Coalition warfare: lessons from the American Expeditionary Force.

The relationship lessons from World War I projected forward and reinforced in current models provide tools to overcome potential coalition conflicts. The coalition interactions of General Pershing, Premier Clemenceau, Marshal Foch, and Marshal Haig emphasized the importance of positive relationships among key leaders to create and sustain effective cooperation among allies.

"Coalition Warfare: Lessons from the American Expeditionary Force" is a leadership case study that examines the parameters and relationships among allies and coalition partners during World War I. It focuses on leadership and command relationships of the American Expeditionary Force led by General John J. Pershing and the key leaders from other major coalition partners--France and Britain. The discussion is kept at the strategic and operational level of war and explores individual allies and coalition's aims in deciding the best use of American troops, the confrontations of the key leaders, and the final resolutions that enabled the United States to create an independent expeditionary force in World War I. The United States entered World War I as the relatively new and minor military force in the war. Both Britain and France wanted the United States to fill the role as a force provider with American troops being amalgamated into their armies as troop replacements. Conversely the United States insisted on creating its own armies and corps, commanded by American generals, versus having its forces built into division-level blocks and having those divisions under the corps and armies commanded by allied generals.

The leaders discussed are General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of American Armies; George Clemenceau, the French Premier; Marshall Ferdinand Foch, the Supreme Allied Commander; General Henri Philippe Petain, Commander-in-Chief of French Armies; and Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, the Commander-in-Chief of British Armies.

In the concluding sections, the discussion applies lessons from World War I that are applicable to current conflicts in which the United States is the dominant military power and integrates minor powers to build effective coalitions.

I would rather try to persuade a man to go along, because once I have persuaded him, he will stick. If I scare him, he will stay just as long as he is scared, and then he is gone.

--Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States

Introduction

The United States entered World War I as the relatively new and minor military force in the war. Both Britain and France wanted the United States to fulfill the role as a force provider with American troops being amalgamated into their armies as troop replacements. The United States wanted to enter the war on equal footing with both Britain and France and thereby establish a voice in world affairs.

The United States' rationale for wanting to make its voice heard was rooted in its limited dealings with coalitions and the wars it fought with foreign powers in the 1800s. The War of 1812 saw the United States battling Britain for two reasons. The first reason was the impressing of American sailors into the British Navy, and the second was the American belief that British agents in Canada were inciting Indian attacks across the border. The United States was not directly in a coalition during the conflict, but was taking advantage of conflicts occurring between Britain and France. As a result, France indirectly supported the United States. (1)

A decade later, President Monroe issued the Monroe Doctrine (December 1823). Again the United States was in an indirect coalition as President Monroe announced that any further European domination in the Americas would not be tolerated. He said that knowing full well that the British Navy would defend Latin America from other European powers. (2) In both the Mexican-American War in 1846 and the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States entered into coalitions where it dominated its allies. In the war with Mexico, the United States supported the revolt of settlers in California. (3) In the war with Spain, the United States sided with the people of Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico. The United States dominated those partners, but eventually let them gain independence. Cuba gained independence in 1902, the Philippines in 1946 (after World War II), and Puerto Rico in 1952 when its citizens voted for commonwealth status. (4)

With its entry into World War I, the United States was directly involved in coalitions and wanted to protect itself from foreign domination--the same type it inflicted on Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico. To put the United States on an equal looting with France and Britain, the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, and General Pershing wanted to create an American army fighting under American commanders. Secretary Baker directed General Pershing via a letter of instruction to create and lead a separate and distinct American army, "the identity of which must be preserved." (5) Conflicts arose out of the Allies' differing perspectives on the use of American troops.

In 1917 Britain and France, the dominant Allied powers, were in desperate, almost terminal conditions with respect to manpower. France wanted 500,000 untrained men sent immediately to England to receive infantry training, then be drafted into the French armies. (6) On the other hand, the United States as the up-and-coming power, was pushing for a more active role in building and leading its own forces in battle from the divisional level up. This article will first examine the individual allies and coalition's aims in deciding the best use of American troops, the confrontations of the key leaders, and the final resolutions that enabled the United States to create an independent AEF in World War I. The United States and General Pershing insisted on creating its own armies and corps, commanded by American generals, versus having its forces built into division-level blocks and having those divisions under the corps and armies commanded by Allied generals. The discussion will then apply relevant lessons to current conflicts where the United States is the dominant military power and integrates minor powers to build effective coalitions.

Background and AEF Buildup 

When the United States entered World War I, France and Britain had sustained multiple defeats that decimated their armies. The overall size of the United States military was 208,034, including active and guard units. (7) When General Pershing arrived in France in June 1917, he landed with just 191 officers and men. (8) American troops did not arrive en masse until September 1917, and then the contingent was only comprised of the 1st Division with 14,000 men. (9) Additional American troops flowed in slowly as there was both a shortage of trained forces and ships to transport them from America. This slow influx of troops was insufficient to both stand up an American Army and to bolster Allied divisions. A year later, American troop strength was 1,400,000 (10) and climbed to approximately two million by the Armistice. (11)

The high demand for troops raised the first major conflict between the Allies. In dealing with all the manning amalgamation issues, General Pershing quickly realized that British and French government and military leaders were primarily looking out for their own interests versus that of the coalition. Additionally, General Pershing believed that the coalition needed a Supreme Allied Commander to provide an overall unity of action and coordinated control to eliminate the disjointed strategies. (12)

Each coalition member was theoretically on the same footing as the others. The Entente early in the war was comprised of Britain, France, Russia, and Italy. Of those four, France was the unofficial lead on the Western Front as the front was in France and it provided the majority of forces. As Russia fell out of the war, the United States stepped in to fill the gap. France, and primarily Premier Clemenceau, tried to dominate the coalition throughout the war. The Supreme Allied Command agreement signed by the respective government leaders gave each of the commanders-in-chief of the British, French, and American armies tactical conduct of their armies and the right to appeal to his government requests and demands of the other coalition members. (13) In essence this agreement balanced the hierarchy in the coalition.

AEF Amalgamation

One of the greatest issues facing the Allies in 1917 was a severe manpower shortage. America's entry into the war seemed to end that dilemma. America was unable to immediately send the hundreds of thousands of troops that the Allies needed. America needed to mobilize, and it would take almost a year before the numbers required by the Allies would show up en masse. Where to place those critical assets created a hot and heavy debate among the Allies. Britain and France endorsed amalgamation, where American troops would first flow to them as replacements for their divisions. The Allies' position was that it was a temporary measure to take advantage of European experience in training and leadership and to bring infantry forces to bear more quickly in the conflict. Once manpower conditions stabilized, it would then be possible to create American armies. They also argued that several other benefits would be attained by taking this course of action--American casualties would be lower under tried and true Allied leaders, amalgamation would relieve logistic support structures and associated support troops by using the Allied systems, and it would season American forces that were untried and untested against experienced German forces. In the end, the American commanders would get back their forces that could then be assimilated into a combat ready army. (14)

Allied experience with amalgamation in World War I comprised of folding weakened battalions and regiments together to reconstitute combat units. The British folded in units from different British units and their commonwealth to build their combat power. France combined different French units to make fully manned divisions. Looking to use other major powers, such as America, to fill in the gaps had not occurred on a large scale until 1917.

America, on the other hand, wanted to create its own standing armies commanded and led by American officers. General Pershing presented his own justification for not amalgamating American troops with the Allies--national pride, language difficulties, and negative impact to the US war effort from home (if foreign commanders ran up high American casualty counts as they were doing to their troops), and most importantly, downplaying America's role in the war and the subsequent peace negotiations. General Pershing would and did provide American forces to both the British and French commanders during times of crisis situations, but then only temporarily. (15)

Another contentious issue between the American and Allied leaders was the doctrine of trench warfare. General Pershing objected to the frontal assault and trench warfare mentality of the Allies. He believed that open warfare, taking advantage of soldiers' initiative, and their associated reliance on the rifle, would reduce casualties and break trench warfare. (16) Trench warfare relied on the following:

* Decisions made at the army or corps level with strict large-to-small unit interdependence

* Highly controlled, overarching intelligence on the enemy

* Firepower and artillery dominated battles

* Frontal assaults with detailed tactics

* Limited objectives with highly specific guidelines

Open warfare depended on the following:

* Decisions made at the tactical unit level with small unit independence and initiative

* Reliable and up-to-date combat intelligence on the enemy

* Maneuvers dominated by the use of rifle formations, flanking assaults, deep objectives with vague guidelines to allow the foot soldier to maximize effectiveness

While discussing the ability of American troops to execute open warfare, General Pershing stated, "In my opinion, no other Allied troops had the morale or the offensive spirit to overcome successfully the difficulties to be met in the Meuse-Argonne sector." (17) General Pershing referenced the Battle of Saint Mihiel, to validate the capability of open warfare in actual combat, stating, "For the first time wire entanglements ceased to be regarded as impassable barriers and open-warfare training, which had been so urgently insisted upon, proved to be the correct doctrine." (18) General Pershing's open warfare doctrine influenced future American commanders (such as General Eisenhower) in World War II. Rebecca Grant writing on General Eisenhower, showcased the open warfare lessons learned and the value General Eisenhower placed on them in the following statement:

   The act of writing the guidebook steeped Eisenhower in the
   intricacies of what Pershing liked to call open warfare. These
   American battles did not feature the stalemate, trenches, and
   meat-grinder artillery duels that virtually defined combat on the
   Western Front for most of World War I. By the time American forces
   fought their major engagements, the conflict had changed, and
   doctrine stressed the advantages of speed and mobility.

The beginning of May 1918 was very stressful on Allied leaders, and the coalition was showing signs of breaking up. The French felt the British were husbanding manpower in England and wanted it committed. Although England had a population base of 48,000,000 people compared to France's base of 39,000,000 people, France had 1,000,000 more troops committed than Britain. France wanted Britain's untapped reserves committed and they wanted the British to expand their front lines. The British felt they held more of the active front lines and that they were committed to other fronts. (19) Both agreed that the United States needed to pick up more of the load, and so they approached General Pershing to support the amalgamation of infantry and machine gunners into the Allied armies. The amalgamation issue was an ongoing controversy until 1 month prior to the Armistice.

Secretary Baker, bending to Allied pressure, received approval for Joint Note Number 18 from President Woodrow Wilson on 19 April 1918 giving preferential shipment of 120,000 infantry and machine gun troops during the months of April, May, June, and July for amalgamation into Allied armies. The troops were to be transported by both United States and British transports. (20) On his own, General Pershing, worked a separate deal (later called the London Agreement) with the British in which he agreed to supply 126,000 for the month of May only. (21) The following month in Abbeville, France, General Pershing argued with Premier Clemenceau, Marshal Foch, Prime Minister Lloyd George, and Lord Alfred Milner over the London Agreement versus the earlier Joint Note Number 18 agreement. General Pershing honored the London Agreement for April and May, allowing American troops to amalgamate with the Allies. He held out committing to amalgamation of forces in June and July until later to see if lending troops was really necessary based on more up-to-date German threat analysis. He finally proposed a compromise of continuing troop movement to the Allies in June with the option to expand to July at a later time. (22) This process of give-and-take persisted for the rest of the war. Obviously, Pershing could not stand by and let the Allies continue to be defeated when he had manpower to give.

French Premier Clemenceau put the most pressure of any ally on General Pershing and Marshal Foch to amalgamate American troops into British and French divisions. Premier Clemenceau stated his position in these comments, "For me, the French Minister of War, who day by day saw our ranks grow thinner and thinner alter sacrifices unmatched in history, was there any task more urgent than to hasten, as far as possible, the effect of the intervention of America?" (23) Marshal Foch also pressured General Pershing to amalgamate American forces for two purposes--first, to strengthen Allied divisions, and second, to season American forces. Early American success fighting along side coalition divisions influenced Marshal Foch's approach to integrating American forces in the war as described by Michael Neiberg: "Their early successes were a pleasant surprise and Foch finally agreed to allow the Americans to fight unamalgamated, that is, under their own flag and officers." (24)

Marshal Foch did not technically have the power to either direct the amalgamation of American forces or direct the formation of an American Army. He simply quit pushing the issue. According to the supreme Allied command agreement, no one had overriding authority over another nation. The supreme Allied command could only suggest their desires to American civilian and military leadership. Both President Wilson and Secretary Baker had given their full support and deferred all such matters to General Pershing. (25) General Pershing specifically addressed Marshal Foch's powers in the statement, "Marshal Foch, you have no authority as the Allied commander in chief, to call upon me to yield up my command of the American Army, to have it scattered among the Allied forces where it will not be an American Army at all." (26)

British commanders also wanted to utilize American forces in their armies. In 1918, the British transported, fed, clothed, and trained five American Divisions. After the German spring offensives were stopped, General Pershing asked for the American forces back from the British. Marshal Haig was incensed when General Pershing asked for the divisions back without them participating in battle under British command. Marshal Haig, after being in several meetings with General Pershing, knew there was little use in arguing with Pershing to try to keep the divisions. (27) Marshal Haig put up an amenable front on the sending of the five AEF divisions back to General Pershing with the comment, "I also wrote to General Pershing who thanked me for dispatching the American divisions (over 150,000 men) from me at the height of battle, they would, owing to the present tired and demoralized state of the Germans on this front, have enabled the Allies to obtain immediate and decisive results." (28) The comments show a lack of confidence in American commanders and that Haig believed British commanders could make the best use of the American troops.

As the Allies began to switch from the defensive to the offensive in 1918, Premier Clemenceau became firmer in directing Pershing to commit troops to the Allies. Clemenceau drafted a letter on 11 October 1918 to General Pershing and Marshal Foch advocating the immediate amalgamation of American forces. He stated that, "The letter was certainly pretty strongly worded--it was the hundreds of thousands of dead, the superhuman efforts made for years by our glorious soldiers, that dictated it. It was harsh both to Pershing who did not want to obey, and to Foch who did not want to command." (29) Premier Clemenceau presented the letter to Raymond Poincare, the President of the Republic, who twice had him tone down the letter. The original draft addressed to Marshal Foch contained such language as, "It is our country's command that you shall command." (30)

Premier Clemenceau believed it to be in Marshal Foch's power as the Supreme Allied Commander to command General Pershing to comply with his orders. Marshal Foch did not agree with Premier Clemenceau and commented as follows, "On October 21, he wrote me an urgent letter telling me of the cares that laid heavy on his mind" and that, "Clemenceau finally urged me not to hesitate to appeal to President Wilson himself if indulgence were no longer of any avail." (31) Marshal Foch instead followed his own approach in working with General Pershing. Marshal Foch stated, "As I had daily dealings with the American Army, I obviously had some knowledge of its imperfection. I knew that they were rooted in its youth and inexperience of war, not in the actions or inaction of any of its leaders." (32)

Marshal Foch continued his attempts to persuade General Pershing to amalgamate troops to the last Allied offensive. General Pershing had been positioning the American Army to attack and eliminate the Saint Mihiel salient in the Allied lines. Marshal Foch developed alternative plans splitting the American Army into First and Second Army and having the French Second Army in between and directing American actions. General Pershing thought Marshal Foch was trying to downplay both the Saint Mihiel offensive and America's role in the war. General Pershing responded with, "I absolutely decline to agree to your plan. While our army will fight wherever you may decide, it will not fight except as an independent American Army." (33) Marshal Foch left the conference and tried a different tact as relayed by Michael Neiberg:

   True to his nature, Foch resolved the impasse with tact and
   compromise rather than by trying to force Pershing to see the war
   his way. When Pershing suggested that the Americans had enough men
   to participate in both the Saint Mihiel and a Muese-Argonne
   offensive, Foch agreed and promised to keep the American Army
   together. He then went one step further, placing all supporting
   French troops for the Saint Mihiel operation under Pershing's
   overall command. Instead of Americans under French control, French
   soldiers would be under American control. Foch also placed all
   Allied aircraft under American control. With one brilliant stroke
   of diplomacy, Foch averted a crisis with his American allies and
   saved the critical Saint Mihiel Offensive. (34)

Marshal Foch's understanding of how to work with coalitions and waiting until General Pershing had time to study the proposal was key to swinging General Pershing's support, Marshal Foch's understanding of each coalition member's overall political and military objectives along with their constraints increased his capabilities to lead as the Supreme Allied Commander.

Creation of the Supreme Allied Commander

General Pershing and Marshal Foch both reached the conclusion early on that the coalition needed a supreme Allied commander to provide an overall unity of action and coordinated control to eliminate their disjointed strategies. (35) For a long time, coalition members looked out primarily for their own interests rather than the good of the coalition. The Germans could be attacking a French sector and the British would not intervene until the situation turned critical to the coalition's survival. The Allies would not coordinate their attacks to put the maximum pressure on the Germans. As General Pershing put it, "When one was attacking, the other was usually standing still.... The Germans were thus left free to concentrate their reserves against the threatened point." (36) The allegations that each country was not pulling its fair share of the load fragmented their efforts.

This conflict was happening not only with the commanders hut with the troops as well. Major James Harbord of General Pershing's staff witnessed a fight in a cafe between 40 French and 40 British officers that required the police to break up. Ambassador Walter Page reported friction even between the British forces and their commonwealth forces of Australians and Canadians when he stated, "Nothing could keep these nations together a week but dire necessity." (37)

On 24 October 1917, the Germans attacked Italian forces at Caporetto, Italy where they soundly defeated them. Using storm trooper tactics, the Germans took 300,000 Italian prisoners. A complete disaster was averted when British and French divisions reinforced the Italian's front. This defeat was a prelude that emphasized the necessity for inter-Allied cooperation. If the Allied team did not work together, the German armies would chew them up one at a time. A temporary fix to improve cooperation was to establish the Supreme War Council (SWC). The council was comprised of and headed by the prime ministers of France, Britain, and Italy. Nonvoting military members were Marshal Foch from France, General Bliss from the United States, General Luigi Cadorna from Italy, and General Sir Henry Wilson from Britain. The SWC mission was "to watch over the general conduct of the war," and orchestrate the military operations of the coalition. (38)

The next major setback to the coalition was the March 1918 offensives. The Germans pushed back both the British lines towards the English Channel and French lines towards Paris. The German offensive made it clear that the Allies must work in concert to survive. Coalition national pride was finally set aside and the appointment of a supreme Allied commander became a reality. (39) The British and French selected Marshal Foch to fill that position as the French had the preponderance of forces and Marshal Foch had previously showed the ability to direct coalition efforts when he stopped a German offensive earlier in the war at Flanders. At Flanders, he had successfully used persuasion versus coercion to rally and inspire both British and French division commanders and their troops to stand their ground on the battlefield and repel further German attacks. (40) On the other hand, General Pershing believed selecting Foch was a mistake, as he put it, "an accident." Marshal Foch, at the time, was the head of the SWC's military advisory committee and just happened to be available. Pershing said his selection "was certainly not because of any particular military ability he had displayed up to that moment." (41) As the events of 1918 would prove, Marshal Foch was the right man for the job as he effectively orchestrated the Allies' defeat of Germany.

The Supreme Allied Command agreement concluded by Premier Clemenceau and Lord Milner gave broad powers to Marshal Foch. Premier Clemenceau stated that the agreement provided Marshal Foch "with the strategic command, and the formula was accepted." (42) The text of the new agreement was as follows.

   General Foch is charged by the British, French, and American
   Governments with the duty of coordinating the action of the Allied
   armies on the Western Front, and with this object in view there is
   conferred upon him all powers necessary for its effective
   accomplishment. For this purpose the British, French and American
   Governments entrust to General Foch the strategic direction of
   military operations.

At the request of the English the following phrase was added.

   The Commanders-in-Chief of the British, French, and American
   armies shall exercise in full the tactical conduct of their armies.
   Each Commander-in-Chief shall have the right to appeal to his
   Government if, in his opinion, his Army finds itself placed in danger
   by any instruction received from General Foch. (43)

The United States, Britain, and France signed the agreement. It clearly gave Marshal Foch more power as he now could direct the "strategic direction of military operations." (44) However, by giving Allied commanders the fight to appeal to their government, Marshal Foch could not order them to follow his directions. (45) Contrary to Premier Clemenceau's desires, the additional wording inserted by the British showed words do matter. The British gave themselves an out that allowed them not to follow Marshal Foch's direction if desired. General Pershing used the clause to his advantage in deciding when and if he would amalgamate his troops into Allied divisions.

The fact that Allies will protect their interests over the coalition's interests points to the criticality of having good relations between nations and understanding each nation's aims. Not fully understanding the differing goals of France and the United States caused some of the confrontations between Premier Clemenceau, Marshal Foch, and General Pershing on the issue of amalgamating American troops. Marshal Foch being on friendly terms with the British Expeditionary Force's and AEF commanders proved essential to the Allies in defeating Germany.

The Supreme Allied Commander Model of World War I set precedence for future conflicts involving the United States. Forrest Pogue described General Marshall's view on the validity of having a supreme Allied commander in World War I and its applicability to World War II. Pogue wrote, "Marshall asked that one officer command the air, ground, and naval forces in each theater. He added that the Allies had come to this conclusion late in World War I but only after the needless sacrifice of 'much valuable time, blood, and treasure...." (46) The appointment of General Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force expanded on the World War I model. The World War II directive which further clarified roles and responsibilities is detailed below.

Directive To Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force--Dwight D. Eisenhower

1. You are hereby designated as Supreme Allied Commander of the forces placed under your orders for operations for liberation of Europe from Germans. Your title will be Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force.

2. Task. You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering the Continent is the month of May, 1944. After adequate channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed towards securing an area that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy.

3. Notwithstanding the target date above you will be prepared at any time to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances, such as withdrawal by the enemy on your front, to effect a re-entry into the continent with such forces as you have available at the time; a general plan for this operation when approved will be furnished for your assistance.

4. Command. You are responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and will exercise command generally in accordance with the diagram at appendix. Direct communication with the United States and British Chiefs Of Staff is authorized in the interest of facilitating your operations and for arranging necessary logistical support.

5. Logistics. In the United Kingdom the responsibility for logistics organization, concentration, movement, and supply of forces to meet the requirements of your plan will rest with British Service Ministries. insofar as British forces are concerned. So far as United States forces are concerned, this responsibility will rest with the United States War and Navy Departments. You will also be responsible for coordinating the requirements of British and United States Forces under your command.

6. Coordination of operations of other Forces and Agencies. In preparation for your assault on enemy occupied Europe, Sea and Air Forces Agencies of sabotage, subversion and propaganda, acting under a variety of authorities are now in action. You may recommend any variation in these activities which may seem to you desirable.

7. Relationship with United Nations Forces in other areas. Responsibility will rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff for supplying information relating to operations of the Forces of the USSR for your guidance in timing your operations. It is understood that the Soviet Forces will launch an offensive at about the same time as OVERLORD with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western Front. The Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater, will conduct operations designed to assist your operation, including the launching of an attack against the south of France at about the same time as OVERLORD. The scope and timing of his operations will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. You will establish contact with him and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff your views and recommendations regarding operations from the Mediterranean in support of your attack from the United Kingdom. The Combined Chiefs of Staff" will place under your command the forces operating in Southern France as soon as you are in a position to assume such command. You will submit timely recommendations compatible with this regard.

8. Relationship with Allied Governments. The reestablishment of civil governments and liberated Allied territories and the administration of enemy territories. Further instructions will be issued to you on these subjects at a later date. (47)

Coalition Relationships

Clearly the most critical element contributing to the success of the Allies was the strength of their coalition. What made the coalition work was the relationship each Allied leader developed with the others. The relationships were not always sterling as the poor rapport between Premier Clemenceau and General Pershing would attest. Both Premier Clemenceau and General Pershing sometimes pushed their own independent agendas versus overall coalition agendas. However, the Allies did meet the overriding goals as a coalition, which were the survival of each nation and the defeat of Germany. No matter what obstacles the Allies faced, they maintained a constant dialogue addressing key issues.

General Pershing displayed an uncanny talent for winning the respect of the French with his actions and sense of humility. He did not roll into Paris as the conquering hero coming to save the day, but instead showed his respect to the French flag and Napoleon's tomb. (48) Showing respect due the Allies was a highly diplomatic move on his part as it would take several months before American troops would arrive, be trained, and serve in offensive operations. (49) General Pershing respected leaders who were direct and laid the issues clearly on the line. According to Marshal Haig, General Pershing respected him for always being frank and forthright.

   When he was going he thanked me for being quite outspoken to him.
   [Haig speaking] At any rate, I always know when I am dealing with
   you what your opinion is on the question at issue. This is not
   always the case with the French. (50)

Even though he was cognizant of respecting the Allies' culture and traditions, General Pershing was extremely hard to work with. Marshal Haig commented on the turbulent relationship with Americans.

   At the Conference of the Supreme War Council a great deal of time
   was wasted discussing the agreement made by Lord Milner and
   General Pershing regarding bringing 120,000 American Infantry
   to France in May to join the British Army. I thought Pershing very
   obstinate, and stupid. He did not seem to realize the urgency of the
   situation. (51)

Marshal Haig recognized what General Pershing wanted to accomplish with an American army, but had no confidence in the American leadership's capability to build an effective force. Marshal Haig documented:

   He [General Pershing] hankers after a great self-contained American
   army but seeing that he has neither commanders of divisions, of
   corps, nor armies, nor staffs for same, it is ridiculous to think
   such an army could function unaided in less than 2 years' time. (52)

The total picture of General Pershing's personality varies from the hard line, highly-disciplined, and hard-to-work-with officer above to a dynamic, innovative, and compassionate leader. He continually strived to gain knowledge through education. Prior to entering the military he was a schoolteacher. He earned a bachelor of arts degree prior to attending West Point. Assigned as a professor at the University of Nebraska, he reshaped the cadet program, earned a law degree, and entered the bar. He eventually taught at West Point as an assistant instructor of tactics. Doctor Frank Vandiver summed up his approach to academic life and also military life in the following statement. "Pershing learned from every experience and turned knowledge to good purpose." (53) General Pershing's approach to dealing with friends and enemies varied with the situation at hand. He preferred a tactful approach, but would also use a harsher, more unyielding approach to meet his goals and missions.

General Pershing spent the early part of his military career putting down an insurgency in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War. There he demonstrated how to successfully treat an enemy or friend from both a chivalrous manner and a position of power. Instead of initially confronting the Moro warriors and sultans with force, he sent letters written in Arabic advocating friendship and mutual assistance. Several of the Moro natives that accepted the proposal grew to trust General Pershing. He subsequently stormed the forts of the Moros that continued the insurgency and soundly defeated them. He treated all Moros, both friend and enemy, with dignity, eventually gaining their cooperation. General Pershing's obituary emphasized the point in the statement, "When at last they [the Moros] came to know he meant to help rather than humiliate them they, too, trusted." (54)

On such a critical issue to him as the amalgamation of American forces, he stood firm against the Allies. That firmness and dedication to building an American Army paved the way for America to become a premier world power. America's prominent position in world affairs today is largely the result of Pershing's activities in Europe. His obituary also addresses that contribution in the following words:

   If he had less firmly insisted on an independent American Army,
   and American soldiers were divided among English and French
   forces, the power of the American government at the peace
   conference would have been negligible and the American nation
   would not likely be the world power it is today. (55)

Even though personalities made relationships more complicated, the Allied leaders always interfaced and together, arrived at solutions to issues. During the Versailles Conference in June 1918, there was a deadlock with Pershing on giving priority shipment of infantry for June and July. Pershing wanted to ship both combat and combat support forces to build up the American Army. The impasse was resolved and a compromise occurred when General Pershing suggested that Marshal Foch, Milner, and himself meet privately. The Allied viewpoint was that Pershing was inflexible and focused too narrowly on his army and not the coalition's best interests. Overall, the Allied leaders and their staff felt that dealing with General Pershing was always a painful affair. (56)

Marshal Foch's tact in working with each Ally went the furthest with maintaining cooperation among the leaders. Marshal Foch stated his philosophy on working with the Allies and the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) alter the war with the comments,

   Thanks to my interpretation of the Supreme Command, I maintained
   continuous contact with my colleagues, and we worked together
   intelligently in an atmosphere of friendliness and even affection. I
   thereby succeeded in obtaining the utmost efforts out of various
   foreign armies under my orders. (57)

He also added:

   We have to treat men, and especially men of a different nation,
   according to what they are, and not according to what we would
   like them to be. I therefore continued my method of patience and
   persuasion as opposed to severity and constraint. (58)

Marshal Foch was not without his detractors and received criticism from not only his own country, but from Britain and America as well. Marshal Foch attempted to play the honest broker with all the Allies and took shots from all sides as he mediated and directed strategic and operational issues. "Balancing French and British interests proved to be one of his most difficult tasks. Every decision he made appeared to French generals to benefit the British, while those same decisions appeared to British generals to help France." (59)

Premier Clemenceau wanted Marshal Foch to take a harder stand with General Pershing by ordering him to comply. Premier Clemenceau chastised Foch's actions and threatened him over the approach he took as referenced in the statement, "M. Clemenceau upbraided me for showing him too much patience and indulgence" and declaring, "You will answer to France for it he told me one day." (60) The success of the American Army in the Saint Mihiel offensive and subsequent operations vindicated Marshal Foch's judgment and approach to dealing with the American Army and General Pershing.

Premier Clemenceau did not necessarily care to understand his allies and their requirements or aims as a sovereign nation. He preferred using a brute force approach to get what he wanted for France. He wanted more out of America in terms of amalgamation, and the earlier America complied with his wishes the better. He saw no utility in an American Army as a fighting force. Additionally, he was not necessarily excited about America gaining a powerful post war voice as a result of having an independent army. He became very impatient with General Pershing toward the later half of 1918 as relayed by Marshal Foch,

   Yet towards the end of the War, M. Clemenceau deemed that the
   American Army was not putting forth all possible effort. He
   attributed this to its commander, General Pershing. According to
   M. Clemenceau, the American general was seeking to constitute
   an autonomous army with a large and important staff, which
   was to act on its own accord without it paying sufficient
   attention to the operations of the other forces. (61)

What enraged Premier Clemenceau about General Pershing was the slow introduction of American troops into battle. Premier Clemenceau saw France's manpower and its future decimation with each battle that passed. He wanted America to share the burden and troop losses. He articulated that in this statement, "General Pershing, in a friendly but obstinate fashion, was asking me to wait until he was in possession of an army complete in every part, and I went on insisting, in a state of nervous exasperation, while my country's fate was every moment at stake on the battlefields, which had already drunk the best blood of France." (62) Clearly one nation cannot demand that another nation act against its best interests as Premier Clemenceau tried to do. There needs to be some give and take to benefit both nations. Neither can a nation turn away from aiding its allies at critical times, as General Pershing seemed to do.

The hard-nosed relationship General Pershing had was not just with superiors and the upper command structure, but also with his peers. General Petain, Commander-inChief, French armies, whom General Pershing confided in as a peer and who often agreed with his position on amalgamation and the leading of an army, had difficulty in dealing with Pershing. He observed that General Pershing was, "inexperienced and difficult to handle" and that he had "a time bomb in his brain; it took time for him to understand." (63) General Petain also credited early failures of the American forces in battle and their poor logistic operations to General Pershing. He attributed the "American failures to Pershing's inexperience and seeking in vain to effect some form of fusion between the untried Americans and the experienced French.

Petain was joined in this uphill struggle by Foch and Clemenceau, who blamed Pershing's invincible obstinacy for the inability of the Allies to make maximum use of these fine troops." (64) General Petain attempted several avenues to aid the Americans and integrate them into operations. The confrontation finally culminated in General Petain seeking higher authority to make General Pershing comply as documented in the statement, "In October [1918], Franco-American differences came to a head. Because it was clear that Pershing would not take orders from Petain, invoking his status as commander in chief of an army of his own, Petain suggested to Clemenceau that the American commander be placed directly under Foch." (65)

Of the approaches above, the most effective method for motivating and leading a coalition was Marshal Foch's approach of understanding, persuading, and compromising with allies. Premier Clemenceau's hard-nosed approach and Marshal Haig's semi-confrontational-at-first-then-resignation approach when others did not agree with his position did not get the results they desired--the amalgamation of American forces and their earlier commitment to battle. Marshal Foch summed up his successful approach with,

   Thanks to the plans to which I was determined to adhere, I succeeded
   in winning the confidence, goodwill and enthusiasm of General
   Pershing and his subordinates, which steadily increased. In the end,
   they acted entirely on my instructions and did exactly what I
   wanted--and did it with pleasure. (66)

The fruit of the approach was seen when Marshal Foch convinced General Pershing to attack and eliminate the Saint Mihiel salient, then disengage and attack west of the Meuse at a point 60 miles away in less than a 2-week period with an untested army. (67) The Saint Mihiel and Meuse offensives stretched the limits of the American forces. Luckily, the gamble paid off with the American operations helping to expedite the armistice.

Coalition Way Ahead

Coalition shortcomings did not end with World War I. Some examples from recent operations illustrate the issues involved. For example, during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Lieutenant General Hornet attempted to integrate Saudi fighter pilots into the Black Hole planning shop of his Air Operations Center. He assumed that by just adding the Saudi pilots to the Black Hole, his staff would automatically integrate them to their best use. At the end of the war he saw the pilots and asked them how they were treated. Colonel Mohammed Al-Ayeesh, the senior Saudi pilot replied, "They treated me like a dumb officer. The moment I walked in, they shunted me to the side." (68)

Colonel Stig Ermesjoe gives a Norwegian Post 9/11 perspective on the dilemma a small nation faces when working with a larger dominant nation as each strives to meet its national aims. He stated:

   Large nations with global interests will typically use alliances to
   actively pursue their national interest and if possible make any
   alliance a way in which they can employ means in the pursuance of
   their strategic objectives. Small nations, however, may develop
   security strategy on their own, but find themselves squeezed between
   their own nation's interests that at any time are developed through
   the alliance framework. And small nations usually do not have the
   material resources to employ national instruments of power
   decisively. (69)

General Tommy Franks, in testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated how critical positive working relationships between coalition partners are in influencing everything from forward basing and power projection to combat operations. He stated, "Our influence in the region is directly related to an active security cooperation program. USCENTCOM's [United States Central Command] program builds relationships that promote US forces with access and enroute infrastructure." (70)

Relationship lessons from World War I projected forward and reinforced in current models provide tools to overcome potential coalition conflicts such as the ones above. The coalition interactions of General Pershing, Premier Clemenceau, Marshal Foch, and Marshal Haig reemphasized the importance of positive relationships among key leaders to create and sustain effective interface and cooperation among allies.

Two reinforcing models that are appropriate were examined during this research. Both models follow more of Marshal Foch's approach of working hand-in-hand with and persuading your allies. The first model to develop and maintain a good relationship with coalition partners follows Michael Fullan's Framework for Leadership Model. (71) Starting with a moral purpose, American commanders establishing coalitions in the future need to emphasize that the United States' actions are intended to improve world security and the security of our coalition members. With that accomplished, American commanders would continue through the model to Understanding Change. American commanders would help the coalition fully understand the complexities of the mission at hand, their part in it, and our commitment to assist them in any way possible.

The key step, especially at the strategic level, is relationship building. Relationship building helps with innovation and implementation, and reduces resistance at combined headquarters and with member nations. Knowledge Creation and Sharing would be directly correlated to the trust developed in the earlier stages. With a high degree of trust, the parties would be more willing to share insights, plans, and recommendations, therefore improving the coalition command and control (C2) structure and the integration of forces.

The last stage of the model, Coherence Making, would need to be carefully managed by the United States. America would need to be highly cognizant of trying not to strong-arm junior coalition partners into decisions and courses of action (as Premier Clemenceau did) and instead rely on persuasion (as Marshal Foch did). As the stronger coalition partner, America needs to take into account everyone's needs and goals and work to blend them into what is best for the coalition. The goal for America and its allies is to have a functioning and engaging C2 and force structure that is willing to intervene in resolving security crises around the world. Maintaining trust with coalition partners and not aggressively directing strategic and operational actions will help meet US goals in the long run.

The second model that could be used to help resolve issues as they arise is T. Owen Jacobs' Principled Negotiation Method. (72) Under principled negotiation, each partner's aims and constraints are discussed. Here bargaining, or solution resolution, is based on merit. The key to principled negotiation is mutual trust, a positive relationship, attacking the problem and not the parties, finding mutual gains, and maintaining objectivity. Mutual gains in security that all parties can easily recognize are as follows.

* Expanded interface and improvement in commonality of tactics, training, procedures, and C2 for coalition partners

* Improved infrastructure and support cooperation

* Enhanced combat reach for all forces.

Marshal Foch effectively used the concepts of mutual trust and mutual gains to achieve consensus between World War I commanders, and therefore proved this model's validity.

Conclusion

This discussion on World War I leadership provided a critical look at the relationships between the United States and its coalition partners throughout the conflict. Some of the lessons have been ingrained in every operation since. One lesson that became a standard in all coalition operations is the requirement for a supreme Allied commander to provide an overall unity of action and integration of forces at the strategic and operational levels of war. The selection of General Eisenhower to be the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force during World War II is the best example. Other lessons presented need to be retaught and reinforced with each new conflict.

One of the lessons that needs to be reinforced is to treat allies and enemies with respect. General Pershing demonstrated that concept in dealing with the Moros in the Philippines and the French people on his arrival to Paris. Enemies of today may become allies in the future. This was profoundly demonstrated after World War II with West Germany and Japan becoming staunch allies.

Reteaching the lesson to trust and allow innovation in your soldiers is equally important. Open warfare worked for General Pershing predominately because of the ability and initiative of the American soldier. General Pershing's statement brings that home, "In my opinion, no other Allied troops had the morale or the offensive spirit to overcome successfully the difficulties to be met in the Meuse-Argonne sector." (73)

Another key lesson needing emphasis is not to pursue your goals to the detriment of the overall coalition efforts. General Pershing, in not allowing the amalgamation of American troops in the Spring of 1918, increased the risk of the Allies losing the war with Germany before an American Army could be established. At the same time, Premier Clemenceau's one-sided focus on insisting on amalgamation could have denied the Allies an effective new fighting force in the American Army.

The most important lesson from World War I, however, was the importance of relationships among Allied civilian and military leaders. What General Pershing quickly realized was that British and French government and military leaders were primarily looking out for their own interests versus those of the coalition overall. Positive relationships at the key coalition leadership level overcame the self-interest issues. General Jacob L. Devers commenting on World War II coalitions observed the same lesson and stated it clearly:

   The theater commander must bear in mind that he has under command
   professional soldiers and experienced commanders of several nations
   other than his own, who owe their first allegiance to their own
   governments. It is only natural that representatives of another
   nation will examine critically every directive received and decision
   taken by the theater commander, from the viewpoint of their national
   aspirations--political, economic, and military. (74)

Commanders should use the Framework for Leadership and the Principled Negotiation Models as points of departure to build positive relationships with coalition partners. They should look at the leadership styles of past leaders. Premier Clemenceau, in demanding unconditional support from weaker coalition partners, ignored the national needs and aims of coalition partners. Civilian leadership will continue to ask for more than coalition partners can deliver. General Pershing's overprotection of America's national interests with respect to the amalgamation issue nearly jeopardized the coalition overall. Marshal Haig, just resigning to go it alone somewhat in isolation, versus actively engaging the coalition partners when he needed help, also took a poor approach. Marshal Foch, effectively playing mediator between all the other coalition leaders, provided the best approach. His method of attempting to understand each coalition partner's position and using persuasion to bring everyone together made the best use of each Ally and reached the Allies' goal of defeating Germany.

Article Acronyms

AEF--American Expeditionary Force

C2--Command and Control

SWC--Supreme War Council

Notes

(1.) United States Department of State, "United States History: Louisiana and Britain." [Online] Available: http://countrystudies.us/united-states/history-44.htm, 1998.

(2.) United States Department of State, "United States History: Latin America and the Monroe Doctrine," [Online] Available: http://countrystudies.us/united-states/history-48.htm, 1998.

(3.) United States Department of State, "United States History: Texas and War with Mexico," [Online] Available: http://countrystudies.us/united-states/history-60.htm, 1998.

(4.) United States Department of State, "'United States History: Ambivalent Empire," [Online] Available: http://countrystudies.us/united-states/history-78.htm, 1998.

(5.) Donald Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986. 12.

(6.) Smythe, 8.

(7.) Ibid.

(8.) Smythe, 13.

(9.) Smythe. 28.

(10.) James C. Harbord, The American Army in France 1917-1919, Boston MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1936, 400.

(11.) Smythe, 234.

(12.) Smythe, 8.

(13.) Georges Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930, 43.

(14.) Smythe, 69-70.

(15.) Smythe, 70.

(16.) Smythe, 72.

(17.) John J. Pershing, "Primary Documents: John J. Pershing on the Battle of Saint Mihiel, November 1919," [Online] Available: http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/stmihiel pershing.htm, 1923, 4.

(18.) Pershing, 7.

(19.) Smythe, 111.

(20.) Smythe, 109.

(21.) Smythe, 110.

(22.) Smythe, 116-118.

(23.) Clemenceau, 63.

(24.) Michael S. Neiberg, Foch: Supreme Allied Commander in the Great War, Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc, 2003, 72.

(25.) The New York Times, "Obituary: John J. "Black Jack" Pershing: General of the Armies of the United States," The New York Times, [Online] Available: http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/johnjose.htm, 16 July 1948, 9.

(26.) The New York Times, 11.

(27.) Smythe, 171.

(28.) Robert Blake, The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914-1919, London, England: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1952, 325.

(29.) Clemenceau, 81.

(30.) Clemenceau, 83.

(31.) Raymond Recouly, Foch." My Conversations with the Marshall, New York, NY: D. Appleton and Company, 1929, 24-25.

(32.) Recouly, 25.

(33.) Neiberg, 79.

(34.) Neiberg, 79.

(35.) Smythe, 8.

(36.) Smythe, 60.

(37.) Smythe, 31.

(38.) Smythe, 60.

(39.) Smythe, 57.

(40.) Neiberg, 64.

(41.) Smythe, 100.

(42.) Clemenceau, 43.

(43.) Ibid.

(44.) Neiberg, 65.

(45.) Ibid.

(46.) Forrest C. Pogue, "U.S. Army in World War II, European Theater of Operations, The Supreme Command," Department of the Army, Available from: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-ESupreme/USA-E-Supreme-2.html, 1954.

(47.) "Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, Directive to Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force," issued February 12, 1944, Chicago, IL: Encyclopedia Britannica [Online] Available: http:// search.eb.com/normandy/pri/Q00223.html, 1999.

(48.) Smythe, 20-21.

(49.) Smythe, 125.

(50.) Blake, 323.

(51.) Blake, 307.

(52.) Ibid.

(53.) Frank E. Vandiver, "Pershing and the Anatomy of Leadership" United States Air Force Academy, CO: Harmon Memorial Lecture, 1963" [Online] Available: http://www.worldwarl.com/dbc/pervandiver.htm, 5.

(54.) Vandiver, 13.

(55.) The New York Times, 30.

(56.) Smythe, 136.

(57.) Recouly, 22-23.

(58.) Ibid.

(59.) Neiberg, 70.

(60.) Recouly, 23.

(61.) Recouly, 23.

(62.) Clemenceau, 65.

(63.) Herbert R. Lottman, Petain: Hero or Traitor, New York, NY: William Morrow and Company, Inc, 1985, 70.

(64.) Lottman, 82.

(65.) Lottman, 83.

(66.) Recouly, 28.

(67.) Smythe, 174-178.

(68.) Clancy, 530.

(69.) Colonel Stig Ermesjoe, The Global War on Terrorism Post 9/11; Comparison in Ends, Ways and Means Between a Super Power and a Small Nation, Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2004, 13.

(70.) Senate Armed Services Committee, "Statement of Tommy R. Franks Former Commander US Central Command, Lessons Learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom," 108th Congress, Washington, DC: A vailable from:http://search.epnet.com/ login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,uid&db= f5h&an=32Y1791084936, 9 Jul 2003, 7.

(71.) Michael Fullan, Leading in a Culture of Change, San Francisco CA: Jossey-Bass, 2001, 3-11.

Colonel Jeffrey A. Hoffer is the Deputy Commander, 3rd Operations Group, Elemendorf Air Force Base, Alaska. At the time of the writing of this article, he was a student at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.