Characteristics of combat actions (operations) in future wars.

The operational art and tactics as well as the military art as a whole are now in the process of dynamic development. There are many contributory factors here, above all the rapid ongoing modernization of the tools and instruments of warfare. The armed forces of technologically advanced states are being equipped on a massive scale with super-modern weapon systems and military hardware and equipment, such as, e.g., space based reconnaissance and navigation systems; a lot of effort is being deployed to develop space based offensive weapon systems, weapons using basically new physical principles, directional nuclear ammunition, advanced integrated reconnaissance and strike systems, fourth generation multi-role helicopters, "mosquito aviation," robotized combat equipment, non-lethal weapons, and more maneuverable and better protected armor and artillery systems; engineer, technical, and logistic support systems are being upgraded and modernized; and sixth generation computerized combat systems and assets are being intensively introduced into the command and control chain.

It is highly indicative that the modernization of the material and logistic base of the armed forces today proceeds not consecutively and gradually, as was the case before, but simultaneously and intensively on all levels of the military hierarchy. It is also noteworthy that strike weapon systems prevail, further widening the gap between offensive and defensive weapons. Thus, the traditional "balance" of offensive and defensive weapons could eventually be upset.

The large-scale introduction of new types of military equipment in the armed forces will double or even treble the combat capability, firepower, and maneuverability of combined arms formations. Analysis of the structural changes in the technical and logistic base of the armed forces also indicates the direction in which the forms and methods of operational and tactical action can be advanced in the foreseeable future (within the next 10 to 15 years). In making this forecast, it is important to take into account the distinguishing characteristics of the present stage in the evolution of the military art, setting it apart from the previous periods, specifically that the content and character of modern military operations (warfare) are predicated on an array of new factors, not least information technology, EW, and space warfare. All of this predetermines the evolution of such unconventional types of operation as information and psychological operations; EW and strike operations; ground, air and space operations; special commando and counter-terrorism operations.

Information warfare has long been part of general warfare, but it did not acquire the form of a special operation until the 20th century, and is being rapidly modernized now. In foreign militaries, information and psychological operations are seen as one way of implementing the so-called indirect approach strategy (L. Hart) or controlled war of the nuclear age (R. Kann). The concept of the so-called unarmed disarmament, as formulated by Sun Zi, a Chinese military leader and military thinker, is being put into practice. The preparation and conduct of this kind of an operation is the prerogative of a country's strategic leadership. Information warfare, however, is conducted not only on the strategic but also on the operational and tactical level.

The objective of information and psychological operations is to mislead the enemy as to the own intention and the time, place, and method of delivering strikes. A special place in such an operation today belongs to the massive introduction and employment of new types of weapons, EW, and reconnaissance systems, and the use of tactics and information impacts as well as new methods of maneuver and disinformation that are utterly unexpected to an adversary.

This highlights the need to develop the theoretical foundations of information and psychological warfare whose organization in the RF Armed Forces generally lags behind that in foreign militaries. It is planned, in particular, to create Ground Forces structures designed to facilitate the successful fulfillment of such tasks. To this end it is expedient to set up special subunits as part of command and control agencies that will be entrusted with the organization and coordination of information warfare (IW) operations. In addition, it is important to give priority to creating special purpose forces and assets ensuring both IW impacts on the adversary and protection against similar action on its part.

The impact of the information factor on the character of warfare is closely connected with the factor of firepower. In all past wars, firepower was the "generator" and engine of all innovations in the military art. In local wars of the 20th century, its role increased further, as a result of its natural merging with EW suppression of the adversary's command and control systems. This brought about a new form of warfare, specifically, the EW-strike operation, which, in particular, constituted the core of such operations as Desert Storm, Desert Fox, Determined Force, and Shock and Awe. They clearly point to a fairly important direction in the evolution of the operational art and tactics that can be described as a higher stage in the development of the combined arms operation. In the next 10 to 15 years this type of operation will apparently become a predominant form of warfare. This conclusion is based on a pronounced trend toward an increase in the duration of the EW and strike phase in local wars. Thus, whereas in the Arab-Israeli War it was 90 minutes, in the Persian Gulf war it lasted for 38 days.

The EW and strike operation comprises EW and assault actions, battles, and engagements; massed and concentrated, multiple and single EW strikes and fire deliveries; systematic combat action by air-defense troops and aviation or navy forces in maritime sectors, synchronized and coordinated by the objective, place and time, and designed to achieve and maintain superiority in firepower, effectively engage enemy troops, disrupt enemy command and control, EW and air-defense systems, and destroy the major elements of the enemy's integrated reconnaissance and strike complexes.

All branches and arms of service as well as special troops of the Ground Forces take part in such an operation in interaction with the Air Force and the Navy with the dominant role of EW assets, aviation, and the Missile Forces and Artillery (MFA).

Decisive objectives are set in such an operation--viz., to counter not only the enemy's individual EW assets but its entire combat command and control system. The basic principles of the preparation and conduct of the EW and strike operation are as follows:

The element of surprise. It is achieved through the massed commitment of EW assets, the use of new kinds of EW screens, setting up EW decoys, imposing an EW blockade, and so on.

Continuity. The operation will attain its objective if in the course of it all major elements of the enemy's operational combat (battle) formation are subjected to continuous EW and fire impacts to their entire depth so as to deny it the possibility of restoring its combat command and control system.

Concentration of efforts in critical sectors. The massed use of EW and strike assets (impacts) is based on the use of effective EW and fire delivery with the aim of ensuring a simultaneous suppression of the opposing enemy force and exploiting the results achieved in the course of these strikes by a mobile, flexible echelon without delay. Should there be a shortage of forces and assets a selective method of effective engagement can be used along the main direction. Priority targets for suppression should be the command and control posts of large combined arms formations, missile forces and artillery, EW and air defense units and integrated reconnaissance and strike systems. The diversity of effective engagement methods in the course of EW and strike impacts is ensured through the integration and combination of passive and active forms of jamming and interference.

Coordination of the actions of EW and strike forces and assets by the place, time, and tasks, as well as coordination of the actions of space based reconnaissance assets is designed to ensure the delivery of surgical pinpoint, selective EW and strike impacts on the critical elements of the enemy's command and control system in the course of an operation.

Maneuver with EW and strike assets is designed to shift combat efforts from one sector (direction) to another.

All-round support of an operation is ensured through a timely uncovering of enemy targets with air, space, and radar reconnaissance assets, as well as engineer, technical, and logistical support of combat action.

The effectiveness of an EW and strike operation will hinge on the condition of the military technological base, in particular, on the implementation of the comprehensive EW modernization program. The present author believes that a very high priority in this context should be given to the creation of such effective assets as integrated automated systems comprising EW reconnaissance and jamming facilities and adaptation systems that have capability to self-adjust to changes in the parameters of enemy targets subject to effective engagement.

Aviation should be the principal means and asset of effective engagement in this type of operation. Its combat capability today, however, is insufficient for an effective fulfillment of engagement tasks either in the long or short range. Estimates show that it should be enhanced by at least 20 percent (from 40 percent to 60 percent). Army aviation is the weakest link today. Its present-day capabilities are such that it is not fully in a position to perform reconnaissance, fire delivery, effective engagement, special, transport or support missions that are assigned to it in the interest of combined arms formations. The present author believes that in the future a special emphasis will need to be placed on creating new types of multi-role helicopters equipped with all-weather reconnaissance and target designation systems with greater firepower and survivability. Troops have an acute need for light unmanned aerial vehicles capable of performing various functions (reconnaissance, EW, etc.) as well as light fixed wing aircraft capable of performing a broad range of missions that should be transported by special carriers and be in service with large combined arms formations.

Along with the development of weapon systems, there is a pressing need to streamline the organizational structure of army aviation units. Thus, it is expedient to have on the army (corps) level an independent assault helicopter regiment, an independent multi-role helicopter regiment, an independent regiment of remote controlled aircraft, an analogous aviation squadron on the division level, and an independent combined aviation squadron. Estimates show that realization of these proposals could enable aviation to enhance the effectiveness of the performance of its combat missions by two and a half to three times.

In order to increase the effectiveness of the EW and strike operation, it is important to streamline the aviation command and control system. To this end it is necessary:

* first, to employ a standardized (unified) detection, target designation, reconnaissance and command and control system based on interoperable automated combat command and control systems to enhance the effectiveness of interaction between the different arms of service and aviation;

* second, to bring front and army aviation command and control posts closer to those of ground troops with a simultaneous expansion in the system of mobile armored integrated command and control posts (in the interest of enhancing the effectiveness of interaction);

* third, to put in place an active target designation and aiming system by incorporating into it long range tactical reconnaissance helicopters as well as remote controlled aircraft to strike ground targets by helicopter gunships from hovering position;

* fourth, as new-generation precision guided, all-weather weapon systems are installed on fixed and rotary winged aircraft, to incorporate them into integrated reconnaissance and strike and missile systems;

* fifth, within the framework of automated command and control systems, to automate the procedure for a formalized presentation of information and all combat documents to command and control posts of the interacting arms and branches of service; and

* sixth, to work out a system for the reception of data from the various command and control levels of the arms and branches of service via automated command and control systems, making it possible to accumulate and reflect navigation and tactical information in near real time.

The existing combat capability of the large combined units and units of the Missile Forces and Artillery does not fully ensure an effective conduct of the EW and strike operation. Estimates show that today the Missile Forces and Artillery account for 30 percent to 40 percent of effective engagement tasks in close combat and 15 percent to 20 percent in long range action. These indicators need to be enhanced by at least 15 percent to 20 percent. The problem could be resolved in different ways, above all by increasing the numerical strength of the Missile Forces and Artillery component as part of combined arms units and large strategic formations as well as by qualitatively upgrading and improving MFA weapon systems, especially increasing the effective range of artillery systems.

The availability of long-range artillery and the enhancement of the capability of multiple rocket systems and new operational and tactical missile complexes will make for a broad employment of maneuver with fire within a range of up to 100 km, shifting fire delivery efforts to new directions without a change of fire positions and concentrating fire power on effectively engaging the most dangerous enemy forces in depth. This new quality of artillery will lay the groundwork for in-depth effective engagement of enemy forces.

One principal area in the development of weapon systems is the creation of precision weapon systems using guided and homing missiles, rockets, projectiles, bombs, and other weaponry.

The task of making a more comprehensive and effective use of the MFA's combat capability in an EW and strike operation can be fulfilled also by upgrading the methods of their combat employment. This is very important, considering the pronounced trend toward a shifting in the forms and methods of offensive action wherein the maneuverable forms of breaching the enemy defenses are beginning to prevail. In this context, traditional elements (stages) of effective engagement (preparation fire and fire support for attack) will hardly be used in their classic understanding. The present author believes that it is more expedient to use the term "fire support of attacking troops" which begins from the moment the attacking forces enter the range of effective engagement with direct fire by the defending side and continues throughout the operation.

The following engagement methods are especially effective: area/point, structural, barrage fire, denial fire, sweeping fire, the fire corridor, and hemming-in fire.

The area/point method of effective engagement consists in the maximum possible decentralization of artillery control on the tactical level with the operational (company and higher) commander getting broader powers and possibilities in organizing the effective engagement of enemy forces. It should be based on the "detect and destroy" principle.

The structural method of effective engagement consists in the selective engagement of targets that are critical to the combat stability of the opposing force.

The fire barrage method is used to establish line of fire positions along the possible routes of an adversary's forward movement.

Denial fire is used to isolate a cut-off or bypassed enemy force in a particular area with the aim of preventing its maneuver.

Sweeping fire is used in certain sectors of terrain with the aim of destroying the enemy's tactical or airborne assault landing and reconnaissance and commando forces.

The fire corridor is created along a particular line of advance of enemy subunits.

Hemming-in fire is designed to protect friendly subunits against attack by the enemy's airmobile, tactical, airborne assault landing or reconnaissance and commando groups on command and control posts, rear service, logistical and other important targets.

The present author believes that effective engagement in an operation should be based on long range impacts made on the enemy in combination with close-in fighting as well as the combined engagement of targets with the assets of various arms and branches of service (MFA and air strikes in combination with EW suppression and the use of minefields, explosive obstacles, and flame throwers).

There is an urgent need to review the procedure of creating effective engagement groupings. Thus, it is expedient to create standardized effective engagement groupings on each operational level, comprising all effective engagement assets on this level, including support aviation, helicopters, integrated reconnaissance and strike systems, missile complexes, and other assets. In addition to this, the creation of such groupings would provide an optimal base for the automated command and control of all weapon systems and effective engagement assets employed in an operation (combat).

Some changes are needed in the procedure of planning an EW and strike operation. Today it is based on the principle of centralized planning. By the extent of detailing, it is subdivided into general, immediate, and detailed. In the future, with the growing time pressure on preparing an operation (combat action) and the increasing amount of incoming information, the inflexible centralization method will not always be acceptable. Its main shortfall is that commanders and headquarters staffs, especially on the tactical level, are denied the opportunity to show independence and initiative in making an effective use of firepower in the interest of carrying out a decision that has been made.

The Combined Arms Academy of the RF Armed Forces, by way of a training experiment, practices the so-called counter (zonal) planning method where-by each level (battalion, regiment, division, corps, army) is assigned its specific area of responsibility where commanders make plans for effective engagement with organic weapons. The advantage of this method, in our view, is that it ensures a certain measure of flexibility and promptness, helping increase the responsibility for the procurement of authentic target coordinates on each command and control level. A higher command and control level in this case assigns to subordinate levels only such parameters as the structure of effective engagement, the general expenditure of ammunition, and the scope of missions to be accomplished in its interests.

Along with the EW and strike operation, there are also good prerequisites for upgrading such a new form of warfare as the ground-air-space operation. The current trend toward the shifting of emphasis in warfare (military action) into the air and space sphere clearly manifested itself in the local wars of the early 1990s. In these wars, space based reconnaissance assets made the core of technical reconnaissance. In addition, space based navigation systems also played a significant role in these kinds of conflicts. Today space based reconnaissance and navigation systems have advanced even further. Much development work is in hand on integrated strike air and space systems based on essentially new technologies, including with the use of weapons employing new physical principles, which marks a new technological breakthrough in weaponry and therefore in the content of combat operations (combat action). In practical terms this means that all key elements of the enemy's operational and tactical force will end up within the range of aerial and space strike, reconnaissance and navigation assets, to the entire depth of its combat (battle) formation. In these conditions it will be necessary to work out new approaches toward the development of forms and methods of the preparation and conduct of a combat operation. In this context, a comprehensive, "multidimensional" form of operational- tactical action should be expected to prevail--that is to say, combat action will be conducted with an equal measure of intensity not only on the ground, in the air and at sea, but also in space. Operations and combat actions will acquire an unprecedented scope and scale in both space and time.

One basically new feature will be a substantial increase in the proportion of "stand-off" action with "stand-off," including space, warfare becoming predominant. This will make for a rapid shifting of combat efforts to the entire depth of the enemy's battle formation. In defining a possible configuration of a ground, air, and space operation, it is important to bear in mind that it will not be conducted according to a classic scheme. Such an operation is more likely to begin with the delivery of space strikes with the simultaneous conduct of the EW and strike phase at the outbreak of hostilities on the ground.

The initial stage of the operation will consist of an intense struggle for information, EW, and air superiority by using space based assets. This will to a very large extent be contingent on which side manages to seize fire initiative and achieve the element of surprise in delivering the first strikes. In this context it is important to note that the defensive/counteroffensive stereotype of the initial period of war, which has been established in the domestic military art, does not reliably reflect the basic nature of modern warfare. Military actions cannot develop according to some pre-arranged scenario, but will be predicated on the specific conditions of the prevailing situation on the ground. It becomes obvious that with the present condition of the RF Armed Forces it can hardly be expected that with the outbreak of war they will be in a position to quickly create a continuous, strategically firm defense front.

Combat operations will acquire a dynamic, point-of-action character, developing unevenly along separate operational lines with deep mutual penetrations by the opposing forces. This is due to the fact that in peacetime, although battle-worthy operational covering troops will be based near the state border on our side, they will be of numerically insufficient strength. Meanwhile, the deployment of the main groupings of ground troops and their forward movement to the border amid intense impacts by the enemy forces from the air and space will require considerable time.

Given the changes that have occurred in the geo-strategic position of the RF Armed Forces, it is necessary to revise the established views on the character of operational defense and its organization. It should be capable of effectively resisting an adversary that has multiple superiority in space based and precision weaponry, as well as in tanks and artillery. In these circumstances, the stereotyped approach to building a continuous in-depth defense with a linear configuration of positions, lines, and sectors is unacceptable.

Defense should not be so organized as to ensure not only protection against the enemy's fire delivery, effective engagement, and air attacks, but also against EW and space attacks. It should be so arranged as to prevent the adversary from disclosing its organization even by using space based reconnaissance assets. This is possible if a large number of decoy targets is created and deployed within the defensive system, operational concealment and camouflage measures are effectively implemented, and stereotypes in the distribution and concentration of main functions are avoided. A typical defense organization in these conditions will be a defense configuration on a wide frontage combining positional and maneuvering methods and forms of defense.

In covering the state border, combat-ready rapid deployment forces (RDF) should be expected to make a wide use of airmobile defense to close the emerging breaches, gaps, or exposed flanks. This form of defense can be employed when there is a danger of in-depth penetration by the enemy's mobile forces through gaps or breaches in the front toward vital targets and installations in the depth of our combat formation.

This form of defense consists in combining air and ground actions, the rapid creation of mobile screens, maneuvering with mobile reserves and delivering air and space strikes as well as using integrated reconnaissance and strike and missile systems, helicopter gunships, the Missile Forces and Artillery, and sea and ground launched cruise missiles to compensate for an acute shortage of defending forces and assets.

In the context of an "expanded"--ground-, air- and space--battlefield and with an acute shortage of forces and assets, dispersed lateral and in-depth defense will be indispensable. It can be used on the operational or tactical level. On the operational level, this form of defense is based on an army (corps) or a part thereof independently holding vital areas and installations along particular operational directions (sectors), combined with action by mobile covering forces and curtain fire and fire pockets in between defense positions. This form of defense is characterized by an uneven distribution of forces and assets by the sectors (directions). Organization of dispersed defense can vary, but most of the time the main forces of a large strategic formation (combined unit) will be concentrated in depth in order to accomplish wide maneuver with second echelons and reserves to sectors (directions) of threat in the course of defensive action.

On the tactical level, dispersed defense is based on the system of defense areas, islands of resistance and strongholds of combat groups (small subunits such as platoons or companies). The core elements of such groups can be tanks (infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers) as well as minefields and explosive obstacles.

In employing this defense configuration against a superior enemy force, troops should reliably protect their flanks and boundaries between the adjacent islands of resistance by using the firepower of small arms and light weapons and AT weapon systems, creating fire pockets, using ambush action and laying remote controlled minefields and explosive obstacles.

The delaying-action kind of defense can be used on the cutting edge of strikes by the enemy's armor and motorized infantry forces in order to gain time and wear down an advancing force. In conducting this form of defense, it is expedient to use tank and motorized rifle units with infantry fighting vehicles that feature high maneuverability, great fire power, and high mobility. Just as in dispersed defense, delaying action can include a wide use of artificial obstacles of all types, ambush action, and blocking fire. Restraining and raiding action is effective in fighting the enemy's enveloping (flanking) detachments. This action consists in blocking the lines of movement and containing enemy maneuver with blocking fire by using remote controlled mine fields and explosive obstacles.

It is important to take into account that from the very outbreak of hostilities the adversary will try to send a large number of air-mobile and airborne assault forces as well as commando groups to the rear and combat service support areas of defending troops to cause chaos and panic in the combat service and logistic support area of our forces by attacking command and control posts, logistic installations, airfields, and fire positions of artillery and air defense units and by seizing communication nodes. NATO exercises show that up to 15 to 20 airmobile and airborne assault and 10 to 15 reconnaissance and commando groups can be dropped into the zone of defending troops.

This brings up the problem of logistic and combat service organization, counter-assault and counter-sabotage action, and protection of communication lines. Soviet combat experience in Afghanistan shows that up to 30 percent to 40 percent of the forces and assets of large combined arms units were allocated to these purposes.

Mounting a counteroffensive after pitched defensive battles with an adversary that has a multiple technical superiority in forces and assets is rather problematic. The experience in the Great Patriotic War shows that it is extremely difficult to regain the strategic initiative lost at the outbreak of hostilities. This will make it necessary not only to wear down and incapacitate an opposing enemy force but also to drastically shift the balance of forces and assets and create at least a local superiority over the adversary in strike (attack) assets in certain zones of operation.

It would of course be wrong to reject the possibility of mounting a counteroffensive at the initial period of war. In all likelihood, an opportunity to use such a decisive form of military action will only exist in certain areas of operation. Moreover, the essence and content of counteroffensive action will be basically different from those employed during the Great Patriotic War. As is known, at that time a break in the course of hostilities was contingent mainly on the condition of the ground forces and the combat effectiveness of armies and fronts which bore the main brunt in fulfilling the task of repulsing the strike of a numerically superior enemy force and its subsequent routing. Aviation played mainly a supporting role then. Now, however, as shown by experience in local wars, air, space and offensive EW and strike assets play a key role in fulfilling operational and strategic tasks in a counteroffensive operation. In order to create prerequisites for mounting a counteroffensive, it is not enough simply to stop the advance of an enemy force: It is also necessary to ensure EW and strike and information superiority over the adversary.

In considering the possibility of mounting a counteroffensive, it is important to take into account the increased vulnerability of advancing troops to strikes with air and space assets, ground and sea launched cruise missiles, and other precision weaponry. This leads to the conclusion that there are no substantial grounds for regarding the counteroffensive operation as the optimal, let alone the principal form of combat action at the initial period of war, ensuring the regaining of the strategic initiative. The counteroffensive has always been, and continues to be, a strenuous and to a very large extent risky form of warfare. If however, operational formations have to resort to it, this is only possible in a favorable environment.

Analysis of the evolution of methods of the offensive operation with the use of advanced space based assets leads to the conclusion that such a complex form of the offensive as the penetration of the enemy's continuous positional defense will be consigned to history as this form of defense will not be employed. This means that overcoming the enemy's defense will begin not with breaching its defense line by an offensive striking force, but with taking advantage of the gaps in the combat formations of the defending force, accomplishing deep air and ground envelopment action with airmobile forces, rapidly penetrating the in-depth defenses of mobile strike formations, and delivering simultaneous combined air, space, ground, and sea strikes against the opposing enemy force.

Even when the adversary manages to organize a sufficiently strong frontal defense, its overcoming will not require a concentration of powerful assault groupings of motorized infantry and tank troops or amassing them in narrow sectors of the front because penetrating this defense and disrupting its operational stability will not pose a particular problem. Powerful air and space based strike assets with the possibility of delivering massed precision strikes and the use of pressure-effect munitions and fuel-air explosives in the course of an EW and firefighting operation can make it possible to create zones of continuous effective engagement with EW, strike, and directed energy assets--a kind of a "gateway" in the enemy defenses that mobile groupings of forces can use to advance rapidly in-depth, seizing the enemy's islands of resistance from the flanks and the rear.

At the same time, the task of troops in a multidimensional, comprehensive ground, air, and space operation is not to smash the enemy's forward edge of the battle area but to create, in its rear and combat service areas, a constantly operating, robust front of action, paralyzing the maneuver of its reserve and second echelon forces.

Thus, the following trends can be forecast in the evolution and development of the forms and methods of offensive operations:

-- employment of similar methods in conducting combat operations and in routing enemy forces with conventional and unconventional weapons;

-- shifting the thrust in warfare from destroying opposing enemy forces (troops) from the position of direct contact to routing them by delivering long-range strikes and neutralizing the enemy's ability to conduct military action;

-- maintenance of the necessary effectiveness of action by forces (troops) with the general downsizing of the combat strength of large strategic formations of the branches and arms of service as a whole;

-- changes in the qualitative and quantitative composition and condition of troops (forces) in zones of operation, resulting from an increase in the share of rapid deployment forces;

-- an increased mobility of combat action which will be highly maneuverable and proceed rapidly without continuous fronts: mobile groupings of forces committed into battle will avoid head-on, direct action in overcoming reinforced defensive lines, seeking to penetrate the flanks and rear zones of the defending enemy force, bypassing strong and insufficiently suppressed islands of resistance;

-- an increased depth of the simultaneous and consecutive effective engagement of the enemy force with firepower assets (directed energy weapon systems) and envelopment action to the entire depth of its combat formation;

-- an increased spatial scope of air, ground and space maneuver;

-- the prevalence of stand-off, remote forms of action over close-in fighting;

-- the diversity of tactical means and methods employed--surgical, selective, in-depth strikes with precision weaponry, raiding action into the enemy's rear and combat service support areas with airmobile detachments and groups, and a massed commitment of fighter and EW and jamming helicopters;

-- the increased thrust given to air warfare with a mixed composition of fixed and rotary winged aircraft subunits and integrated impacts by heterogeneous forces and assets of air and space attack on the enemy's command and control, reconnaissance and EW targets;

-- the prevalence of area/point, zonal action;

-- the increasing impact of commando, raiding, terrorist, and other forms of subversive action on the outcome of war; and

-- the sharply increased role of rapid-action integrated reconnaissance and space weapon systems, capable of reconnoitering and striking enemy targets in real time.

Thus, the main distinguishing feature of the ongoing and anticipated changes in modern warfare is that unlike the linear method of amassing combat efforts, an entirely different form of operation and tactical action will be used--comprehensive, multidimensional, whereby EW, firepower, and information impacts on the enemy will be achieved with an increasing degree of intensity in time and space. This will make it possible to achieve decisive results in an operation, depriving the adversary of firepower, initiative, and the freedom to maneuver within the shortest possible time frame.

Such a comprehensive, multidimensional character of the air and ground offensive requires the employment of heterogeneous combat assets, coordinated in time and place, as well as the concentration of their efforts on attaining one clear-cut objective. In these conditions it is necessary to apply unconventional approaches to selecting the direction of the main strike in an offensive operation. This is not so much a matter of selection as the concentration of efforts in a particular area. The idea is to give priority to impacting key installations (weapon systems, command and control posts, and air-defense, reconnaissance and EW assets), dispersed in-depth in tactical and operational zones.

Maj. Gen. I.N. VOROBYOV (Ret.)

Doctor of Military Sciences, Merited Scientist of the Russian Federation

Maj. Gen. Ivan Nikolaevich VOROBYOV (Ret.), merited scientist of the Russian Federation, D.Sc. (Mil.), professor, professor emeritus of the M.V. Frunze Military Academy, member of the International Academy of Information Science and the Academy of Military Sciences, was born on June 22, 1922; participant in the Great Patriotic War from June 22, 1941 through May 9, 1945; worked his way up from cadet to major, rifle battalion commander; decorated with three State orders for distinguished combat service, including the Order of the Red Banner; has a total of 25 State decorations.

I.N. Vorobyov joined the USSR Armed Forces in 1940; in 1950, graduated from the M.V. Frunze Military Academy cum laude and with a gold medal; in 1955, completed a graduate course at the M.V. Frunze Academy; taught at the M.V. Frunze Military Academy Tactics Department for 17 years, served at a research unit of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces for 16 years; deputy division commander.

At present I.N. Vorobyov is professor of the Combined Arms Academy of the RF Armed Forces; author of more than 200 academic and research papers on tactics and operational art, including such fundamental works as Printsipy obshchevoyskovogo boya and Voyennaya futurologiya; co-author of Taktika in the Biblioteka ofitsera series, Boyevye deystviya v osobykh usloviyakh, Boyevye deystviya nochyu, Metodologiya voyenno-nauchnogo poznaniya, Kultura voyennogo myshleniya, Boyevye deystviya v vooruzhennom konflikte, Taktika mirotvorcheskikh sil, and Kontr-terroristicheskaya operatsiya; a regular contributor to the Voennaia mysl' (Military Thought) journal; a number of his articles won the RF Defense Ministry Prize; in 2000, his series on military tactics was awarded the Academy of Military Sciences A.A. Svechin Prize.