Commanders on the spot.

Sir:

While I agree with Thomas Wildenberg's description of doctrine in his article "Midway: Sheer Luck or Better Doctrine?" [Winter 2005, pp. 121-35] as "comprising the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions," I think it should be pointed out that doctrine does not micromanage military operations, nor does it completely dispel the "fog of war" which limits information about an enemy, nor does doctrine eliminate the significant role of chance in war. There is also considerable leeway in how individuals may interpret doctrine, in how much significance they may give to any aspect of doctrine, and in how they may apply doctrine. And many military decisions do not come within the purview of doctrine.

When considering the role of doctrine in influencing Japanese and American conduct in the Battle of Midway, it must not be forgotten how close the Japanese Navy came to inflicting severe damage on the U.S. Navy's carrier force.

No doubt, as Wildenberg says, Japanese naval doctrine did not emphasize reconnaissance. And Admiral Nagumo's operations officer, Commander Minoru Genda, was personally disinclined to allot resources to reconnaissance, believing that resources were better spent on attacking the enemy. Genda's personal disinclination did reflect doctrine, but a commander in Genda's position with greater appreciation of the use of reconnaissance would have been free to allot more resources to locating the Americans' aircraft carriers.

Japanese doctrinal disparagement of reconnaissance did not prevent Captain Kameto Kuroshima, Admiral Yamamoto's senior operations officer aboard the battleship Yamato, from arranging for two cordons of submarines to be placed between Hawaii and Midway to report on U.S. fleet movements.

On the day of battle, one Japanese recon aircraft was half an hour late in launching because of a catapult problem. Later, a sighting of the American force was inaccurately conveyed as having no aircraft carriers, an error which was not corrected for some time, thereby delaying the decision to attack the American ship rather than hit Midway again. Therefore, even given the Japanese doctrinal downplaying of reconnaissance, the U.S. aircraft carriers could have been located in a timely manner except for a mechanical difficulty and a reporting error, which both could have happened regardless of doctrine. Without the two non-doctrine-caused delays, Admiral Nagumo could have launched the grand assault on the U.S. carriers he intended to.

Admiral Nagumo's great error was not launching an immediate partial attack against the U.S. carriers with available aircraft followed by a later attack with remaining aircraft. The Second Carrier Division leader, Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi, wanted to attack the U.S. carriers immediately with all available aircraft, whether they carried bombs better suited to hit Midway Island or not, and whether or not they had fighter support.

Striking the first blow was key to Japanese doctrine. But what sort of first blow does one conduct? Japanese doctrine didn't provide an answer. The decision was up to the commanders on the spot. In contrast to Yamaguchi's advocacy of an immediate first blow, Nagumo's chief of staff, Rear Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka, recommended a delayed, well-coordinated, all-out grand assault. He wanted all airborne aircraft recovered, refueled, and armed with torpedoes and armor-piercing bombs, and the planes already armed to attack Midway rearmed also with torpedoes and armor-piercing bombs.

Japanese doctrine did not provide a solution to the question of what should be done in that specific situation. Admiral Nagumo asked Commander Genda for his advice, and Genda sided with Kusaka. Nagumo agreed. The opportunity to disrupt the U.S. attack was lost. And the U.S. dive-bombers found the Japanese carriers with bombs, torpedoes, and gasoline covering their hangar decks. In six minutes, three Japanese carriers were lost.

Wildenberg faults U.S. Navy doctrine for failing to have devised a workable doctrine for coordinating air attacks by different types of carrier-based aircraft. However, this failure was fortuitous at Midway. First the American torpedo planes attacked. The Japanese fighter cover was dispersed at sea level, chasing the remaining torpedo planes when the U.S. dive-bombers attacked. Denuded of fighter cover, the Japanese carriers were easy targets. If the torpedo planes and dive-bombers had attacked together, both would have been the targets of the Japanese fighters. In practice the torpedo planes acted as an unintended feint to draw off the Japanese fighters. This happened by chance, but in no human endeavor does chance play such a significant role as it does in war.

Another aspect of the battle, one which could have been disastrous for the United States, was the possibility of pursuing and engaging the retiring Japanese forces, which Spruance refused to do and which no doubt Halsey would have done if he had been in command.

Spruance, in his second most important decision of the engagement, decided to pull away. If he had continued, the U.S. forces would have blundered into a night battle with the follow-up Japanese cruisers and battleships, and our remaining two aircraft carriers would probably have been sunk. There was no doctrinal guidance or imperative to turn to for deciding to continue or not to continue after the retiring Japanese.

JOSEPH FORBES

Pittsburgh, Penna.