Considering cloning.

Opposition to a ban on the reproductive cloning of human beings is based on two main types of argument: one defending individual "rights" to a done; the other, defending scientific freedom. The first approach has a fundamental flaw: it claims the right for one person to predetermine the identity of another in the name of the individual freedom of the former.

This is based on an argument which has become increasingly familiar - the "right to reproduce". First invoked in the name of infertile couples, k has been claimed by others barred by regulations on age, family circumstances and so forth from using the technology.

Claims couched in terms of competing and conflicting "rights" appear irreconcilable. Yet, when the "right to reproduce" amounts to a consumer right of access to a market product, it is simply not on the same level as, for example, the fundamental right to found a family, as stated in Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Article 16 defends a basic component of human life against any political prohibition, not the "right" to use any technology to overcome physiological impediments to natural reproduction. Whatever the commercial pressures, whatever the compelling personal motives behind calls for cloning, they are not on the same level as the fundamental right of each new human being to a unique identity.

The principle that each human life has equal intrinsic value transcending genetic, social or any other conditions hinges on the defining uniqueness of each individual. Cloning would remove the uniqueness that ensures no one has chosen and instrumentalized another person's identity. That uniqueness is the ultimate guarantee of human liberty. A ban on the reproductive cloning of human beings does not close the door to the use of cloning techniques in embryology or the cloning of human tissue. These issues can and are being dealt with separately.

More generally, the right to freedom of research is reinforced by the collective nature of a scientific community which shares a body of scientific knowledge and the rights and responsibilities which go with it.

As the distinction between the science and technology of genetics diminishes, there are increasingly claims to the same right to apply the technology derived from science as to conduct research. This carries risks for science, as well as for society.

When the claim to freedom of research is misused to cover the use of controversial technology, this undermines valid claims to scientific freedom. When doubts remain in scientific circles and in society about a technique like human dolling and yet scientists try to go ahead unilaterally, this undermines scientific freedom.

An issue like human reproductive cloning has to be dealt with collectively, involving both the scientific community and a broad range of participants from the community at large in ethical review and derision-making processes, such as the one undertaken by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

When scientists take part in efforts to tackle the ethical issues and establish rules and guidelines, they actually reinforce and safeguard scientific freedom. They do so by winning the public trust required to underpin scientific freedom and by ensuring that protection of freedom of research is built into framework agreements.

The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, unanimously adopted in November 1997 by the 186 member States of UNESCO, proscribes the reproductive cloning of human beings because it is counter to the basic guiding principles of human genetics set out in the Declaration. As has often happened in the past when consensus is reached on the need to restrict certain new applications of science, critics charge that this is a hysterical, panic response. Such attacks appear increasingly anachronistic.

Today, the bioethical review process, a complete novelty only 15 years ago, has gained in depth and scope, as it has gained experience. Scientific literacy amongst young people is rising, as they stay on in education in ever greater numbers. It is no longer credible to dismiss any restriction on scientific applications as retrograde and irrational. Knowledge is always positive, but its applications can be negative or even perverse. We have entered an era of accountability where science can and must be consistent with human rights, where we apply science when it is both feasible and acceptable.

To let science and technology determine what can be done, rather than let principles determine what should be done, is never neutral because it devalues the human factor. In the case of human genetics, what we mean by "human" must determine what we do with the genetics.