Conservative populism - a dead end.

IN THE LAST TWO or three years, a new species has evolved in the bestiary of American politics--the "conservative populist." Suddenly, it seems, conservatives are competing for the mantle formerly worn by William Jennings Bryan, Tom Watson, Lyndon B. Johnson, and George Wallace.

What is the explanation for this phenomenon? Is it the product of advanced Madison Avenue doublethink, or just election-year silliness? ("Populism" sounds like "popular"; therefore, it will win votes.) Or does the adoption of populist terminology reflect a deeper problem, perhaps even a serious split, within the conservative movement?

It is possible that advocates of "conservative populism" do not fully understand what populism is. Let's begin with a bit of history. The populist movement originated in the American South and West during the 1870s and '80s among poor farmers hit by a devastating series of agricultural depressions. The movement grew out of local "farmers' alliances," whose original purpose was to promote cooperative buying and selling, and to help farmers get credit. Since the farmers' principal problems were low crop prices and lack of credit, the alliance leaders eventually began to demand inflation of the money supply as a remedy for agricultural ills. The alliances also fought against price discriminatin and excessive rates charged by the railroads that served farm areas. There is no doubt that many of the farmers' grievances were legitimate.

In 1890-92, the leaders of the alliance movement succeeded in turning it into a national "People's Party." The Omaha Platform of the new party, adopted in July 1892, became the basis for subsequent populist programs. It called for abolition of national banks, substitution of new issuances of legal-tender treasury notes "in sufficient volume to do the business of the country on a cash system," free and unlimited coinage of silver, and, in addition, government ownership of the means of transportation and communication. The populists proposed other measures that would hardly seem radical today, such as popular election of senators, a graduated income tax, an eight-hour day, and the initiative and referendum. Many of these measures were later adopted at either the federal or the state level.

At their 1892 convention, the populists nominated a former "Greenbacker" from Iowa, General James B. Weaver, as their candidate for President. The new party, campaigning principally on the "free silver" issue, captured more than a million votes and carried four states. The free-silver proposal had proved its popularity. According to the silver advocates, all the nation's ills could be cured by the simple technique of restoring silver to its role as a medium of coinage. So politically powerful was this simplistic notion that, in 1896, the Democrats moved to preempt it by adopting a free-silver plank and nominating William Jennings Bryan, who electrified the convention with the most famous populist speech of all time, in which he declared that "you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold." The Populist Party also nominated Bryan in 1896. Its platform continued to advocate free silver, as well as more radical measures such as government ownership of rilroads and telephone systems.

Bryan conceded that he knew little about the monetary system. "The people of Nebraska are for free silver and I am for free silver. I will look up the arguments later." This is the authentic voice of populism. What the people seem to want (sensible or not) is what the candidate proposes.

After 1896, the Populist Party withered away, since its most popular issue had been stolen by the Democrats and many of its other proposals were enacted at the federal or state level. But populist politicians did not disappear; they simply moved into the Democratic Party. (Today, it seems, they may have strayed further afield.)

The essence of populism was, and is, a simplistically conspiratorial view of history and economics. The preamble to the People's Party platform of 1892 stated: "A vast conspiracy against mankind has been organized on two continents, and it is rapidly taking possession of the world." The evil conspirators were "the gold bugs," "the moneyed interests," big banks, Wall Street, corporations, and capitalists generally. The victims were "the people" or "the ordinary man."

Hostility to business (particularly big business) has been a permanent feature of the populist mentality from the 1880s to the "urban populism" of the 1970s. The populist politician of the 1890s whipped up the voters by attacking Wall Street, big banks, and the railroads; today, he attacks Wall Street, big banks, and utilities generally. Keeping utility rates as low as possible is his favorite sport.

The symbol of all evil for the original populists was gold. The manipulators of gold, operating through "the secret cabals of the international gold ring," controlled all the world's finance and commerce. As the historian Richard Hofstadter has pointed out, the populists' gold-conspiracy theory, aside from being incorrect, was strongly anti-Semitic. Populist writers identified Jews with usurers and with the "international gold ring." References to "Shylocks" were common. An Associated Press reporter commented on "the extraordinary hatred of the Jewish race" manifested at the Populist convention in 1896.

Southern populists slipped easily into the habit of anti-black racism. Perhaps the best-known example was Tom Watson, a Georgian who was the Populist Party nominee for Vice President in 1896 and has remained a folk hero of populists for generations. (He was one of Jimmy Carter's favorite spiritual ancestors.) Earlier in his career, Watson had proposed an alliance of poor blacks and poor whites to fight against the moneyed interests. Later on, when white opinion in the South moved in the direction of the Ku Klux Klan, Watson moved with it. His hostilities were eclectic: He was anti-Jewish and anti-Catholic, as well as being anti-black. Tom Watson was not unique. Populist politicians all over the South took similar paths. (Alabama populists in the 1982s got votes by claiming that the Pope planned to sail up the Alabama River in a gunboat and take over the White House in Montgomery.)

As soon as the political wind shifts, the populist changes direction. A good example is the conversion of George Wallace (an archetypal populist) when he perceived the need for courting black voters. If, through some diabolicasl chain of events, racism became popular once more, populist politicians would be the first to climb aboard the bandwagon.

In America, populism has always been a movement of the Left. The populist program of the 1890s advocated nationalization of a significant segment of the economy, and would have set in motion a permanently inflationry monetary and credit policy specifically designed to favor debtors over creditors. One obvious effect of such measures would have been a substantial redistribution of wealth. Such solutions are permanent fixtures of populist agitation: The "urban populism" of the 1970s advocated public ownership of utilities, extra-heavy taxation of large corporations, and universal health care at public expense.

In brief, populism was founded on economic fallacies, simplistic remedies, and a conspiracy theory of history. It spawned a recognizable political type: the demagogue whose success is predicated on sensing exactly which way the wind is blowing at any particular moment. It would not be accurate of classify populism as a "radical" movement in the European sense. It never advocated violent revolution or Marxist solutions. (The proposal for government ownership of railroads was included in populist manifestos but never made much headway.) But populism has always pushed in the direction of egalitarianism, anti-capitalism, government intervention, regulation, and inflation.

It seems clear from this brief analysis of the history and theory of populism that it has nothing to offer to conservatives. How, then, are we to exlain the sudden eagerness of some conservatives to call themselves "populists"?

Perhaps we may find a clue in Richard Viguerie's recent book, The Establishment vs. the People, which openly advocates a "populist revolt." In this book, viguerie blames all of the nation's problems on the "elite," also known as the "establishment." These insidious folks include such normal populist targets as Big Bankers and Big Business. They also include some of those who are typically, and often legitimately, included on conservative hit lists: Big Government, Big Education, and Big Media. (For Vigueries, everything big is also bad, except for big cliches.) Most of the players on the Big Enemy leam, it appears, went to Ivy League schools. The message is clear. If you want to play on the good guys' team. avoid the Ivy League like the bubonic plague. (Out of zeal for the truth, I am forced to reveal that I went to not one, but two Ivy League school. Clearly, I am beyond redemption.)

Everything that is wrong with the country, in Viguerie's view of things, is the fault of the "establishment." The various Biggies have effectively conspired to burden us with inflation, taxes, welfare, and much, much more. Why big businessmen, lawyers, bankers, and other moguls would want to inflict these evils upon themselves is never explained.

If one has the patience to sift through the rhetoric, Viguerie's solutions taxes, cut federal spending, deregulate, encourage savings, and supprt a strong defense. These proposals undoubtedly deserve conservative support. But they have nothing whatever to do with populism. Viguerie even advocates a return to the gold standard--conceivably a sound idea, but the very antithesis of everything populism has ever stood for. A populist? Advocating a gold standard?? What's going on here?

Either Viguerie is ignorant of the history and meaning of populism, in which case his analysis lacks credibility; or he is aware of it, in which case his book is a blatant attempt to deceive his audience by the deliberate misuse of terminology.

Viguerie's book contains numerous quotations from elected officials and conservative spokesmen who are identified as espousing populism, or at least as adopting populist rhetoric. This can only confirm the cynicism of those who have learned by experience that public figures will say anything to curry favor with the electorate.

Genuine leadership consists of telling people unpalatable truths. Populism, on the other hand, revels in telling them exactly what they most want to hear: that their troubles are caused by a secret cabal of bankers, Ivy Leaguers, union leaders, or other elite malefactors. That conservatives are willing to take the easy road to popularity by embracing the simplistic and deceptive rhetoric of populism is an extremely bad sign. Subsidies are popular; easy money is popular; "soaking the rich" is popular; buying votes with expensive government programs is popular cutting taxes is popular. The voters seem to want all of these things at once. The populist will promise all of them, and whatever else a temporary majority seems to want. What we need, instead, is politicians who care more about their country than about being "popular." A latter-day Diogenes, searching for such men, would have a long and lonely quest.

Populism is an unruly horse that always dominates its riders. Conservatives would be well advised to avoid the temptations of facile rhetoric and return to the difficult task of limiting government and providing responsible leadership.