Completion of inspections urged.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was called upon by the Security Council on 31 March to allow the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to complete the inspection activities agreed to by the Agency and the People's Republic on 15 February.

That would be a step in fulfilling DPRK's obligations under its safeguard agreement with IAEA and under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Council said in a statement by its President Jean-Bernard Merimee of France.

The Council also expressed its concern that JAEA had been "unable to draw conclusions" as to whether there had been "either diversion of nuclear material or reprocessing or other operations" in DPRK. It invited the Director-General to further report on the question of completion of the inspection activities when he is scheduled to report on the follow-on inspections required to "maintain continuity of safeguards" and verify that there had been "no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded".

DPRK and the Republic of Korea were asked to renew discussions on the implementation of the joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Council appealed to Member States engaged in dialogue with the People's Republic to continue that dialogue. The Council would further consider the matter if necessary "in order to achieve full implementation of the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement"

Deep appreciation was expressed for IAEA efforts to implement the safeguards agreement.

|Further non-compliance'

The Agency's Board of Governors stated in a 21 March resolution that DPRK was "in further noncompliance" with its safeguards agreement and had aggravated the situation by not allowing IAEA inspectors to conduct "indispensable inspection activities". The Board regretted the stalemate in the Agency's efforts to resolve the safeguards issue, which it said was "due to the lack of cooperation" on the part of the DPRK.

As agreed by the Agency and the People's Republic, an IAEA inspection team visited DPRK from 1 to 15 March, IAEA Director-General Hans Blix reported (A/49/97-S/1994/322) on 22 March.

Inspection activities had proceeded "without difficulty at all facilities except the radiochemical laboratory". For the first time, the inspectors had been able to perform a "physical inventory verification" of the nuclear material at the fuel-rod fabrication plant, Mr. Blix said.

Difficulties at the radiochemical laboratory had centred on inspection activities agreed upon in Vienna and designed to "restore continuity of knowledge through taking samples and smears". Such samples, as well as gamma-mapping, could indicate "whether operations have taken place in facilities where cameras have ceased to operate and seals have been broken", he reported.

Although IAEA had made clear to DPRK that it was indispensable for the Agency to perform all the activities which the People's Republic had previously accepted, on "some points central to the Agency's ability to detect any diversion of nuclear material", the DPRK side had "permitted itself to disregard commitments made in Vienna" on 15 February, the report said.

|A la carte approach'

IAEA Director-General Blix told correspondents on 2 5 March in New York that the Agency's main concern was "how much plutonium the People's Republic had and whether it was producing more".

The radiochemical laboratory--where IAEA inspectors had not been allowed to undertake the necessary examination--could be used to separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel, Mr. Blix said. According to DPRK, the facility had been used in 1990 for that purpose. But IAEA inspections in 1992 suggested that that had occurred on more than one occasion, and there could be more plutonium than the amount declared, although it was not possible to say how much more, he said.

As a result of its most recent inspection, the Agency could not exclude that in the period since its 1993 inspection the radiochemical plant had been operated, the Director-General stated.

In 1993, IAEA had requested to see two non-declared sites, which it had reason to believe were related to nuclear waste and which could shed light on DPRK's nuclear programme, Mr. Blix recalled. That request had led to a crisis and, after that incident, the DPRK had allowed only inspections for maintenance of surveillance and containment equipment in two facilities. Such an "a la carte approach" to safeguards was unacceptable, he concluded.