis see Balakrishnan Gopal, "The National Imagination," in New Left Review, I (211): 56-69. 1995 (London: New Left Review).

(23.) Daniel Gutwein, "Left and Right Post-Zionism and the Privatization of Israeli Collective Memory," in Anita Shapira and Derek Penslar, Israeli Historical Revisionism from Left to Right (London: Frank Cass, 2003) P. 9-42.

(24.) Michel Warschawski, Toward an Open Tomb: The Crisis of Israeli Society (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2004).

(25.) Yuram Hazony, "The Jewish State at 100", cited in Daniel Gutwein, "Left and Right Post-Zionism and the Privatization of Israeli Collective Memory" in Anita Shapira and Derek Penslar, "Israeli Historical Revisionism from Left to Right"(London: Frank Cass, 2003) P. 32.

(26.) Uri Ram, "Postnationalists Pasts: The Case of Israel", in Social Science History, 22 (4): 513-545. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 1998), Pp. 513-4.

(27.) Hegel cited in Balakrishnan Gopal, "The National Imagination", in New Left Review, 1 (211): 56-69, 1995 (London: New Left Review) P. 59.

(28.) Efraim and Inari Karsh, Empires of Sand: The Struggle for Mastry in the Middle East 1789-1923, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

(29.) Efraim Karsh, Fabricating Israeli History: The "New Historians" (London: Frank Cass. 1997).

(30.) E.g., Antonio Negri, 1992. "Interpretation of the Class Situation Today: Methodological Aspects," in Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn and Kosmas Psychpedis, Open Marxism, VII, Theory and Practice, ed.. (London: Pluto Press, 1992). Pp. 69-105.

(31.) Ibid.

(32.) Some studies exist, but are not specifically dealing with the development of capitalism in Palestine. For example, Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996); Roger Owen and Sevket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Beshara Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus 1700-1900 (Los Angles: University of California Press, 1995); Vladimir Lotsky, The contemporary History of the Arab Countries (Moscow: Progressive House, 1975).

(33.) Yoav Peled, "Civil Society in Israel", in Palestine--Israel Journal of Politics, Economics, and Culture, Vol.12 No.1 2005. on the web at (http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=325).

(34.) Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, "From War Profits to Peace Dividence: The New Political Economy of Israel," in Capital and Class, No, 60, Autumn 1996, 61-95.

(35.) Ibid., 62.

(36.) Ibid., 61.

(37.) See for example, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Global Formation: Structures of the World Economy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1989); Samir Amin, Empire of Chaos (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1992); Giovanni Arrighi, ed., Transforming the Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990).

(38.) Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, "From War Profits to Peace Dividence: The New Political Economy of Israel," in Capital and Class, No, 60, Autumn 1996, 61-95.

(39.) Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy provided similar analysis of the US in Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964); Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, "From War Profits to Peace Dividence: The New Political Economy of Israel," in Capital and Class, No, 60, Autumn 1996, 61-95 (UK: Conference of Socialist Economists).

(40.) Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, "From War Profits to Peace Dividend: The New Political Economy of Israel," in Capital and Class, No, 60, Autumn 1996, 61-95 (UK: Conference of Socialist Economists).

(41.) Yoav Peled, "Civil Society in Israel." in Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics, and Culture, Vol.12 No.1 2005. on the web at (http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=325).

(42.) Avi Shalim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999); Benny Morris, "The New Historiography: Israel Confronts its Past," in Tikkun, 3/6. 1988, Pp. 19-23 & 99-102 (CA: Tikkun).

(43.) Nitzan and Bichler, "From War Profits to Peace Dividence: The New Political Economy of Israel," in Capital and Class, No, 60, Autumn 1996, 61-95 (UK: Conference of Socialist Economists) p. 62.

(44.) Ibid.

(45.) Fadel Al Nakib, 1997, "The Political-economy of the Zionist Project," in Sabri Jiryis and Ahmad Khalifah, ed., "Israel: A General Survey, 3rd ed., (Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1997).

(46.) Source: "The Political-economy of the Zionist Project", in Sabri Jiryis and Ahmad Khalifah, ed., "Israel: A General Survey, 3rd ed., (Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1997).

(47.) Nitzan and Bichler, "From War Profits to Peace Dividence: The New Political Economy of Israel," in Capital and Class, No, 60, Autumn 1996, 61-95 (UK: Conference of Socialist Economists) p. 68.

(48.) Ibid., 69.

(49.) Melman cited in Nitzan and Bichler, "From War Profits to Peace Dividence: The New Political Economy of Israel", in Capital and Class, No, 60, Autumn 1996, 61-95 (UK: Conference of Socialist Economists)p. 70.

(50.) Nitzan and Bichler, "From War Profits to Peace Dividence: The New Political Economy of Israel," in Capital and Class, No, 60, Autumn 1996, 61-95 (UK: Conference of Socialist Economists) p. 73.

(51.) Yoav Peled, "Civil Society in Israel."

(52.) Yoav Peled, "Civil Society in Israel."

(53.) Nitzan and Bichler, "From War Profits to Peace Dividence: The New Political Economy of Israel," in Capital and Class, No, 60, Autumn 1996, 61-95 (UK: Conference of Socialist Economists) p.72.

(54.) Ibid., 72.

(55.) Ibid., 74.

(56.) Keith W. Whitelam, The Invention of Ancient Israel, The Silencing of Palestinian History (New York: Routledge, 1996).

(57.) Nitzan and Bichler, "From War Profits to Peace Dividence: The New Political Economy of Israel," in Capital and Class, No, 60, Autumn 1996, 61-95 (UK: Conference of Socialist Economists) p. 78.

(58.) Yoav Peled. "Civil Society in Israel" in Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics, and Culture 12 no.1 2005. on the web at (http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=325).

(59.) Seif Da'Na and Laura Khoury, "The Rise of Palestine and the Demise of Oslo: the Historical Significance of the Palestinian Intifada", in The Journal of Middle East Affairs, Vol. 7 No. 1-2 Winter/Spring 2001.

(60.) Ze'ev Sternhell, The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism and the Making of the Jewish State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

(61.) Uri Ram, "Memory and Identity: The Sociology of the New Historiography", in Theory and Critique (Jerusalem: Van Lear Center) No, 6, Summer 1996. Translated and published n Arabic in Al-Karmel. No 60. Summer 1998.

(62.) Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, "Zionism, Theology, and the Dual Identity," in Al-Karmel. No. 52 Spring 1997. Pp. 201-15.

(63.) Tom Segev, The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993).

(64.) Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question (London: H. PORDES, 1967), 18.

(65.) Ze'ev Sternhell, "Israel at Fifty: Zionism Secular Revolution", in Le Monde Diplomatique, May 1998.

(66.) See for example, Eric Habsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1995).

(67.) Tom Segev, The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993).

(68.) Ibid.

(69.) Ibid., 514.

(70.) Ibid., 514-5.

(71.) Ibid.

(72.) Ibid.

(73.) Ibid., 517.

(74.) Norman Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering (NY: Verso, 2000).

(75.) Benny Morris, "The New Historiography: Israel Confronts its Past," 20.

(76.) Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947-1949; Benny Morris, The New Historiography: Israel Confronts its Past; Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across The Jordan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999); Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987).

(77.) Cited in Benny Morris, The New Historiography: Israel Confronts its Past, 21.

(78.) Cited in Benny Morris, The New Historiography: Israel Confronts its Past, 21-22.

(79.) Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across The Jordan The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine 1921-1951 (NY: Columbia University Press, 1990).

(80.) Benny Morris, The New Historiography: Israel Confronts its Past, 21.

(81.) Ibid., 22-3.

(82.) Ibid., 23.

(83.) Benny Morris, The Expulsion of Palestinians and the Birth of the Refugee Problem: Israeli Documents, 38.

(84.) Ibid.

Seif Da'Na is an assistant professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin-Parkside.

Table 1
Israeli military expenditures as a Percentage of GNP (45)

Period        % Of GNP

1950-1955     7.1
1956          13.4
1962-1966     10.1
1967          15.6
1968-1972     21.7
1973          32.7
1973-1975     32.8
1981-1985     23.2
1990          12.4
1992          12

Table 2
A comparison between the Israeli-military institution
and Western countries, 1976-1977 (46)

                Employed in      Military           % of military
Country         the army (per    expenditure (per   expenditure
                1000 citizens)   capita) in $ US    of total GNP

Israel          49.76            831                30.7
United States    9.49            432                 5.4
Britain          5.91            195                 4.9
France          10.26            258                 3.8
West Germany     8.0             251                 3.4