Conference on disarmament opens second part of 1986 session.

Conference on Disarmament opens second part of 1986 session

The Conference on Disarmament opened the second part of its 1986 session on 10 June in Geneva, hearing a call for the "new spirit of Geneva' to be developed and enriched.

Both the Soviet Union and United States should demonstrate political will and readiness to take concrete steps in their ongoing bilateral disarmament talks, stated Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov in a message read to the Conference by its President for June, Konstantin Tellalov of Bulgaria.

"Nowadays, security is exclusively a political problem. It is only through the achievement of a new political thinking and in the politicial means and dialogue that the way out can be found--a way capable of guaranteeing the future of human civilization', Mr. Zhivkov said.

The "peoples of the entire world follow with hope' the work of the Conference, he went on. "We believe that it can contribute substantially to limiting the danger of war, and limiting a nuclear catastrophe.'

The Conference agenda, he said, "includes all major issues on whose solution the success of this great human endeavour depends'. The problem of nuclear disarmament and space weapons in all its various aspects could not be solved through the efforts of the leading nuclear-weapon States only, although their special responsibility was commonly acknowledged. The cessation of all nuclear-weapon testing--along with a ban on tests-- "is a top priority task,' he said.

The 40-member Conference-- consisting of the five nuclear-weapon States and 35 other countries--is the world's only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament issues. Its 1986 session is scheduled to conclude in August.

Spring session ends: The Conference on Disarmament concluded the first part of its 1986 session on 25 April after agreeing to re-establish its Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and appointing Luvsandorjiin Bayart (Mongolia) Committee Chairman. The session began on 4 February (see UN Chronicle, Vol.XXIII, No. 3).

Reviewing the Conference's work, Celso Antonio de Souza e Silva (Brazil), President for April, noted that during the month subsidiary bodies on chemical weapons, radiological weapons and a comprehensive programme of disarmament had continued their work. However, during the three-month period, the Conference was not able to set up such bodies on the four nuclear items on its agenda--the nuclear test ban; cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; and security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

Mr. Souza e Silva hoped that the Soviet Union and the United States would agree on the need to halt testing at the earliest possible date. "In the absence of such an understanding, our multilateral efforts seem doomed to failure, despite their urgency and earnestness', he said.

Nuclear test ban: No consensus was reached on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. Alternative texts were put forward by western countries (CD/521) and by the Group of 21 (CD/520/Rev. 2), the latter also supported by socialist States.

Several delegations condemned the nuclear test conducted by the United States on 10 April. On 15 April, the USSR, in a message to the 40-member body (CD/690), said the United States intended to keep the world "in fear of universal annihilation', and once again had placed the "egoistic, imperial ambitions of the United States military-industrial complex above the interests of mankind'. United States invitations to observe its nuclear explosions could be compared to "inviting a person opposed to the death penalty to attend an execution', the USSR stated.

Recalling its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing proclaimed in August 1985, the Soviet Union said it would be forced to resume such testing if the United States continued to carry out nuclear explosions. It also reaffirmed its proposal to begin multilateral talks immediately on a complete nuclear-weapon test ban.

The United States denied allegations that its recent nuclear test had violated international agreements, and said the "moderate level of underground nuclear testing' was in no way a "direct provocation or challenge to any State'. The Soviet Union, "instead of arguing for the questionable benefits of an unverified moratorium on nuclear testing', should engage in "serious negotiations to reduce significantly offensive nuclear arsenals'.

Other nuclear items: The Conference decided to hold informal meetings on the item on "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament'. Several States, however, maintained the position that establishing a subsidiary body on the subject would be a more desirable course.

The Conference agreed to resume discussions during the second part of its 1986 session (June-August) on how to proceed with regard to the item on "prevention of nuclear war including all related matters'. Some members of the Group of 21 continued to oppose the suggestion that the item be considered in informal meetings, stating that such an approach did not do justice to the seriousness of the issue. Working papers on that subject were submitted by Argentina and China.

"We have lost the right to life', declared President Raul Alfonsin in the Argentinian paper (CD/688). "We never renounced it voluntarily. But almost without our realizing it, the nuclear arms race between the super Powers took that right away from us.'

He listed measures to reduce the growing risk of nuclear war, including a moratorium on nuclear weapon tests; ratification and strict observance of bilateral arms limitation agreements by the two major Powers; renunciation of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States; agreement on non-first-use of nuclear weapons; prohibition of deployment of nuclear weapons in any geographical area, but "particularly those areas which are free of confrontation between the military alliances'; and non-extension of the arms race to outer space, with a ban on any activity which "directly or indirectly develops the offensive and defensive capabilities of strategic nuclear forces'.

Those steps, according to Argentina, should be complemented by confidence-building measures, including establishment of multilateral crisis control centres to facilitate direct contracts between States in times of crisis.

China asserted (CD/691) that the Soviet Union and the United States, as the only States capable of launching a world-wide nuclear war, had a special responsibility for preventing nuclear war. They must "conduct serious negotiations and reach agreeement as early as possible, on halting the test, production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons, drastically reducing all types of nuclear weapons they have deployed anywhere inside and outside their countries, and destroying them on the spot', China declared. That would create favourable conditions for convening an international conference on disarmament with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States.

The long-term objective would be the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. To reduce the nuclear threat in the meantime, agreements should be concluded banning nuclear-weapon use, prohibiting space weapons, and reducing conventional arms and forces, China stated.

Outer space: Some States welcomed the Conference decision on 24 April to re-establish its Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. The subsidiary body was to "continue to examine, and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space'. Its mandate (CD/694) also asked that the Committee take into account in its work "all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives, as well as developments which have taken place' since the body was established in 1985.

The Group of 21 hoped that through "diligent and constructive work', the Committee could complete the "exploratory phase' in 1986 and begin substantive negotiations in 1987 on a treaty, or treaties, to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Western nations felt that the Committee mandate was "realistic' and would permit the Conference to conduct concrete work, taking into consideration expectations of all countries represented. The Conference now had a sound basis for moving forward on the "sensitive and important issue of outer space', they stated.

Socialist States continued to favour "businesslike' negotiations towards concluding an agreement to prevent an arms race in outer space, with the understanding that all efforts would be directed at preventing the development of space strike weapons, and preventing the use of force in space and from space against Earth.

Seismic test: The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, set up in 1976 to facilitate the verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, also reported (CD/682) to the Conference.

Since 1979, the Group has been working on an international co-operative seismic data exchange system consisting of a network of more than 50 seismological stations around the world. Data extracted from the stations and transmitted over the Global Telecommunication System (GTS) of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) is to be processed at special international data centres for use by participating States. Practical tests of selected parts of the proposed system have been performed with broad multilateral participation.

The Group provided findings (CD/681) regarding its Technical Test (GSETT), conducted from 15 October to 14 December 1984. A final report is expected to be submitted to the Conference after the Group's next session (21 July-1 August 1986).

The 1984 technical test, for which 75 seismographic stations in 37 countries contributed Level I data (such as signal arrival time, first motion, amplitude, magnitude and period), to be routinely exchanged over the envisaged system, marked the first regular use of the GTS. The Expert Group affirmed that the test had provided a "vast amount of experience, previously unavailable, on many aspects of practical operation of a global seismic data exchange system'.

The test demonstrated that the WMO/GTS ensured in general "operative and undistorted' transmission of Level I seismic data, and that most of the procedures for collecting, exchanging, compiling and analyzing the data worked satisfactorily, the Group reported.

To ensure that the global system was equipped with modern seismographic systems which were well-sited and capable of continuous recording of data, the Group recommended that standardized technical specifications be worked out, taking into account recent developments in seismometry.

Computer programmes and procedures should be developed to ensure full utilization of data from the seismographic stations, the report stated.

In light of shortcomings in the use of the WMO/GTS, the Group recommended that further efforts be undertaken to demonstrate that reliable communications for Level I data and bulletin transmission could be established using the GTS between all regions. To that end, the Group would maintain contact with WMO regarding possibilities for upgrading the existing system. A number of shortcomings in the use of the system could be overcome at the national level.

In connection with data analysis, the Group recommended clarification of procedures for defining seismic events, and further development and testing of procedures for continuous exchange of information between data centres.

Some delegations considered the Group's work to be "organically linked' with progress towards elaborating a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, and that its future activities should take into account not only all achievements in seismology but also the requirements for application of such achievements to Conference agenda item 1, on the nuclear test ban.

Other delegations, however, said such requirements were outside the technical and scientific responsibilities of the Group.

The Soviet Union said it would support continuation of the Group's activities to further improve the international exchange of seismic data, and felt the Group's work and elaboration of a nuclear test ban were "organically linked'. The German Democratic Republic said it would oppose attempts to transform the Group into an "instrument in charge of monitoring and justifying ongoing tests'.

The United States said the Experts' report for the first time contained "elements of a political nature' exceeding its technical and scientific responsibilities. "The Group should not seek to involve itself with statements or problems beyond its competence', it stressed.

Japan said the question of verification and its limitations--"obviously linked to the question of compliance' --was a major issue relating to the nuclear test ban. It was pleased therefore at the Soviet Union's readiness to support continuation of work on international data exchange.

Chemical weapons: The Conference from February through April continued work on the chemical weapons convention it had been drafting, although key aspects of the verification question remained unresolved.

The United States proposed an amendment (CD/685) regarding special on-site inspections, to the text of a draft convention (CD/500) it had submitted in 1984. It said "misunderstandings' may have arisen regarding a reference in article X to "government-controlled facilities'. Some delegations might feel that that implied discrimination against States whose economies were structured so that there was little or no involvement of private enterprise in their chemical industries. No imbalance in inspection obligations was intended. The amendment sought to clarify the original intention of article X--that obligations under it would apply equally to all States, regardless of economic or political system.

The Soviet Union on 22 April in new proposals asked that elimination of stockpiles be initiated by each State party to the convention not later than six months after the convention's entry into force, and would be completed within 10 years.

Also, 30 days after the convention's entry into force, States parties would officially declare the precise location of chemical weapons production facilities. Destruction or dismantling of such facilities would begin not later than one year after the convention's entry into force. Procedures for the destruction and dismantling of such facilities should be developed, the USSR said. Cessation of the operation of "every chemical weapon production facility, including those of private enterprises and transnational corporations, should be ensured by means of strict verification, including systematic on-site inspections', the USSR proposed.

Photo: President Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria