Chemical Safety Board: Improvements in Management and Oversight Are Needed.

GAO-08-864R August 22, 2008

The principal role of the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) is to investigate accidental releases of regulated or extremely hazardous substances to determine the conditions and circumstances that led to the accident and to identify the cause or causes so that similar accidents might be prevented. Accidental releases of these toxic and hazardous chemicals occur frequently and often have serious consequences. CSB reported to Congress that the agency received notification of approximately 900 chemical accidents in calendar year 2007, and that 31 of these accidents were serious or even fatal events that warranted the commitment of CSB investigators. CSB began operating in 1998 as an independent agency created under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The act directs CSB to (1) investigate and report on the cause or probable cause of any accidental chemical releases from stationary sources resulting in a fatality, serious injury, or substantial property damages; (2) make recommendations to reduce the likelihood or consequences of accidental chemical releases and propose corrective measures; and (3) establish regulations for reporting accidental releases. The agency publishes investigative reports and issues safety studies and videos to help prevent future accidents. Congress modeled CSB after the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which has a similar public safety mission. Like NTSB, CSB has no enforcement authority and a limited regulatory role. As outlined in the authorizing statute, CSB is to be managed by a five-member board. Currently the board has one vacancy. CSB received an appropriation of $9.4 million for fiscal year 2008 and had 39 staff as of January 30, 2008.

CSB has implemented some GAO and IG recommendations related to improving its operating policies and procedures since we last reported in July 2000. However, we found that CSB has not fully addressed several critical recommendations, and problems in governance, management, and oversight persist. Specifically, CSB has not fully responded to key recommendations related to investigating more accidents that meet statutory requirements triggering CSB's responsibility to investigate, improving the quality of its accident data, resolving human capital problems, and ensuring accountability and continuity of management. In our view, independent oversight from an existing IG remains the most effective way to help CSB address its continuing problems, provided that the arrangement is made permanent and funding is provided to the IG for the function.

Categories: Environmental Protection, Accident prevention, Accountability, Chemical accidents, Data collection, Environmental monitoring, Federal regulations, Hazardous substances, Independent agencies, Internal controls, Investigations by federal agencies, Quality control, Regulatory agencies, Reporting requirements, Risk management, Safety regulation, Safety standards, Strategic planning, Toxic substances