Combat support: overseas basing options.

Today's security environment is characterized both by a range of regional security threats and by a persistent global insurgency and counterinsurgency. The ability of US forces to provide swift and tailored responses to a multitude of threats across the globe is a crucial component of security in today's complex political environment.

Transforming logistics to meet new and emerging military and geopolitical challenges is a major focus in today's military. Methods and approaches used during the Cold War have proven to be both cumbersome and ineffective in meeting the demands of the 21st century. The featured article examines one way to respond to the new challenges.

"Combat Support: Overseas Basing Options" presents research by RAND that provides an analytic framework for evaluating options for overseas combat support basing or forward support locations. The framework integrates the traditional threat-based assessments concept with capability-based planning. This framework relies on a sequenced, potentially simultaneous set of deployment scenarios, which RAND terms the multiperiod-multiscenario concept. This methodology is a major departure from the current war planning mindset.

Introduction

The global geopolitical divide that once defined US military policy faded away as communist governments in Eastern Europe collapsed and the Soviet Union disintegrated in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was replaced by a security environment characterized both by a range of regional security threats and by a persistent global insurgency and counterinsurgency. The ability of US forces to provide swift and tailored responses to a multitude of threats across the globe is a crucial component of security in today's complex political environment. The Air Force, as with the other services, has responded by transforming itself into a more expeditionary force. To realize its goals of global strike and persistent dominance, it is vital that the Air Force support the warfighter seamlessly and efficiently in all phases of deployment, employment, and redeployment. One of the major pillars for achieving these objectives is a global combat support basing architecture.

This article focuses on an analytic framework for evaluating options for overseas combat support basing or forward support locations (FSL). The presentation of this framework is important because it addresses how to assess these options in terms of the relevant programming costs while considering a novel approach to scenario planning. This formulation minimizes the costs of facility operation, construction, and transportation associated with meeting the training and deterrent exercises needed to demonstrate US global power projection capability to deter aggression, while maintaining the necessary storage capacity and system throughput to engage in major combat operations.

This framework is based on the notion that US interests are not only global but dynamic as well, particularly when the United States is confronted with emerging anti-access and area denial threats. Consequently, the Air Force must be ready to deploy forces quickly across a wide range of potential scenarios.

Development of a Multiperiod, Multiscenario Combat Support Planning Methodology

In recent years, the focus of contingency planners was on individual, deliberate, threat-based deployments. This led to supporting the warfighter by developing optimal combat support networks which were designed to counter known threats. An unfortunate characteristic of this type of designed network is that it often performs poorly if the set of demands, such as locations and quantities, differs from the plan. The new planning environment, with its broad and unclear set of potential adversaries, calls for robust and efficient combat support networks that meet operational requirements at reasonable costs over a wide range of contingencies.

The Air Force's new role in this environment will inevitably include a commitment to multiple, overlapping engagements in diverse geographical areas with varying degrees of operational intensity. Some of these engagements, such as drug interdictions, will occur multiple times over a short time horizon. To capture the nuances of the multifaceted, continuous deterrent environment, temporal and spatial elements with other parameters, such as combat support capability and costs must be integrated. These parameters are captured in a new planning methodology in which several likely deployment scenarios, from small-scale humanitarian operations to major regional conflicts, are considered. For any given scenario, decisions should be made regarding its likelihood of occurrence over time, its interrelationship with other scenarios, and its finality.

RAND has developed a new framework that integrates the traditional threat-based assessments concept with capability-based planning. This framework relies on a sequenced, potentially simultaneous set of deployment scenarios, which was given the term multiperiod-multiscenario (MPMS) concept. This methodology is a major departure from the current war planning mindset. Previously, whether planning for nuclear warfare against the Soviet Union or lot large-scale conventional war in the Near East, US analysts were planning for one large conflict that would occur only once and that would change the defense environment so greatly that plans for outyears following this conflict would no longer be valid.

The Geopolitical Environment

One of the United States' major defense policy goals is to deter threats and coercion against US interests anywhere in the world. This multifaceted approach requires forces and capabilities that discourage aggression or any form of coercion by placing emphasis on peacetime forward deterrence in critical areas of the world. In addition, US forces must maintain the capability to support multiple conflicts if deterrence fails. (1) Air Force core competencies, such as agile combat support, global attack, and rapid global mobility, reflect these changes m the global threat environment. Global attack capability is defined as "the ability to engage adversary targets anywhere, [and] anytime." Rapid global mobility is defined as "the ability to rapidly position forces anywhere in the world." (2)

The Air Force can rapidly airlift forces anywhere in the world if those forces are sufficiently small, and if the airlift capacity is not consumed by other requirements elsewhere. However, the United States' strategic policy goals and the reality of today's security environment require a capability that can project a continuum of power both swiftly and globally. Doing so requires a combat support system that has both the agility and the adaptability to support a broad range of potential engagements anywhere in the world.

US Operations and Exercises Since 1990

It has been more than a decade since the end of the Cold War. and in that period US forces have been involved in numerous operations and conflicts. Although the United States does not respond to every crisis in the world, the regions of the world in which it has conducted operations reflect the strategic interests of the United States and its allies. Many of the deployments have occurred in regions where the United States has either a permanent support infrastructure, such as Europe, or a longstanding presence, such as the Near East. However, a large number of recent deployments have required US forces to enter new locations that had neither existing US infrastructure nor a historical US presence. Factoring in the relative paucity of these locations' organic logistics infrastructure, these operations and exercises have frequently required deployments to bare bases, with the associated heavy use of combat support assets. The remainder of this section outlines several potential military and nonmilitary operations in the Near East, the Asia-Pacific, Central Asia, South America, Europe, and Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa. The type and the location of potential operations were selected to reflect both historical US involvement and potential locations where future conflicts might intersect with US interests. We were also mindful of selecting a set of operations that would place varying stresses on the combat support system so we could evaluate a wide range of demands on the combat support requirements.

Near East

Despite the demise of the Baathist regime in Iraq, the US military will continue to be involved in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Moreover, most nations in that region have authoritarian governments. (3) There is a potential for instability in many of these governments, which may not be able to cope with growth in popular unrest. The potential growth of fundamentalism in many Islamic countries may also contribute to further volatility in this region. Although Iran may eventually become friendlier with the United States, its current system of government, with a powerful non-elected head of state, has severely hampered any movement toward normalization of relationships. Crises such as a regime change in Saudi Arabia would further change the security environment in the Persian Gulf and may consequently increase the importance of Iran's role in the region. (4) A destabilized Saudi Arabia and a potentially prolonged interruption of the flow of oil would have severe consequences for the United States and the global economy. (5) Currently, the most immediate threats may be the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the increase in insurgency movements.

In our analysis we use different types of Southwest Asia (SWA) scenarios to simulate different-sized regional conflicts and to measure the combat support capabilities of alternative FSLs. We also give attention to Eastern Africa, with the Horn of Africa playing an important strategic role.

Asia-Pacific

Over the past 50 years in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States has focused on the security of South Korea and has established support plans for containing North Korea. Although the United States may not be challenged by a near-peer for the near future, the potential exists for regional powers to develop capabilities to threaten US interests. Asia is also a region where there could be large-scale challenges to the US military. China, in particular, may emerge as a more powerful maritime force in the future, challenging the US Navy and Air Force dominance in the Pacific. Although China may not match the advanced military power of the United States, it could play an asymmetric game in the region by taking advantage of its vast coastline, as well as the large geographic extent of its rear base that reaches all the way to Central Asia. (6) China, in essence, could occupy the same role in the Pacific in this century that the Soviet Union played in Europe m the latter half of the twentieth century. Therefore, near-peer scenarios, such as Taiwan-China or China-Russia, can be used to assess the effect of potential FSLs in these very stressing scenarios.

The sea-lanes of the South China Sea and the waters surrounding Indonesia are transited by nearly half of the world's merchant marine capacity. These areas are also critical to the movement of US forces from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and beyond. Although the end of the Cold War has reduced the clear and immediate global military threat, the potential for both conventional and nonconventional threats still exists. One of the growing concerns is the threat of piracy and its connection to terrorism. Another issue is the overlapping claims to the South China Sea by China, Taiwan, and several Southeast Asian countries all laying claims to some or all of the Spratly Islands] The distances in this region are vast, and US basing and enroute support infrastructure are not as rich as in other important regions. Other potential scenarios in this region include counterterrorism activities in Indonesia or the Philippines and counter-insurgency operations in the Philippines.

Central Asia

The support of some Central Asian countries in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the ongoing US military presence in Afghanistan, and the rich oil reserves of the Caspian Sea region--combined with potential conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia--have brought this region to the attention of many policymakers. However, the poor infrastructure of the Central Asian region provides a test to any combat support capability. Moreover, the trepidation of some North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to project force into the region because of its proximity to Russia could put most of the burden on the United States. (8)

Some Central Asian countries may be able to play a role in supporting the Air Force's continued efforts in Afghanistan or potentially in an Indian-Pakistani conflict. Furthermore, we are interested in measuring the effectiveness of our global storage and maintenance system in supporting the US response to a potential conflict in this region. For example, the tension between the ethnic Kazakh and Russian populations of Kazakhstan could hypothetically trigger a civil war that would lead to the secession of the northern provinces of Kazakhstan or even Russian occupation of part or all of the country.

South America and Caribbean

The United States' continued efforts in antidrug activities in South America is likely to be the main focus for the military in this region. (9) Nevertheless, economic and political upheavals could require differing military roles for US forces in the future. In this region of the world, planning concentrates on small-scale operations that would mostly involve special operations force.

Europe

The United States has strong historical ties with Europe, with dozens of US bases located across the continent. In the near term, it is hard to imagine any major conflicts in Europe such as the ones in the former Yugoslavian states that culminated with Operation Allied Force. Nevertheless, we will include a variation of a Balkan scenario to test United States Air Forces in Europe combat support capabilities. In addition, we assume a continued European role as a support command, as in OEF and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Africa

Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa continue to be plagued with civil wars, ethnic or clan-based conflict, and severe economic disasters. The 2003 civil war in Liberia led to the deployment of Nigerian peacekeepers with a small US force in the country. (10) In 2002, with the help of Britain and a large United Nations peacekeeping mission, the West African state of Sierra Leone emerged from a decade of civil war. More than 17,000 foreign troops disarmed tens of thousands of rebels and militia fighters. (11) The Gulf of Guinea in West Africa, particularly Nigeria, has become a strategic interest of the United States because of an increased oil export to the world market.

Recent developments in Northern Africa have been encouraging, with Libya pledging to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons. However, the continued threat of insurgencies in Algeria and the Western Sahara may require future US involvement in Northern Africa. The countries of this region continue to be sources of Islamic fundamentalist groups, providing pools of recruits and staging areas for terrorist acts, most notably the Casablanca bombing of May 2003, and possibly the subway attack in Spain on March 11, 2004. Across Africa, political instability and high levels of violence may continue to persist. The potential for extraction of large volumes of oil from African nations may add to their geopolitical importance. In this region of the world, we concentrate our scenarios on humanitarian support requiring a small-scale aerospace force presentation.

The Tenets of Deployment Scenarios

In keeping with the new security paradigm and the concept of MPMS, we constructed a deployment framework using the following tenets.

* Although it is impossible to select combat support bases without specific operational deployments, the selection process should not be slaved to a particular deployment. For that reason, we do not seek to optimize the system for a handful of deployments alone.

* Combat support requirements should be dynamic and deployment scenarios should cast a wide geographical net in order to stress the combat support and transportation requirements.

* Deployments should be sequenced in time and space in order to evaluate physical reach and test long-term effects of location and allocation of assets.

* To hedge against the uncertainty of the future security environment, multiple series of possible scenarios should be developed to test the robustness of the overseas combat support bases.

Analysis Approach

To evaluate and select alternative forward-basing options, we developed an analytic framework that uses an optimization model to assess the cost and capability of various portfolios of overseas combat support basing or FSLs for meeting a wide variety of global force projections.

We have taken two complementary approaches in developing the optimization model. The primary approach attempts to minimize the overall system cost while meeting operational requirements. The other approach focuses on maximizing the support capability (for example, reducing the time to initial operating capability [IOC]). Examining the costs of alternative support basing options, for a constant level of performance against a variety of deployments, is an important process in the development of suitable programming and budgeting plans. In this approach, we are careful to ensure that adequate capacity is maintained to meet requirements as specified in the defense planning scenarios.

Our analyses show the costs and deployment timelines for various FSL options under different degrees of stress on combat support while taking into account infrastructure richness, basing characteristics, deployment distances, strategic warning, transportation constraints, dynamic requirements, and reconstitution conditions. We developed several sets of deployment scenarios using the MPMS concept, with each including training exercises, deterrent missions, and major combat operations (MCO). These so-called streams of reality allow our model to measure the effect of timing, location, and intensity of operational requirements on combat support--and vice versa. We develop several of these streams (or timelines) to account for the inherent uncertainties in future planning associated with each timeline.

After we determined the desired requirements in terms of combat support resources, our optimization model, the RAND Overseas Basing Optimization Tool, selects a set of locations that would minimize the costs of supporting these various deterrence and training exercises while maintaining the capability to support major regional conflicts should deterrence fail. This tool essentially allows for the analysis of various what-if questions and assesses the solution set in terms of resource costs for differing levels of combat support capability.

Our analytic approach has several steps, (Figure 1 as seen below.

* We first select a diverse set of deployment scenarios that would stress the combat support system. These deployments include small-scale humanitarian operations, continuous force presentation to deter aggression, and major combat operations.

* The deployments and the force options drive the requirements for combat support, such as base operating support equipment, vehicles, and munitions.

* These requirements, the set of potential FSLs and forward operating locations (FOL), and the transportation options, such as allowing sealift or not, serve as the inputs to the optimization model.

* The optimization model selects the FSL locations that minimize the FSL facility operating and transportation costs associated with planned operations, training missions, and deterrent exercises that are scheduled to take place over an extended time horizon, satisfying time-phased demands for combat support commodities at FOLs. Major combat operations are included in this analysis to ensure that the resulting network has sufficient capability to allow for such operations should deterrence fail. The transportation costs associated with these operations are not considered in the model because of the different funding mechanisms for the execution of combat operations. The model also optimally allocates the programmed resources and commodities to those FSLs. It computes the type and the number of transportation vehicles required to move the materiel to the FOLs. The result is the creation of a robust transportation and allocation network that connects a set of disjointed FSL and FOL nodes.

* The final step in our approach is to refine and recalibrate the solution set by applying political, geographical, and vulnerability constraints based on current expert judgments concerning the global environment. Since this step is applied post optimally and may make additional iterations necessary, it may require reevalution and reassessment of the parameters and options chosen.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

The end result of this analysis is a portfolio containing alternative sets of FSL postures, including allocations of war reserve materiel (WRM) to the FSLs, which can then be presented to decisionmakers. This portfolio will allow policymakers to assess the merits of various options from a global perspective.

Combat Support Factors

Several major constraining and contributing factors affect the capability of FSLs to support the warfighter. Our analytic framework takes each of these parameters into account in its process of selecting an optimal set of combat support locations.

* Base Access. This important issue deserves careful consideration and must be addressed before each conflict or operation. However, rather than eliminating some sites a priori because of potential political access problems, we allowed the model to select the most desirable sites based on other factors first. We then ,forced specific sites out of the solution set if we had reason to believe that these sites presented access issues--thereby providing the economic cost of restricting the solution to politically acceptable sites.

* Forward Support Location Capability and Capacity. The parking space, the runway length and width, the fueling capability, and the capacity to load and offload equipment are all important factors in selecting an airfield to support an expeditionary operation. (12) Runway length and width are key planning factors and are commonly used as first criteria in assessing whether an airfield can be selected.

* Airlift and Airfield Throughput Capacity. Timely delivery of combat support materiel is essential in an expeditionary operation. However, a mere increase in the aircraft fleet size may not improve the deployment timelines. The fleet size must always be determined with respect to the throughput capacity of an airfield. The maximum-on-ground (MOG) capability, for example, directly contributes to the diminishing return of deployment time as a function of available airlift.

* Forward Operating Location Distance. Distance from FSLs to FOLs can impede expeditionary operations. As the number of airlift aircraft increases, the difference in deployment time caused by distance becomes less pronounced. Adding more airlifters to the system will reduce the deployment time, albeit at a diminishing rate, until the deployment time levels off as a result of MOG constraints.

* Modes of Transportation. There are several advantages to using sealift or ground transportation in place of. or in addition to, airlift. Allowing for alternative modes of transportation might bring some FSLs into the solution set that otherwise may have been deemed infeasible or too costly. Ships have a higher hauling capacity than do aircraft and can easily carry outsized or super-heavy equipment. In addition, ships do not require overflight rights from any foreign government.

* Afloat Prepositioning. We examined the potential for storing combat support resources (munitions and nonmunitions) aboard an Afloat Preposition Fleet (APF). Although afloat prepositioning does offer additional flexibility and reduced vulnerability versus land-based storage, the APF is much more expensive than land-based storage and presents a serious risk with regard to deployment time. Even if a generous advance warning is assumed to allow for steaming toward a scenario's geographic region, it can be difficult to find a port that is capable of handling these large cargo ships. The requirements placed on the port, including preemption of other cargo movement, also restrict the available ports that can be used by an APF.

* Cost. The main objective of the model is to reduce the total cost of exercises and deterrent missions while meeting the time-phased operational demand for combat support resources for those missions as well as for major combat operations. These costs include construction and expansion of facilities and operations and maintenance and transportation for peacetime and training missions. Incorporated in each of these costs is the effect of differences in regional cost-of-living or country cost factors.

Results and Recommendations

We focused on three of the most important combat support resources--basic expeditionary airfield resources (BEAR), (13) munitions, and rolling stock such as trucks. These resources comprise the bulk of many of the consumable and repairable items in the combat support package. In the case of munitions, they pose storage and transport complexities.

From the outset of the study, we attempted to answer two basic questions. First, how capable are the Air Force's current overseas combat support bases of managing the future environment? Second, what are the costs and benefits of using additional or alternative overseas combat support bases for storing heavy combat support materiel?

To answer these questions, we devised five different streams of reality--or deployment timelines--to represent a wide range of possible future Air Force deployments across the globe. (Table 1)

The base scenario, or the most likely global deterrent scenario, places the focus on supporting a number of deployments in the Persian Gulf region, Asian littoral, and North Africa over a time horizon of 6 years, in keeping with the future years defense program (FYDP) convention. Figure 2 represents the size in terms of combat support requirements, and the timing of each deployment for the base scenario. The sizes of recent deployments are given on the y-axis as a reference. Notice that we have scheduled the major combat operations in each scenario for execution at the end of the FYDP period. This approach focuses attention on providing resources to support deterrent deployments. It ensures their funding while also placing major combat operations requirements in the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process.

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

Selection of Existing Combat Support Bases

We solved the problem of finding the least-cost bases that would satisfy operational requirements using existing forward support locations. For this example it was Ramstein Air Base. The model selected 11 FSLs (Table 2). These locations represent the optimal locations to support the baseline scenario. Although the model was allowed to select from the four existing munitions preposition ships, none was chosen unless infrastructure expansion at the existing land-based FSLs was excluded from the solution. In that case, a single APF ship assigned to the Arabian Sea was used to compensate for the lack of storage space at the land-based FSLs.

We assessed the capabilities of the selected FSLs (Table 2) against the remaining four timelines. These FSLs, along with an additional site at Eielson Air Force Base, were able to meet the demand for three of the four additional streams, although with increased transportation requirements and costs. However, for Stream 4, the 10-day IOC requirement had to be relaxed to 12 days for the South American deployment, and a single munitions ship, with Guam as its home base, appeared in the solution.

Selection of Additional Combat Support Bases

The next step was to evaluate existing and potential FSLs against the baseline scenario and the four alternative streams of reality. We generated a list of potential FSL locations around the globe that could support a wide range of deployments. As before, the model selected an optimal list for the baseline scenario---the most likely scenario. The earlier 11 existing sites presented in Table 2 remained in the solution (the model selected them again), along with five new sites in Europe and Asia: Incirlik, Turkey; Clark Field, Philippines; Paya Lebar, Singapore; U-Tapao, Thailand; and Balad, Iraq (Table 3). It should be noted that the list in Table 3 is by no means sacrosanct, and alternative sites may provide the same capability at a similar or marginally greater cost. In particular, Souda Bay, Greece; Akrotiri, Cyprus; Constanta, Romania; or Burgas, Bulgaria may be suitable alternatives to Incirlik, Turkey. In addition, some realignment of existing sites may be more efficient and effective than current sites. For example, the port of Salalla in Oman could be used to meet some requirements met by Seeb or Thumreit with lower cost and less time than the current sites. The new combination of existing and potential FSLs offers about 30 percent savings in total costs by reducing the overall transportation cost to the system.

Figure 3 illustrates the final results from the combination of the baseline scenario and the four other streams of reality. This figure also shows the locations of the other candidate sites that were not selected by the model. It and the accompanying Table 4 divide these locations into Tier 1 and Tier 2 categories. We use the label Tier 2 FSLs for a set of FSLs that require a more detailed consideration as potential sites. They may also have appeared in the solution as a result of one or two individual deployments, and therefore their role is closely fixed to the nature of those particular deployments. Additionally, all the Tier 2 FSLs. with the exception of Puerto Rico, have uncertain political futures or limited internal capabilities, lraq, for example, falls in this category, but its location for support of many operations makes it invaluable. However, we emphasize that the focus should not be on a particular latitude and longitude but rather on a particular region. Balad, Iraq, would be suitable if all the issues of security and long-term political amenities were resolved. If the uncertainties continue, then an alternative location in the region with similar capabilities should be considered.

[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]

Figure 4 presents the costs for the base scenario and all four streams. For each stream the expanded set of FSLs offer the same capability at a reduced overall cost to the Air Force. Note especially that the set of existing land-based FSLs could not support Stream 4 requirements and required that the IOC deadline be extended from 10 to 12 days and also required the use of an APF munitions ship. However, when we selected from the expanded set of land-based FSLs, the need for the afloat option disappeared. The advantage of the global basing option is not limited to cost and encompasses a more efficient use of multimodal transportation. For each stream, the model was able to make better use of trucks and high-speed sealift for the expanded pool of bases, yielding about 50 percent less airlift usage without compromising operational requirements.

[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]

Recommendations

We make the following recommendations based on our analysis of overseas combat support basing options.

* Using a global approach to select combat support basing locations is more effective and efficient than allocating resources on a regional basis. One of the strengths of the analytic framework chosen is the lack of regional command boundaries. We are able to look at all regions of the world simultaneously with operations occurring in various locations at the same time, thereby extracting the most efficient solution without adversely compromising the capability needs of a particular region.

* Political concerns need to be addressed in any decision about potential overseas basing locations. For instance, while an APF is much more expensive than alternative land-based storage options and may suffer from increased risk in deployment time, it may be necessary to consider the APF option because it offers more flexibility if access is denied. Additionally, countries like Iraq are continually selected by the model because cost and time are its major driving criteria. However, the uncertainty surrounding the future of Iraq (and similar countries) should force us to pause and consider alternative sites that may be less desirable mathematically but offer a higher probability of access and stability.

* Closer attention should be paid to Africa both as a source of instability and as a possible location for combat support bases. Africa, with its potential as a source of future oil combined with the uncertain future of many of its nation states, requires a great deal of attention from policymakers. Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa continue to be plagued by civil wars, ethnic, or clan-based conflicts, and severe economic disasters. There is an increased likelihood that terrorists may seek haven in the remote areas of Africa because of the continued US military presence in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Also, the geopolitical importance of the region, with its high levels of oil production, makes it an area of interest to the United States. If deployments to the region increased in the furore, the current set of bases would not support those operations. Possible FSL locations in Africa could support operations across the entire southern half of the globe. Although the initial construction costs for these bases would be high, the costs would be quickly offset by the reductions in transportation costs. As an initial phase, we recommend closely evaluating western regions of Africa, with particular attention to Nigeria, Sao Tome/Salazar, and Senegal, along with South Africa.

* Some Eastern European nations should be considered as serious candidates for future overseas bases. The potential for continued conflicts in central Asia and the Near East has made many of the countries in the eastern part of Europe very attractive as potential storage locations for WRM. The appeal of this region has been further heightened by the inclusion of some of these countries in the European Union and NATO, combined with the lower cost of living and the relatively large professional labor market. Romania and Bulgaria in Eastern Europe, along with Mediterranean locations such as Greece and Cyprus, form an appealing region that would allow easy access to both the United States Central Command and the United States European Command areas of responsibility. These locations are especially attractive because they allow for multimodal transport options, using Black Sea ports for Romania and Bulgaria, assuming passage through the Bosporus Strait in Turkey to the Mediterranean. Poland and the Czech Republic, although very accommodating to US efforts in the current operations, are located relatively far from the potential deployments that were considered in this report. Also, the Czech Republic is a landlocked state, and while Poland has significant coastline on the Baltic Sea, these ports do not allow for rapid transport to the regions of Air Force interest. In terms of transportation time and cost, Germany can provide a better capability than either Poland or the Czech Republic, because of existing US installations.

* Southeast Asia offers several robust options for allocation of combat support resources. The remoteness of Guam and Diego Garcia from most potential conflicts in the region requires the consideration of other locations in the Pacific. The geographical characteristics of the United States Pacific Command put a heavy reliance on airlift and possibly fast sealift. Most of the current US bases are located in Japan and the Korean Peninsula with the main purpose of supporting the Korean deliberate plan. To support other possible contingencies, we propose a closer examination of three locations--Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines. Each of these locations offers a host of options for the Air Force, including storage space, adequate runway facilities, proximity to ports, and strategic location. Darwin, Australia, has many of the desired attributes for an overseas combat support base, but its remoteness to most potential conflicts makes it a comparatively poor choice.

* Potential future operations in South America may be greatly constrained unless additional infrastructure in the region is obtained. In our analysis, a large South American scenario obtained from the defense planning scenarios overstressed the system of existing facility locations. preventing the satisfaction of a 10-day IOC deadline, even with the use of APF ships. While the states of South America are relatively stable, the recent difficulties in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela demonstrate the potential volatility of the region. As with Africa, future US intervention cannot be discounted owing to significant US interests in the region's oil supply. Although the current combat support infrastructure is sufficient for small-scale operations such as drug interdiction, an expanded combat support presence would facilitate larger-scale operations in the region.

* Multimodal transportation option is the key to rapid logistics response. RAND has shown in several earlier reports that overreliance on airlift may in fact reduce response capability because of throughput constraints and lack of airlift. (14) A comprehensive mobility plan should include a combination of air, land, and sealift. Judicious use of trucks and high-speed sealift in fact may offer a faster and less expensive way to meet the Air Force's mobility needs.

Article Highlights

The new planning environment calls for robust and efficient combat support networks that meet operational requirements at reasonable costs over a wide range of contingencies.

This article presents the results of research by RAND that provides an analytic framework for evaluating options for overseas combat support basing or forward support locations (FSL). The framework is important because it addresses how to assess options in terms of the relevant programming costs while considering a new approach to scenario planning. This formulation minimizes the costs of facility operation, construction, and transportation associated with meeting the training and deterrent exercises needed to demonstrate US global power projection capability to deter aggression, while maintaining the necessary storage capacity and system throughput to engage in major combat operations.

This framework is based on the premise that US interests are not only global but dynamic as well, particularly when the United States is confronted with emerging anti-access and area denial threats.

The framework integrates the traditional threat-based assessments concept with capability-based planning. This framework relies on a sequenced, potentially simultaneous set of deployment scenarios, which RAND terms the multiperiod-multiscenario (MPMS) concept. This methodology is a major departure from the current war planning mindset.

To evaluate and select alternative forward-basing options, RAND uses an optimization model to assess the cost and capability of various portfolios of overseas combat support basing or FSLs for meeting a wide variety of global force projections. Two complementary approaches are used in developing the optimization model. The primary approach attempts to minimize the overall system cost while meeting operational requirements. The other approach focuses on maximizing the support capability (for example, reducing the time to initial operating capability).

RAND analyses show the costs and deployment timelines for various FSL options under different degrees of stress on combat support while taking into account infrastructure richness, basing characteristics, deployment distances, strategic warning, transportation constraints, dynamic requirements, and reconstitution conditions. They developed several sets of deployment scenarios using the MPMS concept, with each including training exercises, deterrent missions, and major combat operations. These so-called streams of reality allow the model to measure the effect of timing, location, and intensity of operational requirements on combat support--and vice versa. Several of these streams (or timelines) were developed to account for the inherent uncertainties in future planning associated with each timeline.

After determining the desired requirements in terms of combat support resources, a RAND optimization model (Overseas Basing Optimization Tool) selects a set of locations that would minimize the costs of supporting these various deterrence and training exercises while maintaining the capability to support major regional conflicts should deterrence fail. This tool essentially allows for the analysis of various what-if questions and assesses the solution set in terms of resource costs for differing levels of combat support capability.

The end result of the analysis is a portfolio containing alternative sets of FSL postures, including allocations of war reserve materiel to the FSLs, which can then be presented to decisionmakers. This portfolio will allow policymakers to assess the merits of various options from a global perspective.

Article Acronyms

APF--Afloat Preposition Fleet

BEAR--Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resources

FOL--Forward Operating Location

FSL--Forward Support Location

FYDP--Future Years Defense Program

IOC--Initial Operating Capability

MCO--Major Combat Operations

MOG--Maximum on Ground

MPMS--Multiperiod-Multiscenario

NATO--North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OEF--Operation Enduring Freedom

SWA--Southwest Asia

WRM--War Reserve Materiel

Notes

(1.) United States Department of Defense, "Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach," fall 2003.

(2.) United States Air Force, "Air Force Strategic Plan, Long-Range Planning Guidance, Volume 3," May 2000.

(3.) The main exception is Israel, which is democratic. It is certainly too early to assess the outcome of Iraq's recent elections.

(4.) For more information on Iran and its security strategies see the following publications: Daniel Byman, Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Jerrold Green, Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolution Era, Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, MR- 1320-OSD, 2001. Shabram Chubin, "Whither Iran? Reform, Domestic Politics and National Security," Adelphi Paper, Issue 342, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002.

(5.) Sokolsky, Richard. Stuart E. Johnson. and F. Stephen Larrabee. Persian Gulf Security: Improving Allied Military Contributions. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MR-1245-AF, 2000.

(6.) As a simple illustration of the size of the U.S. and Chinese navies, consider the following: The U.S. Navy's warships have a total "full-load displacement" of about 2.9 million tons. whereas China's have less than 300,000 tons. The United States deploys 24 aircraft carriers (out of world's 34): China deploys none.

(7.) Khalilzad, Zalmay, and lan Lesser, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MR-897-AF, 1999.

(8.) Sokolsky, Richard, Stuart E. Johnson, and F. Stephen Larrabee, Persian Gulf Security: Improving Allied Military, Contributions, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MR-1245-AF, 2000.

(9.) At the urging of Peru and Colombia, President Bush may authorize the resumption of anti-drug surveillance flights over Colombia. (The New York Times, August 6, 2003)

(10.) The role of American troops was confined to assisting with logistics, reflecting the general uneasiness of the Pentagon over making a longterm commitment while US troops were heavily committed in Afghanistan and Iraq (The New York Times, August 5, 2003)

(11.) A short description of this action may be found on the BBC News Web site, [Online] Available : http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/ country_profiles/106156l.stm (last accessed October 7, 2005).

(12.) In our analysis, some of these factors are computed parametrically in order to assess a minimum requirement of a potential field for meeting a certain capability.

(13.) BEAR provides the required airfield operational capability (such as housekeeping or industrial operations) to open an austere or semiaustere airbase.

(14.) Amouzegar, Mahyar A., Robert S. Tripp, Ronald G. McGarvey, Edward W. Chan, and C. Robert Roll, Jr., Supporting Air and Space Expeditionary Forces: Analysis of Combat Support Basing Options, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG-261-AF, 2004. Vick, Alan, David T. Orletsky, Bruce Pirnie, and Seth G. Jones. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team, Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MR-1606-AF, 2002.

Mahvar A. Amouzegar is a Senior Analyst at RAND and an Associate Dean at California State University, Long Beach. Ronald G. McGarvey is an Operations Research analyst at RAND. Robert S. Tripp is a Senior Analyst at RAND. C. Robert Roll, Jr, is the Director, Resource Management Program, Project Air Force at RAND.

Table 1. Sequencing of Scenarios by Timeline

               Base            Stream 1         Stream 2
             Scenario

               SWA 1             SWA 3           SWA 1
Year 1       Singapore       South Africa     Horn Africa
                              East Timor

           Central Asia        Thailand       Central Asia
Year 2       Thailand        Sierra Leone       Liberia

          Horn of Africa       Spratleys        Balkans
Year 3         SWA 2             Haiti           Rwanda
                                 Chad

             Thailand           Balkans        Singapore
Year 4         India             Egypt          Cameroon
                                                 India

               SWA2              SWA1             SWA2
Year 5     North Africa      North Africa        Taiwan
                                Liberia       Sierra Leone

               Egypt         Central Asia      Spratleys
Year 6        Taiwan             India            Chad
                               Cameroon         Thailand

Year 7+        MCO1              MCO1             MCO1
               MCO2              MCO2             MCO2

             Stream 3          Stream 4

          South America 2      Spratleys
Year 1       Cameroon            Chad
             Singapore

               SWA 3        South America 1
Year 2       Thailand       Horn of Africa
               Haiti

              Taiwan             SWA 2
Year 3     South Africa        Singapore

             Spratleys          Taiwan
Year 4         Egypt             Haiti

               SWA1              SWA2
Year 5        Rwanda          East Timor
            East Timor

           Central Asia          SWA 1
Year 6     North Africa         Rwanda
             Singapore

Year 7+        MCO1              MCO1
               MCO2              MCO2

Table 2. Optimal Existing FSLs to Support the Baseline Scenario

Ramstein AB, Germany                   Seeb, Oman
Sigonella AB and Camp Darby, Italy     Thumrait, Oman
RAF Mildenhall and Welford, UK         Kadena, Japan
AI Udeid AB, Qatar                     Andersen AB, Guam
Sheik Isa, Bahrain                     Diego Garcia, UK
Masirah Island, Oman

Table 3. Optimal FSLs from an Expanded Set to Support the Baseline
Scenario

Ramstein, Germany                  Sheik Isa, Bahrain
Sigonella and Camp Darby, Italy    Thumrait, Oman
Mildenhall and Welford, UK         Incirlik, Turkey
Al Udeid AB, Qatar                 Clark Field, Philippines
Masirah Island, Oman               Paya Lebar, Singapore
Andersen AB, Guam                  U-Tapao, Thailand
Diego Garcia                       Balad, Iraq
Kadena, Japan                      Seeb, Oman

Table 4. Global Set of Overseas Bases

Tier 1                             Tier 2

Al Udeid AB, Qatar                 Louis Botha, South Africa
Andersen AB, Guam                  Bagram, Afghanistan
Diego Garcia                       Baku, Azerbaijan
Kaduna, Japan                      Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico
Masirah Island, Oman               Tocumen, Panama
Mildenhall and Welford, UK         Cotipazxi, Ecuador
Ramstein, Germany                  Sao Tome/Salazar, Sao Tome
Seeb, Oman                         Kaduna, Nigeria (b)
Sheik Isa, Bahrain                 Balad, Iraq
Sigonella and Camp Darby, Italy
Thumrait, Oman
Clark Field, Philippines
Incirlik, Turkey
Paya Lebar, Singapore
U-Tapao, Thailand
Souda Bay, Greece (a)

(a) Alternatives to Souda Bay, Greece, are Akrotiri, Cyprus; Burgas,
Bulgaria;or Constanta, Romania.

(b) An alternative to Kaduna, Nigeria, may be Dakar, Senegal.