Cometh the hour Cometh the man: the results of their presidential election was a vote of confidence in the Palestinians' political maturity in handling the succession that followed the death of Yasser Arafat, a man who for over half a century refused to let go of strings that manipulated every aspect of their lives.

On 9 JANUARY, THE PALESTINIANS elected Mahmoud Abbas, a longtime comrade of their deceased leader, Yasser Ararat, to succeed him as president of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Remarkably, the election campaign was free and fair despite unfavourable circumstances: What is left of Mandate Palestine is a war zone roamed by Israeli soldiers and armed militants. The few blots on the landscape were caused mainly by small-minded Israeli soldiers delaying or detaining some voters, and Israeli officials turning away registered voters from post offices in East Jerusalem--prompting former US president, Jimmy Carter, who was among a body of international observers, to telephone the office of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to protest. Predictably, Palestinians accused Israelis of deliberately 'denying them' a presence in Jerusalem, claimed by both as their capital city.

The election of Abbas--nom de guerre Abu Mazen--by 62% of the vote, made history in a region where the 'inspired' leader' is usually 'voted', unchallenged, by 99% of 'his people'. The withdrawal of a popular rival, Marwan Barghouti, who decided not to contest the election from his Israeli prison cell (despite leading by two points in pre-election polls), helped Abbas, who was backed by the Fatah movement, the backbone of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO).

LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION

Abbas's rival, (Marwan's brother) Dr Mustafa Barghouti, 25 his years junior, collected over a quarter of the votes (other candidates collected less than 7% between them). Liberals were delighted by figures proving the existence of a 'legitimate' opposition securing a third of the vote, as a force to both pursue reform and check Abu Mazen. Arafat's long leadership was no different, they say, from other Arab regimes who deny the existence of any opposition to their rule.

Abbas, in contrast, accepts opposition that represents political, economic and social interests which contradict those of the PLO, as part of a legitimate landscape. A long due transition from revolution to state, a move which advisers to the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat urged PLO leaders to take on the eve of his 1977 historic visit to Israel, which started the peace process.

Israelis too should welcome the new dawn in Palestine, as it frees their Prime Minister Ariel Sharon from a trap of his own setting. His predecessors, of different political colours, Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, Ehud Barak, and even Bibi Netanyahu, gritted their teeth and embraced Ararat as an interlocutor. Failing to make the accustomed transformation from warrior to statesman (like Rabin, Barak, Etzra Weitzman, Moshe Dyane), Sharon's reaction to the deepening Palestinian Intifada ironically started by his controversial visit to the Al Aqsa Mosque as opposition leader in 2000--was to declare Arafat an "incorrigible terrorist with whom Israel would no longer deal". Acts of terror by both Islamists and secular Palestinians, and Arafat's manipulative politics, aided Sharon in persuading US President George Bush--not exactly streetwise in terms of world affairs--to do the same (even calling on Palestinians to deselect Arafat). Soon Israel and America discovered, surprise, surprise, that no other politician had the authority to negotiate a peace deal. Attempts to bypass Arafat by reaching out to his prime ministers--Abbas and then Ahmed Qurei (Abu Alla'a)--backfired badly.

HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY

Now Palestine has a freely-elected president acceptable to America and also considered kosher by the Israelis. Abbas's legitimacy is threefold: Democratically elected president; popular support (appealing even to hotheads on the streets by calling Israel 'the Zionist entity'); and a founder of Fatah who carries the baggage of the revolutionary's long journey towards independence.

President Abbas's election presents a historic opportunity for all. Sharon's 'unilateral' plan to evacuate all the Jewish settlements from the Gaza strip later this year was attacked by doubtful Palestinians, Arab conspiracy theorists, and Europeans, as a way to get out of both 1993 Oslo obligations and President Bush's Road Map for peace, in order to swallow the rest of the 1967 occupied West Bank.

Sharon portrayed the plan as a not-perfect-second best; a redeployment to more defensible lines, as the raging Intifada costs run high in terms of human life, economically, militarily, and politically (even far away Asian nations refused Israeli help following the Tsunami disaster).

EXERTING CONTROL

Abbas is critical of the four-year-old Intifada--a bloody affair with unacceptable human tragedies on both sides--compared with the largely unarmed precursor of the 1980s. He is genuine in his disappointment with radical elements, as he told me during a dinner in Kuwait, in 2003, when it was considered there was no looming prospect of him returning to politics. Abbas belongs to a rare breed of politicians whose declared politics matches their personal beliefs. He places a high value on human life both Israeli and Palestinian and calls for an end to the Intifada. His best option is to resist calls from the radicals, and cooperate with Israel in its Gaza withdrawal plan, linking it firmly to the Road Map, and inviting the Americans to oversee the cooperation. He could later sell the idea to sceptical Palestinians as also the best option to establish an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank.

Since Abbas has no control over Sharon's behaviour, he must concentrate on controlling his own side to prevent any rocking of the boat, and give the Israeli prime minister the benefit of the doubt. The latter may be a changed man--he has teamed up with Labor to force his Gaza plan through the potentially violent opposition of the settlers, which in itself could trigger a political civil war inside Israel that could lead to change. It is doubtful whether Sharon has changed enough to repeat the deal (more than 90% of the West Bank, a share of Jerusalem and all of Gaza) that Ehud Barak offered Yasser Arafat in 2000. Equally doubtful is that Abbas would accept less than what Arafat turned down five years ago.

The PNA has been weakened by four years of Israeli-military attacks eroding its infrastructure and secularity and by a decade of neglect under Ararat. Hamas has little respect for any state laws, but it is disciplined from within - which makes a deal with its leadership possible, providing the Israelis do not provoke them into action by 'target assassination of their leaders', while some of the militias on the fringes of the Fatah movement might also be persuaded to suspend the Intifada, even though some have already warned against 'surrender'.

Until he has built up his personal authority, Abbas will find it difficult to enforce a ceasefire, without which he can not negotiate a final peace. Three days after his election, Palestinian militants attacked a crossing point in Gaza, killing six Israelis and injuring many more. Sharon froze relations with Abbas and the Palestinian leadership

President Bush appears willing to help Abbas burnish his domestic standing, and, most importantly, put pressure on the Israelis not to over-react to the inevitable acts of terror by renegade groups.

Easing travel restrictions and allowing Palestinians to work in Israel, along with the expected American and European economic aid, should help the Palestinians see the election of Abbas translated into an almost immediate improvement of their lot.

For his part, President Abbas could introduce, for the first time in the region, a British-style cabinet accountable to the electorate, by choosing all his ministers from those elected to legislative and national councils in May.

However, as we all know, the political sands of the Middle East often shift with the slightest breeze, often to reveal a less rosy picture than the one we so fervently anticipated.