Compulsory military training (CMT) in Australia prior to the first world war.

Compulsory military training (CMT) was made law by the Defence Acts of 1909 and 1910 and took effect on 1 July 1911. It was the end result of continuous debate regarding the national defence of Australia. With the exception of a few, most notably W.M. Hughes, defence matters were largely viewed with apathy until external developments awakened the pressing need for reorganisation and strengthening. Hughes played a critical role in creating and developing the arguments for CMT from federation until its implementation. Although invasion had been credited as a possibility from the outset, the Japanese victory of 1905 and German naval expansion emphasised the immediate need for a more effective system of defence. This need was driven home by the continuous pressure of the National Defence League, established with the objective of implementing CMT. The association of influential Labor men with the league directly impacted on the eventual implementation of CMT.

In 1901, Australia was aware of increasing activity throughout Asia and the Pacific, yet a sense of security prevailed. (1) The French were a significant force in the Pacific, having colonised Tahiti, New Caledonia and Rapa along with numerous other island groups. The US had taken control of the Philippines and Guam in addition to the official annexation of Hawaii in 1898. Russia viewed Korea and Manchuria as within its sphere of influence as a result of the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway and search for a warm water port in the Pacific. (2) German expansion involved the acquisition of the north coast of New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Caroline, Palau and Mariana Islands.

The situation in China posed two different threats. Firstly, having displayed a tendency to immigrate to Australia during the gold rush, the Chinese were regarded as potential invaders. Secondly, the extension of European influence in China through the construction of railways signified the coming of more European and Russian ships to the East. (3)

The most prominent activity regarding security concern was the rise of Japan as a modernised and powerful nation. Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese war had demonstrated their naval and military ability. The sudden realisation of Japanese modernisation resulted in extensive prophecies regarding future Japanese aims. (4) 'A peaceful isolated people had suddenly become a military menace.' (5) Although Australians were aware of increasing activity and had identified numerous threats, other than alarmists, very few felt that there was any pressing need to reorganise and strengthen military forces. This was highlighted by the decrease in the colonial defence budgets before federation and the nature of the first federal defence debates. (6) These external developments were not extreme enough to awaken a need for reform, as was the case in 1905.

As early as 1903, W.M. Hughes proposed in parliament that CMT should become law. The justifications behind such a scheme were developed and extended and finally accepted by the Deakin government and the Labor party conference of 1908. (7) In the debate surrounding the first defence bill, Hughes outlined two main arguments for the necessity of CMT. Firstly, he claimed that it was necessary for the 'preservation of freedom'. (8) With an appreciation of increasing international involvement in the East, he believed that Australia was vulnerable. Secondly and more seriously, he argued that it would quell any possibility of an internal threat posed by a standing army. Earlier experiences of militarism in Australia had supplied Hughes with this argument for compulsory service. (9) The military was used against the people at the Eureka stockade in 1854 and again at Lambing flat at the time of the anti-Chinese riots. It was also used against the workers in the strike struggles in the 'eighties and 'nineties. CMT, he argued, was a necessary step in creating a democratic army that could not be used in industrial disputes. (10) In 1901, these two arguments formed the basis of Hughes reasoning for CMT.

In the debate regarding the defence bill of 1903, Hughes developed and extended his arguments. He re-emphasised the importance of developing a citizen army to avoid any internal threats that a standing army may pose. By training every fit male, the citizens would be able to protect their freedom without the professional corps. (11) He also stressed the importance of an effective military force and outlined how ineffective a compulsory call up of inexperienced men would be in time of war in the absence of any prior military training. In addition, he raised the potential social benefits that CMT would provide including the 'physical, mental and moral welfare ...' of the growing generation. (12) Military training would improve their physical strength and discipline would inculcate them with good habits for the duties of citizenship. In addition, he argued that it would help undo the destructiveness of city life while promoting fellowship through the comradeship of training and hence prevent men from moving to cities. The arguments that Hughes made in both 1901 and 1903 formed the basis of the drive for a system of CMT.

The debate regarding compulsory military service took a new direction in 1905. The Japanese defeat of Russia at the Battle of Tsushima facilitated the organisation of the pressure group, the National Defence League. (13) The Japanese had virtually destroyed the Baltic fleet on route to Vladivostok, judged by the British admiralty as equivalent to Trafalgar. (14) Japan emerged from the war as a first rate naval power. Returning to power shortly after the war, Deakin displayed an increased interest in defence. He was the first to outline the significance of the Japanese victory. Japanese naval stations were the most efficiently equipped, supported, protected and nearest to Australia. (15) In addition, Colonel J.G. Legge reported that just 4361 "naval miles" from Yokohama, the Japanese navy could reach Australia in 14.5 days. (16) Tsushima caused an increase in Australian public concern for defence matters.

The National Defence League (NSW Division), established in September 1905, played an important role in arousing interest in defence matters in both politicians and the public. Hughes was appointed the position of honorary secretary. Its objectives were to secure 'Universal compulsory military training (military or naval) of the boyhood and manhood of Australia for the purposes of national defence ...' (17). The military training was to be based on the Swiss system and the naval training to be based on that of the British Royal Naval Reserve. The league also stated the objective of securing 'An adequate and effective system of national defence.' (18) The League outlined two main justifications for the necessity of CMT. Firstly the need for increased defence capacity and secondly, the societal benefits that the physical and character development of Australian youths would provide. (19) The founder of the league, G.R. Campbell stated that the urgent development of Australian military forces was necessary for the purpose of providing a large striking force ready for immediate action ...' (20). In his eyes, the task of the League was more than simply the creation of a reserve. The creation of an organised pressure group with the central objective of securing CMT was an important step for the drive started by Hughes in 1903.

The League was a persistent pressure group that was influential in turning the tide in favour of CMT. The official organ of the league was a quarterly publication, The Call. The Call was widely dispersed for free to all members of parliament, mayors, landowners and principal ministers of religion. (21) Dedicated to the promotion of CMT, each cover stated the journal's purpose: 'To awaken Australians to realise that the defence of our country is the duty of all.' (22) It contained many unsubtle and influential cartoons by Normal Lindsay that were perhaps more influential than the text itself. (23) The call was a quality magazine that consistently produced propaganda and illustrated every argument in support of CMT.

The inclusion of influential Labor men in the composition of the National Defence League was of key importance. It was central in the conversion of the Labor party to CMT as party policy in 1908. Labor politicians such as A.H. Griffith, Dr W. Maloney, J.C. Watson, W.M. Hughes and H. Dobson among others associated with the league helped convert the Labor party towards adopting the scheme of compulsory training. Watson, leader of Labor in the federal parliament from 1901 to 1907 joined the league in August 1905. By 1907 Watson stated that he would ascertain the public's opinion on CMT in the hope to find a large proportion in favour. (24) It was Watson who took the decisive step at the Labor conference of 1908. He moved a successful resolution for the compulsory training of all males for national defence in light of the potential threats of Japan and China. In addition, he justified it on the grounds that a 'citizen force was the antithesis of militarism.' (25) The motion was voted in favour 24 to 7.

The vulnerability of Australia to invasion was highlighted by the visit of the US Navy and the 'dreadnought crisis' in Europe. The American fleet visited in 1908 and left Australians 'awed by the power of modern navies and even more alarmed by their own exposure to attack.' (26) If a Navy with the strength of the US fleet arrived, the Royal Navy operating in the Pacific and Sydney's defences were completely inadequate to protect anything. (27) Deakin's invitation to the Americans served its purpose. It added fuel to a powerful argument regarding the necessity of increased defence. A similar visit by a British fleet would have simply inspired 'confidence and inaction.' (28)

The 'Dreadnought crisis' had a similar effect in highlighting the vulnerability of Australian defence. An alarmed British public feared German aims to contest 'naval mastery' with the Royal Navy demonstrated by the German Dreadnought-building program. (29) The possibility of the Royal Navy losing its pre-eminence to the German Navy as a direct result of their Dreadnought building program created deep concern in Australia. The concentration of the Royal Navy in the North Sea would detract from British commitments to the Pacific. Apprehension grew with the realisation that British interests in the Pacific may be left open to attack. (30) The 'Dreadnought crisis' highlighted the need for an Australian Navy, as the Royal Navy would not always be adequate and reliable. This also outlined the necessity for CMT as a means of developing effective land forces. It was estimated in 1908 that it would take 50 years to develop an effective naval force yet only 20 years to develop effective land forces. In addition, effective ground forces would be necessary to back naval defence. (31) The visit of the 'Great White Fleet' and the 'Dreadnought crisis' in Britain exposed the vulnerabilities of Australian defence. The drive for CMT as an integral part of defence received greater attention.

Following the unsuccessful attempts of the Deakin and Fisher governments, the bill for CMT pushed by the Deakin-Cook government became law in December 1909. In conclusion, the successful implementation of CMT can be credited to a combination of continuous campaigning by Hughes and the National Defence League coupled with the awakening of the inadequacy of Australian defences highlighted by external developments. Hughes was responsible for the creation and development of the foundational justifications behind CMT. He continued his cause with stubborn persistence and there was rarely an argument for the case of CMT that Hughes had not created. From 1905 onwards, the National Defence League and external developments worked simultaneously to develop a public awareness of Australian vulnerability and the necessity of strengthening defences. This led to the adoption of CMT by the Labor party in 1908. CMT was designed to play a crucial role in the strengthening of defences by developing an Australian youth that could quickly and easily be developed into an effective fighting force if circumstances required.

(1) T. Tanner, Compulsory Citizen Soldiers (Waterloo: 1980) p.54.

(2) Ibid, p.53.

(3) Ibid, p.53.

(4) I. Cumpston, Australia's Defence Policy: 1901-2000, Volume One (Canberra, 2001) p.19.

(5) Ibid, p.20.

(6) Tanner, Compulsory Citizen Soldier, p.54.

(7) J. Rawling, Conscription in Australia: speakers' notes (Sydney, 1936) p.7.

(8) Tanner, Compulsory Citizen Soldier, p.58.

(9) Rawling, Conscription in Australia, p.3.

(10) Ibid.

(11) Tanner, Compulsory Citizen Soldier, p.58.

(12) Ibid, p.60.

(13) Ibid, p.78.

(14) Ibid, p.71.

(15) I. Cumpston, Australia's Defence Policy, p.21.

(16) Ibid, p.22.

(17) Rawling, Conscription in Australia, p.6.

(18) Ibid.

(19) Tanner, Compulsory Citizen Soldier, p.74.

(20) J. Barrett, Falling In: Australians and 'boy conscription' 1911-1915 (Sydney, 1979) p.47.

(21) Ibid, p.48.

(22) Tanner, Compulsory Citizen Soldier, p.86.

(23) Ibid, p.88.

(24) J. Barrett, Falling In, p.52.

(25) Ibid, p.52.

(26) Ibid, p.10.

(27) Tanner, Compulsory Citizen Soldier, p.129.

(28) Ibid, p.129.

(29) J. Grey, A Military History of Australia (Melbourne, 1999) p.72.

(30) I. Cumpston, Australia's Defence Policy, p.13.

(31) J. Barrett, Falling In, p.12.