Combat service and logistic support in the Vistula-Oder strategic offensive operation (toward the 60th anniversary of victory of the Great Patriotic War).

The Vistula-Oder Operation, conducted by troops of the First Belorussian and the First Ukrainian fronts in the period from January 12 until February 3, 1945, was one of the largest strategic offensive operations at the final stage of the third period of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Its success was facilitated by vigorous actions by armies on the left wing of the Second Belorussian Front and the right wing of the Fourth Ukrainian Front. In the course of the operation, Soviet troops routed a strong enemy grouping covering the Berlin axis of advance, accomplished a strategic breakthrough of enemy defenses and, pushing the pursuit to a depth of 600 kilometers, reached the distant approaches to Berlin. (1)

Strikes against the adversary were planned throughout the extent of the Soviet-German front with the main efforts concentrated on the Warsaw-Berlin salient. Here, by early 1945, troops of the First Belorussian Front (commander Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov) and the First Ukrainian Front (commander MSU I.S. Konev) had reached the line of the Vistula River, holding three bridge-heads on its western bank: Magnuszew (45 kilometers along the front and 18 kilometers in depth), Pulawy (up to 30 kilometers and 10 kilometers, respectively), and Sandomierz (70 kilometers and 50 kilometers, respectively). They were confronted with the main forces of the Nazi Army Group A, based on the 300 km to 500 km deep defense line on the Vistula. The Nazi command authorities, erroneously believing that the Red Army was going to deliver the main strikes in Hungary and Eastern Prussia, concentrated their main forces on the flanks of the Soviet-German Front. That made it possible to ensure a considerable superiority over the adversary at the center of the front: 3.9 times in personnel (2,203,700 and 560,000 servicemen, respectively), 6.7 times in artillery (33,500 and about 5,000 guns, respectively), 5.7 times in tanks and self-propelled artillery systems (more than 7,000 and 1,220, respectively), and 6.8 times in combat aircraft (5,000 and 730 times, respectively). (2)

The Soviet war economy at the second half of 1944-early 1945 enabled the supreme commander to create such large groupings of forces and conduct large scale offensive operations, while allowing the rear services to provide all round support in complex combat conditions. Table 1 gives some quantitative indicators of the production of basic types of weapons, combat hardware, equipment, and ammunition in 1944. (3)

The Table shows graphically that in the second half of 1944 (shortly before the launch of the Vistula-Oder Operation), the main efforts of the Soviet war industry were focused on the production of large caliber artillery guns (from 76 mm and higher), tanks and self propelled artillery guns (mainly medium and heavy types), and combat aviation--that is to say, the most powerful and effective weapon systems and combat assets to engage the adversary in combat and in the operation as a whole.

By the second half of 1944, traffic on all of the country's principal modes of transport increased substantially. Table 2 shows that its growth was ensured above all with railway shipments. At the same time, the share of the air transport component began to increase. In January 1945, compared to December 1944--that is to say, during the period of the most intensive preparations for the Vistula-Oder operation and at the beginning of the operation--loading on railways increased by 971 rail cars per day and unloading by 589 cars a days. (4)

The growing numerical strength of troops, especially in the regular army, as well as the highly mobile, maneuverable and dynamic character of combat action substantially increased their needs for material and technical supplies. Thus, whereas in 1943, Soviet troops consumed 3,261,000 tonnes of fuel and lubricants and 4,417,700 tonnes of bread and baked products, in 1944, the numbers increased to 3,846,000 tonnes and 5,468,000 tonnes, respectively, with 55,000 more rail carfuls of ammunition sent to the fronts.

The condition of the country's economy in 1944 helped considerably increase the rear services' logistic capabilities. Thus, whereas in early 1943, the railway troops had a total numerical strength of 196,000 servicemen, in late 1944, it reached 253,000 (5) with railway operation and maintenance brigades beginning to be formed, each structurally organized with three operation and maintenance regiments. In early 1945, based on brigade command and control centers, military operation and maintenance front directorates were deployed: They were designed to direct the operation of railways beyond Soviet borders.

The numerical strength of the road troops was also growing. By the beginning of the Vistula-Oder Operation, it was approximately 240,000 servicemen. By January 1945, the road troops numbered more than 600 units and agencies of all kinds.

Motor units were also being strengthened. Whereas as of January 1, 1943, the T/O strength of motor transport units was 67,125 personnel with 35,234 motor vehicles, in early 1944, the figures increased to 164,733 and 78,733, respectively. (6)

The administrative support structure that had evolved by the beginning of the operation effectively met the war needs. Interaction and synchronization of efforts between administrative support agencies and combined-arms operational formations substantially improved with command and control agencies playing a greater role in the provision of logistic support.

The expanding work load of administrative support agencies required a further increase in material and technical logistic support assets. At the same time, the highly mobile and maneuverable character of combat action brought about the need for administrative support units and agencies capable of maneuvering in the course of combat operations and providing troops with all types of material and technical supplies in a timely manner. In this connection it should be noted that by the beginning of the Vistula-Oder Operation, administrative and logistic support units and agencies did not as yet feature sufficient mobility so special priority was given to increasing the number of rail, motor, and road transport units and formations. At the same time, the number of fixed site agencies in the regular army was being reduced; the amount of motor transport facilities and their capacity was constantly growing; transport aviation was widely used for logistic supplies and evacuation; and the organizational structure of administrative and logistic support units and agencies was improved considerably. In all, by that time, the Rear Services of the Red Army had 13 motor transport brigades, 49 independent motor transport regiments, and 222 independent motor transport battalions. The coefficient of technical readiness of front and army motor transport facilities as well as the coefficient of their utilization increased substantially. (7)

On Polish territory, where the Vistula-Oder Operation was conducted, Rear Services administrative and logistic support units and agencies were to perform a number of new tasks, namely: make an effective use of the country's railways and highways as well as of its waterways; use new procedure in ensuring the procurement of agricultural produce; provide assistance in the reconstruction of the country's war ravaged economy; and provide assistance to the local population, citizens of other countries subject to repatriation, and prisoners of war. Such matters were dealt with in accordance with the resolutions of the State Defense Committee (GKO) and military councils of the fronts, jointly with USSR civilian agencies and departments that were tapped in implementing particular measures.

The great scale of the upcoming operation required a wide use of railways. Because railways in Poland and Germany had a narrower gauge than in the Soviet Union, in October and November 1944 the GKO issued special resolutions whereby the operation of railways to the west of the Vistula was to be based on the West-European gauge. In order to reload combat and transport hardware, weapons, ammunition, fuel, and foodstuffs from the allied gauge to the West-European gauge, the GKO ordered the creation of transshipment bases under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat for Defense Center, subordinated to the chief of the Red Army Rear Services (they were also tasked with the transshipment of wounded and sick evacuated from the fronts to hospitals in the country's hinterland areas, to which end special field hospitals were deployed in basing areas). In order to provide assistance in the industrial reconstruction effort as well as in setting up the operation of transport and operation and maintenance agencies in the territory of Poland that was liberated by that time, the GKO created special agencies, attached to the chief of the Red Army Rear Services (thus, to restore the operation of the Dombrows, Upper Silesian and Low Silesian coal basins, a special directorate was created, which was headed up by Gen. M.P. Milovskiy).

By late 1944-early 1945, the volume of material and technical equipment captured from the enemy increased considerably. In 1944, the Trophy Service was placed under the command of the chief of the Red Army Rear Services, while as of February 1945, by the time the Vistula-Oder Operation was completed, the chief of the trophy directorate (department) of a front (army) was at the same time also deputy chief of a front's (army's) rear services.

Communication lines of the First Belorussian and the First Ukrainian fronts passed through territories where enemy agents, hit and run units, and remnants of routed enemy troops were still active. They attacked rear services units and agencies, blew up railway tracks and trains, and attacked motor convoys. To protect and defend front rear areas, the following forces and assets were used: troops under the jurisdiction of the USSR People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) (for example, on the First Belorussian Front there were four NKVD regiments), reserve regiments, Air Defense units and large combined units (antiaircraft artillery covered 82 rear services installations in staging areas, including 13 bridges across the Vistula, 31 railway nodes, and a large railway station) (8) as well as motorized rifle subunits. Yet it was impossible to fulfill all defense and protection tasks with attached forces (troops) alone. There was also a need to raise the combat proficiency of personnel and to enhance the combat readiness of rear service units and agencies. Under a GKO resolution dated December 18, 1944, On Protecting Rear Services Areas and Communication Lines of the Regular Army, six rear services protection divisions were formed on foreign territories, one of those divisions beginning to perform its missions already in the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation. All of those measures considerably enhanced the survivability of rear services as well as their performance.

Measures were implemented to bring rear services units and agencies subordinated to central Rear Services agencies closer to the front line. As early as June 1944, several hospitals under the jurisdiction of the USSR People's Commissariat for Health were redeployed to Belorussia from Baku and Kaluga; by August, hospitals with a total capacity of 40,375 beds were moved to Belarus and the Ukraine. (9) In all, in the second half of 1944, 190 evacuation hospitals and casualty clearing stations, and 43 other medical establishments were redeployed from the country's hinterland to the front line.

Front line hospital bases were deployed on the eastern bank of the Vistula River. Specialized hospitals of the First Belorussian Front (in the area of Pulawy) were based three to four kilometers, while those of the First Ukrainian Front 10 kilometers to 15 kilometers from the front line. In the Demblin area, battle field hospitals were separated from enemy forces only by the Vistula. Some of them were deployed at army hospital bases while some army hospitals were set up at the location of divisional medical battalions. During the preparation of the operation, medical establishments on all levels were cleared of wounded and sick to the maximum degree possible, as a result of which by the beginning of the operation, the First Belorussian Front had 85,258 free beds while the First Ukrainian Front had 103,700. (10) The fronts also had a reserve of medical agencies and facilities to ensure maneuver, if necessary, in the course of the operation. Thus, the army hospitals of the main front group on the First Belorussian Front were almost completely closed and transferred to the reserves.

At the same time, the NKO's central artillery, gear and equipment and other depots were redeployed to Belorussia and the Ukraine.

Rear Services agencies had considerably more time to prepare for the Vistula-Oder Operation than they had had for the preparation of many previous operations. Thus, troops of the First Belorussian and the First Ukrainian fronts (rear services commanders Lt. Gen. N.A. Antipenko and Lt. Gen. N.P. Anisimov, respectively) had advanced to the Vistula as early as in the first half of August 1944. The immediate preparation of the operation, at the most critical time, however, was reduced by eight days (due to the difficult situation of the Anglo-American forces following the Nazi breakthrough of their front in the Ardennes, the day set for the launch of the offensive operation was moved forward from January 20 to January 12). Organization of logistical support for the operation during the preparation period was characterized by the movement of rear services units and agencies to front line troops to the maximum degree possible. Thus, their first echelons were positioned 25 kilometers from the front line; second echelons, 70 kilometers to 80 kilometers; and third echelons, 200 kilometers to 220 kilometers. On the whole, the depth of the fronts' rear services areas was 200 kilometers to 250 kilometers and of the armies (including combat rear services) 85 kilometers to 130 kilometers. The deployment of combat services agencies on Vistula bridgeheads, where a large number of troops and combat hardware and equipment were concentrated, was especially challenging.

By the beginning of the offensive operation, the following reserves of material and technical supplies were created on the fronts: ammunition from 1.4 to 9.9 units of fire; fuel and lubricants, from 3.3 to 14.1 unit-miles; and foodstuffs, from 7.8 to 65.3 daily rations, which on the whole ensured the troops' needs (see Table 3). (11)

Storing large amounts of fuel posed some difficulties since the fronts did not have sufficient storage capacity. In this connection, a part of front line reserves was stored at NKO fixed site depots and bulk oil tanks a large distance away from the front line. To expedite the shipment of fuel, 200 liter containers were prepared at some depots in advance, and droppable fuel tanks were prepared in the event that fuel would have to be air-lifted.

High priority was given to the maintenance and repair of roads and highways. By the beginning of the operation, two front line military highways and two lateral roads were prepared on the First Belorussian Front, with a total length of 1,000 kilometers. On the First Ukrainian Front there were three such roads. Each army on both fronts had two to three military highways, 25 kilometers to 40 kilometers each, which helped to make the maximum possible use of army road units to pursue the retreating enemy troops. (12) Special attention was given to reconstructing destroyed bridges and building new ones (the First Ukrainian Front built 11 bridges and river crossing sites in the Sandomierz area alone).

To ensure supply movement, the First Belorussian Front had 3,749 motor vehicles; the armies had 4,407 motor vehicles with a total capacity of 14,864 tonnes, while the divisions had 3,019 vehicles (5,874 tonnes). The First Ukrainian Front and its armies had a total of 7,389 motor vehicles. Although the railroads leading to the Vistula had been restored a long time before the operation began, motor transport accounted for a substantial share of operational and supply shipments (from December 1 until January 10, the front line transport facilities of the First Belorussian Front carried 274,974 tonnes of various cargoes).

The troops of the First Ukrainian Front launched the offensive from the Sandomierz bridgehead on January 12, while the troops of the First Belorussian Front began from the Magnuszew and Pulawy bridgeheads on January 14. By the character of tasks performed in the course of the offensive, the Vistula-Oder Operation can be divided into two stages. Stage 1 -- from January 12 through January 17. During this time, the troops of both fronts broke through the enemy defense lines on a 500 km frontage to a depth of up to 160 kilometers, routed the main forces of Army Group A, and ensured favorable conditions for the operation to rapidly advance to a great depth. Stage 2 began on January 18 and lasted until February 3. The troops of the First Belorussian Front and the First Ukrainian Front, in close interaction with a part of forces of the Fourth Ukrainian Front and with assistance by the Second Belorussian Front, routed advancing enemy reserves, took the Silesian industrial area, and, reaching the Oder River on a wide frontage, seized several bridgeheads on its western bank from the line of march, thus setting the stage for an assault on Berlin. In the depth and the rate of offensive, the front line operations were strategic. Combined arms and tank armies conducted a series of subsequent operations, the first of which (to a depth of 150 km to 180 km) the combined-arms armies accomplished within five to six days at a rate of 30 km a day, while the tank armies (150 km to 350 km) within five to 10 days at an average rate of advance of up to 45 km a day (on some days their daily advance was up to 70 km). Taking advantage of their high mobility, the tank armies acted in separate sectors, bypassing areas of resistance and separating from the main forces of combined-arms armies 45 km to 100 km.

The high pace of the offensive complicated the operation of the rear services with logistic units and agencies having to move to a large depth, which also complicated rear service command and control. At the same time, as it had to retreat rapidly, the adversary did not have the time to destroy roads and blow up its depots and material and technical assets. Ammunition expenditure turned out to be less than planned and was considerably lower than in the course of preceding operations (it declined in pursuit of the adversary, increasing considerably, however, as the troops approached the Oder and began fighting for bridgeheads on its western bank). The expenditure of material and technical supplies in the course of the operation was: ammunition, 0.17 to 2.9 units of fire; fuel and lubricants, 1.8 to 1.85 unit-miles; and foodstuffs, from 21 daily rations. (13)

The organization of rear services command and control during the operation was characterized by continuity and stability. Front line rear services commanders had high capacity communication nodes at their disposal. Rear services command headquarters staffs were always up to date on the operational situation on the ground, which enabled them to make timely and effective decisions.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the Vistula-Oder Operation, brilliantly carried out by the troops of the First Belorussian Front and the First Ukrainian Front, was marked by a great scale, the difficult conditions of the deployment of troops and rear services on bridgeheads, and also the fact that it was conducted outside Soviet state borders. All of that had a direct impact on the performance by the rear services. The key ingredient to the operation's success was its thorough preparation. Rear services units and agencies and the reserves material and technical supplies were deployed in proximity to the front line--to the maximum degree possible, which created favorable conditions for logistical support and combat service support.

Analysis of the organization and provision of logistic and combat service support of troops in the Vistula-Oder Operation as well as in the course of armed conflicts in the recent period leads to the following conclusions.

* First, this analysis confirms that success of combat service and logistic support can be achieved only with the maximum possible level of centralization of rear services command and control. In this connection, subordination of the railway troops as a major structure ensuring the organization and conduct of reconstruction and repair works to the Defense Ministry was an expedient decision. It should also be borne in mind that transport movement planning and organization in wartime should be ensured by the Rear Services headquarters according to General Staff plans and requisitions.

* Second, the increasing role of the motor transport and the air transport component has become a stable trend: They have emerged as important structures for the delivery of material supplies and for maneuvering them. This necessitates the inclusion of sufficient ground and air transport reserves into the strategic and operational levels.

* Third, in present day conditions, troops should have sufficient capability to perform air landing operations and act independently behind enemy lines in prolonged separation from the main forces, conduct combat action with a "reversed" front, quickly switch from one type of combat action to another, carry out daring hit and run raids, fight under encirclement and break the encirclement, and execute rapid retrograde movement. Combat actions by troops, diverse in character and content, will in the future require the rear services to show greater combat readiness and mobility in providing combat service support. It is necessary to work out theoretical foundations and provide constant training to rear services structures on all levels in the interest of ensuring reliable material and technical support for such actions as well as to make troops more logistically independent and self-sufficient.

* Fourth, the combat service and logistic support system both in the character of action and the tasks performed, is the least protected, as compared to other combat support systems and the most vulnerable among them to enemy weapon systems which have become immeasurably more powerful and effective. So the survivability of the combat service and logistic support system and its ability to effectively operate under the extreme conditions of the combat and operational situation is highly topical now. To this end, it is necessary to create a system of all-round protection of combat service and logistic support installations against enemy strikes, comprised of general and specific protection subsystems. The former should be comprised of operational-strategic command assets and forces--reconnaissance and anti-precision guided weapon, air defense and EW systems, also including operational-strategic measures and activities to counter all types of enemy reconnaissance, performing about 30 percent to 40 percent of tasks of ensuring defense against precision guided weapons. The latter subsystem, designed to conceal and camouflage combat service and logistic installations and facilities against various destruction effects and impacts, can comprise a system to provide early warning about a possible strike with precision guided weapons and to defend against them as well as individual and collective subunit protection complexes, etc. (its share of tasks is 60 percent to 70 percent). It goes without saying that the survivability of the combat service and logistic support system should be ensured through effective ground based defense and protection of all installations and facilities.

* Fifth, it is very important that concentration of the main combat service and logistic support efforts in combat and operation in present day conditions differs greatly from that, e.g., in the Vistula-Oder Operation. Whereas in the past, 23 divisions and 5,342 guns and mortars were deployed on the relatively small Magnuszew bridgehead and 16 divisions and 3,324 guns and mortars on the Pulawy bridgehead, held by the First Belorussian Front (ammunition, material, technical and even medical supplies--on the ground, in close proximity to fire positions), today this is fraught with the loss not only of all the reserves and supplies prepared for combat but also with a complete failure of an operation. It is also vital to ensure a high level of forecasting of combat (operation), dispersal of supplies not in the narrow sectors of action, as before, but in extensive areas, as well as the availability of highly mobile, maneuverable ground and air transport facilities.

* Sixth, the combat service and logistic support system, its structure and preparation in peacetime should ensure the commitment of troops without any complex reorganization. In other words, the rear services must be always ready to conduct combat operations.

NOTES:

1. Operatsii sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg., Vol. 4, Voenno-nauchnoye upravlenie Generalnogo shtaba, Moscow, 1959, p. 97; Vislo-Oderskaya operatsiya 1945, Vol. 2, Voennaya entsiklopediya, Moscow, 1994, pp. 100-102.

2. Istoriya Tyla rossiyskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil (XVIII-XX vv.), Book 3, MO RF, St. Petersburg, 2000, p. 463.

3. Ibid., p. 356.

4. Ibid., p. 359.

5. Istoriya Vtoroy mirovoy voyny, Vol. 10, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1979, p. 26.

6. Avtomobilnyy transport v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne. Perspektivy yego razvitiya i ispolzovaniya v sovremmennoy voyne, Leningrad, 1960, p. 67.

7. Istoriya Tyla rossiyskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil, p. 368.

8. TsAMO (Central Archives of the Defense Ministry), rec. gr. 67, inv. 20087, file 277, page 11.

9. Istoriya Tyla rossiyskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil, pp. 374-375.

10. Ibid., p. 468.

11. Ibid., p. 466.

12. Ibid., p. 467.

13. Ibid., p. 469.

Col. V.I. FILONOV

Candidate of Military Sciences

Col. M.A. VILINOV (Ret.)

Candidate of Military Sciences

Table 1 Production of Arms and Military Equipment in 1944

                                          Number (in thousands)
Type of Product                          First Half  Second Half

Rifles and carbines                       1,258       1,192.0
Submachine guns                           1,003.5       967.3
Machine guns                                230.5       208.6
Mortars                                       3.7         3.4
Guns of all types                            61.6        60.8
  including 76-mm and larger caliber         27.1        29.0
Tanks and self-propelled artillery guns  13,819      15,163
  including heavy and medium caliber     10,191      11,636
Aircraft                                 19,595      20,646
  including combat aircraft              16,295      16,910
Shells and mines                            111.9       107.0

Table 2 Cargo Traffic in 1944 (in billions of tonnes-kilometers)

Mode of Transport  First Half  Second Half

Rail               132.3       149.0
Sea                 17.1        17.1
River               11.1        11.1
Road                 1.7         1.7
Air                 19.7        31.5

Table 3 Reserves of Material and Technical Supplies by the Beginning of
the Operation

                   The First Belorussian     The First Ukrainian
Title                     Front                  Front

                           Ammunition (in units of fire)

 82-mm mines              4.2                   4.0
120-mm mines              5.0                   4.0
 76-mm PA shells          3.1                   3.5
 76-mm DA shells          3.3                   Up to 4.0
122-mm (G) shells         3.4                   Up to 3.5
122-mm (D) shells         5.5                   Up to 4.0
152-mm (G) shells         9.8                   Up to 4.0
152-mm (D) shells         5.4                   Up to 3.5
203-mm shells             6.7                   Up to 4.0

                       Fuel and Lubricants (in unit-miles)

Motor gasoline            4.3                   5.1
Diesel fuel               3.4                   4.6
Aviation gasoline        14.1                   9.4