Commo systems lack the human element. (Letters to the Editor).

The following three letters are responses to the article "Why Can't Joe Get the Lead Out?" by Colonel Gary H. Cheek and the letter-to-the-editor "Artillery--Never Leave Home Without It (And Don't Forget the 'Dumb' Rounds)" by Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) John M. Perkins, Infantry, in the January-February edition.

Editor

Back to the Future

I was involved in the Crusader program from 1991 until its cancellation last year. I watched Louisiana Maneuvers, Army After Next, Army XXI, digitization, etc., come and go. I sat in hours of briefings and watched millions of dollars spent trying to fit this cannon system into each new "paradigm," and I could never understand why nobody "Got it."

I participated in innumerable discussions about the esoterica of precision and accuracy, cannons versus rockets, counterfire, target sets, fractional damage--you name it. And while Crusader always provided incredible battlefield results no matter the scenario, none of us ever got it quite right.

So, I was astounded when I read the letter from LTC Jenkins and the article by COL Cheek. The juxtaposition of those two pieces in one issue was brilliant and provided me a crystal clear vision of why we, collectively, got it all wrong about what is so important about cannon fire support.

COL Cheek was perfect in his description of what is really missing from the heart of cannon artillery direct support [DS]. You can't automate emotion, you can't automate urgency, you can't automate dealing with the incredibly rapid and unpredictable environment of the DS mission (if that is an acceptable term) in close combat. Can you imagine an FO's [forward observer's] having to look down to use his fingers on a keypad while watching a bad guy move in on his position at night, in the rain, with gloves on, etc.?

LTC Perkins hit it dead-on when he described the situations he and his FOs repeatedly found themselves in. He especially got it right when he talked about the kinds of responses he expected and got from his Redlegs who performed the DS mission and talked to FOs and, as necessary, directly to the maneuver soldier.

What he wanted and got, what Audie Murphy wanted and got, what Dragon 6 and Lieutenant Dewitt wanted and got was pretty profound: cannon artillery fires--on time, on target--that always were adjusted because things changed. And each got those fires from somebody he knew.

Everybody can play in the fire support game when things are planned, set and clear--ground-, air- and sea-based fires. But I firmly believe that the dynamics of the close fight have not changed, that only one "Bad Boy" can play when things get close and tough and mean and nasty. That is, or it used to be, cannon artillery responding to an FO who sits in the same foxhole with his infantry brothers. If the articles I have read over these past several years were any indication, I'd bet we'd be hard pressed to find an active duty infantryman who loves his Cannoneers like LTC Perkins does, and that's, in Perkins' words, "criminal" and, it's our fault.

If we can't restore that love by providing the human element to ensure the foot soldier gets the steel he needs, we might as well move Block House Signal Mountain to Huntsville.

LTC(R) David V. Crowell, FA

Minneapolis, MN

Digital Comma Tools Not Fielded

Colonel Gary H. Cheek's article spoke to a subject that pained me during my time as a battalion FDO [fire direction officer] in an active duty battalion charged with direct support [DS] of a light infantry brigade and, more recently, during my time as the battalion FDO for a National Guard general support [GS] unit. That subject is "artillery digital communication systems."

COL Cheek's article was the most courageous and brutally honest critique of any subject I've read in your magazine. COL Cheek is correct when he states that the human element of fire support has been lost during the implementation of digital systems. And his written words echo the private thoughts of the officers and NCOs charged with making current artillery digital systems work. Advancement in the name of digital "progress" has done little to improve the overall performance of the Field Artillery. More often than not, these systems only have served to unnecessarily complicate our branch's mission.

The essence of this article is not that digital communications are an inappropriate priority for the Field Artillery. Certainly, digital communications between battalion and battery FDCs [fire direction centers] greatly speeds the processing of fire missions. And safety during missions is greatly improved by digital communications between the battery FDC and individual howitzer sections (so the chief of section can visually verify fire commands)--despite the fact that the gun display unit [GDU] is an unreliable system ripe for replacement by a more modern version.

Digital communications technology has the potential to greatly improve the capabilities of the artillery, but the systems that have been fielded so far do not deliver the connectivity required.

This trend is continuing. The infamous "red gumball" displayed by the AFATDS [advanced FA tactical data system] has stopped far more fire missions in training than any simulated enemy action.

It takes several days of setup for us to establish connectivity between disparate digital systems during a division or corps Warfighter exercise, and the Battle Simulation Center where Warfighter exercises are conducted is a much less primitive environment than the field.

The design of these systems has equally stressed all potential nodes in the fire support network in the names of "flexibility" and "oversight." However, when digital systems are designed, emphasis should be placed on the sensor and shooter. This all-or-none approach incorporated into systems like AFATDS has sacrificed simplicity and reliability.

COL Cheek is dead-on in his assessment. Current digital systems fail to deliver reliable connectivity and are too complex for soldiers to gain proficiency on, particularly our time-constrained Reserve Component artillery units.

What we need is a system that is easy to set up (fewer, more compact and reliable components), simple to operate (the "Burger King" approach), operates on a simple network that prioritizes the sensor and shooter and doesn't require extensive training to troubleshoot.

Computerized artillery systems have revolutionized our pursuit of accurate fires. However, the communications systems our branch uses have failed to make fires any more responsive.

"Going digital" has been stressed down to the officers and NCOs at the battery level. But our junior officers and NCOs cannot meet digital connectivity expectations with the tools they have been given to do the job.

CPT Brett A. Saffell, INARNG Commander, B/2-150 FA

You're Darn Tootin'!

I am a computer operator in F Battery, 7th Field Artillery, 25th Infantry Division [Light] Artillery at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and I just finished the article "Why Can't Joe Get the Lead Out?" I have been thinking about this same thing for a long time, but every time I said anything similar, everybody seemed to look at me like I was nuts and just afraid of change. I got the look that said, "Deal with it--you have to learn AFATDS."

And, I am actually in favor of automated and digital communications--to a point.

I recently finished a JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana] rotation, and there were so many problems with this system, starting at the battalion level, that I often wondered if soldiers on the other end of this training exercise were "dying" because we could not get our act together.

Every mission should be sent as quickly as possible, and I don't think the soldiers being rushed or attacked by an enemy who greatly outnumbers them care about our attack guidance, loss of digital communications or the four or five cells the mission has to go through in order to get to me or my big heavy M198 howitzers that have to shift onto the target. All they want to hear is "Shot" and "Splash."

I can honestly say that other than the live-fire portion of this last rotation, I did not talk to a forward observer. If I did receive a voice mission, it was only from battalion because digital went down again and battalion finally broke down and sent the mission by voice. This mission, of course, was probably too late because battalion had spent so much time trying to send it digitally! Thus, we end up in a vicious cycle.

When the FDC [fire direction center] receives a fire mission digitally, the sense of urgency is the same as for any other mission. We get it out as fast as possible and remind the guns they need to hurry. The computer operator has his finger on the mouse button ready to send, "Shot." The RTO [radio-telephone operator] holds his hand microphone and gets ready to send voice "Shot" because the digital "Shot" only goes through about half the time. The chart operator begins to put the round on his target grid, and finally the HTU [handheld terminal unit] operator opens up his subs field looking for more missions.

As you see, the process is automatic, almost robotic. There is no feeling, understanding or urgency because we don't know the soldier or soldiers on the other end, and we certainly don't know the situation. Receive the mission... process it... Boom... wait for correction--that is all there is to it.

But when you hear a soldier on the other end saying, "We need those rounds now, Over," then you know that what you are doing is for the good of your fellow soldiers in combat. You know you are shooting at a force trying to kill your brothers, and you feel a certain bond and great sense of relief when you can hear that same voice come on the radio again and adjust the fire.

That is what artillery is all about. We are not about computers, radios and radars. We are about timely, accurate fifes.

If I had my way, I would chuck that big white box out the window, hook up the LCU [lightweightcomputer unit] with the BCS [battery computer system] in it and process the mission. I wouldn't have to worry about AFATDS' "gumballs," attack criteria, lockups (which happen quite often and only at the most inconvenient times) and OPFAC [operational facility] reconfiguration messages.

Give me two charts, a radio and a well-trained FDO [fire direction officer],and I promise accurate, timely fires in support of any unit.

SGT Marshall S. Poland Computer Operator, F/7 PA

25th IN Division, Schofield Barracks, HI