Civil (NGO) - military cooperation: lessons from Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda.

In this decade we have witnessed extensive human rights abuses, massive refugee movements, and the murder of hundreds of thousands of civilians as a result of the civil wars in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. The international community's response to the plight of the people caught between the warring factions in these countries has come in a variety of forms. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including the International Committee of the Red Cross, Medecins Sans Frontieres, CARE, OXFAM, and church relief organizations, delivered vast amounts of emergency humanitarian assistance, medical supplies, water purification equipment, and tents. The United Nations deployed thousands of peacekeepers to protect and assist the NGOs delivering aid and to help terminate the hostilities. Although NGOs and peacekeepers had sometimes worked together in the past, a new working relationship was made necessary by the extremely harsh environments faced by the missions in these countries, where lawlessness was frequently the norm.

This new relationship has not been without its major difficulties. It has been strained by factors such as differing organizational cultures, structures, and decision-making processes, as well as by varying interpretations of impartiality and the use of force. Improved civil-military cooperation is vital to the success of future joint NGO-UN peacekeeping humanitarian operations. An examination of the factors hampering cooperation suggests that there are several means to improve the civil-military relationship.

Coordination mechanisms

Coordination and cooperation are dependent on a series of key factors, including proper communication and consultation, an understanding of each other's cultures, and organizational structures. In the joint humanitarian operations in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, several formal mechanisms were utilized to facilitate coordination, cooperation, and assistance in the field. These included Civil-Military Operation Centres (C-MOCs), established by UN peacekeepers, and On Site Operation Centres (OSOCs), established by UN agencies.

The Civil-Military Operation Centres in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were located in the UN operation's headquarters (HQs) and key field offices. They provided a forum for NGO and UN agency personnel and peacekeepers to discuss the situation at hand: who was doing what where, how to improve cooperation, and how to prevent the duplication of services. All elements of the delivery process were discussed, including the type of UN military assistance, route, departure time, final destination, and participating organizations.

Another civil-military coordination mechanism consisted of On Site Operation Centres (OSOCs), established by the lead UN agency in the country. Weekly coordination and working group meetings were held at OSOCs, where maps and relevant information about the current situation were made available. Meetings and working groups at the OSOC in Rwanda were attended by UN agencies, up to 60 NGOs, and a small United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) peacekeeping liaison team. The presence of the liaison team helped to improve what was already a close relationship, creating a working rapport and serving as the contact point for military assistance, whether in the form of logistics, communications, repairs, medical, planning, or protection.

Informal coordination methods were also frequently used, such as the exchange of liaison officers and personnel between UN peacekeeping contingents and willing NGOs and UN agencies. This process was a practical way of ensuring quick dissemination of information. The exchange of liaison officers and personnel also helped to "put a human face on the relationship between the organization." (1) This channel was not always used, however. The principal explanation, according to interviewed relief personnel, was that information would take too long to travel through several levels of the chain of command before reaching the Force Commander. (2) By that time, the information might be completely irrelevant.

Factors influencing cooperation

Perceptions of the efficacy of cooperation and communication in the civil-military relationship varied. Commanding Officers and senior military officers emphasized that the level of coordination and communication was good, while peacekeepers and relief workers operating in the field stated that the relationship was poorer, in part because there existed a significant ideological gap as a result of different cultures and operating procedures. Although the level of cooperation improved from the operation in Somalia though the former Yugoslavia to Rwanda, six principal factors hampered civil-military cooperation and coordination.

1) Varying cultures and ideologies

Varying cultures and ideologies have a significant impact on the degree of civil-military cooperation, a problem which has been emphasized by past and present relief workers and by military personnel. In general, relief workers see themselves as nonviolent people who have dedicated part of their lives to assist those who are less fortunate, while in most cases peacekeepers are soldiers trained for war. These different mindsets and ideologies contribute to the negative perceptions that many members of these groups have of the other. Some military personnel perceive relief workers as peace activists left over from the 1960s, and they tend to underrate the importance of NGOs in humanitarian crises. This has been manifested by military personnel through chauvinistic attitudes, arrogance, and the dismissal of information and opinions offered by relief workers. This disrespect for relief workers can easily destroy the already fragile level of cooperation and coordination existing on the ground.

In turn, some relief workers view military personnel as macho machine-gun-toting cowboys. The Commanding Officer of one UNPROFOR contingent felt that NGOs perceived peacekeepers to be like MASH fictional characters, with some senior military officers being viewed as incompetent idiots like Major Frank Burns. (3) Such attitudes can also damage the fragile cooperation on the ground.

2) Organizational structures

The organizational structures of UN forces and NGOS are for the most part polar opposites. The field command and control structure of a UN peacekeeping force is vertical. Authority flows from top to bottom, from the Force Commander to the commanding officers of national contingents to platoon commanders to the individual soldier in the field. By contrast, the operational structure of most professional NGOs is horizontal and fluid, with significant decision-making authority lodged at the site with the most information, usually in the field. Many NGOs follow a consensus-based approach. These varying structures hamper cooperation and coordination on several grounds. For example, because some NGOs and peacekeepers are unfamiliar with the other's organizational structure, they have difficulty establishing a compatible communications link with the appropriate contact or decision-maker.

3) Communications breakdowns

Several factors account for communications break-downs, including incompatible equipment or lack of agreed communications procedures within the NGO community, within the UN force, and between the UN force and NGOs. The use of incompatible communications equipment (field phones, satellite phones, short wave radios) was a prevalent problem in all three countries. Some UN military contingents possessed more technically advanced equipment than that of NGOs or even other military contingents, making communications in the field difficult, and often impossible.

Lack of pre-established communications links and pre-established procedures between various national contingents and relief organizations also hampered cooperation. This problem was prevalent during the early stages of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) operation in Bosnia. Andrew Bair, a former Political Affairs Officer with UNPROFOR, has stated that the failure of certain national contingents to communicate with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in their sectors resulted in both organizations severely lacking engineering services and logistical support. (4) Poor communications procedures can drastically limit the level of possible cooperation and waste precious time required for the delivery of life saving supplies. It also can lead to the overlap of resources and turf disputes.

Last but not least is language. Peacekeepers and relief personnel come from a wide variety of countries and speak a wide variety of languages, and adequate translation services are not always available. If people cannot communicate, little can be achieved.

4) Independence of NGOs

Many NGOs refuse to accept military assistance, believing that it undermines their independence or compromises other principles. Some such NGOs have accepted limited military assistance in the form of logistics and security support in situations of extreme violence. Some, however, refuse military assistance in almost any circumstance. One such organization is the ICRC, where "only on direct order from ICRC headquarters will delegates even converse with any military force, let alone work with them operationally." (5) Many NGOs oppose military assistance in the belief that being seen with any military organization, including peacekeepers, can increase the chances that the NGO will be attacked and/or denied permission to travel freely.

5) Impartiality

Similar to independence, impartiality is one of the central principles of professional relief organizations. A relief organization must be perceived as impartial to be able to perform its duties and survive in a conflict zone, and the importance of impartiality cannot be underestimated. For this reason, relief organizations are very hesitant to cooperate or co-locate with UN forces, especially if the use of force has been authorized. No organization wants to be seen or viewed as working with any organization perceived as partial toward one or more of the belligerents, as this can seriously jeopardize the welfare of the mission and relief workers, and significantly limit freedom of movement.

Impartiality is also one of the key principles of UN peacekeeping. However, peacekeepers can have great difficulty in maintaining the perception of impartiality in operations where force has been authorized. The loss of impartiality can have severe repercussions, because "without impartiality, there can be no prospect of preserving the confidence and cooperation of conflicting factions." (6) Wider Peacekeeping, a British Army Field Manual, describes in detail the worst case scenario if a peacekeeping operation's impartiality is lost:

At worst, the loss of impartiality could trigger an uncontrolled escalation in a peace enforcement scenario to widespread and unrestrained violence, heavy civilian and military casualties and the failure of the mission. (7)

6) Use of force

The use of force is one of the most contentious elements in the civil-military relationship. The threat or use of force, whether appropriate or not, can singlehandedly terminate civil-military cooperation and coordination. In many situations, UN peacekeepers and civilian components of joint humanitarian operations have very different attitudes and interpretations regarding the use of force. Certain NGOs grant that the use of force might be a necessary evil in extreme circumstances, as when all means to deliver aid have failed. One such example occurred when UNPROFOR and NATO threatened to use force to ensure the delivery of humanitarian supplies to besieged towns and cities in the former Yugoslavia. However, the vast majority of relief workers interviewed during the course of this research adamantly favoured negotiations with the protagonists and favoured the possibility of handing out food packages (known as handing out samples) rather than the use of force in such situations, fearing that NGOs might become targets of retaliation.

Inappropriate or excessive use of force also hampers civil-military cooperation. An example of inappropriate use of force, according to several relief workers at least, is the use of a shot fired in the air to gain the attention of a group of people. This has been utilized by UN forces as a tool to control crowds and to maintain a certain degree of decorum when transporting or handing out aid. Relief workers have stated in interviews that this type of force can have unpredictable consequences, causing civilians to stampede in fear, or increasing the level of violence. However, some of the peacekeepers interviewed believed that this is an acceptable use of force, which in the vast majority of circumstances establishes the wanted results. Differences in opinion over such tactics have caused significant tensions between peacekeepers and relief personnel, thus limiting cooperation.

Reforms for civil-military cooperation

Several steps could be taken to improve future joint missions. Greater cooperation, coordination and fewer negative perceptions could be achieved through cultural sensitivity training, reforms to present coordination mechanisms, and greater understanding and respect for the differing organizational structures and cultures involved. Specific reforms could include the creation of joint training manuals, more frequent exchanges of personnel, modifications to C-MOCs, and joint NGO-military debriefings.

The creation of common training and guidepost manuals could promote coordination and cooperation in future joint operations. Such manuals might consist of three sections, describing UN forces, NGOs, and coordination mechanisms. The section on UN forces would have sub-sections detailing organizational structure and chain of command, military culture, fundamental principles of peacekeeping operations, mission responsibilities, rules on the use of force, and the applicability of international humanitarian law to UN troops. The second section, focused on NGOs, would provide similar information, describing the varying operational and organizational structures of professional NGOs and UN agencies, the chain of command, decision-making procedures, culture and ideology, specializations, fundamental principles, and procedures for dividing responsibilities in the field. The third section would describe a series of field coordination mechanisms, such as C-MOCs and OSOCs. Other subsections would include proper communications procedures, procedures for exchanging liaison officers, common call signs, security guidelines, and emergency preparedness plans.

Panel discussions and roundtables encompassing representatives of relief organizations and states contributing to UN forces are additional options. Such discussions could assist in preparing plans of action prior to deployment or in writing the abovementioned joint training manuals. Meetings could be either formal or informal, and would allow representatives to mingle and become familiar with other organizational structures and operational procedures. (The Canadian Department of National Defence has already organized a series of such roundtable discussions.) These discussions could consider schemes for dividing responsibilities and roles between participating NGOs and UN military contingents, as well as possible guidelines for a joint code of conduct.

Familiarity could also be increased through the use of internship programs or staff exchanges between national militaries and national chapters of NGOs, both domestically and in the field. An internship/exchange period could range from six months to one year, with the principal objective being to foster a greater understanding of the varying organizational structures and operation procedures of other organizations. This was attempted in Norway, where, according to relief workers interviewed, the degree of success varied with the participants' willingness to learn and accept differing organizational cultures. Those entering the program with an open mind and willingness to learn were more successful in developing an understanding of other operations.

Modifications to the Civil-Military Operation Cells could also increase civil-military cooperation. In Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, the level of trust and confidence in the military liaison officers at the C-MOCs was limited by continuous personnel rotations, with many nations rotating their troops every six months. By the time a positive level of confidence, rapprochement, and trust was established, the military officers were rotated out, leaving no time to build an effective cooperative relationship. Cooperation is a human process and, without confidence and trust, interaction is limited. One possible approach would see the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations train UN civilians to work side by side with the military at C-MOCs to act as intermediaries in the civil-military relationship. These civilians would be trained in the general operational procedures and cultures of both NGOs and the military. However, before the UN could provide such personnel, cost questions would have to be addressed.

A great deal can be gained from debriefings on field activities. Such debriefings should be expanded to include all relevant members of joint humanitarian operations: the Force Commander, Commanding Officers of national contingents, NGO staff, representatives of UN agencies, departments and United Nations Civilian Police, specialists, and academics. All aspects of the joint operations should be discussed, including what went right and wrong. Participants should also provide or implement recommendations to improve future operations. With a high degree of participation, there would be many perspectives and suggestions for improvement. These recommendations and suggestions would form the basis of a "Lessons Learned" report that could assist in, or provide a guideline for, modifying civil-military coordination mechanisms to increase future cooperation and assistance.

A developing relationship

Extensive civil-military cooperation is a phenomenon less than ten years old, developed in highly volatile areas of the world where guns were rampant and lawlessness prevailed. This new working relationship has been influenced by several key factors, including varying ideologies and organizational structures, and differences over the use of force. Several mechanisms have been developed to overcome obstacles limiting cooperation and coordination, notably C-MOCs, OSOCs, and the exchange of liaison personnel. These mechanisms have had varying degrees of success, with ideologies and varying mindsets still preventing cooperation in some instances.

The future of civil-military cooperation ultimately depends on the willingness of individuals and organizations to work side by side in a collegial manner. On a positive note, the level of cooperation has improved from one operation to the next, largely due to greater understanding and acceptance of the varying organisational structures and cultures involved and the application of new coordination mechanisms. One hopes that the many joint discussions, both formal and informal, positive field experiences, and the many "Lessons Learned" documents created since the mid 1990s will provide a guidepost for improving future working relationships in the field.

Andre Beauregard graduated with his MA in Political Science in April 1998. He recently completed a six-month internship at Project Ploughshares. The preceding article is based on a section of his MA thesis, Civil-Military Cooperation in Joint Humanitarian Operations: A Case Analysis of Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

(1) Working With the Military, Training Module, UNHCR, 1995, p. 42.

(2) CARE representative.

(3) Canadian Commanding Officer.

(4) Andrew Bair, "The Changing Nature of Civil-Military Operations in Peacekeeping," in Alex Morrison, ed., The New Peacekeeping Partnership, 1995, p. 66.

(5) Andrew S. Natsios, "The International Humanitarian Relief System," Parameters, Spring 1995, pp. 73-74.

(6) Wider Peacekeeping, Army Field Manual, London, HMSO, 1995, p. 4-2.

(7) Wider Peacekeeping, pp. 4-2 to 4-3.