Contract-based military in Russia: problems and solutions.

Debate around military reform in Russia has been going on for the past few years. The idea of creating a "professional military" is being increasingly aired in the media, which only arouses incomprehension and concern among the military professionals. Is it that Russia has never in its history had a highly professional army and navy? Is it that the Russian army under Peter the Great, which in 1709 routed Swedish troops in the legendary Battle of Poltava, was not professional? Is it that the Russian army in the days of A.V. Suvorov and M.I. Kutuzov was less professional? The high professionalism of its military leaders and foot soldiers alike manifested itself during the years of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945), as is evident from the numerous victories in battles on land and at sea.

There is every reason to say that our Armed Forces remain highly professional. After all, within the first six months of service (depending on the complexity of the military occupational specialty), every enlisted man or NCO receives the required amount of knowledge and basic skills in a particular military occupational specialty and at the end of a training course takes a test to see how well he has performed. So I consider it of principal importance to specify that the term "professional military" is used in the present article only insofar as applies to armed forces manpower acquisition and refers to volunteer enlistment-on contract.

In the course of all military reforms and reorganizations in Russia, priority has always been given to manpower acquisition in the army and navy. The ongoing military reform of the RF Armed Forces is not an exception in this respect either.

Military history shows that there are three methods of manpower acquisition: on a volunteer basis (by enlistment, recruitment, contract, agreement, etc.); through conscription-that is to say, compulsory enrollment (compulsory recruitment, draft, call-up, etc.), and the mixed method of manpower acquisition (voluntary/compulsory).

Volunteer enlistment is the oldest method of manpower acquisition. It goes back to the third millennium BC and the emergence of mercenary armies and mercenary recruitment, or mercenary soldiery* as a method of armed forces manpower acquisition. As of the late 15th century, mercenary recruitment becomes the most common method of armed forces manpower acquisition while mercenary armies become the main military force of states.

In the 17th-18th centuries, the final victory of absolutism and the emergence of nation-states in Western Europe brought about a need for transition to standing mercenary armies. They were, essentially, already regular armies, but depended for manpower acquisition on mercenary recruitment.

In Russia, following the formation of a centralized state in 1550, Ivan the Terrible replaced separate armed groups and detachments with a Russia-wide army whose core was constituted by the Streltsy. The Streltsy received monetary compensation, perks and privileges for their service and also were entitled to run their own business when off-duty. In the last quarter of the 17th century, the Streltsy army lost its importance and operational efficiency, taking part in antigovernment uprisings. So in the 1720s it was disbanded.

In the l8th-l9th centuries, the situation required a transition to a new method of armed forces manpower acquisition, by introducing conscription--i.e., compulsory enrollment for military service.

Major military reforms in Russia were carried out by Peter the Great. They centered around the creation of a regular Russian army and navy with manpower acquisition based on conscription levy, introduced in 1705 and replacing the various methods of manpower acquisition that had existed before (volunteers, draftees, Cossacks, etc.). It was the most advanced manpower acquisition system for its time. It favorably differed from mercenary recruitment, allowing for a large army.

The conscription levy system provided for numerous exemptions in military service on class, status, territorial, ethnic, and other grounds. More than 20 percent of the population was exempted from the conscription levy. A person due for conscription could buy his way out of military service by hiring a "deputy" who would serve instead of him. The shortfalls of the conscription levy system as a method of manpower acquisition became especially pronounced in the second half of the 18th century, when there emerged a need for a large regular army and the preparation of well trained reservists. By the late 18th century, the conscription levy system became a serious impediment to both force development and the evolution of the military art in the transition to new colunm and extended order tactics.

In 1874, conscription levy in Russia was replaced with compulsory military service whereby all males reaching 21 were to do military service. Persons who were for some reason exempted (more than 50 percent of inductees) were enrolled in local defense forces in the event of war. Under the 1874 compulsory military service regulations, the overall term of military service was 15 years (10 years in the navy), including six years of active military service (seven in the navy) and nine years in reserve (three years in the navy).

Deferments were granted to students, on grounds of family commitments, and so forth. Only sons in families and only breadwinners in families with underage siblings were exempted from military service. Clergy, doctors, and teachers were completely exempted from service.

Infantry and infantry artillery manpower acquisition was based on the territorial principle. Guards, cavalry, and navy manpower acquisition was based on the ex-territorial principle. In wartime, all troops were augmented with inductees and reservists so that 75 percent of manpower came from inland governorates, i.e., ethnic Russians, and 25 percent from residents in border areas.

In 1912, a new law on compulsory military service was adopted in Russia, but it did not introduce any substantial changes in the manpower acquisition system as established under the 1874 regulations.

In the subsequent period the character of compulsory military service was constantly changing (length of service, order, procedure of service, etc.). It is noteworthy that compulsory military service to date remains the main method of armed forces manpower acquisition in the absolute majority of states in the world.

Introduction of compulsory military service precipitated the evolution of a mixed method of armed forces manpower acquisition--i.e., by draft (on a compulsory basis) and by volunteer enlistment (by contract, agreement, etc.). Preference in volunteer enlistment is given to NCOs, i.e. junior command personnel, and subsequently also to highly qualified military specialists.

Over time the number of volunteer servicemen steadily grows. Thus, the share of NCOs and warrant officers in the Soviet army and navy was constantly growing. As of late 1992, the Russian army (successor to the Soviet army) established volunteer enlistment under contract for NCOs and enlisted personnel.

At present, contract-based volunteer enlistment as a method of armed forces manpower acquisition is gaining new momentum. This manpower acquisition system has been adopted in the United States, Great Britain, France, Canada, and a number of other states.

The military leadership of major Western countries today regards armed forces manpower acquisition and personnel training as the most important component of force development, designed to meet the needs of all branches of service for well trained, highly qualified personnel both in peacetime and in wartime.

According to Western experts, the only viable method of creating a military capable of performing any combat missions (apart from the development of effective weapon systems for them) today is the constant upgrading of armed forces manpower acquisition methods and the use of most advanced technology in training and maintaining the combat readiness of both individual servicemen and entire military units.

The experience of leading Western states shows that transition to the contract based volunteer enlistment principle as a method of armed forces manpower acquisition is an extremely complex process involving resolution of a large number of political, military, social, economic, demographic, and other problems. At the same time, approaches toward enlisted and NCO personnel training are being drastically reviewed, requiring (along with their sharp intensification) the use of advanced training methods, based on cutting-edge technology and scientific achievements.

The groundwork for the organization and accomplishment of the transition to a volunteer military is laid by specific federal laws regulating the activity of state executive agencies, ministries, departments, organizations, and individual officials and citizens in providing conditions for a mass enlistment of volunteers for military service.

Analysis of the general principles of reforming armed forces manpower acquisition (say, in the United States, France) points to a number of substantial advantages, malting it possible to sharply downsize regular armed forces and enhance the level of personnel training and preparation in the process of transition to competitive manpower acquisition in modem militaries. Transition to volunteer enlistment as a method of armed forces manpower acquisition, however, is a prolonged, labor-intensive, and costly process, requiring considerable preparatory work and the conduct of target specific research and experiments on the problem at hand, the study of the experience of other countries, and consistent implementation of pilot projects in military units and sub-units.

In building a volunteer military, the main emphasis should be placed on the formation of a functional manpower acquisition system geared to military personnel needs in peacetime and wartime.

Thus, in the interest of manning regular armed forces with enlisted and NCO personnel, Western militaries use a balanced servicemen classification system based on specific categories and military ranks. The financial status of military servicemen is predicated on their compliance with the requirements of laws, the military oath of allegiance, manuals, regulations, and other enactments regulating military service.

Personnel preparation and training in armed forces built on volunteer enlistment rely on high standards set for career military servicemen. It requires considerable efforts and time to meet these standards. In enlistment personnel training, a special emphasis is placed on discipline, fitness training, acquisition of military occupational specialties, and motivation for further studies and professional advancement.

The aforementioned leads to the conclusion that transition to volunteer (contract based) enlistment as a method of manpower acquisition in the RF Armed Forces will require a whole complex of problems to be resolved since this:

* first, violates the exterritorial principle of armed forces manpower acquisition (owing to a lack of official housing for military servicemen and their families, enlistment of reservists for military service will be based mainly on the residential principle); this could lead to creation of armed formations in RF components based on the territorial principle;

* second, involves difficulties over the accumulation of manpower mobilization resources insofar as we lose the military specialist training base that existed under the conscription system. This will result in reduction in the volume of militarily trained mobilization manpower resources.

To prepare and build up such resources in the process of transition to a new armed forces manpower acquisition system (mainly on a contract basis), it is necessary, without destroying the old mobilization manpower training and accumulation system, to modernize and upgrade it, making a phased transition to a new system.

A new mobilization manpower training and accumulation system should ensure the creation of various categories of mobilization manpower resources from among reservists. It envisions the retention of specialists at specific military units by signing with them reserve military service contracts subject to compulsory target-specific preparation and training in various forms and activities. The voluntary signing by citizens of reserve military service contracts should be ensured by granting them various compensations, benefits, and social security guarantees.

Transition to a new system of mobilization manpower training and accumulation should include streamlining the agencies in charge of mobilization manpower training and accumulation, making them more efficient, and building up the reservist officer training base.

Transition to a new mobilization manpower training and accumulation system will require the tapping of substantial intellectual, organizational, financial, and technical resources, considerable time, and comprehensive support from the state. The estimated costs of putting in place a new mobilization manpower training and accumulation system will be higher than in the existing system, but the effect from investment will grow considerably, primarily through target-specific, priority reservist training and guaranteed manning of troops (forces) with highly trained specialists according to the mobilization plan.

Transition to a contract based method of armed forces manpower acquisition also will necessitate a review of the T/O structure of military units and sub-units. Western experience shows that to ensure effective operation of military units, the following is necessary: a substantial increase in the numerical size of support civilian personnel; improvement of the financial and social status of military servicemen; exercise of a case-by-case approach in each specific military unit toward the provision of housing to contract servicemen, employment of their wives, provision of schooling or daycare for their children, construction of cultural, leisure and recreation facilities, and provision of social security guarantees.

For the Armed Forces to be competitive on the labor market, it is essential to create such conditions for military service wherein young and energetic people could choose it a life-long career. They will hardly agree to devote their life to service in the Armed Forces with a salary of 2,000 to 3,000 rubles a month. It is difficult for a person to live on this sort of money, to say nothing about supporting a family. And this is far from the only problem that has to be addressed now so as to make military service more attractive to Russians.

First of all, there is a pressing need to deal with the problem of housing for contract servicemen. Given that the barracks and related facilities available in military units now do not fully meet volunteer enlistment needs, the volume of the necessary capital investment will have to be established for each specific military unit on a case by case basis.

Clearly, fulfillment of these tasks will require considerable spending by the state, the volume of which can be accurately established only once an appropriate federal program has been worked out. Thus, transition to volunteer enlistment as a method of armed forces manpower acquisition in the United States required an additional appropriation of $4.6 billion (at an annual rate) and took 13 years to complete (this, considering the U.S. economic capability!).

In conclusion, I would like to draw the readers' attention to the fact that reform of the RF military should measure up to changes in the country's economic and political life, bringing the Armed Forces and other troops and armed formations in Russia to a level reliably guaranteeing the state's defense and security. A number of objective and subjective factors, however, does not at present allow for target oriented, focused work to begin on a reorganization of the state's entire military system. Today it is critical to exercise an extremely cautious approach toward this matter so as not to destroy what has remained of the world's once strongest military. In so doing, it is important to bear in mind that transition to volunteer enlistment as a method of armed forces manpower acquisition, not hacked with the state's economic capabilities, coupled with the abolition of draft, will inevitably lead to a full loss of the state's military organization with all the ensuing political consequences.

In pursuit of an executive order by the president and government of the Russian Federation, the Russian Defense Ministry, together with a number of federal agencies concerned, drew up. a draft concept for transition to manpower acquisition mainly on a contract principle. On November 21, 2002, a session of the RF government made a decision to work out and present to the RF government, by July 1, 2003, an appropriate federal program providing, in the 2004-2007 period, for transition to a predominantly contract based principle of manpower acquisition for standby units of the Ground Forces, the Airborne Troops, and naval infantry.

Provision of conditions enhancing the prestige of military service in society and, therefore, the competitiveness of the military profession on the labor market, will facilitate a steady increase in the number of military servicemen doing their military service on a contract basis in standby military units, and subsequently also in other military units, in positions that are critical to their operational efficiency (primarily in junior command personnel slots). Other slots--NCO or non-NCO--are to be filled with conscript servicemen.

* Mercenary soldiery is a method of armed forces manpower acquisition based on obtaining personnel for military service by hire, mainly from among foreigners.

Vassiliy Vassilyevich SMIRNOY was born on March 30, 1950 in the village of Pyshchug, Kostromskaya Oblast; joined the Armed Forces in 1967; graduated from a higher military school, the M.V. Frunze Military Academy, and the General Staff Military Academy; held various command and staff positions; member of the General Staff since 1982; appointed chief of the Main Organization and Mobilization Directorate and deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in August 2002.