Change and opportunity--steady in the harness!

Never before in my 30-plus years of service have I seen such a period of dynamic change and complete commitment of our Army as we see today. If change makes you uncomfortable, then certainly you must be having a hard time sleeping.

As your new Chief of Field Artillery for both Active and Reserve Components (AC and RC) units. I see this period as an opportunity. Our Army's current fight against the war on terrorism along with the corresponding mobilizations, movements and deployments on a scale not seen since the Second World War provide both the energy and resources for Army transformation.

One can readily understand the Army's frustration when our one-million-plus AC-RC force found it incredibly difficult to rotate 300,000 Soldiers forward deployed in order to fight with a fresh set of troops. Why can't the 700,000-plus who remain on the bench fall in to rotate onto the field?

I believe the answer is "readiness and relevance"--that's why the Army recently undertook the AC-RC rebalancing initiative and why we are transforming. We are rebalancing to ensure the AC can deploy and be ready to fight anywhere at any time for 30 days without having to mobilize RC units.

Historically, Redlegs have deployed and fought beside the maneuver forces they support. As we transform for the future, we will ensure that this support remains--that we are always ready, competent, flexible and relevant. I am committed to ensuring no maneuver commander even considers a plan that does not include his artillery.

Currently, the greatest transformation challenges are in cannon developments and organizations. In this brief column, I focus on those challenges, only mentioning rocket and missile artillery in passing. Our rocket and missile artillery are significant capabilities that also will be integral to the future force and, as such, will be discussed in future columns.

Precision Fires and Effects. Our first and most essential task is to support the close fight. This is the raison d'etre for our cannons. We will continue to improve our precision fires as well as more precise area effects in support of the maneuver brigades.

To achieve this precision, we must overcome the challenge of target location error (TLE). Precision munitions, such as Excalibur and other global positioning system-(GPS)-guided projectiles, will "miss precisely" if our observers can't locate targets accurately.

For the mounted observer, our standard is no more than 20 meters TLE at 10 kilometers. The fire support sensor system (F[S.sup.3]) will be mounted on the Knight vehicle in early 2005 and provide that standard; currently, we have 31 Knights deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the rapid force initiative (RFI) program. The F[S.sup.3] will be a long-range advanced scout surveillance system (LRA[S.sup.3]) with a lightweight laser designator rangefinder (LLDR) module. We must give the Bradley fire support team (FIST) this same capability.

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For the dismounted observer, we have the current commercial-off-the-shelf Mark VII and Viper/Vector 21. These systems fielded in Afghanistan and Iraq under the RFI are lighter weight, have night vision and provide digital connectivity.

The five requirements for accurate predicted fire remain constant. They enable our fires to be precise. They are the science of our business, providing the "Gunnery Solution." Overcoming TLE, our bane for more than 30 years, will deliver "the keys to the joint effects kingdom" to our observers. I have made fixing TLE a priority above all others as we move to improve the responsiveness and effectiveness of our joint fires while driving down our logistical ammo tail.

Our current fight in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) clearly dictates that we also must improve our counterfire radar capability. Our radars must become omni-directional (360 degrees) and more accurate and process data much more quickly in order to attack and destroy fleeting improvised shooters, to include those in urban areas.

The Special Operations Forces (SOF) version of the lightweight countermortar radar (LCMR) is being fielded to our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan under the RFI. The operational and organizational (O & O) plan for improving the LCMR's range, accuracy, precision and timeliness for FA and mortar fires is being staffed. The Phoenix radar replacing the Q-37 radar will significantly improve counterfire along with the multi-mission radar (MMR) replacing the Q-36 radar. The MMR will not only be able to detect enemy fires and direct timely, effective counterfire, but also control aircraft and detect missiles.

Common location, direction and elevation are provided by our position and azimuth determining system (PADS) and the gun laying and positioning system (GLPS). In the nearterm, the improved PADS (IPADS) will replace the antiquated PADS that suffers a low readiness rate with costly repairs. Eventually, these capabilities will be embedded in weapons systems, greatly reducing requirements for conventional survey.

The solution for determining weather data is similar. The meteorological measuring set (MMS) and Profiler Block I (only 33 systems available) remain separate systems. Ultimately, determining weather data should be embedded in our weapons, reducing personnel requirements and leveraging Internet and space-based data.

Transforming Delivery Systems and Organizations. Although the decision to terminate Crusader came as a great disappointment to most artillerymen, in hindsight, Crusader would not have been relevant, given the transformational requirement for howitzers to be transportable by C-130 aircraft. However, we are leveraging many of the Crusader program's technologies in the development of our non-line-of-sight-cannon (NLOS-C). These include the projectile tracking system (PTS), the ammunition autoloader and the command console modules.

It is safe to say that until Army transformation is complete, artillerymen can anticipate providing precise and effective, timely and devastating close support fires for four different brigade formations. Forcible-entry brigades (82d and 101st Airborne Divisions and the 173d Airborne Brigade) will use the M119 and M198 cannons and, possibly, high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) launchers. As we see the lifespan of the M119 closing in 2010, we will conduct research and development (R & D) to procure an enhanced forcible-entry cannon in that time frame.

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Stryker brigades currently use the M198, a dependable and effective cannon. But as a towed system, it does not match the survivability and mobility of the formation it supports. The Marine Corps' M777 lightweight 155-mm cannon with towed artillery digitization (TAD) added, making it the M777A1, is an interim solution. But we will continue to pursue a self-propelled cannon for the Stryker brigade with a better 6400-mil capability, possibly the NLOS-C deployable in a C-130.

Our counterattack corps brigades (3d and 4th Infantry Divisions and 1st Cavalry Division) will continue to be supported by Paladins for as long as the Army fights with Bradleys and Abrams tanks--feasibly out to 2025. The Paladin proved itself during O1F with accurate, responsive effects, firing high-explosive rounds with point-detonating fuzes (HE/PD) and HE with variable-time fuzes (HE/VT) in areas where there was concern for collateral damage. According to the 3d Infantry Division Artillery (Div Arty) Commander, Paladin was the weapon of choice in the fight to take Baghdad. We will continue to make prudent improvements to Paladin to pull emerging capabilities "to the left," especially in command and control.

We are looking closely at using the FA ammunition supply vehicle (FAASV) chassis as the platoon leader's command and control vehicle and calling it the FA operations center vehicle (FAOCV). As we transform, our direct support (DS) battalions will be assigned (organic) to brigade units of action (UAs) and will change from three six-gun batteries to two eight-gun batteries (two four-gun platoons per battery). Paladin firing platoon leaders and platoon sergeants must have combat vehicles to command and control their guns.

The NLOS-C, along with the NLOS-launcher system (NLOS-LS), will form the backbone of organic fire support for the future combat system-(FCS)-equipped UA. The NLOS-C will share the same chassis as the infantry and armor FCS variants it will support. For the first time, our guns will have the same survivability, mobility, operational maneuver and sustainability as the maneuver forces they support--that is significant.

Our requirement for this cannon is a range of at least 30 kilometers firing HE with an accuracy not to exceed .55 percent of its range at low angle. It will fire six rounds per minute using an autoloader, be able to respond to a mission on the move within 30 seconds and be rearmable in less than 12 minutes with no fewer than 24 complete rounds.

We are concluding a study to determine if the NLOS-C should be a 155-mm or 105-mm cannon. This study covers much more than caliber--it is about capabilities. Just as other services have moved to smaller diameter bombs and increased precision, we, too, seek to shrink our logistics tail with increased precision while sustaining our current lethality and range in smaller, lighter, more deployable systems.

The transformed, modular and expeditionary brigade-based force must be able to attack into "white spaces" on the battlefield--the operationally significant spaces uncovered by friendly or enemy systems--and artillery that is agile intra-theater by C-130 will be essential to do that.

Those of you who have served in DS battalions will agree that, in most divisions, the DS battalions were de facto organic to the brigades. The Div Arty commanders' rule is DS battalions answer first to their supported maneuver brigades and then to the division as a whole--conflicts with that rule are few as each Div Arty commander works closely with his brigade commanders.

Currently, the plan is to assign FISTs to the maneuver companies. But DS commanders should be responsible for the fire support function in their brigades. With that responsibility also should come the authority to train and develop those assets. I am committed to ensuring fire support NCOs and officers are absolutely trained, competent and ready--fully capable of performing their intended fire support mission. If this means reassigning FISTs back to the headquarters and headquarters battery in cannon battalions, then we'll work to do this and re-enable their training.

As the Army increases the number of maneuver brigades, most likely the number of DS cannon battalions organic to the brigades will increase correspondingly. However, "at the end of the day," our branch won't grow as I expect cannons echelons-above-division (EAD) will be realigned as DS battalions.

I use "DS battalions" as a familiar term; however, as these cannon battalions become organic to maneuver brigades, we'll need to relook names and relationships. After all, it has been one of our sacred points of pride that artillery is never in reserve, so we will examine the role of those cannon battalions assigned to maneuver brigades not committed or in reserve.

I clearly see growth in our 13F Fire Support Specialist Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) in order to provide expertise to every maneuver formation down to the company level.

At the division level, we will see, perhaps, the greatest change as the Army shifts to a brigade-based (UAs) institution. Currently, I do not see that this organization suggests brigades will deploy and fight alone; however, they will have modularity that will enable them to be task-organized "on the fly" to provide a force custom-tailored for the mission.

The division- or corps-sized unit of employment, or UEx, will be a tactical warfighting formation led by a two-star and be joint-capable. Subordinate maneuver and supporting UAs will not be assigned to the UEx but will be task organized modularly. This will include what we know as the Div Arty, which will be called the "fires unit of action." We envision that each UEx will have a fires UA(s) assigned for fighting, although not necessarily stationed with it during peacetime.

Fires UAs will be commanded by an artillery colonel and include a mix of launchers and cannons as well as counterfire radars. Additionally, the fires UA will contain a reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) company with common ground stations, an information operations (IO) element and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) platoons. The fires UA will be more capable than the current Div Arty. The Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC's) Task Force Modularity team is determining the exact make-up of the fires UA, the number of them in the force and their stationing details.

As with any change, there are many questions. What are the allocation rules for determining the number of fires UAs in the Army? Where will the fires UA be positioned? What is the relationship between the 06 fires UA commander and the FA battalion commanders in the maneuver UAs? Will the effects coordinator for the UEx be an 06 or 05? How about the role of the fire support element (FSE) soon to be called the effects coordination cell (ECC)? Will these organizations have multiple components (AC and RC)? Will there be stations in the continental US with a UEx and its subordinate maneuver UAs but with no fires UA collocated?

The FA's Future. We are proactively engaged with the TRADOC team to ensure the FA remains ready and relevant as part of the combined arms and joint warfighting team. We will not see a net growth of artillery, but there will be additional requirements for cannons inside the maneuver UAs (AC and RC) and our fire support Soldiers and fire support officers (FSOs) will remain critical effects coordinators in every maneuver formation.

We intend to train our 13F leaders and FSOs as "joint observers" capable of coordinating the delivery of all joint effects, both lethal and nonlethal. We are heavily engaged with other services, particularly the Air Force, and committed to growing "a bench" of Army joint terminal air controllers (JTACS) to provide our maneuver companies ready access to all joint effects.

For the Army to maintain readiness and relevance, we can expect to continue to see some artillery force structure converted to other capabilities, such as the current reorganization of 18 RC artillery batteries into Military Police companies. This is not a bad thing. Many of these formations were neither manned nor equipped at deployable levels--and, therefore, not "ready."

What many of you may not realize is that Field Artillery Soldiers comprise the largest MOSs in the National Guard, and all but nine states have at least one National Guard artillery battalion. As the Army rebalances, all artillery formations on our rolls will be maintained at the C-1 level of readiness, in terms of both modernized equipment and trained Soldiers. To that end, we are working closely with RC leaders.

With these changes, you must remain "steady in the harness," helping the Army pull as a team and seeing change as opportunity. We are working these issues at Fort Sill, at TRADOC and in the Pentagon as well as dialoging with FA leaders in the field. If you would like to ask questions or express your concerns about this column, send an email to [e-mail]. I may not be able to answer all emails; however, be assured that you will have had input.

Proud Redlegs. Our artillery Soldiers have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan and are accomplishing a wide variety of standard and non-standard missions. They have proven themselves ready and relevant--proven themselves adaptable and capable of executing Army missions across the full spectrum of conflict. Today, artillerymen also serve effectively as infantrymen to accomplish these missions: securing sensitive facilities and international borders, owning terrain as well as planning and acquiring targets, leading effects-based operations planning, shooting precise and lethal counterfire, continuing to coordinate nonlethal effects--in short, "rolling up the bad guys."

I am extremely proud of the successes of these Redlegs who have been using their unlimited imagination to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan.

I see our future formation growing ever more joint, continuing to leverage technological advancements in precision and emergent capabilities, and carrying more effects coordination in "our rucksacks" for maneuver commanders

After all, it's about being ready and relevant ... we will remain flexible, capable and loyal to our Army. If you wear crossed cannons on your collar, you have every right to be proud of your accomplishments and contributions. Your future is bright and challenging.

Brigadier General David P. Valcourt Chief of Field Artillery