Combat employment of special units on mountainous terrain.

Mountain-mass occupies a considerable part of territory on all continents. In wars of the slave-owning and feudal eras, combat action on difficult mountainous terrain was conducted occasionally, affecting mainly populated and accessible areas. With the appearance of large armies (18th-19th centuries), the scope of military operations began to steadily expand, including on hard of access, rugged mountainous theaters. That brought about the need for special mountain units.

Mountain troops evolved gradually, over a long time. The process unfolded differently in European and Asian states. Such troops were also called differently. Say, in France and Italy they are designated alpine; in Germany, Greece, Turkey, and Russia, mountain infantry; in Austria, Tyrolunits, and in China, light infantry. In the armies of all states, mountain troops had a special T/O structure and received special mountain combat training.

A prototype of special mountain troops units in European armies were Jaeger detachments, a variation of light infantry designed to accomplish close envelopment, turning movement, and outflanking on flatland and rugged terrain. The word "Jaeger" (chasseur, hunter) emerged during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648). Jaeger teams as special subunits spread in the course of the Seven Years' War (1756-1763). In the Russian army, the first Jaeger type battalion was formed by P.A. Rumyantsev, in 1761, in the course of the siege of Kohlberg Fortress. During the Russo-Turkish war (1768-1774), all infantry regiments in the Russian army had Jaeger teams which were used to conduct reconnaissance, accomplish turning and flanking movement, and operate on rugged mountainous terrain. By the beginning of the 1812 War, there were 62 Jaeger regiments in the Russian army. During the Caucasus War (1817-1864), Jaeger cavalry teams acting as light infantry made daring raids behind enemy lines, penetrating enemy positions by mountain paths.

Employment of an increasing number of troops for action on mountainous terrain required special weapons adapted to combat operation in rugged terrain. As a result, in the late 18th-early 19th century, a new kind of surface to surface artillery had evolved--mountain artillery. The first 12-gun mountain battery in the Russian army was formed in 1842. It was armed with mountain "unicorn" pieces [Russian smoothbore artillery pieces] and howitzer-mortars. Subsequently, a 2.5-inch mountain gun and a 76-mm mountain gun were created in 1883 and 1909, respectively. Later on, light guns and howitzers appeared that could be carried in disassembled form, which enabled artillery to accompany and provide combat support to infantry in hard of access mountainous regions, delivering fire with a high angle of elevation from both indirect and direct fire positions.

In the 19th century, special mountain units and subunits were formed in the armies of many states. It is noteworthy that it was before outbreak of World War I that the theory of mountain warfare began to evolve. One of its founders was F. Engels who, in his work, Gornaya voyna prezhde i teper, (1) studied the conduct and concept of wars on mountainous terrain in the past. K. Clauzewitz made a significant contribution to the theory of mountain warfare. His work O Voyne contained sections Oborona v gorakh [defense in mountain areas] and Nastupleniye v gorakh [offensive in mountain areas], assessing the impact that mountainous terrain has on the conduct of war. Clauzewitz pointed out in particular that before the Thirty Years' War, with imperfect firearms, mountain warfare was limited, but beginning in the second half of the 18th century, the situation turned around. With the increasing numerical strength of the army, he wrote, the course of the evolution of tactics since the Middle Ages eventually brought mountainous terrain into the orbit of military action. (2)

World War I, which in its geographic scope and methods of conduct, greatly differed from all previous wars, had a major impact on the formation and combat employment of special mountain units. It was the first war of the "machine" period with the use of million-strong militaries armed with a large number of weapons and military equipment. From the very start, military operations covered a substantial part of Europe, Asia, and Africa, including mountainous regions. The main military events unfolded on the West-European (French) and East-European (Russian) theaters of operations, but there were also theaters with predominantly mountainous terrain--Asian-Turkish, Italian, and Balkans. Military operations were especially active in the Caucasus theater, where the Russian army successfully carried out a number of operations--Sarykamysh, Erzerum, Trapezund, etc.

World War I confirmed the importance of special mountain units as an organic part of armies. German military analyst Meyer noted that the presence of special mountain units, such as Italian alpine troops or the German alpine corps, was indispensable for a military power that had mountainous regions or bordered on such regions. (3)

That view was not shared by all military experts, however. In the 1920s-1930s, a discussion on the issue at hand began in the Soviet military press. Thus, Glagolev and Shleming, in an article, Organizatsiya gornykh voysk (Voenniy vestnik, No. 8, 1926), wrote: "The war showed that there is not a particular need for special mountain infantry. The Russian soldier who grew up on flatland terrain and had never seen mountains in his life quickly adapted to action in the Carpathian mountains at the most difficult period, in the winter of 1914-1915, conducting offensive operations and taking mountain summits."

Yet there were also proponents of a different point of view. For example, P. Agiashvili, in his article Nuzhny li nam osobyye gornyye voyska (Voenniy vestnik, No. 9, 1925) as well as Brilev, in an article, Organizatsiya gorno-strelkovykh chastey (Voyna i revolyutsia, No. 9, 1926) came out in favor of creating mountain infantry units in the Red Army. As a result of scientific debate in many of the world's armies the opinion prevailed that mountain troops were necessary. In that context, A. Badi's book Voyna v gorakh (1927), the work by A.A. Biyazi Osobennosti primeneniya voyennoy tekhniki v gorakh (1936), and a number of works by professor A.G. Korsun on mountain warfare, published in the Soviet Union in the 1920s-1940s, produced a major impact.

The Soviet leadership gave special priority to formation of mountain troops, which had to do with the country's geographic situation. Mountainous borders were 18,500 kilometers long, accounting for 86 percent of the 21,500-kilometer Soviet land border. In the late 1930s, the Red Army adopted new mountain artillery systems: the 76-mm mountain gun (1938) and the 107-mm mountain pack mortar (1938). Mountain rifle troops used T-26 tanks, vehicles and antitank guns.

In 1936, the mountain rifle division TOE was established whereby the unit in question was to have: 12,506 personnel, 7,937 horses, ten T-26 tanks, 12 122-mm howitzers, 36 76-mm mountain guns, 12 86-mm mortars; 48 antitank guns, 102 heavy machineguns, 286 light machineguns, 89 motor vehicles, and 4,252 packloads.

The division was organizationally comprised of three mountain rifle regiments, each regiment including five mountain rifle companies, a machinegun company, a mountain pack battery, and a mortar platoon; an artillery regiment, including three 76-mm mountain gun battalions, one 122-mm howitzer battalion, a tank company, an independent cavalry squadron, an independent engineer battalion, and a CW company.

World War II offers ample material for a study of the combat employment of mountain troops. In their majority combat operations on mountainous terrain were conducted by regular field troops. Lacking both special training and special mountain gear and equipment, field troops nonetheless conducted successful offensive and defensive operations in the mountains. That, however, did not in any way deny the need for special mountain troops.

One distinguishing feature was that in addition to special mountain troops, not only infantry but also tank and artillery units operated on mountainous terrain just as they did on flatland terrain.

Military practice completely overthrew prewar forecasts by some military experts who believed that mountain warfare would be limited and conducted only by specially trained forces. During World War II, mountain theaters became an area of large-scale military operations, in the course of which the Soviet Army acquired extensive experience. Defensive and subsequently offensive operations by Soviet troops in the Caucasus, in 1941-1943; the crossing of Eastern Carpathian mountains by the 2nd Ukrainian Front in August-September 1944; the offensive through the Carpathian mountain ridge in the fall of 1944; combat operations in the Transylvanian Alps, mountainous regions in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; the operation by the 14th Army in the Kirkenes sector in the polar region; and the crossing of the Bolshoy Khinganskiy Ridge by the 6th Army of the Transbaykal Front in August 1945 substantially enriched the world's military art.

Combat operations on mountainous terrain were as a rule conducted in separate, oftentimes isolated sectors with large gaps and open flanks. That created opportunities for a wide use of bypassing and flanking movement by light detachments.

Experience showed that of all ground troops units, mountain rifle subunits proved the most adapted to combat action in mountainous, forested mountainous, and mountainous-desert terrain. They were the least affected by the lack of passable road networks, the time of day or season of the year or difficult climatic conditions. Nonetheless, to operate successfully in mountainous terrain, troops needed special mountain training as well as special gear and equipment. In the offensive on mountainous terrain, rifle subunits, in interaction with subunits of other branches of service, accomplished the same tasks as on flatland terrain, but the pace of their advance was considerably higher: 400 meters to 600 meters a day.

Alpine subunits were as a rule used in the most hard of access sectors for deep turning and outflanking movement, moving along paths parallel to the enemy's escape routes, carrying out daring raids behind enemy lines to seize mountain passes (passages), bridges, and road junctions, and to destroy roads and hold installations along the enemy's escape routes.

All types of artillery were used in mountainous terrain, but mortars, mountain guns, and howitzers proved by far the most adapted to action on difficult, rugged terrain. Artillery widely used direct fire. To improve conditions for fire delivery, some guns, platoons, and batteries were deployed on commanding heights.

The Carpathian-Dukla operation showed that large tank units can conduct effective offensive on mountainous terrain. The offensive strike by the 4th Guards and the 21st Tank Corps in the direction of Tarnavka and Dukla as well as the bold maneuver by the 242nd Tank Brigade going around the Dukla pass on October 1-3, 1944 contributed to the success of the operation by the 38th Army.

Based on that experience, the Soviet command adjusted the organization of the mountain rifle division. According to the new TOE, which was developed in February 1945, the division was to have: three mountain rifle regiments, an artillery regiment, an independent antitank battalion, and an independent antiaircraft battalion. Each mountain rifle regiment was to be comprised of: two mountain rifle battalions, a mountain pack gun (76-mm) battery, an antitank guided missile company, an engineer company, a submachine-gun company, a reconnaissance company, a signals platoon, and a transport company. Each mountain rifle battalion consisted of three rifle, machinegun and mortar companies. An artillery regiment was to have three battalions: two battalions organized with three 76-mm mountain gun batteries and one with two 107-mm mortar battery (six mortars in each).

A comparison of the 1942 and 1945 mountain rifle division TOE shows that during the war the division's combat capabilities and operational effectiveness were basically the same. It is noteworthy, however, that under the 1945 TOE, the regiment consisted not of five rifle companies but of two mountain rifle battalions. That was based on the combat experience which showed that it was difficult for the regiment commander to organize command and control of five rifle companies operating in isolated sectors on mountainous terrain.

Soviet troops were confronted with considerable problems in the course of combat operations in the mountainous-desert terrain in Afghanistan. As it turned out, the large Soviet force that was brought there in 1979 was not sufficiently adapted to mountainous warfare. It was necessary above all to revise the structure and technical equipment of logistic support services and to enable administrative and technical subunits to defend themselves. With that aim in view, motor transport used to deliver materiel, especially ammunition, was provided with armor protection while personnel was issued appropriate weapons. Analogous requirements were made for special support troops, including engineer, CBR, and signals troops, which proved rather vulnerable to enemy attack.

Experience showed that not just any combat equipment was suitable for mountainous warfare. Tanks and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles oftentimes did not have enough room to maneuver and so remained effectively untapped. Artillery pieces did not have sufficient tube elevation or depression angles for direct fire delivery. Some types of mines and mine detectors were ill-adapted to be used on mountainous terrain. In the course of combat action, measures had to be implemented to increase the firepower of motorized rifle and airborne subunits by providing them with automatic grenade launchers, Shmel portable flame throwers, automatic rifles, and grenade launchers mounted under barrel.

At the same time, Grad and Uragan multiple rocket launchers were widely used in mountainous warfare with antiaircraft guns adapted to fire on mountain tops. Automatic rifles were equipped with optical sights. The BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle and the 82-mm Podnos mortars performed very well, as did the AGS-17 grenade launcher. The latest modification of the RPG-7 grenade launcher with fragmentation grenades was used in dismounted combat.

There arose a pressing need for remote mine, especially antitank mine, detection. Furthermore, mine clearing facilities were needed that could enable troops to march at a rate of 25 to 30 kilometers an hour. Because engineer subunits had a shortage of sappers to provide engineer support to motorized rifle subunits, it was necessary to prepare a non-T/O sapper section of seven to eight men in each company.

An artillery observer with a command and control group was attached to each platoon or company to organize more effective interaction with support artillery and aviation, adjust fire and aim and guide aviation. A non-T/O forward air controller was prepared from among commissioned officers or NCOs. T/O forward air controllers were attached to the battalion or regiment while the division had an aviation control group.

Combat experience in Afghanistan can be useful for improving mountainous warfare tactics in contemporary conditions.

Subunits should be ready to conduct combat action independently, in isolation from the main or adjacent forces for a long time. It is also very important to observe the following tactical rules: all movements and changes of position are to be made only once close-in defense has been organized and reliable radio communication set up (movement is only to begin after reliable communication has been set up with the combat command and control center, command posts, checkpoints, outposts and guard forces); earlier organized shelters and positions are not to be occupied because they can be mined by the enemy; subunit commander is the last to withdraw from combat; subunit movement forward proceeds by stages with subunits covering each other; command posts and artillery emplacements are located not closer than 1,500 meters from high ground so that artillery fire can cover approaches to all subunits in defense; subunits performing combat missions advance in column one by one, following sappers (commando raiding parties and support groups move 100 meters to 150 meters ahead of the main forces); each serviceman is assigned an observation and fire delivery sector; a stock of storage cells (up to five sets) is created for each radio station, receiver and observation and illumination device; any movement outside the deployment area (point) is seen as the conduct of combat action; all combat action begins only after thorough coordination organization.

In conducting the counterterrorist operation in the Northern Caucasus, federal troops were confronted with basically the same problems as in Afghanistan.

The brunt in fighting illegal armed formations was borne by combined arms units and subunits, represented mainly by composite regimental (brigade) and battalion tactical groups.

The methods of combat action by motorized rifle and tank subunits largely differed from conventional methods. Tactical order of battle was as a rule more compact, deployed at reduced intervals and distances. Logistics and technical subunits were positioned in close proximity to operational combined arms subunits so that the latter could ensure their protection and defense.

Tactical groups and detachments were created to conduct reconnaissance and search, restraining, and assault action and turning and outflanking movement; protect communications; set up screening forces and security posts; organize ambushes, and provide close support for advancing troops. In addition to tactical groups and detachments, the following unconventional elements of the tactical order of battle were used: mobile combat groups; assault and supporting fire elements; hunter, antiair assault, helicopter borne raiding detachments (groups), armor groups, and helicopter borne mine-laying groups.

Mobile combat groups were used to accomplish independent, impromptu tasks, to counter the enemy's large mobile groups. In accomplishing special tasks, they were reinforced with interior troops, SOBR special rapid-reaction detachments, OMON special-purpose police detachments, and Interior Ministry troops subunits. Assault and supporting fire elements operated as part of raiding, storming, commando, blocking (and sometimes guard) detachments. Their base was comprised of tank and artillery subunits, which ensured an effective combination of firepower, movement and maneuver. Hunter detachments (groups) accomplished the tasks of combating the enemy's reconnaissance, commando, or terrorist groups in conducting combing operations on mountainous terrain, built-up areas or in restraining action. Helicopter borne raiding groups acted as part of raiding and bypassing detachments and were also designed to accompany transport convoys and to prevent ambush action. They played an important role in averting fire strikes, commando and terrorist action by enemy forces. Armor groups were included as part of mobile screening forces, bypassing detachments, outposts, and convoy escort detachments as well as assault detachments in operations in built-up areas. Mobile helicopter borne mine laying groups were created to quickly lay minefields and explosive obstacles at choke points, blocking lines and escape routes.

With the clustered character of mountain warfare the role of small subunits increases considerably. That necessitated the creation of combat groups in motorized rifle subunits, including servicemen of different military specialties.

Mountain warfare training of subunits was a weak point in combat operations in Chechnya. Personnel experienced considerable difficulties in orientation on mountainous terrain, could not always effectively use rugged terrain conditions for covert turning and outflanking movement, camouflage, concealment and cover against enemy observation and fire. There was an acute shortage of mountaineering gear and equipment as well as alpine trainers.

The general conclusion is that today the RF Armed Forces lag behind many foreign militaries in the level of mountain warfare training. Creation of mountain rifle units designed to accomplish missions only in armed conflicts is not quite expedient. Given the difficulty of organizing combat training, deployment, and provision of mountain rifle units (subunits) with a large number of items of equipment it is expedient to develop a TOE structure for "light" units analogous to those that exist in foreign militaries (mountain, light infantry, airborne), designed to accomplish the entire spectrum of special tasks in both an armed conflict and a large scale war.

One distinguishing feature of "light" units should be the absence or a minimum number of T/O models of arms and military equipment of large mass or dimensions and the availability of such a unit of arms and equipment that would enable them to: arrive at a designated area by any transport (including by air) within a minimum time span; conduct independent combat action in isolation from other forces for five to 10 days without additional supplies of ammunition or other materiel (of course with effective fire support from long-range and precision guided weapon systems that are currently in service with the Ground Forces); conduct reconnaissance and obtain intelligence on the company--battalion level in close to real time; accomplish reconnaissance, search, offensive, and defensive tasks with high effectiveness, and so forth.

Thus, successful accomplishment of combat tasks on mountainous terrain (on mountainous theaters of operation) can be ensured by a rational T/O structure of troops, their provision with special (mountain warfare) arms and military equipment, a comprehensive combat training program, a well prepared command and control system, and provision of troops with all necessary special means and equipment (alpine gear, personnel and materiel evacuation facilities, etc.), taking into account the experience in local wars and armed conflicts of recent years.

NOTES:

1. F. Engels, Izbrannyye voyennyye proizvedeniya, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1956, pp. 97-99.

2. K. Klauzevits, O voyne, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1941, p. 87.

3. Meyer, Voyna v gorakh, Gosvoenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1924, p. 17.

Maj. Gen. I.N. VOROBYOV (Ret.)

Doctor of Military Sciences