Conference on Disarmament: no tangible progress reported on chemical, nuclear test bans.

In spite of intensive negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament concluded its two-part 1988 session (Geneva, 2 February-29 April, 7 July-20 September) without reporting tangible progress on major disarmament issues, including such toppriority issues as a chemical weapons ban and a nucleartest ban.

The 40-member body includes the five nuclear-weapon StatesChina, France, USSR, United Kingdom and United States-other militarily significant States, as well as some neutral and non-aligned countries, known as the "Group of 21".

Ali Shams Ardakani of Iran, Conference President for September, at the conclusion of the session, said the ideals of disarmament raised hopes for humanity. The Conference, as the sole international forum for multilateral disarmament negotiations, should be empowered to finalize expeditiously a comprehensive chemical weapons convention, he said.

During 1988, the Conference reestablished five ad hoc committees to continue work on banning chemical and radiological weapons, preventing an arms race in outer space, a comprehensive programme of disarmament, and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These bodies work towards reaching consensus on elaborating new instruments in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

Within the framework of its permanent 10-item agenda, it also considered items related to a nuclear-test ban; cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament; and prevention of nuclear wan No consensus was reached on proposals to establish subsidiary bodies on those three agenda items.

The Conference reaffirmed its decisionto increase its membership by not more than four States, but no agreement has yet been reached on which four States would become members. During the session many high-ranking diplomats addressed the Conference.

Chemical weapons

Negotiations continued to ban chemical weapons through a multilateral convention calling for prohibition of development, production and stockpiling of such weapons and for their destruction.

Bogumil Sujka of Poland, Ad Hoc Committee Chairman, reported progress on certain definitions and criteria, for example, agreement on the term "chemical weapons production facility". Some guidelines on the international inspectorate were agreed upon.

Among proposals presented in 1988 was a joint paper from the USSR and the United States on the definition of a chemical weapons production facility, which was a result of their bilateral consultations. A Soviet proposal on the systematic international verification of the non-production of chemical weapons at a test facility was welcomed by several countries, including the United States. The Federal Republic of Germany made proposals on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and on verification of their non-production. Finland, Norway and Canada made suggestions regarding verification.

Austria said it would provide headquarters for a verification organization to be established under the chemical weapons convention.

The Ad Hoc Committee is to meet again in January 1989.

Amendment to partial test ban

The Conference on 5 August was informed of an amendment proposal to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, aimed at converting that instrument into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. It was submitted by Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia. The General Assembly in its resolution 42/26 B had recommended that nonnuclear-weapon States parties to the 1963 Treaty submit such a proposal to the depository Governments-the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States-with a view to convening a conference at the earliest possible date to consider Treaty amendments.

The date-5 August 1988-was chosen for the initiative because it marked the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty.

The USSR supported in principle the proposal. It was taking steps to set in motion the machinery under Article II of the 1963 Treaty, which calls on a depository State to circulate copies of an amendment proposal to all the parties and make arrangements to convene the conference as soon as one-third of the parties so request.

The United States said that although it did not favour amending what had been a very effective treaty in the absence of conditions which must precede a comprehensive test ban, it would carry out its legal responsibilities as a depository Government of the Treaty. It was also taking steps to ensure prompt circulation of the proposed amendment to all parties.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, set up in 1976 to facilitate verification of a comprehensive test ban, continued to prepare a report on an updated design of a modern international seismic data exchange system based on exchange of waveform (Level 11) and parameter (Level 1) and the processing of such data at the four experimental international centres in Canberra, Moscow, Stockholm and Washington. The Group also began start-up tests in preparation for a large-scale test of the elements of such a system in 1990.

ICBM agreement

In July, the USSR and the United States reported to the Conference on their agreement on notifications of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, signed in Moscow on 31 May.

The USSR on 30 August informed the Conference about the destruction of the first SS-20 missiles under the Soviet/United States INF Treaty, which members of the Conference had been able to observe at the invitation of the Soviet Union. Forty-seven States had witnessed the event, including 32 members and 15 countries invited by the Conference.

Outer space

The Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in 1988 reported that after discussions, there was a better understanding and clearer perception of various positions.

Venezuela on 4 August proposed an amendment to the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Under the proposal, States parties to the Treaty would undertake not to develop, produce, store or use space weapons. They would also undertake not to place in orbit around Earth any objects carrying space weapons, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner

Comprehensive programme

The Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament concentrated on various outstanding issues, with some progress made towards narrowing areas of disagreement.

The Committee agreed that it should resume work in 1989 with the "firm intention" of completing the Programme in 1989.

Radiological weapons

The Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons continued work towards a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. It reestablished two contact groups: one considered "traditional" issues, the other prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. Their reports will be used as a basis for future work on the treaty.

Security assurances

An ad hoc committee continued negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Discussions revealed that specific difficulties relating to differing perceptions of security interests of nuclear-weapon States and nonnuclear-weapon States persisted and that the complex nature of the issues involved continued to prevent agreement on "common formula" which could be included in an international legally binding instrument. There was, however, wide support for continuing the search for a common approach on the substance of negative security assurances and, in particular, on such "common formula?'. The Committee discussed inconclusively the Nigerian suggestions (1) that non-nuclearweapon States be assured taking into account the diversity of their military situations and (2) that the nuclear-weapon States put aside their unilateral assurances and facilitate negotiations on an international convention.