Conference on Disarmament ends work for 1984; some progress on chemical weapons, but no action on nuclear issues.

New proposals for a chemical weapons treaty from the United States, Soviet Union and China were considered a "hopeful sign" in the words of Rolf Ekeus of Sweden, Chairman of the body's Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons charged with the actual negotiating process.

However, the Conference, during the 24 weeks of its two-part session (7 February-27 April, 12 June-31 August), because of lack of consensus, could not agree on a mandate for an ad hoc subsidiary body to consider a test ban, nor on the establishment of subsidiary bodies to deal with the items on cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war including all related matters; and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In a statement, the Group of 21 neutral or non-aligned States asserted that under the circumstances, serious consideration should be given to amending the rules of procedure, to the effect that the rule of consensus should not be used in such a way as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary organs for the effective performance of the functions of the Conference.

At the session's end, a number of nations expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of progress at the 1984 session, some of whom related that to the status of the current international political situation.

'Mutual Suspicion': On 10 July, Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar told the Conference that the arms race had created a precarious situation "which has its origin in the atmosphere of mutual suspicion prevailing between the two leading nuclear Powers".

The challenge, he said, is to "acquire the necessary capacity to dispel this mutual suspicion and to establish in its place the essential basis for mutual trust which will enable us to halt the arms race and progressively negotiate reductions in arms levels".

The Conference should intensify its efforts "in the present critical situation". Nuclear war, he went on, would be "the final negation of man". Although the basic key to avoiding nuclear war was in the hands of the leading nuclear Powers, the other States also had a duty to make a contribution, controlling situations which could reach the dangerous nuclear threshold, he said.

In addition to its chemical weapons committee, the Conference established other committees to deal with radiological weapons, security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Reports from these committees were approved as part of the Conference's annual report to the General Assembly (see below). The Conference--the world's only multilateral body for disarmament and arms limitation negotiations--concluded its session in Geneva by adopting that report.

During the session, the Conference also consulted regarding a proposed increase in membership (from 40 to 44), and measures to improve the body's functioning.

Requests for membership have been received from Norway, Finland, Austria, Turkey, Senegal, Bangladesh, Spain, Viet Nam, Ireland, Tunisia, Ecuador, Cameroon and Greece.

Members: Members of the Conference now include the five nuclear-weapon States (China, France, USSR, United Kingdom, United States) and the following 35 countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

Conference President for August (the office rotates alphabetically on a monthly basis among members), Ian T. Cromartie (United Kingdom), will continue to carry out his functions until the start of the 1985 session on 5 February.

Other Conference Presidents this year were Stanislaw Turbanski (Poland), February; Ion Datcu (Romania), March; Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka), April; Maj Britt Theorin (Sweden), June; Victor L. Issraelyan (Soviet Union), July.

Rikhi Jaipal is Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General. Vicente Berasategui is Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference.

Chemical Weapons

The Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons embarked on its priority task of negotiating a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Among the numerous proposals submitted this year were the United States draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons (CD/500), presented on 18 April by United States Vice-President George Bush. The text provides for an "open invitation" verification scheme by which all States would agree to open for international inspection on short notice all military or government-owned or government-controlled facilities. The United States also submitted in July a paper (CD/516) on the declaration and interim monitoring of chemical weapons stockpiles.

The Soviet Union in July 1982 had submitted a comprehensive document (CD/294) containing "Basic Provisions" for a chemical weapons convention. In February this year, in the Conference debate, it also stated it could agree to verification of destruction of chemical stocks by a "permanent presence" of international inspectors at destruction facilities--a departure from earlier policy.

China's proposals (CD/443) also outline elements for a treaty, including some of definitions, such as that for "chemical warefare agents".

In introducing the Committee's report, Chairman Ekeus said the Committee in 1984, in defining and developing procedures on holding negotiations in the Conference, for the first time had actually undertaken negotiations on the text of a convention.

Due to the extensive and complicated nature of the substance of a text and the limited time available, it had not been possible to consider all parts of the convention at this session. It had, however, been possible to draft the main parts of the scope of the convention, he said.

The question of how to formulate the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons still remained to be resolved. The crucial issue of the definition of chemical weapons appeared essentially to be solved. Furthermore, a solution to the question of the concept of chemical warfare agents had been formed, the Chairman said.

The issue of the declarations of chemical weapons had partly been subject to drafting, he went on. Consultations were being held on the declarations of locations of chemical weapon stockpiles. The problem of the destruction of chemical weapons had been elaborated upon, including the question of diversion as well as schedules for a balanced destruction of chemical weapons. The issue of production facilities, especially so-called single purpose facilities, had been treated in parts for the first time, he said.

Considerable work had been done on the issue of compliance. A first text concerning the preparatory commission to be entrusted with the task of preparing the work of the proposed Consultative Committee had been elaborated, and consultations had been held on that text, Mr. Ekeus concluded.

The chemical weapons committee's recommendations are, among other things, that:

* The preliminary structure of convention, complemented by preliminary draft texts, as stated in its report, be used for further negotiations and drafting of the convention;

* Reports of the Chairmen of the working groups on scope, elimination, and compliance, including proposed draft formulations, and other relevant present and future Conference documents, also be used in the further elaboration of the convention; and

* A resumed session of the Conference be held next year after the regular session, of long enough duration to ensure that the period between September 1985 and January 1986 would be more fully utilized for negotiations.

The committee is also to convene from 14 January to 1 February 1985, before the annual Conference, to deal with the issues of permitted activities and verification on challenge, including matters related to the Consultative Committee.

Nuclear Test Ban

The item on a comprehensive nuclear test ban was considered at plenary meetings and in informal meetings. As no consensus was reached on a mandate, the Conference was unable to establish a subsidiary body to consider the subject.

A large number of countries, including members of the Group of 21 and the group of socialist countries, felt the mandate of the former subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban, which concentrated on verification issues, fell far short of the expectations of the international community. The Conference, they said, must revise the mandate so as to empower the body to actually negotiate a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests and not merely to engage in a discussion of peripheral issues in the name of verification.

Other delegations, including the United States and the United Kingdom, said it did not make sense to revise the mandate, as the Conference had by no means completed its work under the former mandate. But, in a spirit of compromise, they were willing to broaden the mandate substantially in order to make progress towards the eventual objective of a complete cessation of nuclear explosions.

Mandates proposed by the Group of 21 (CD/492 and CD/520) and a group of socialist States (CD/522) in essence called for negotiations towards a comprehensive test ban. A group of nine Western States (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States) also proposed a mandate (CD/521) which called for resumption of the substantive examination of specific issues relating to a comprehensive test ban, including the issues of scope, verification and compliance, with a view to negotiating a treaty.

Most delegations considered that the cessation of the nuclear arms race required to participation of all nuclear-weapon States in negotiating a test ban.

The Group of 21 felt the nuclear-weapon States should cease regarding nuclear weapons as essential elements of their security at the expense of the security of everyone else, and begin the process of halting the nuclear arms race in its quantitative and qualitative aspects. To that end, all nuclear-weapon States should stop testing, producing and deploying nuclear weapons.

The group of socialist States favoured immediate and significant measures for the prevention of nuclear war, including a comprehensive test ban treaty, and believed that until a treaty was concluded, all nuclear-weapon States should proclaim a moratorium on all nuclear explosions.

This group rejected endeavours to engage the Conference in meaningless discussions on a nuclear test ban which could be turned into a smokescreen for the lack of political will on the part of some countries to stop nuclear testing. It was not an alleged verification problem that prevented progress towards a comprehensive test ban treaty, they stated. All possibilities existed today to sufficiently verify compliance with such a treaty. The nuclear-weapon States concerned should review their positions and affirm a clear commitment to treaty negotiations.

The Soviet Union stated it was ready to continue without further delay negotiations on a nuclear-weapon test ban. Should a subsidiary body of the Conference be provided with a negotiating mandate, it would consider the possibility of organizing an exchange of data on the radioactivity of air masses with the establishment of appropriate international data centres on the same basis as envisaged for the exchange of seismic data. It would elaborate on this proposal in negotiations within an appropriate Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament, it said.

Western delegations did not agree that problems of verifying and complying with a future test ban had been solved. They reaffirmed their commitment to a comprehensive test ban, and favoured re-establishing a subsidiary body to resume substantive examination of specific issues relating to such a ban, including scope, verification and compliance. The subsidiary body should examine the institutional and administrative arrangements needed to establish, test and operate an international seismic monitoring network as part of an effective verification system. The scope of a test ban treaty should be such as to ban all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time and should not be limited solely to nuclear weapons.

During the session, Australia tabled a working paper which incorporated principles for verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

Japan suggested that the Conference make an in-depth study of a "step-by-step formula" under which underground nuclear test explosions of a yield considered at present technically verifiable on a multinational basis would be taken as the threshold, and agreement would be reached on banning test explosions overstepping that threshold. Thereafter, the threshold would be lowered as verification capabilities improved.

Some members of the Group of 21 had serious apprehensions as to the idea of a separate threshold arrangement. The experience of the existing threshold test ban treaty was hardly encouraging, they felt, and threshold proposals and other "step-by-step approaches" tended to legitimize nuclear-weapon testing.

The United States said resolution of issues relating to verification and compliance was crucial if a test ban was eventually to be achieved. A comprehensive nuclear test ban was its ultimate objective, it stated. It was a question of timing, not principle. The United States was firmly committed to significant and verifiable arms reductions, expanded confidence-building measures and effective verification capabilities. But until it was persuaded that these policy objectives were not only being seriously addressed but well along the road to being satisfied, it was not prepared to agree to a mandate that provided for negotiations in a subsidiary body of the Conference.

The United Kingdom was disappointed at the failure to set up an Ad Hoc Committee on a test ban and re-called that it had the previous year supported the formation of a working group. Changing the mandate of such a body, however, would not help to find a solution to this basic problem, it stated.

China said that once the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals had taken the lead to halt the testing, improvement and production of nuclear weapons and substantially reduce their nuclear weapons, it would be prepared to take corresponding measures.

France said commitments in this field should be part of the process of nuclear disarmament; such commitments should first be taken by the two countries which possessed by far the most important nuclear arsenals and conducted by far the most tests.

Seismic events: During the year, the Conference also noted the progress report of the Add Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, covering its eighteenth session held at Geneva from 30 July to 10 August. Its next session, also in Geneva, is set for 25-29 March 1985.

The group plans to report on a technical test concerning the exchange and analysis of seismic Level I data, using the Global Telecommunications System of the World Meterological Organization (WMO), for the period 15 October to 14 December 1984. So far, 27 States are to provide data from more than 50 seismological stations on all continents. Four experimental international data centres--at Lima, Moscow, Stockholm and Washington, D.C.--will be used in the test.

Prevention of Nuclear War

Both the Group of 21 and a group of socialist States proposed mandates for an Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of Nuclear War, including All Related Matters. Although each of the groups indicated support for the proposals of the other, the proposals were opposed by the western group.

At the session's end, the Group of 21, supported by socialist States and China, proposed a mandate as a "lowest common denominator" of all views on the matter, which called for consideration of all proposals relevant to the item, including appropriate and practical measures for prevention of nuclear war. Because of lack of support from some Western nations, no consensus proved possible on that proposal.

The Group of 21, in a statement, noted that after discussing this question for two years, the Conference had been unable even to establish a subsidiary body to consider appropriate and practical measures for prevention of nuclear war. They wanted the General Assembly to take note of "this deplorable failure of the Conference" and to "devise other suitable steps to expedite effective action to remove the danger of nuclear war".

The Group of 21 felt a subsidiary body could seek agreement on a small number of short-term measures, including: an immediate freeze of the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States, to be followed and the United States, to be followed within five years, at most, by a freeze of nuclear arms of the three other nuclear-weapon States; the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use their nuclear weapons; and the merging into a single forum of the two series of negotiations, which the Soviet Union and the United States had been conducting, and broadening their scope so as to embrace also tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons. The Conference was an ideal forum for such negotiations, the Group of 21 stated.

Some countries felt that to associate the prevention of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons with the prevention of nuclear war was an attempt by the two major nuclear-weapon States and their allies, which relied on the possession of nuclear weapons as a pillar of their security, to divert attention from the actual threat of annihilation posed by existing nuclear weapons. Since the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970, nuclear weapons had multiplied several times weapons had multiplied several times over, whereas there had not been any increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States, it was noted.

A group of socialist countries said the overwhelming majority of States felt that the prevention of nuclear war was the number one global problem and should now take a central place in Conference work.

The group of socialist countries emphasized the urgency for all nuclear-weapon States to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, as the Soviet Union had done. Such undertakings by all nuclear-weapon States, incorporated in a convention, would be equivalent to the complete legal prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, these States felt.

The group again urged a general exclusion of the use of force from international relations. All nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances against non-nuclear States in whose territory there were no such weapons. The status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone already created should be respected, and the creation of other such zones in various parts of the world encouraged. Other appropriate measures would include those to: prevent accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; avoid the possibility of surprise attacks; prevent the spread of the nuclear arms race to other spheres, in particular outer space; and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form. States that had not yet done so should adhere to the NPT so that it might have universal application.

The present military-strategic parity, these States held, was a reliable guarantee of peace and should be preserved at ever decreasing levels of armaments reached through appropriate and far-reaching disarmament measures based on the principle of equality and equal security. It was not parity that fuelled the arms race, but the quest for superiority, they said.

Some nations felt the stated policy of nuclear-weapon States of not disclosing the whereabouts of the nuclear weapons they disseminated at will an land, sea and air was a major impediment to the effectiveness of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

A group of Western delegations, including the United States, United Kingdom and France, said the terms in which the item had been formulated clearly meant that the prevention of nuclear war could not be dealt with separately from the prevention of war itself, including conventional war. The maintenance of peace and security in the nuclear age required strict compliance by all States with their obligations under the United Nations Charter, in particular the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force, to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of States, and to settle all political disputes by peaceful means.

A declaration on the prohibition of use or first use limited to nuclear weapons would be unverifiable by its very nature and would fail to prevent armed conflict, these Western countries said. None of their weapons, nuclear or conventional, they said, would ever be used, except in response to armed attack. Their nuclear arsenals ahd a single function, the prevention of war and the preservation of peace and security through the strategy of deterrence. The elements of deterrence and defence, together with arms control and disarmament were integral to the maintenance of peace and security.

They pointed out that a balanced reduction of conventional forces in Europe to levels of parity would reduce the need to rely on nuclear deterrence to maintain peace and stability there. Deep reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union would also make a major contribution to decreasing the likelihood of nuclear war. A nuclear freeze would consolidate the present nuclear imbalance in Europe, perpetuate asymmetries in the strategic balance and reduce the incentive to undertake negotiations on balanced and verifiable reductions, they stated.

These Western countries regretted that the Soviet Union had unilaterally broken off the on-going bilateral negotiations on intermediate range and strategic nuclear weapons. They appealed to the Soviet Union to return to the negotiating table without preconditions, and categorically rejected the assertion that members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or any State of the group, were planning to initiate war or developing scenarios of a so-called first nuclear strike, or of limited nuclear war.

The Western delegations also rejected the accusation that they had obstructed the proceedings of the Conference and affirmed their readiness to continue consultations.

Regarding the bilateral nuclear negotiations, the group of socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, said the United States had gone beyond the point of raising preconditions and, by the deployment of new medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe, had created a fait accompli which made further negotiations impossible.

The full responsibility for the breakdown of the talks rested, in their view, with the United States. The basis for resuming the talks would be created only if the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles was stopped and measures leading to their withdrawal taken. They also rejected the assertion that there was a nuclear imbalance in Europe and on a global scale.

China was of the view that the fundamental way to prevent nuclear war lay in the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. Pending the realization of that goal, the non-use of nuclear weapons would be a measure conducive ive to reducing the danger of nuclear war. As far back as the early 1960s, China said, it had unilaterally declared that in no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons and it undertook not to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Many delegations held that conventional wars could not, under any circumstances, be equated with nuclear war, since nuclear weapons were instruments of mass destruction that would threaten the survival of belligerents and non-belligerents alike.

Cessation of Nuclear

Arms Race and

Nuclear Disarmament

No consensus was reached regarding the establishment of a subsidiary group to consider the separate item on "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". A group of socialist countries and the Group of 21 had submitted proposals, but a group of Western countries were not convinced such a committee was needed.

The socialist draft mandate (CD/523) called for an Ad Hoc Committee to begin elaborating practical measures aimed at the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament, in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (1978), including a nuclear disarmament programme.

The Group of 21 proposal (CD/526) called for similar measures and submission of recommendations to the Conference as to how it could best initiate in 1985 multilateral negotiations or agreements, with adequate measures of verification, in appropriate stages for: (a) cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems; (b) cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and (c) substantial reduction in the existing nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination.

The Group of 21 deplored that it was not possible to establish an ad hoc committee to initiate multilateral negotiations because of the persistent opposition of certain nuclear-weapon States and their allies, which based their security policy on the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons and continued the nuclear arms race to ever-rising levels of qualitative and quantitative enhancement of the nuclear over-kill capacity.

Western States, including the United States, the United Kingdom and France, rejected this characterization of their security policies, which were, they said, solely defensive and had contributed to preserving peace and security for almost 40 years.

Many countries rejected the assertion that deterrence had prevented a nuclear war and that, therefore, deterrence had worked. They noted that history indicated that once a particular type of weapon had been developed, it would be used, as had already been the case with nuclear weapons.

The Group of 21 said that multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament were long overdue. Bilateral negotiations, because of their limited scope and the number of parties involved, could never replace the genuinely multilateral search for nuclear disarmament measures.

The group of socialist States reiterated their proposal for negotiations on the prohibiting of nuclear neutron weapons.

Many nations felt the effective cessation of the nuclear-arms race required all nuclear-weapon States to take part in multilateral negotiations. The disparity that might exist between the nuclear arsenal of the two major nuclear-weapon States, on the one hand, and the nuclear arsenals of other nuclear-weapon States on the other, was a matter that should be dealt with in the process of multilateral negotiations. But that could not constitute an obstacle to a process to eliminate the fundamental disparity existing between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

Arms Race in Outer Space

Both the Group of 21 and a group of socialist countries proposed mandates for an ad hoc committee to undertake negotiations aimed at an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space. The socialist proposal recalled the Soviet draft convention submitted to the 1983 Assembly on the prohibition of the the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth.

A group of Western countries--Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States--had submitted earlier a proposal under which the Conference would establish an ad hoc committee "to identify, in the first instance, through substantive examination, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space".

No consensus was reached on the proposals tabled by the Group of 21 and a group of socialist countries. The Conference's annual report states that in view of the absence of such a consensus, no progress was achieved during 1984 on the subject.

The Group of 21 wanted a mandate to spell out the ultimate objective of reaching an agreement, or agreements, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space, as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 38/70. They expressed serious concern about the perils posed by extending the arms race into outer space, in particular an increased danger of nuclear war. Some States felt that an agreement, or agreements, should cover the banning of the development, testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapons on earth, in the atmosphere and in outer space, as well as the destruction of existing anti-satellite weapons systems.

Members of the group of socialist countries emphasized that the Soviet draft treaty on non-use of force in space provided for a ban on testing and deployment in outer space of any space-based weapons to be used against targets located on the earth's surface, in the atmosphere and in outer space, as well as for a radical solution to the anti-satellite weapons issue. They recalled that the Soviet Union had in 1983 undertaken a unilateral obligation to refrain from launching any kind of anti-satellite weapon into outer space as long as other States, including the United States, also refrained from similar actions. Members of the group also emphasized the danger in the plan of elaborating a "large-scale and highly efficient anti-ballistic missile defence".

China held that the primary task now should be the banning of all space weapons, including anti-satellite weapons, which impaired the stability of outer space. That should include a ban on developing, testing, producing, deploying and using such weapons, and the destruction of existing space weapon systems.

A number of Western delegations, including the United States, the United Kingdom and France, reaffirmed the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space. In order to define possible areas of negotiations, they said, the Conference must first have a clear and shared idea of the issues involved in preventing an arms race in outer space. An analysis of relevant international agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, should constitute the starting point in considering the subject. Issues relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space should be identified, to locate loopholes or gaps in existing legal instruments and to determine needed remedial measures.

Many countries were concerned about plans to develop entirely new types of weapons systems in outer space in the name of defensive weapons. Those delegations warned of the grave implications of developing such weapons and emphasized the urgent need to act before it was too late.

During the session, France proposed: (1) the strict limitation of anti-satellite systems, including in particular the prohibition of all such systems capable of hitting satellites in high orbit, the protection of which is the most important from the point of view of strategic balance; (2) the prohibition, for a renewable period of five years, of the deployment on the ground, in the atmosphere or in space of beam-weapon systems capable of destroying ballistic missiles or satellites at great distances and, as the corollary to this, the banning of the corresponding tests; (3) the strengthening of the present system of declaration as established by the Convention of 14 June 1975 on the registration of space objects, with each State or launching agency undertaking to provide more detailed information on the specifications and purposes of objects launched so as to improve the possibility of verification; and (4) a pledge by the United States and the Soviet Union to extend to the satellites of third countries the provisions concerning the immunity of certain space objects on which they have reached bilateral agreement between themselves.

Security Assurances

The Conference this year again created an ad hoc body to consider and negotiate on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In its conclusions and recommendations, the Ad Hoc Committee reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending effective measures on nuclear disarmament.

Work on the substance of the effective arrangements and discussion on various aspects and elements of an interim solution, however, revealed that specific difficulties relating to differing perceptions of security interests of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States persisted, it was stated. The complex nature of the issues involved continued to prevent agreement.

Against this background, the Ad Hoc Committee recommended the Conference continue to explore ways and means to overcome the difficulties encountered in its work and to carry out negotiations on the question of such arrangements. It was also generally agreed that the Ad Hoc Committee should be re-established in 1985, on the understanding that consultations take place to determine the most appropriate course of action, including the resumption of the activities of the Ad Hoc Committee itself.

In the debate, many nations stated that so long as nuclear weapons existed and could be used, there would be no security for anyone. They felt that nuclear disarmament constituted the most effective security assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Other countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom and France, said that, while nuclear disarmament was undoubtedly of the greatest importance, vital significance was attached to the unconditional adherence by all States to the commitment contained in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter to refrain from the threat or use of force except in the exercise of their inalienable right to individual or collective self-defence. In that context, they reaffirmed their position that none of their weapons, nuclear or conventional, would ever be used except in response to armed attack.

A number of delegations generally regretted the fact that there had been no forward movement in the negotiations on the question since last year and they reiterated the Group of 21's view that further negotiations in the Committee were unlikely to be fruitful so long as nuclear-weapon States did not exhibit a genuine political will to reach a satisfactory agreement. They were of the view that nuclear-weapon States were under the obligation to guarantee in clear and categorical terms that non-nuclear-weapon States would not be subjected to attacks or threats of attacks with nuclear weapons.

China reiterated its unconditional guarantee not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-free zones. The Soviet Union stressed the importance of its unilateral obligation never to use nuclear weapons against those States which renounced the production and acquisition of such weapons and did not have them on their territory.

Some States stressed the urgency of reaching agreement on a "common formula" which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. There was no objection in principle to the idea of an international convention; however, the difficulties encountered were also pointed out. Some nations suggested that pending agreement on those matters, elements of interim arrangements should be explored. In that regard different aspects as to the form and substance of such arrangements were analysed.

Radiological Weapons

The Conference on Disarmament on 17 April established an ad hoc committee on radiological weapons "with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons".

It also agreed that in the 1984 session it would continue substantive examination of questions relating to the "traditional" radiological weapons subject-matter and questions relating to the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, without setting up two subsidiary bodies to deal with those questions or prejudging the relationship between them.

Many delegations favoured the approach proposed in Sweden's draft provisions of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons and the release or dissemination of radioactive material for hostile purposes (CD/530) as the best negotiating framework to make progress on all major aspects of the issue. Other States, however, were convinced that proposals aimed at resolving the question of prohibiting attacks against nuclear facilities in the context of banning radiological weapons could only result in a failure to make progress on either of them.

In its conclusions and recommendations, the Ad Hoc Committee stated it was generally recognized that the discussion held during the session contributed to a better understanding of the issues involved as well as to a further search for their solution. It recommended that the Conference re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons at the beginning of 1985.

New Types of Weapons

of Mass Destruction

The Conference also considered the question of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction.

A group of socialist countries, recalling their earlier proposals, had suggested in document CD/434 that the subsidiary body have a mandate to draft a comprehensive agreement prohibiting development and manufacture of new type of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and also to draft possible agreements prohibiting particular types of such weapons. As a first step towards preventing the emergence of such weapons, they said, the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States should make declarations pledging not to develop any such weapons; those declarations should then be endorsed by the Security Council.

Other nations felt it would be more appropriate to negotiate agreements to ban potential new weapons of mass destruction only on a case-by-case basis as such weapons might be identified. They pointed out that no such weapon had been identified so far. A general prohibitory agreement would not permit the definition and implementation of appropriate verification measures. They said the practice followed followed in recent years--periodic informal meetings with the participation of experts--would allow the Conference to identify any cases which might require particular consideration and which would justify specific negotiations.

A view was expressed that, pending the conclusion of a general agreement prohibiting the development and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction, the more powerfully armed States should adopt unilateral measures to prevent the use of scientific and technical discoveries for military purposes. Scientists would have an important role to play, and they should be associated in an appropriate manner with the work of the Conference on that subject.

Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

The Conference re-established this year its ad hoc subsidiary body on a comprehensive programme of disarmament with the task of renewing, "as soon as the circumstances are propitious", its work on the programme with a view to submitting it to the General Assembly not later than 1986.

The ad Hoc Committee reported that present circumstances were not conducive to making progress towards resolving outstanding issues and that it would not be fruitful to pursue the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament at the 1984 session.