Conclusion: implications for the psychology of religion.

As we look back over the articles, comments, and replies of this special issue, we are struck by two themes that appear to garner the most agreement among the various authors and involve the most important implications for the psychology of religion. The first theme is the need to respect the unique worldviews of today's religions and treat them as equal partners in dialogue. Too often, we believe, the naturalism and scientism of psychology are viewed as neutral discourses and given a higher status. The second theme follows from the first-the need for a pluralism of methods to help level the research playing field and formalize the respect of religious worldviews. Some pluralism is already occurring with the advent of qualitative methods, but we envision an even broader pluralism that is open to theism. Space limitations allow only a brief description of each theme here.

Respecting a Religious Worldview

We should clarify at the outset that we believe that few, if any, researchers intend to disrespect a religious worldview. Although some border on this in our view, depicting religious worldviews as "folk beliefs" and "counterintuitive ideas" (Boyer, 2001; Churchland, 1995), we believe the most problematic issues are the more subtle, method-related issues. For many cultural and historical reasons, psychological practices have long been centered on methods (Nelson, this issue; Reber, this issue). Research questions are framed in ways that the method can handle; theoretical constructs are measured in ways that the method can use; and results are interpreted in ways that are "close" to the method-generated data.

This method-centeredness would not be a problem if the methods were themselves devoid of values and assumptions. Without values, this centering would exert no particular bias and permit no taint of the ultimate outcome of empirical studies or research programs (Reber, this issue). However, this common understanding of psychological methods is a myth (Slife, this issue). The traditional methods of psychology do have assumptions and values that influence how research questions are posed, constructs are measured, and data are interpreted.

More importantly for this special journal issue, these assumptions and values are not the assumptions and values of most world religions. The articles of this special issue make clear that the assumptions and values of psychological science include a slew of "isms"--materialism, reductionism, objectivism, scientism, positivism, and determinism. These assumptions are often wrapped together in the term "naturalism" (e.g., Griffin, 2000), but they point to radically different understandings of the world from most religions. Psychologists who study religious claims and experiences with naturalistic methods could overlook these differences or assume the superiority of a "scientific understanding" and impose a naturalistic rendering on both the research process and outcome.

The authors of the first four articles focus primarily on theistic religions in this regard, such as Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. However, the assumptions and values of psychological science are problematic for a host of nontheistic religions. For instance, the reductive materialism implicit or explicit in much of psychology (Nelson, this issue; Slife, this issue) marginalizes or explains away the type of consciousness needed for many schools of Hinduism, such as Sankhya and Ayurveda, where the Brahma underlies the generation of matter. Consider also traditional Buddhist Abhidhamma philosophy where the importance of consciousness is emphasized over the obvious material world. In all these situations, philosophical positions are adopted in modern psychology that foreclose the possibility of real dialogue by denying assumptions that are fundamental to religious points of view.

Perhaps the primary implication, in this sense, is that researchers should allow themselves to consider other research questions, construct measurements, and data interpretations than those associated with naturalism. For example, no interpretation of research results is dictated per se by the data. The data, as many philosophers of science put it (Curd & Cover, 1998), are "underdetermined," allowing for several differing interpretations of any data set. If this is true, then there may be many instances in which an interpretation can be consonant not only with the data but also with the tradition and world-view of the religion or religions being studied. One of the vital lessons of this special issue is that the absence of religious rhetoric does not make the interpretation neutral, nor does it make it more descriptive. The absence of religious rhetoric is another rhetoric, not a non-rhetoric.

We have space for only two brief examples of this religious interpretation. First, much of the "image of God" research focuses on how our experiences with significant authority figures (e.g., our fathers) form our image of God (cf. Dayringer & Oler, 2005). Although we agree that such factors are influential, any recognition of the real and current presence of God in our lives means that our divine images do not originate solely from earthly authority figures. The presence of God can itself be influential, a perspective which is excluded even in some religiously sensitive treatments of the subject (e.g., Rizzuto, 1981).

Consider as a second example the research on the relationship between religion and health. Here researchers often work to explain the effects of religious participation or spiritual practices with mechanisms that can be explained in social psychological or neurobiological terms, extracted from their context and duplicated in a secular framework (e.g. Kabat-Zinn, Lipworth & Burney, 1985; Dennett, 2006). While much is gained by this research, ultimately an active, sovereign God cannot be treated in this instrumental fashion without obscuring the very thing we are trying to understand (Shuman & Meador, 2003). Both examples illustrate how interpretations of relevant psychological data can be more sensitive to the traditions and worldviews of religion.

Methodological Pluralism

One important way to formalize our respect of non-naturalistic traditions is to allow for a pluralism of methods. Pluralism does not mean relativism here, where anything goes and nothing is justified. It means that one philosophy of science is not allowed to monopolize the discipline (Slife, Wiggins, & Graham, 2005). Other ways of knowing, and thus methods, are not only permitted but encouraged and developed, depending upon the questions being asked and the realm or topic being studied. In this sense, the scientific method, as it is understood traditionally, is really a scientific method--one among many possible methods and ways of knowing. Method is no longer considered to be universal to all applications, especially to worldviews that are opposed to it on many dimensions.

This need for a pluralism of methodologies goes against the call of scholars such as Lee Kirkpatrick (2005, pp. 8-11) who argue that we need a single comprehensive paradigm for the psychology of religion. We believe that such as mono-paradigmatic approach would stifle dialogue and inhibit rather than facilitate the search for truth. One need only consider the dominance of the behavioral paradigm in psychology during the first half of the twentieth century to understand the power of a single approach to close off important areas of knowledge and approaches to a topic.

On the other hand, pluralism is a type of pragmatism (James, 1909/2005). We could take a lesson from the pragmatism of good carpenters, where the job dictates the tools used. In other words, we should attempt to have investigative questions drive what methods we choose, rather than our methods drive what questions we ask (and how we operationalize and interpret our findings). In a very pragmatic sense, a hammer was formulated into a "shape" that fits certain practices well and other practices poorly. And surely not everything is a nail, or can be operationalized as a nail. Similarly, we believe that religious experiences and religious claims should not be forced to fit the epistemology of a naturalistic method.

It is true that hammers can pound screws, but hammered screws frequently lose their function. Analogously, naturalistic methods can investigate aspects of religious topics, but we should be sensitive to when they distort and impoverish religious meanings and look to alternative methods in their stead. When the investigative question requires counting, we should not hesitate to use the methods that were specifically formulated for this task--quantitative methods. However, when research questions turn to meanings, representing such meanings with numbers is surely an impoverished approach. We should use the methods that were specifically formulated to understand and discern meanings--qualitative and interpretive methods.

Even when qualitative methods are used, researchers sometimes focus on the differing procedures of these methods, not on their differing philosophies. A true methodological pluralism is also a pluralism of the philosophies underlying the different methods. Still, such a pluralism begs the question as to how the various methods, with their different guiding philosophies, can be organized and made coherent. Without some coherence, there is little to prevent a pluralism from devolving into a free-for-all relativism.

Here, we admit that there is much to be worked out. Still, we believe that the hermeneutics of Gadamer (1995) and Taylor (1989) has the potential to bring a reasonable degree of coherence to this pluralism, allowing both quantitative and qualitative methods to play important roles (Richardson, this issue). This coherence is the kind of coherence and concord that can emerge from a successful conversation, one that can yield greater understanding and agreement but does not efface individual differences and, partly for that reason, is never finished.

A hermeneutic ontology portrays human beings as "self-interpreting beings," the fundamental pulse beat of whose lives is a kind of mutually shaping, co-constituting interplay between I and Thou, individual and wider society, and present and past. This interplay is the ground of our being, something Gadamer (1995) terms "effective history." As participants in this process, we have more responsibilities, less direct control or mastery over the course of events, and a greater sense of meaningfulness than modern ideologies of expressive individualism and personal authenticity--the kind that seem to suffuse the psychology enterprise (Richardson, this issue).

From there, it seems to us to be just a short step or two to a Biblical worldview. Of course, not everyone takes those steps. But many, secular or religious, might agree that the hermeneutic view, in Willard's (this issue) words, articulates a powerful "understanding of knowledge itself that captures actual knowledge practice in human life as well as in the sciences." If so, it is in a strong position to help us transcend the hubris of modern psychologies and foster a fruitful dialogue between psychology and religion.

REFERENCES

Boyer, P. (2001). Religion explained: The evolutionary origins of religious thought. New York: Basic.

Churchland, P. (1995). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. In P. Moser and J. Trout (Eds.), Contemporary materialism: A reader (pp. 150-179). London: Routledge.

Curd, M., & Cover, J. A. (1998). Philosophy of science: The central issues. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Dayringer, R., & Oler, D. (2005). The image of God and the psychology of religion. Binghamton, NY: Hayworth Press.

Dennett, D. C. (2006). Breaking the spell: Religion as a natural phenomenon. New York: Viking.

Gadamer, H. G. (1995). Truth and method. (J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshall, Trans.) (Rev. ed.). New York: Continuum. (Original work published 1960).

Griffin, D.R. (2000). Religion and scientific naturalism: Overcoming the conflicts. Albany: SUNY Press.

James, W. (1909/2005). A pluralistic universe. Glacier National Park, MT: Kessinger Publishing.

Kabat-Zinn, J. Lipworth, L. & Burney, R. (1985). The clinical use of mindfulness meditation for the self-regulation of chronic pain. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 8, 285-294.

Kirkpatrick, L. A. (2005). Attachment, evolution, and the psychology of religion. New York: Guilford.

Rizzuto, A. (1981). The Birth of the Living God: A psychoanalytical Study. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Shuman, J.J. & Meador, K. G. (2003). Heal thyself: Spirituality, medicine and the distortion of Christianity. New York: Oxford.

Slife, B. D., Wiggins, B. J., & Graham, J. T. (2005). Avoiding an EST monopoly: Toward a pluralism of methods and philosophies. Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy, 35, 83-97.

Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

AUTHORS

SLIFE, BRENT D. Address: 1072 SWKT, Department of Psychology, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah 84062. Title: Professor of Psychology. Degrees: BA, William Jewell College. MS, PhD, Purdue University. Specializations: Philosophical underpinnings of psychotherapy, philosophy of social science, religion/science interface, marriage and family therapy.

NELSON, JAMES M. Address: Department of Psychology, Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, IN 46383. Title: Associate Professor of Psychology, Director of Graduate Psychology and Counseling Programs. Degrees: BA, Eastern Washington University; MDiv., Fuller Theological Seminary; MS., PhD, Washington State University. Specializations: Psychology and religion; theoretical and philosophical issues in psychology; cross-cultural psychology, especially with East Asia; qualitative methods.

BRENT D. SLIFE

Brigham Young University 

JAMES M. NELSON

Valparaiso University

Correspondence concerning this article may be sent to Brent D. Slife, PhD, 1072 SWKT, Department of Psychology, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84062. Email: [e-mail].