Changing human behavior and institutions toward 21st century paradigms - a theoretical construct.

People often take prejudice or habit for truth and in that case feel no discomfort, but if they once realize that their truth is nonsense, the game is up. From then onwards it is only by force that a man can be compelled to do what he considers absurd.

- Alexander Herzen (circa 1850)

As the human species moves into a new millennium, it will face daunting and unknown challenges. Of course, technology will present unexpected opportunities. And the world may become more democratic and cooperative with increasing opportunities available through international trade and multinational corporations and organizations. Yet challenges and threats such as terrorism, ethnic cleansing, and racial and gender bias exist alongside the opportunities. Societies (including individuals who create and maintain societies) retain assumptions, values, dogmas, thought systems, and institutions which were developed in the 19th and 20th centuries and earlier, but which surely will not serve us well in the 21st.

It seems to me that the great contemporary challenge is to learn to re-evaluate the symbols and symbol systems created by "thought leaders" and institutions. We need to re-evaluate and reform schools and their support institutions, government and its agencies, relations between nation states, and, indeed, relations between individuals to better meet the challenges and opportunities of the future.

In order to learn to challenge the thought leaders and their symbols, individuals must learn to revise their belief systems. It is not sufficient to just see the need for new paradigms. Indeed, to conceptualize the new paradigms, individuals must change at very personal levels. For social change to occur, those revised personal constructs must then be institutionalized.

ASSUMPTIONS AND VALUING

Assumptions

The above quote by Herzen (9:129) was used to introduce this essay because it sets the tone for the basic premise of my thesis. To wit: that one behaves toward a thing in terms of basic assumptions one holds about it. In the words of Francis Chisholm (4:27): "Our behavior depends in part on how we see and formulate situations, and that formulation depends itself on premises and assumptions, some of which we don't consciously know we have." The ability of a person to revise fundamental assumptions, terminologies, and undefined terms which involve hidden assumptions, has resulted in much of modern science's progress (6:1i-1ii).

To change behavior then, one assumes that basic assumptions must be altered since new premises lead to different values and these in turn to the desired behavior. The behavior is intelligent if based upon intelligent assumptions, but behavior is not changed by arguing that one ought to feel or act differently. Behavior Bi is logical within the frame of the set of premises [P.sup.1], if a different set of behaviors [B.sup.2] is desired, the assumptions must be changed into another set of premises [P.sup.2], from which [B.sup.2] is a deduction. One can't get to [B.sup.2] from [P.sup.1]; first [P.sup.1] must be uncovered, made conscious so the assumptions on which it is based can be assessed, then changed to [P.sup.2]. From [P.sup.2] one may arrive at [B.sup.2], or at some intermediate point between [B.sup.1] and [B.sup.2] (4:11-13).

To give an example of the extent to which one's assumptions influence perception, and thus cause such errors as identification, consider the case of the color wheel (4:24). Color strips (blues, reds, yellows, etc.) are inserted in a slotted disk in such proportions that, when it rotates rapidly, the wheel appears a uniform gray. Now suppose one sees it rotating and says: "The wheel is gray." The statement makes a silent assumption that the grayness is out there, a part of the external world. The statement: "It appears gray to me" implies a different structural assumption. These are fundamentally different structural assumptions even though they are not verbalized at all (4:24-5).

Example A has in effect asserted false assumptions about the structure of the event which the statement describes. A assumes that the wheel is gray and identifies it as such.

That the "truth" of a set of premises cannot be tested by logic is indicated by the fact we may label any irrational behavior as irrational because we don't see the premises the behavior comes from. We might regard insane persons as strictly logical since what they say, or their behavior, might be completely deducible from the premises they hold. The premises the insane hold are nonsense, given our kind of world; but the behavior is perfect deduction from the premises. When testing a set of premises one must ask "Let us see, if we assume this set of premises, what turns out?" The test of the premises as far as their application to the world is concerned, is empirical. What one knows is the result of one's premises, including the silent structural ones.

Korzybski in Science and Sanity (7) wished to generalize scientific methodology and to teach methods of achieving an orientation in terms of fact. According to Chisholm, Korzybski considered the problem in these terms (4:35):

1. Re-education and re-orientation are a matter of changing premises, including the silent ones.

2. Silent assumptions of our usual system of evaluation must be uncovered.

3. To achieve a systematic re-orientation, a non-Aristotelian system is necessary from which to investigate the functioning Aristotelian system.

4. The non-Aristotelian system has to be based on premises that can be tested empirically and which will make structural assumptions about the nature of reality.

In the process of changing assumptions to scientific ones, it is important to recognize that the relations that hold among the entities of the territory are not necessarily the ones that hold among the symbols in the symbolism. Valid knowledge is not knowledge of the things directly but of the relations which exist between the things and the symbols which represent them. The aim of such knowledge is to secure maximum predictability by making the structure of our symbolism a little closer to the structure of situations. If we use a language which contains assumptions about the real world, the conclusions that we draw will be conclusions about the world of these assumptions, not about the real world. Empirical premises are those which do not make silent metaphysical assumptions about the real world.

Whenever one makes a statement, a theory is implied (assumptions). For instance, if one says: "I am 40 years old," it is implied that (1:29):

1. The calendar year is considered as a unit of time.

2. The unit is a practical measure of one's life.

If one says, "This leaf is green," one implies among other things, that:

1. There are colors in this world.

2. This color is different from others.

3. This color is visible to the naked eye.

A statement can be seen as contained within a theory, explicit or implicit, since no statement is made outside a theoretical framework. A great many theories, however, may constitute a system. By system is meant "a body of theories that involves a common method of thinking about the world and ourselves" (1:30). These theories may be taken as assumptions or derived from assumptions at a higher inferential level. A scientific statement is easily recognized as part of an explicit theory while "commonsense" statements are not so easily linked to formal premises or postulates. Nevertheless, it can be seen that no statements stands all by itself; no statement is ever made outside a theoretical framework (1:29-30). Further, we build theories that occasionally harden into doctrines and we also assimilate doctrines that are prevalent in our cultural environment. Nobody is without doctrines, or some set of values based upon assumptions, but again, these doctrines may or may not withstand the crucial test of experience.

Valuing

A particular theory may be contained in a more general theory and theories in turn may be viewed as elements of systems. The theories which form this matrix are, of course, based upon conscious or unconscious assumptions. By "system," here is meant (to repeat): "a body of theories that involves a common method of thinking about the world and ourselves" (1:30). A system refers more specifically to that method of thinking itself, exemplified in theories that may either agree or clash with one another. The belief system is conceived to represent all the beliefs, sets, expectancies, and assumptions, conscious and unconscious, that at a given time one accepts as true of the world in which one lives. The disbelief system is composed of a series of sub-systems rather than merely a single one, so that the belief-disbelief system is asymmetrical rather than symmetrical. The disbelief system contains all one's disbeliefs, those views which at a given time one rejects as false (11:31-6). A belief-disbelief system is conceived as an organization of parts that may or may not be logically interrelated. It would be more correct to say that a person's belief-disbelief system is really a political-religious-philosophic-scientific-etc., system representing one's total framework for understanding the universe as best one can.

The belief system, then, is based upon conscious and unconscious assumptions and consists of values. The distinction between judgments of value and judgments of reality must be made, though they are often closely intermingled. The statement: "This table is rectangular" is a judgment of reality and geometry while the statement: "This table is exquisite," is a judgment of value. In the latter case, the speaker is not interested in affirming the existence of objective properties; feeling enters into the value judgment. The statement would lose all meaning if it did not take into account the desire of the speaker; it is subjective, although every judgment, even of reality, is subjective in the sense that it reflects first of all, the structure of the mind (2:3-13).

The world of words is also a world of values, (1:67-9) because when we label an event we determine where it "belongs," and then we react to the event according to the place we have given it. Identification (labeling) and introjection of others' values may contribute in large measure to the distrust one has of one's own experiencing as a guide to valuing. One learns from others a large number of conceived values, and adopts them as one's own, even though they may widely diverge from what is being experienced. Because these assumptions are not based on one's own valuing, they tend to be fixed and rigid, rather than fluid and changing.

Dogmatism 

It would appear, when dealing with dogmatism, that a set of conventional assumptions such as the following would be valid (11:335-37):

"It might appear from the theory of belief systems that those with relatively open systems should show greater changes than those with closed systems."

"Closely related to the assumption that attitudes and values are difficult to change is the judgment that change is socially desirable, while non-change is socially undesirable."

"Persons who do change their attitudes are seen as progressive, mature, open-minded, tolerant, rational and reality-oriented."

Rokeach and Kemp (11:336) introduce a different set of operational assumptions dealing with openness-closeness and change. Their position is that the conventional assumptions about change "do not leave room for the additional possibility that both change and non-change may result from the same underlying motive." It is a more defensible view, as seen from the position of a new set of assumptions, that persons with relatively closed systems may manifest change and sometimes fixedness for basically the same reasons. The position taken by Rokeach and Kemp (11:337) then is that:

"It is not that open persons are expected to change their value and closed persons are not, but rather that both groups should change - but in different ways."

If the conventional assumptions cited above are valid, one would expect to find that: "persons identified as possessing open systems would be subject to changing readily, that the changes are socially desirable and that those persons would be seen as progressive, tolerant, etc." The converse would be expected of those persons with closed systems. If, however, Rokeach and Kemp (11:337) are correct in their assertion that change is to be expected of persons with closed systems as well as open systems, but "that both groups should change - but in different ways," then the problem of subjects with open or closed systems need not be considered as a contingency.

To identify a belief-disbelief system it will be necessary to assert that it includes each and every belief and disbelief of every sort one may have built up about the physical, social, etc., universes in which one lives. In the words of Rokeach: "It would be more correct to say that a person's belief-disbelief system is really a political-religious-philosophical-scientific-etc., system" (11:35). Further, Glazer (11:35) writes: "... no study of the relation between attitude and personality has yet ... solved the problem of distinguishing ideology - the views someone picks up - from character - the orientations that are basic to a person." The concept of the belief-disbelief system thus includes all of a person's belief and is therefore more inclusive than what is normally meant by ideology. A distinction between open and closed systems follows (11:55-6):

a. A belief-disbelief system is open or closed to the extent that, with respect to its organization along the belief-disbelief continuum:

Open                              Closed

1. the magnitude of rejec-        1. the magnitude of
tion of disbelief subsys-            rejection of disbelief
tems is relatively low at            subsystems is relatively
each point along the                 high at each point along
continuum;                           the disbelief continuum;

2. there is communication         2. there is isolation of parts
of parts within and                  within and between
between belief and disbe-            belief and disbelief
lief systems;                        systems;

3. there is relatively little     3. there is relatively great
discrepancy in the degree            discrepancy in the degree
of differentiation                   of differentiation
between belief and                   between belief and
disbelief systems;                   disbelief systems;

4. there is relatively high       4. there is relatively little
differentiation within the           differentiation within the
disbelief system;                    disbelief system;

b. to the extent that, with respect to the organization along the central-peripheral dimension:

Open                              Closed

1. the specific content of        1. the specific content of
primitive beliefs (central           primitive beliefs (central
regions) is to the effect            regions) is to the effect
that the world one lives             that the world one lives
in, or the situation one is          in, or the situation one is
in at a particular moment,           in at a particular moment
is a friendly one;                   is a threatening one;

2. the formal content of          2. the formal content of
beliefs about authority              beliefs about authority
and about people who                 and about people who
hold to systems of author-           hold to systems of author-
ity (intermediate region)            ity (intermediate region)
is to the effect that                is to the effect that
authority is not absolute            authority is absolute and
and that people are not to           that people are to be
be evaluated (if they are            accepted and rejected
to be evaluated at all)              according to their agree-
according to their agree-            ment or disagreement
ment or disagreement                 with such authority;
with such authority;

3. the structure of beliefs       3. the structure of beliefs
and disbeliefs perceived             and disbeliefs perceived
to emanate from authority            to emanate from authority
(peripheral region) is               (peripheral region) is
such that its sub-                   such that its sub-
structures are in relative           structures are in relative
communication with each              isolation with each other,
other and finally;                   and finally;

c. to the extent that, with respect to the time-perspective dimension, there is a:

Open                              Closed

1. relatively broad time          1. relatively narrow, future-
perspective                          oriented time perspective

To summarize:

A system is defined to be closed to the extent that there is a high magnitude of rejection of all disbelief subsystems, an isolation of beliefs, a high discrepancy in degree of differentiation between belief and disbelief systems and little differentiation with the disbelief system. The more closed the system, the more is the acceptance of a particular belief assumed to depend on irrelevant internal drives and/or arbitrary reinforcements from external authority. On the other hand, the more open the system, the more should the person deal with objective structural requirements and the less should one deal with irrelevant pressures. It is appropriate to add that open and closed systems are only ideal types convenient for purposes of analysis. Generally, a person will be: "open to information insofar as possible, and will reject it insofar as necessary" (11:60-8). If threat leads to dogmatism in individuals, by the same token it leads to dogma in institutions. Individuals accept or form closed systems to the degree they are made to feel alone, isolated, and helpless in the world in which they live (11:69) and thus anxious regarding what the future holds in store.

Rokeach has concluded that persons with either open systems or closed systems are expected to change their assumptions, differing only in the ways they may be expected to change (11:337). His findings contribute to the present argument in that he indicates that persons with open systems differ in several significant ways from persons seen as possessing closed systems. Some of the differences as identified by the research are as follows:

1. The closed persons have more difficulty than open persons in synthesizing or integrating new beliefs into a new system (11:196).

2. The closed persons reject the experimental situation more than do open persons (11:196).

3. The closed persons do not like to become involved in situations requiting new systems of thought (11:197).

4. The closed persons tend to reject the new belief system; they therefore do not remember the beliefs, thus there is nothing to synthesize or integrate into a new system (11:197).

5. The closed persons rejected the problem situation to a significant level over the open group (11:209).

6. The closed persons did not differ from open persons in problem solving as a function of intelligence (11:209, 345).

7. The closed person tends to "go along" with the experiment but only on the surface. He is not really prepared to entertain it seriously (11:212).

8. The closed persons were less able to see logical contradictions between beliefs (11:245).

9. The closed persons were more loyal to authority and less likely to defect from an impossible system (artificially imposed in the experimental situation) (11:246).

10. The closed persons do not differ to a significant degree from the open persons on perceptual analysis but they do on perceptual synthesis (11:264-5).

The preceding indicates that persons who have been identified as possessing closed systems are less likely to adopt the new system (meta-Aristotelian) than are "open subjects." A synthesis of Rokeach's research indicates that the person with the closed system would be typified by the following characteristics:

The closed person would likely reject new learning situations and new systems of thought. The person would tend not to remember the new beliefs, but the failure to remember would not be a function of intelligence. One would be likely to tend to "go along" but only on the surface. The closed person would be less likely to recognize logical contradictions between beliefs while being loyal to authority. He/She would further remain loyal to a previously held system and find it difficult, if not impossible, to defect from a known system.

There would be little difference between open and closed persons in perceptual analysis but significant difference would exist in perceptual synthesis. The closed person would thus have greater difficulty than the open person in synthesizing or integrating new beliefs into a new system.

It may be well, here, to restate Rokeach's position, that persons with either open or closed systems would be expected to change values over time (11:336). The change may be for opposing reasons. In the closed person it may represent a "party line" change in conformity to authority, in the other it may represent a more genuine change based on a deeper appreciation, understanding, or maturity (11:336). Change or non-change from the closed system may be the result of conformity, identification with authority or ego defenses; while change or non-change from an open system may be the results of such factors as a more correct appraisal of reality, intellectual conviction rather than dogmatic conviction. Both open and closed persons change their values over time, but the basic difference in the quality of such changes seems to lie in diametrically opposed directions as far as personality integration is concerned (11:345).

Changing Assumptions

When considering changing one's operational assumptions, or those assumptions by which an institution is operated, it would be well to consider this statement by Marc Belth:

Few if any institutions "educate" their members to question the grounds of their own existence in such a way as to produce fundamental changes in institutional direction, meaning and function (9:14-15).

In the field of education, nurturing the means of criticism of itself and of other institutions has not been widely fostered because of widespread opposition to such a practice. In many cases, teachers lack the requisite competencies to put such ideals into effect, and some citizens may believe that to permit schools to encourage freedom of inquiry either will bring about disrespect toward society or will in some manner undermine democracy (9:15).

The existence of such popular books as Teaching as a Subversive Activity (8) by Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner, Deschooling Society (5) by Ivan Illich, and Crisis in the Classroom (12) by Charles Silberman indicates a significant level of discontent.

In coping with the present situation, it would be well to remember that for individuals to change their perceptions they must be frustrated in their actions. Moreover, no one can force anyone else to change perceptions (8:136). It would appear, however, that at least some teachers have fulfilled one of the basic conditions of perception change - a recognition of frustration resulting from their assumptions. They refuse to accept as an unalterable "given" the structure of the school and some educators recognize that students' problems cannot be resolved within the formal structure of schools. In the words of Barry Stevens (10:149):

It gives me the creeps that children who are told they are 'wrong,"no good,"worthless' cannot get away, and that our young people are required to fit into a society which does not fit them. When we require always more doctors, more psychotherapists, more jailers, more cops, who is at fault?

We know from the available research that sometimes perceptions can be changed if the point of view (assumptions) of the perceiver is shifted. Perceptual change can occur when a different point of view has been made evident to a perceiver - that is, when the perceiver is put into an environment that makes it difficult, if not impossible, to function with one's old assumptions (8:137). This need was dealt with by Korzybski in his attempt to explain how general semantics can promote moral development through change in viewpoint. He said (7:xxxi):

In general semantics we do not 'preach"morality' or 'ethics' as such, but we train students in consciousness of abstracting, consciousness of the multiordinal mechanisms of evaluation, relational orientations, etc., which bring about cortico-thalamic integration, and then as a result, 'morality,"ethics,"awareness of social responsibilities' etc. follow automatically.

Korzybski went on to say (7:xxxi)

Unfortunately our educational systems are unaware of, or even negativistic toward, such neuro-semantic and neuro-linguistic issues. These are sad observations to be made about our present educational systems.

It may be well to note that Science and Sanity (7) was published in 1933, but similar criticisms were made in the 1970's. For example, Peck's findings, supported by Hartshorne and May (9:120) indicate the inadequacy of moral education programs. Values (assumptions) are taught, however, whether the school consciously plans for such teaching or not. Therefore, it becomes a matter of whether we wish to plan such processes reflectively in terms of desired outcomes or to let them drift because such undertakings have not been a characteristic feature of past programs. The issue is whether the school as social institution can question the basic assumptions on which it is founded.

What type of teacher is needed to contribute to this institutional change? In an article reporting the results of a dissertation study, Dandes found that the greater the psychological health of the teacher, the greater the possession of attitudes and values characteristic of effective teaching (9:121). Teacher education programs, however, have primarily emphasized the acquisition of knowledge of one's subject and of teaching methodology. Those who employ teachers rarely recognize the value of hiring instructors who dare to question fundamental assumptions. The conforming teacher is more pliant and docile and does not disrupt the organizational machinery (9:122).

To contrast the hostility toward those who question the basic assumptions upon which schools are founded, we may consider what Korzybski said about scientists and the progress of science. In his book Manhood of Humanity (6:1i-1iii), he takes the position that the growth of science is largely the result of the freedom of scientists "to revise their fundamental assumptions..." and to critically accept inferential knowledge (knowledge not based on sense data but on inferences from observed happenings) with its "as if" character.

The non-questioning acceptance of the "norm" in education, and in much of the life of the average person, is in sharp contrast to "the peaceful progress we have in science, where we are free to analyze our basic assumptions, and where we use a language of appropriate structure" (6:1iiii-1iv). Korzybski also noted (7:xxxvi) that in day-to-day life people operate in terms of "hasty generalizations," "mis-evaluations," and half-truths. We react and act as if our half-truths or false knowledge were all there is to be known, which leads to self-deception and maladjustments.

Francis Chisholm elaborates on this point by describing the difficulty encountered by physicists of two centuries ago who tried to find "heat." (4: 24-5). Scientists assumed that heat was a kind of substance. It was a solid, or fluid, which was to be found in some bodies and not in others. Scientists of the time "knew" that heat was a substance from a structural assumption of language. One can talk about heat; heat is a noun and nouns are the names of things. Chisholm says (4:25): "Now if you have never questioned (your assumption), that what you say necessarily reflects the structure of the world, of course heat is itself a substance." It is not generally realized what serious difficulties an inadequate, unduly limited form of representation or theory brings about. If our orientations and evaluations are inadequate, our predictability is impaired, and we feel with the poet Housman, "I, a stranger and afraid, in a world I never made" (7:xxxiii). One difficulty is that a language or any other system cannot be revised structurally without going outside the existing system.

Therefore, in revising operational assumptions, and thus perceptions, attitudes, and behavior, one must recognize that perceptions are unique and that no one can be absolutely certain of anything. We must recognize too that language is far from neutral in the process of perceiving, as well as in the process of evaluating perceptions (8:99).

Conclusion

New opportunities and new challenges surely will not be resolved by solutions that were formulated in more innocent and primitive times. Symbols created to serve sophisticated technology cannot be allowed to mislead. Symbol makers who misrepresent reality for personal gain must be challenged. Finally, we must expose and criticize old dogmas, for we cannot solve contemporary problems within yesterday's paradigms.

SELECTED REFERENCES

1. Bois, J. Samuel, Explorations in Awareness. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1957, pp. 29, 30, 36-8, 54-6, 67-9, 131, 135-7.

2. Bougle, C. C., The Evolution of Values. New York: Agustus M. Kelly, Publisher, 1970, pp. 3-13.

3. Cass, James, "The Schools in Perspective," Saturday Review, 1:24, 24, January 13, 1973.

4. Chisholm, Francis R., Introductory Lectures on General Semantics. Lakeville, Conn.: Institute of General Semantics, 1945, pp. ii-iv, 9, 11-13, 24-5, 27, 35.

5. Illich, Ivan, Deschooling Society. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, pp. xviii-116.

6. Korzybski, Alfred, Manhood of Humanity. Lakeville, Conn.: The International Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Company, 1921, pp. xvii, xlix, li-lii, li-liii, liii-liv, 46-92, 59, 63, 107, 113.

7. Korzybski, Alfred, Science and Sanity, 4th Edition. Lakeville, Conn.: The International Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Company, 1958, pp. xi, xxv-lxx, xxi, xxxiii, xxxvi, xlvii, lii, 8-9, 11, 13, 14, 31, 58, 63, 64, 93, 102, 111-122, 112, 123-130, 139, 202, 280, 317, 318, 319, 371, 372, 373-5, 376, 386-411, 418-19, 433.

8. Postman, Neil, and Charles Weingartner, Teaching As a Subversive Activity. New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1969, pp. 99, 136, 137.

9. Rich, John M., Education and Human Values. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1968, pp. 14-15, 120-121, 122.

10. Rogers, Carol R., Barry Stevens, and Others, Person to Person: The Problem of Being Human. Menlo Park, Calif.: Peninsula Lithograph Co., 1967, pp. 129, 149.

11. Rokeach, Milton, and Others, The Open and Closed Mind. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960, pp. 31-6, 55-6, 60-8, 69, 196, 197, 209, 212, 245, 246, 264-5, 335-7, 345.

12. Silberman, Charles E., Crisis in the Classroom. New York: Vintage Books, 1970.

William M. Fox is Associate Professor in the Education Department at St. Lawrence University in Canton, NY. His article "General Semantics as a Therapeutic Modality" appeared in ETC vol. 38, no. 1, Spring 1981.