Civil Society and a Global Norm.

What Should the United Nations Be Doing?

"Civil society" is an arena, not a thing, and although it is often seen as the key to future progressive politics, this arena contains different and conflicting interests and agendas. Global institutions are still the prisoners of a state-based system of international negotiation, and find it exceptionally difficult to open up to non-state participation at any meaningful level. We may dream of "global community", but we don't yet live in one, and too often "global governance" means a system in which only the strong are represented and only the weak are punished. What should the United Nations be doing to reconcile the demands of the different actors who will shape the regimes of the twenty-first century?

When United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan talks of the "new diplomacy," he is echoing a common perception that the characteristics of global governance--the rules, norms and institutions that govern public and private behaviour across national boundaries--are changing in new and important ways. As economic and cultural globalization proceed, the State's monopoly over governance is challenged by the increasing influence of private actors, both for-profit and not-for-profit. There is already a consensus among the donor community that a "strong civil society" is crucial to successful development performance. It is already clear that governance in the next millennium is unlikely to mean a single framework of international law applied through a unified global authority. More likely is a multi-layered process of interaction between different forms of authority (States, citizens and markets), and different forms of regulation (laws, conventions and social norms), working together to pursue common goals, resol ve disputes and negotiate new trade-offs between conflicting interests.

As a result of the political openings of the last decade, civic groups increasingly feel that they have the right to participate in global governance. Much less attention has been paid to their obligations in pursuing this role responsibly or to concrete ways in which these rights might be expressed in the conduct of international institutions and the governance of global regimes. The first set of issues--and by far the most contentious--concerns legitimacy and accountability: who speaks for whom in a civic alliance or network, and how are differences resolved when participants vary in strength and resources? There are really two questions that are being asked: is representation the only route to civic legitimacy in global governance? If so, how "representative" must an organization be in order to qualify for a seat at the global negotiating table?

It is no accident that questions about legitimacy are being raised at a time when civic groups have started to gain real influence on the international stage. In that sense, they are victims of their own success.

Both Governments and civil society face difficult questions in linking different levels of their activity together--local, national, regional and global. For Governments, these questions are somewhat more straightforward, since they have a chain of intergovernmental structures through which debate and decision-making can be linked. The situation is much more challenging for civic groups.

Civil society involvement in global governance cannot be legislated into existence or imposed from above. Nevertheless, the United Nations has a crucial role to play in nurturing this historic shift, both as "midwife" and as "host", in making sure that its own structures and mechanisms are open to participation and serve as role models for the rest of the international community. This is far from the case at present. Since many of the questions concern dilemmas of structure, governance and accountability in international alliances, the United Nations--as the body charged with negotiating and monitoring global standards--has a special responsibility to lead in this field. In its role as "midwife", there are plenty of avenues for action.

First, civic groups, Governments and business need a "safe space" in which to exchange ideas about the practicalities of global governance and the implications for the different actors involved. As far as possible, such discussions should be based on careful analysis of innovative practice, like the Commission on Sustainable Development, not discussions of general principles. Civic groups need more support in developing concrete new approaches to governance, accountability and communications in global networks.

Second, the UN can help to ensure that the playing field for civic involvement is levelled, so as to encourage the broadest possible range of organizations to participate, especially from the South. This will mean additional support for Southern groups to develop new capacities and skills, and to travel to global forums, restrictions on the number of northern groups at the negotiating table, and decentralized mechanisms that relocate the centre of gravity away from New York and Washington, D.C. For example, only 251 of the 1,550 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) associated with the UN Department of Public Information come from the South; the ratio of NGOs in consultation with the Economic and Social Council is even lower. A basic guide to the "rules of the game" would also be useful in selecting NGOs on the basis of the degree of "helpful knowledge' they bring to the discussions.

At present, these rules vary widely and unnecessarily, given that most intergovernmental organizations face common dilemmas. There are other ways of clarifying the rights and responsibilities of access and participation--like an independent ombudsman to arbitrate in disputes between civic groups and intergovernmental organizations, or between NGOs in a network who may feel aggrieved. Humanitarian relief agencies, for example, look set to introduce such a mechanism voluntarily after a period of intensive debate. However, such formal mechanisms may not be welcomed very widely and may be of limited use in practice: the World Bank's inspection panel has had relatively little success in institutionalizing accountability, though it is certainly an advance on what went before.

Most important of all is greater rigour in the debate, in place of the anecdotes, prejudice and confusion that are so common. This applies especially to the vexed questions of legitimacy and representation in civil society, where general statements are often applied across the board to radically different types of organization, forms of participation, issues and requirements. This obscures the discussion of practical alternatives, and renders Governments and intergovernmental organizations vulnerable to the charge that they are using the difficulties of practice to frustrate progress on fundamental points of principle.

Whatever the remaining problems of legitimacy and accountability, structure and relationships, one thing is certain: at the aggregate level, the increasing involvement of civil society in global policy debates in the last 10 years has been a significant force for good. The landmines campaign, Jubilee 2000, the women's and environmental movements, and many others have secured real advances for people on the margins of global progress. As we begin a new millennium, civil society and intergovernmental organizations have reached an historic moment in their relationship with each other. The old antagonisms have largely disappeared, to be replaced by a more complex picture in which there are no easy answers and few issues that generate an immediate consensus. For their part, intergovernmental organizations must be supportive of civic efforts to grapple with this new agenda and committed to meeting their side of the bargain in opening the regimes of the future to global citizen action. Greater openness for civic in volvement in global regimes brings increased responsibilities to play that role effectively, sensitively and in ways which genuinely give voice to the poor. This is a challenge to all civic groups and to all Governments, without whose active support it will be impossible to consolidate the gains of the recent past.

Michael Edwards Is Director, Governance and Civil Society in the Ford Foundation's Peace and Social Justice Program, a former Senior Civil Society Specialist at the World Bank, and author of Future Positive: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, (London: Earthscan 1999). This article is based on a paper he presented to the UNU Conference in Tokyo.