Contending With Contradictions: China's Policy toward Soviet Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1953-1960. (Book Reviews).

CONTENDING WITH CONTRADICTIONS: China's Policy toward Soviet Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1953-1960. By Mercy A. Kuo. Lanham (Maryland), Boulder (Colorado), New York, Oxford (UN): Lexington Books. 2001. xiii, 193 pp. (Table, figures.) US$60.00, cloth. ISBN 0-7391-0235-4.

Though the origins of the Sino-Soviet conflict have received abundant coverage, the role of Chinese policy toward Eastern Europe largely remains a poorly covered area. The book under review effectively fills the gap. It is a product of the author's research in the United States, China and Poland, largely based on archival sources. Besides, it is a unique case study by a researcher fluent both in Chinese and Polish, with a deep understanding of the realities in both nations.

The first two chapters of the book cover the general outlines of Chinese foreign policy in the fifties; chapter 3 describes China's vision of world affairs and its initial formulation of a relationship with Eastern Europe in the period between Stalin's death and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union s (CPSU) 20th Congress; chapter 4 concentrates on China's reaction to the 1956 uprisings in Poland and Hungary; and chapters 5 and 6 evaluate its declining role in East European affairs since 1957.

The book is premised on the assumption that, for the Chinese, Stalin's death in 1953 meant the appearance of a vacuum of leadership in the Communist movement and the Socialist zone. For Mao, Khruschev was a leader inferior not only to Stalin, but also to Mao himself. Khruschev's secret speech at the CPSU 20th Congress opened a Pandora's box of de-Stalinization and Eastern European efforts to assert larger autonomy. The situation created an opportunity for China to obtain a leading position in the Communist bloc.

The author points out the two major goals of China's foreign policy: gaining equality within the socialist zone, and preserving its unity. Kuo stresses the conflicting nature of both. While supporting Eastern European efforts, Polish in particular, for greater independence from Soviet domination, the People's Republic of China (PRC) envisaged itself as a leader in this process. Therefore, the Chinese notion of equality primarily assumed Sino-Soviet joint leadership in the bloc rather than the real equality of every participant. Stressing the importance of unity and solidarity, China simultaneously undermined it by supporting Eastern Europe's drift to more self-determined domestic politics and their stress on national specificity.

The book examines Chinese responses to three scenarios: Tito's Yugoslavia, Gomulka's Poland and Nagy's Hungary. In 1948 Mao desperately needed Stalin's recognition and absolution from the label of the "half-hearted Tito." Besides, he advocated autonomy within the bloc, rather than independence. This explains the CCP's tacit approval of the Komintern decision on Yugoslavia. In 1956, with Poland seeking autonomy within the Socialist zone, China found a way to counterbalance Soviet influence and increase its own. In the case of Hungary, the unity of the bloc was under question again, which explains the PRC's support of the Soviet invasion.

The author claims that the Polish and Hungarian uprisings in 1956 opened the way for the Chinese to make authoritative decisions in the Soviet bloc. The PRC's direct intervention in the crises, especially in the case of Poland, helped to salvage some appearance of order in the midst of disarray. Chinese policy compensated for the lack of Soviet ideological leadership. Preserving the USSR as the formal leader, China acquired influence and power in intrabloc relations and paved the way for a switch from monocentrism to polycentrism.

The new atmosphere offered an opportunity for the PRC to set intrabloc relationships on a new footing, recognizing each country's independence, equality and national specificity in combination with a group solidarity. This process of change was put forward by China, and culminated in dual Soviet-Chinese leadership of the bloc. At the same time, the formal primacy of the Soviet Union was supposed to be preserved for the sake of unity. Clearly, this kind of strategy could not but increase Soviet suspicions. Beijing's role in maneuvering between Moscow and Warsaw, which sought self-determination, undermined the trust of the Poles, who were China's major ally in Eastern Europe. Finally, the strategy resulted in China's isolation.

Kuo concludes that China's involvement in Eastern European affairs in the fifties, especially its relations with Poland, added a critical dimension to Soviet-Chinese relations. Combined with bilateral issues, ideological divergences and trends in Chinese domestic politics, it constituted one of the key elements in explaining the forthcoming crisis in relations.

The book under review provides an excellent analysis of an issue little known and poorly understood. It opens up a new page in the research surrounding the origins of the Soviet bloc split.