Challenges to China's Russian policy in early 21st century.

In the beginning of the twenty-first century, Sino-Russian relations have achieved some significant breakthroughs, but their differences in strategic interests have been exposed in view of the U.S.-Russian agreement to reduce their nuclear weapons and Russia's implicit consent to the Bush administration's withdrawal from the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty. Sino-Russian economic exchanges have been progressing well in recent years, bilateral trade exceeded US$10.7 billion in 2001, (1) and was expected to surpass US$12 billion in 2002. But the Russian government wavered over the oil-pipeline project linking Siberia with Daqing in China's Northeast; the offer from Japan to absorb the construction cost of an alternative pipeline serving Japan through Nakhodka was apparently an effective temptation. (2)

In view of the Bush administration's attempts to win over Russia to isolate China, especially in the wake of the September 11 incident, Chinese leaders have been alerted to the potential danger in Sino-Russian relations. Apparently the Asian policy of the Putin administration has shifted from the sole emphasis on China during the Boris Yeltsin era to a more balanced policy with multiple foci. (3) In this connection, Russia's policy towards China has been influenced by the concern for balance. For example, India believes that Russian exports of advanced weapons to China, with which India is engaged in strategic competition and has territorial disputes, will exacerbate China's security threat to India. As Russia accords considerable priority to its strategic partnership with India, it has to reckon with the Indian factor and is therefore subject to pressure from New Delhi in its relations with China.

Better understanding of the domestic developments in Russia, strengthening the Russian determination to push for multipolarity, effective deterrence against the Bush administration's strategy of winning over Russia to isolate China, achieving breakthroughs in the bilateral economic relationship, and developing people-to-people diplomacy between the two countries have been identified as significant issues in China's Russian policy in the twenty-first century. This article attempts to analyze the foreign policies of the two countries and the impact of the changing international environment on them, as well as the Sino-Russian strategic/military co-operation and the difficulties in the bilateral ties in the context of these significant issues.

Sino-Russian Relations and China's Foreign Policy

Achievements in the Bilateral Relationship: In the forty years between October 1949 when the two countries established diplomatic relations and May 1989 when their leaders normalized state-to-state and party-to-party relations, there were dramatic leaps and bounds in the bilateral relationship. In the 1950s, the two countries enjoyed a brotherly alliance; from the end of the 1950s to the end of the 1970s, ideological differences between the two ruling Communist parties led to serious deterioration in the bilateral relationship and even to military confrontation between the two countries. Entering into the 1980s, the post-Mat leadership began to initiate economic reforms and opening to the external world, while Mikhail Gorbachev followed with his economic and political reforms. Both countries also adjusted their foreign policy priorities in view of their domestic reforms and the changing international strategic environment. Soviet expansionism had to be reversed in view of its severe economic difficulties.

In 1982-83, China's independent foreign policy line began to take shape, and it rejected any alliance with a major power or a power bloc. Above all, it tried to secure a peaceful international environment to concentrate on economic development as the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist regime had to rely on the improvement of the people's living standards. Normalization of Sino-Soviet relations therefore was in accord with mutual interests. Through various channels, leaders of both countries finally reached agreement to satisfy Beijing's demands (4) and realized the normalization of state and party relations during Gorbachev's visit to China in May 1989. (5)

In the restoration of Sino-Soviet ties, Deng Xiaoping insisted on state sovereignty, China's dignity, national security and the Four Modernizations as the guiding principles. In 1999, when the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was due to expire, Chinese leaders decided to initiate negotiations with their Soviet counterparts. Deng Xiaoping's position was that China should not agree to negotiate the improvement of bilateral ties when China was still under the Soviet military threat; discussions should begin only after the Soviet authorities had agreed to remove the three major obstacles, i.e. Beijing's demands mentioned above. The Chinese leadership, however, recognized that from the point of view of China's overall foreign policy strategy, the time was ripe for the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations. Normalization of Sino-American relations and Sino-Japanese relations had been achieved; and in a number of configurations of major power relationships, China's position would become increasingly difficult. Adjustment in Sino-Soviet relations at this stage would not only fill an important gap in China's foreign policy, but would also enhance China's flexibility and bargaining power in dealing with other major powers. But the adjustment must not be hastily executed, otherwise China's relations with the U.S. and other Western powers would be adversely affected.

In the summer of 1982, when China and the U.S. were about to conclude an agreement on the latter's arms sales to Taiwan, Chinese leaders decided to re-start SinoSoviet negotiations. Deng Xiaoping's strategy was to use China's relations with Country A to influence its relations with Country B, and then exploit China's relations with Country B to promote its relations with Country A. The objective was to achieve a balance in the relations among the major powers, stability in the international situation and a global environment conducive to China's modernization programme. (6) This actually was the foundation of China's independent foreign policy line of peace.

When Deng Xiaoping met Gorbachev in May 1989 in Beijing, he reviewed Sino-Soviet relations during which he emphasized that the Soviet Union had placed China in the wrong position, and that the real issue had been inequality. Regarding the ideological controversies, Deng commented that with the benefit of hindsight, "both sides have uttered many empty word;" he too acknowledged that the Chinese side was not correct in every way. Deng then observed: "We have settled the historical account, these issues have now gone with the wind." Deng summed up the meeting as "ending the past, opening up to the future." Drawing on the historical lessons from the international Communist movement and Sino-Soviet relations, Deng indicated that both alliance and confrontation had not worked, Sino-Soviet relations should be based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. (7) Consequently, in the Sino-Soviet Joint Communique released, it was formally stated that both countries agreed to develop bilateral ties on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. It was further stated that the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations would not be directed against any third country nor damage the interests of any third country.

The Tiananmen Incident and the dissolution of the Soviet Union pushed the relations between China and its northern neighbour to a new stage. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the healthy development of Sino-Russian relations has been impressive. In the first place, bilateral ties were well maintained in the state succession process. In August 1991, the Chinese leadership's position during the coup in Moscow was highly ambiguous, to say the least. (8) But on December 27, 1991, two days after the establishment of the Russian Federation, the Chinese government announced its recognition of the federation as a sovereign state and indicated that China would be prepared to develop good-neighbourly relations with the federation. In the following January, both governments, on the basis of the 1989 and 1991 joint communiques, agreed to develop friendly relations. In March 1992, Russian foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, visited China, and removed all doubts that the two countries could develop friendly ties.

Bilateral relations developed rapidly on this foundation. At the end of 1992, the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, visited China, and the two governments concluded a joint statement, reaffirming "a relationship of good-neighbourliness, friendship, mutual benefit and co-operation based on peaceful co-existence." In September 1994, Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, visited Moscow, and the two leaders concluded a joint statement, an agreement to stop targeting their strategic nuclear weapons at each other, and another agreement on the western sector of their border. They too declared that the two countries would establish a long-term, stable "constructive partnership facing the twenty-first century." Then in April 1996, Boris Yeltsin visited China again; and in the joint statement released, the two countries announced their determination to "develop a strategic cooperative partnership based on equality and mutual trust facing the twenty-first century."

In April 1997, President Jiang Zemin returned to Russia for a state visit, and the two heads of state released a declaration on global multipolarity and the establishment of a new international political and economic order. They too articulated their opposition to attempts to achieve global unipolarity and political hegemony. At the same time, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan also reached agreement on reducing troop levels along their common border of over 7,000 km to about 260,000. Tanks, armoured personnel carriers and artillery would be cut substantially too. (9) In November 1998, the leaders of both countries held an informal summit in Russia. They concluded a joint statement on the border issue; by then the marking of the common land border had basically been completed. (10)

The Worldview of the Chinese Leadership and Sino-Russian Relations: In the 1990s, Sino-Russian relations developed from the initial normalization of relations to a relationship of good-neighbourliness and friendship, then from a constructive partnership to a strategic co-operative partnership. Undeniably the progress has been satisfactory. Chinese leaders perceived the 1990s as a transitional period between bipolarity and multipolarity; and they expected the transitional period to be a long one. The U.S. was the major winner in the Cold War, and has emerged as the sole superpower in the post-Cold War era. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact meant that China could no longer exploit the "strategic triangle." (11) However, though the U.S. and Russia have the military capabilities to attack China, they do not have the incentive to do so; and this situation will continue in the future.

In the eyes of the Chinese leaders, the demise of the bipolar world was mainly due to the economic and technological backwardness of the Soviet Union. While a multipolar world is still in the embryonic stage, the emerging balance of power will be determined by the competition in "comprehensive national power." "Comprehensive national power" to a large extent depends on economic development and technological progress. In the foreseeable future, China has to concentrate on the development of its "comprehensive national power," otherwise it will fall behind in the intense competition.

In contrast to the 1970s and 1980s, China had no intention of openly organizing a broad united front against U.S. hegemony at the end of the Cold War. Chinese leaders believed that the strategic focus of the U.S. lay in Europe and its flank, the Middle East. Although the U.S. had emerged as the sole superpower in the wake of the Cold War and the war in the Persian Gulf, it still did not have enough resources to strengthen its role in the Asia-Pacific region. The Chinese leadership considered that in the post-Cold War era, factors for instability would exacerbate, and various territorial disputes, ethnic contradictions and religious conflicts would emerge. These developments causing instability would also have an adverse impact on China, especially the demonstration effect of the ethnic separatism and Islamic fundamentalism in the newly-independent Central Asian republics on the national minorities in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia.

By 1992-93, Chinese diplomacy had returned to normalcy after the Tiananmen Incident, (12) China no longer perceived itself as the main target of the U.S.'s strategy for "peaceful evolution." The Asia-Pacific region was relatively calm in comparison with Europe which had to accommodate the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The generals of the People's Liberation Army, however, were quite concerned with the strengthening of the American conventional forces and the adjustments in U.S. strategy, especially the plan to enhance its military capabilities from being able to handle one and a half wars to the management of two major regional conflicts. (13)

Throughout the 1990s, Chinese leaders perceived no need for significant adjustments in its basic foreign policy. Naturally they hoped to accelerate the trend towards multipolarity, and be able to check the U.S.'s attempt to dominate international affairs. This was actually the foundation for the Sine-Russian strategic partnership. Chinese leaders believed that both China and Russia accorded high priority to their respective major-power status and diplomatic traditions; but they too had to maintain cordial relations with the Western countries, and especially the U.S. Hence Beijing and Moscow did not require an alliance relationship to promote their mutual interests, and on many occasions they did not even have to engage in joint action. Although the bilateral strategic co-operative partnership did not clearly define their commitments and obligations, both parties had adequate mutual confidence and trust to engage in parallel action to promote multipolarity and balance against the U.S. Such an arrangement could avoid explicitly antagonizing the U.S., especially the Congress and public opinion. It would also facilitate the involvement of other countries. For example, when China and France established a comprehensive partnership in May 1997, the two countries stated in the joint declaration released: "The two parties have decided to foster the march towards multipolarity ... to contribute to a new political and economic international order that is both just and rational and opposes any attempt at domination in international affairs." (14)

China has never abandoned its efforts to cultivate the Third World to balance against the U.S. Such diplomatic activities remained relatively low-key in the 1990s, but the Chinese authorities adopted a high profile whenever Sine-American relations encountered difficulties. In the wake of the Tiananmen Incident, Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen visited Africa in August and the Middle East in September. (15) Soon after the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1996, the U.S. and Japan strengthened defence co-operation, and President Jiang Zemin visited Ethiopia, Kenya, Egypt, Mali, Namibia and Zimbabwe in June. During the visit, Jiang conspicuously articulated China's objection to interferences in other countries' domestic affairs, and condemned individual major powers assuming the role of international policemen, using the pretext of human rights in interfering with other countries' affairs. On the Middle East question, Jiang stated that the U.S. had to respect the views and positions of the Arab countries concerned. (16) In the following year, when Premier Li Peng visited Africa, criticisms of the U.S. were much more muted because by then Sine-American relations had improved. (17)

China's diplomatic activities in the United Nations revealed a similar pattern. What was significant was that in balancing against the U.S., China and Russia often adopted parallel actions separately, and avoided the impression of well co-ordinated joint action. In February 1998, when the Clinton administration was prepared to launch large-scale air strikes against Iraq, it was generally expected that Beijing and Moscow would closely co-operate diplomatically as the avoidance of military conflict was in their mutual interests. In fact, many Third World countries, especially Islamic countries, expected them to do so. But close co-operation between China and Russia did not materialize; in fact, it was Russia and France which demonstrated significant mutual support instead. (18)

Chinese leaders considered that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s eastward expansion and the U.S. policy of expanding its influence in Central Asia and among the Confederation of Independent States meant that Russia experienced pressure from both sides. Further, Russia suffered from serious internal contradictions which had been contributing to its weakness. Hence adjustments in its foreign policy became essential for its survival and development. The first step would be adjustment in its policy towards Europe. Under immense pressure from NATO and the European Union, the core of the Russian strategy was to fully exploit its potential in geopolitics so as to establish a relatively safe buffer zone to counter NATO's eastward expansion and the Western countries' infiltration in Central Asia.

At the same time, Russia had to demonstrate its powerful deterrence as a nuclear superpower at various levels to counter the American nuclear threat, so as to guarantee its security and its influence in the international community. But in view of its declining strength, it would be impossible to realize its strategic objective without the strategic co-operative partnership with China. Chinese leaders too recognized that the foreign policies of the two countries should be mutually supportive; the Sino-Russian strategic co-operative partnership was essential to China's realizing its strategic objectives and its promotion of multipolarity. (19)

Though Beijing and Moscow have been eager to declare that their strategic cooperative partnership is not directed at any third country, it cannot be denied that it is directed at the U.S. as well as its pressure on and containment of China and Russia. (20) Chinese leaders believed that the global strategy of the U.S. depreciates the international status and influence of China and Russia, and thus damages their national interests. In the post-Cold War era, the U.S., on the basis of its superior economic and military capabilities, has been pursuing an ambitious strategy of unipolarity. Its fundamental objectives are: to maintain its status as the sole superpower in the world, to ensure its leadership in international affairs, to continue to expand the community of states upholding democracy and the market economy, to maintain its lead in military capabilities, and to prevent new challengers to its predominant position from emerging: Regarding the latter objective, the U.S. naturally targets against China, Russia and India. (21)

Further, the U.S.'s regional security strategies also constitute serious threats to China and Russia, including NATO's eastward expansion, the strengthening of the U.S.'s bilateral and multilateral military alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, increasing arms sales to Taiwan, etc. This naturally promotes mutual support and co-ordination between the two countries in countering the pressure and containment from the U.S.

In the post-Cold War era, the overall U.S. objective regarding Russia is that it should remain "weak but not chaotic." Russia should be absorbed into the American strategic orbit and become subservient to U.S. interests. Actual policies involve the cultivation of pro-American forces in the Russian domestic scene, so as to influence its political development and policy-making process; promoting radical economic reforms in Russia, exploiting economic assistance, repayment to external debts, access to international economic organizations, etc. as incentives and sanctions; and exerting pressure on Russia in disarmament and arms control so as to weaken the defence industries in Russia and its military capabilities. (22)

Regarding China, the U.S. strategic objectives are to promote democracy and market reforms, set guidelines for its political and economic developments, accelerate "peaceful evolution" in China, and at the same time "contain" its speed of emerging as a major power and competitor. To realize such objectives, the U.S. will increase its pressure on China regarding democracy and human rights issues in the political sphere; it will support China's economic reforms, but will maintain simultaneously a series of policies discriminating against China; militarily, the U.S. will be highly alert to China's defence modernization, and will continue to blackmail Beijing strategically through measures such as arms sales to Taiwan; and finally it will strengthen its propaganda towards China, trying to cultivate American values and lifestyles among the Chinese population through various channels. The Chinese authorities believe that the Bush administration would be even more enthusiastic in the pursuit of such policies than its predecessors.

At the same time, Chinese leaders also recognize the limitations of the Sino-Russian strategic co-operative partnership. Regarding NATO's eastward expansion, China's support for Russia is largely symbolic. Similarly, on the strengthening of U.S.-Japan defence co-operation, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, etc, Russia can do no more than articulating its support for the Chinese position and condemning the U.S. actions. In the case of the Korean situation, when the Clinton administration proposed quadrilateral negotiations among U.S., China and the two Koreas in April 1996, China agreed to take part even when Russia was excluded.

New Challenges in Sino-Russian Relations During the Putin Administration: Vladimir Putin has been acting as the Russian President since January 2001, and was formally inaugurated as president in the following May. Putin obviously wants a more centralized system of government, and he has made considerable progress. In the eyes of China's Russian experts, concentration of power in the federal government will allow the latter to be more in control of foreign policy, and this should be an improvement over the confusion, contradictions and frequent changes in the Yeltsin era. Hence Russian foreign policy should improve in stability and continuity. Sino-Russian border agreements as well as their completion of the border demarcation work have also removed a contentious issue in Russian domestic politics concerning Sino-Russian relations. Consensus within Russia on its China policy has strengthened and this consensus includes: a) a recognition that developing a co-operative relationship with China is in accord with Russia's interests; and b) a demand that the bilateral relationship should bring Russia concrete benefits. It is expected that Moscow's China policy would be more practical and rational.

These experts observe that Putin's education and work experience were mainly related to Europe. He speaks German, worked in East Germany for a long time, and understands European affairs well. But apparently he has little experience regarding China and Asia, and had not been involved in Sino-Russian relations before he became president. (23)

In the first year of his presidency, the Putin administration released three revised important documents: Russia's Concept of State Security, A Vision of Russian Foreign Policy and Russia's Military Doctrine. These official documents clearly oppose a unipolar world, but Putin and his colleagues also emphasize the demands of modernization and the new threats of terrorism, organized crimes, etc. Russia's Concept of State Security in particular stresses that economic decline, institutional decay, organized crimes, corruption, terrorism and separatism are serious threats to Russian security. According to such an analysis, the Putin administration obviously accords a high priority to Russia's integration with the Western financial and trade institutions, early admission into the World Trade Organization, and the elimination of the trade restrictions imposed by the U.S. and European Union. In the longer-term future, Russia hopes to achieve an institutionalization of its relations with the European Union, because the latter is Russia's most important trade partner and source of foreign investment. (24)

From China's point of view, the most significant development in Sino-Russian relations in recent years was the reversal of Moscow's position in opposing the Bush administration's plan to establish a National Missile Defence (NMD) programme. In July 2001, Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin released a joint declaration opposing the development of anti-ballistic missiles. In the following June, when the "Shanghai Five" was formally organized as the Shanghai Co-operation Organization, Putin and Jiang Zemin still openly opposed the development of a missile-defence system by the U.S. But one month afterwards, when the two countries concluded a Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Co-operation in Moscow, Putin indicated that "Russia has no plan to adopt joint action with any country, including China" in opposing the U.S.'s NMD programme. (25)

In November 2001, when Putin visited the U.S. and was received by President George Bush in his Texas ranch, the two leaders reached an understanding on the U.S.'s withdrawal from the 1992 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty. In the following month, when President Bush formally announced the American withdrawal from the treaty, he stated that Putin agreed that the decision would not damage the new relations between the two countries nor Russia's security. (26) During Putin's visit to the U.S., the two leaders also reached a verbal agreement to reduce the two countries' strategic nuclear arsenals by two-thirds in the next decade. The U.S. would reduce its existing 7,000 nuclear warheads on inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to about 1,700-2,200; and Russia too would reduce its stockpile of 5,800 warheads to about 1,500. The two countries would thus reduce their respective strategic nuclear arsenals to the level of the 1960s. At the peak of the Cold War, they both had about 10,000 nuclear warheads each. (27)

Russia obviously has to cut its nuclear weapons in order to reduce its defence expenditure, which is essential to overcoming its economic difficulties. Russia lacks the economic power to engage in an arms race with the U.S.; it has to make the concessions because of its limitations. Putin had to accept the Bush offer of simply removing the nuclear warheads from the ICBMs, and not destroying them. The reward for Russia was that NATO agreed to set up a joint committee with policy-making powers on common action, thus allowing Russia a voice on NATO's security affairs, but without veto power. (28) Further, NATO would consider reducing the pressure on Russia generated by its eastward expansion.

The agreement between the U.S. and Russia exposes the discrepancy in interests between China and Russia on the question of nuclear weapons. China at this stage only has about 20 ICBMS which can reach the U.S., hence a small-scale NMD programme may, to a considerable extent, neutralize its nuclear deterrence. Russia's strategic nuclear weapons, on the other hand, are comparable to those of the U.S. quantitatively and qualitatively. The U.S.'s NMD programme will not be able to affect Russia's nuclear deterrence in a significant way for some time. Hence the Putin administration could afford some temporary concessions; while China can only resort to an increase in its production of ICBMs and the development of multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology to ensure the reliability of its nuclear deterrence. (29) Chinese leaders are concerned that the heavy burden of defence modernization will become a serious obstacle to the country's economic development. In 2002, China's defence budget rose 17.6% to 166 billion yuan; earlier, the Bush administration also increased the U.S.'s military expenditure by US$48 billion to US$379 billion. (30)

In the wake of the September 11 incident, the Putin administration strongly backed the U.S., including encouraging the Central Asian republics to provide military facilities for the U.S., increasing its assistance to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to fight the Taliban regime, etc. The conservative mainstream in the U.S. then had a very positive perception of the Putin administration; it included Russia into the democratic camp, and promoted the cultivation of Russia and India to "contain" China. (31) Economically, it also appealed to Russia to abandon its dreams of reviving "the Russian Empire" and pushing for multipolarity, and that it should engage in market reforms and be prepared to integrate with Europe instead. After all, Russia's trade balance mainly came from Europe and China; and countries previously controlled by the Soviet Union in Eastern and Central Europe as well as along the Baltic Sea have been striving hard to depart from the Russian sphere of influence and join Europe. (32)

Russia's common stand with France and Germany in opposing the U.S. military campaign against Iraq was probably a surprise for the Bush administration. Russian officials blamed the latter for neglecting Russian interests, treating Russia as a junior partner of the U.S. as if Russia had no choice but to support the U.S. Their American counterparts, on the other hand, considered Russian expectations to be unrealistic, occasionally sending contradictory signals to the West. President Putin is naturally concerned with the parliamentary elections at the end of 2003, and domestic criticisms against making too many concessions to the U.S. while getting too little in return. In the early 1990s, the Yeltsin administration was also eager to toe the Western line, but was subsequently disappointed by the lack of economic assistance from the West. It will be difficult for the U.S. and the rest of the Western world to satisfy the Russian demands, and this will remain a serious obstacle to the development of their relations. As revealed by opinion surveys, the U.S. attack of Iraq had led to a rise of anti-American sentiments among the Russian people. (33)

The U.S. and Russia exchanged accusations during the military campaign against Iraq. The Russian government protested against American surveillance aircraft flying over Georgia, it criticized the U.S. attack of Iraq for generating instability in the neighbouring areas, and the Russian legislature even suspended deliberations on the arms control treaty between the two countries. The Bush administration in return accused Russia for selling advanced weapons to Iraq. The Bush administration's hardline position on Iran and North Korea will likely create more frictions in U.S.-Russia relations. However, in a psuedo-multipolar situation, all major powers will act with restraint, keeping all options open. In early April 2003, Condoleezza Rice, special assistant for national security affairs to President Bush, visited Russia and was received by President Putin. Both sides attempted to limit the adverse impact of the Iraqi war on their bilateral relations. (34) The Chinese authorities responded in a similar way. When the U.S. announced its withdrawal from the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, President Jiang Zemin was visiting Myanmar, and he received phone calls from both President Bush and President Putin. China and Russia were able to indicate a common stand in support of the global strategic balance and on the maintenance of international stability and security. In response to the U.S. announcement, the Chinese authorities expressed their concern, and appealed to the Bush administration to initiate a new security dialogue to discuss the American NMD programme. (35)

Domestic Arguments on Russia's China Policy

In the 1960s, when serious differences emerged in Sino-Soviet relations, Soviet propaganda officials as well as dissidents discussed the threat of Red Guards from China swarming into the Soviet Union. (36) When China engaged in economic reforms and opening to the external world, orthodox theoreticians such as Oleg Rakhmanin, deputy head of the Department for Socialist Countries of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee, severely criticized the Communist Party of China (CPC) for its betrayal of socialism and defection to capitalism. On the other hand, the reformists inside and outside the CPSU naturally advocated that the Soviet Union should borrow from China's experience and introduce market reforms. (37)

Throughout the 1990s, there was a broad spectrum of views in Russia on China. There were groups which appreciated the experiences of China's reforms and considered them superior to those in Russia; and there were those who rejected China's reform models, considering them as inappropriate for Russia or undemocratic. By the end of the decade, China's economic achievements were beyond dispute; but the above arguments continued. Those who objected to China's economic model believed that China's economy would encounter serious problems ahead.

Regarding Sino-Russian relations, there were advocates for co-operation with China to balance against the West; some urged Russia to assume the role of balancer among the major powers; and there were groups which feared that China's strength would constitute a threat to Russia. It is interesting to note that those who supported or rejected China's reforms did not establish definite links with those who promoted or discouraged further co-operation with China. Among those who appreciated China's reform experiences, some urged for closer co-operation with China to balance against the West, some advocated for a balancer role for Russia while improving relations with both China and the West, and some argued for a hardline position in dealing with China. At the same time, those who rejected the Chinese reform model included the advocates for more radical reforms as well as the conservatives who opposed the West. Hence, different views on Russia's China policy co-existed within the same political party, while similar views on China policy appeared in political parties confronting each other.

At the end of the 1990s, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and its allies tended to support economic reforms along the Chinese path, and many in the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences held similar views. The latter appreciated the gradualist approach in China, and considered the approach in accord with the principle of sustainability, implying that there should not be serious problems in China's long-term economic development. Many researchers in the institute anticipated some difficulties in Sino-Russian relations in the future, but China as a global power would not be a threat to Russia. (38)

The CPRF and its allies recognized the CPC's leadership role in China's reforms, and perceived this as an important factor in support of China's political stability. Besides the nationalists and Communists, many advocates for market reforms were among those in support of China's reform model. The latter believed that the "shock therapy" had been a failure, and the Chinese approach provided a model for transition into a market economy. Many democrats in Russia recognized the achievements of China's economic reforms too, but they tended to believe that China's reform strategies had not solved all the problems, and that China's experiences might not apply to Russia because of the differences between the two countries.

Supporters for strengthening Sino-Russian relations mainly came from groups which appreciated China's economic reforms. Russian socialists generally accepted China as a strong pillar in the international socialist movement and a representative of developing countries. China's role was perceived to be similar to that of the Soviet Union after 1917, hence China would be Russia's natural ally, and India should also be invited to join the two countries. The views of Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the CPRF, were representative. (39) Non-communist nationalists who were pro-China often stressed Sino-Russian co-operation to check the U.S. and Islamic fundamentalism, hence Russia should sell advanced weapons and military technology to China to strengthen its military capabilities. Some liberals were also in support of improving Sino-Russian ties, and Lev Delyusin was a significant example. He gave top priority to the resolution of the border issue, and considered that economic co-operation would be the foundation of the bilateral relationship at this stage. (40) Other liberals held similar views, and they regarded the rule of law a crucial condition for economic development; in comparison, illegal immigration, cross-border crimes, smuggling activities, etc. were secondary problems.

Among those who shared a positive evaluation of China's reforms were some advocating for a balanced Russian foreign policy. Yevgeniy Bazhanov, for example, believed that China would not establish an alliance with any major power; and an alliance with China would not be in accord with Russia's interests, as Russia had to depend on Western capital and technology. Bazhanov also considered that expansionism would be too costly for China, and instead China would continue to be friendly with various countries. (41) Bazhanov and like-minded Russians hoped that Russia would be able to maintain constructive, co-operative relations with both China and the West.

There were different groups in Russia which perceived China as a major threat. Pro-Western radical reformers wanted to follow the Western model and pushed for full integration with the West. Radical nationalists, on the other hand, considered China too Westernized, and were reluctant to see Russia engaging in alliance with foreign court tries for fear of too much external influence. An important base of the pro-Western radical reformers was the Moscow Institute of Foreign Relations, a university of the Russian Foreign Ministry; former foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev and former acting prime minister Yegor Gaydar were notable representatives of this group. Their views were similar to those of Francis Fukuyama, believing that history has ended, the Western powers have secured the central position of the world, China is insignificant, and multipolarity is meaningless. (42) Gaydar had been very active in promoting Russia's departure from its "Asiatic mode of production" and integration with the Western civilization. At the same time, Gaydar also warned against the military threat from China. (43) Russia's liberal democratic movement, the Yabloko movement, also held similar views.

Undeniably a segment of the Russian people are xenophobic, and they perceive China as a threat, with considerable resentment against immigrants from China. They believe that the Chinese people covet the rich resources of Russia's "virgin lands," look down upon the Russians as "stupid," "bear-like," etc., and cannot accept the Russian claims of the Maritime and Amur regions.

The extreme nationalists in Russia were the most hostile towards China. They believed that China had become too Westernized, and constituted a part of the hostile forces surrounding Russia. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, openly declared that the U.S. and China were the two major enemies of Russia and they both wanted to destroy Russia. (44) Aleksandr Dugin, leader of another small party, the National-Bolshevik Party, also subscribed to similar views. (45) Finally, leaders of some border regions often ignored the federal government's policies in their pursuit of narrow local interests; this had been even more serious during the Yeltsin administration, and they had made a lot of noises attempting to block the Sino-Russian border negotiations. In recent years, as border negotiations have been completed, President Putin has managed to centralize power in the federal government, and Sino-Russian border trade is in the interests of the border regions, the obstructionist role of the Russian border region governments in the development of Sino-Russian relations has been in decline.

The Russian federation has established a democratic system, and the numerous political parties cover a broad spectrum in ideology and foreign policy. President Putin often has difficulty in securing a majority support in the legislature; he therefore has to maintain a fine balance among various interests to avoid obstructions to the implementation of his policies. He certainly has to follow public opinion to gain the support of the electorate to win elections. Although President Putin has been quite successful in centralizing power, the reversal of the tide remains an arduous, time-consuming task. Various types of vested interests are difficult to challenge, and different bureaucracies such as the foreign ministry have their respective positions. These factors have been making a significant impact on Russia's China policy and Sino-Russian relations. In the recent decade and more, research in China on the Western world has been developing fast with considerable resources from the Chinese authorities and Western countries. In comparison, research on Russia has been suffering from a decline in resource support, and inadequate attention has been paid to Russia's domestic political developments in China's foreign policy establishment and its associated research organizations.

Military Exchanges

Since 1991, Russia has been promoting exports of weaponry to fund its military research and development, as well as the transformation of its defence industries in the transition to a market economy. Despite much official efforts, military sales had been in decline; they fell from a peak of US$25 billion in 1987 to about US$2-3 billion per annum in the late 1990s. (46) The major causes for this sharp decline include: keen competition; traditional buyers in Eastern and Central Europe attempting to leave the Russian sphere of influence; Syria, Ethiopia, etc. suffering from severe financial difficulties; and Iran, Iraq, etc. were under international embargoes. Hence China and India emerged as the most important purchasers.

Russia has been China's principal source of advanced weapons. Normalization of Sino-Russian relations took place in 1989, and a small amount of arms were imported from Russia by China in the following year. (47) By 1992, about 40% of Russia's arms exports went to China. (48) In that year, President Boris Yeltsin indicated that China acquired US$1.8 billion of weaponry from Russia. While the latter encouraged further purchases from China, the Chinese military also dispatched many delegations to visit the Russian military-industrial complex and research facilities. Russian scientists were recruited to work in China to develop defence technology too. According to Far Eastern Economic Review in August 1993, since 1991, more than one thousand Russian military experts were engaged in exchanges with China; most of them went for short-term visits, but about three hundred of them stayed in institutions in China on a long-term basis. This figure did not include those recruited by the Chinese military bypassing the Russian authorities. (49)

From 1992 to 1995, China bought 72 Su-27 fighters, four Kilo-class submarines, ten Ilyushin transport aircraft, and one hundred S-100 air-defence missile systems. (50) In 1996, China reached an agreement with the Russian arms exports monopoly, Rosvooruzheniye, to assemble two hundred Su-27 fighters in Shenyang. (51) Although Taiwan had acquired one hundred and fifty F-16 fighters from the U.S. and sixty Mirage 2000 fighters from France in 1992, the People's Liberation Army may still maintain a slight edge in the control of the air over the Taiwan Straits. The Kilo-class submarines have strengthened the Chinese submarine fleet, especially in escorts for the blue-water naval task forces; after all, the Whiskey-class and Romeo-class submarines from the Soviet Union in the 1950s have become obsolete. The Chinese navy bought four Sovremenny-class destroyers too at the cost of US$500 million each; these destroyers may be equipped with nuclear-tipped Yakhont missiles, posing a serious threat to the U.S. aircraft carriers.

It was reported that Russia had contributed engines and electronic avionic systems for China's domestically produced FC-1 and J-10 fighters, thus helping the Chinese air force to overcome technical problems troubling it for many years. China has expressed interest in Tu-22M Backfire long-range bombers and the more advanced Su-30 fighters, purchases of a small number of such aircraft is a distinct possibility. Sophisticated radar surveillance aircraft (similar to the American Airborne Warning and Control Systems, AWACS), AS-17 Krypton air-to-surface anti-radar missiles and AS-15 Kent cruise missiles (similar to the U.S. Tomahawks) are on the Chinese shopping list too. (52) Besides advanced naval craft, the Chinese navy in the 1990s acquired from Russia sophisticated sonar technology, multiple-target torpedo control system, propulsion equipment for nuclear submarines, technology to improve the submarine-launched cruise missiles, etc. (53) China also made use of Russian technology to make its nuclear submarines quieter, and acquired advanced torpedoes from Russia and Kazakhstan. (54) However, China so far has refrained from buying an aircraft carrier from Russia. Imports for the army has been limited. In 1990, China bought twenty-four Mi-17 transport helicopters; and later, it also purchased a small number of T-72M and T-80 tanks as well as some armoured personnel carriers. (55)

American experts considered China to be quite advanced in the infrastructural facilities concerning nuclear weapons, bio-chemical weapons, etc., and they had no concrete evidence that Russia had provided assistance in these areas. According to media reports, in the foreseeable future, China may seek from Russia navigational and guidance systems for missiles, engines for the final stage of rockets, MIRV technology, SS-18 18 ICMBs, mobile launching-pads for SS-20 IRBMs, etc. (56) The Tu-22M Backfire long-range bombers and the AS-15 Kent cruise missiles may carry nuclear warheads.

On the surface, weaponry and military technology transfers between China and Russia are mutually beneficial, and an important part of their strategic co-operative partnership. However, in view of the suspicions and lack of trust for China in some segments of the Russian society, considerable reservations exist in such transfers. Quantitative and qualitative restrictions have been imposed on Russian sales of advanced weapons and military technology to China; and severe limits have often been set on China's production and exports of weapons originated from Russia. Concessions by Moscow are secured in the negotiations only upon strong insistence on the part of Beijing. Finally, Russian exports of conventional weapons to China are usually those which would pose a minimum of threat to Russia. (57)

China's purchase of the Su-27 fighters was a good example. In 1990, when China proposed to buy the most advanced fighters in service in the Soviet Union then, the latter was reluctant to sell a small number of the aircraft because of the concern for China's reverse-engineering practice. (58) In 1992, the Russian government finally agreed to sell twenty-six Su-27 fighters to China mainly because of its financial difficulties. China's payment method, however, was found unsatisfactory because only a third of the bill amounting to US$700 million was paid in hard currencies, the rest was to be settled by barter trade. China subsequently delayed payment for three years for the second batch of the aircraft so as to exert pressure on the Russian authorities to transfer the technology for China to produce the aircraft itself. Russia conceded in 1995 because of the steady decline in its arms exports, but it still refused to let China produce the aircraft engine. It further imposed the following conditions: the airports in which the Su-27s were stationed had to be at a certain distance from Russian territory; the aircraft could not be sold to third countries; when the fighters were in service, permission from the Russian authorities had to be obtained before they could be refitted; and the aircraft had to be sent back to Russia for maintenance according to fixed schedules. (59)

When the Chinese side attempted to negotiate for the acquisition of more advanced fighters, including the Su-30, Su-34, Su-35 and Su-37, the Russian authorities showed a lot of reluctance. Yet at the same time, they readily sold Su-30 MKI fighters to India, and attempted to offer the United Arab Emirates and South Korea the even more advanced Su-35 and Su-37 respectively. Initially, Russia was also hesitant in selling to China the air-to-air AA-12 Adder missiles to be fitted to the Russian fighters, but again no such hesitancy was shown regarding such sales to India, Malaysia and other countries. (60)

Competition for influence between China and India and the latter's suspicions of China probably also contribute to Moscow's restraint in its arms sales to China. India used the so-called China threat as an excuse for its development of nuclear weapons, and there is a view in India that China wants to contain India. China's close ties with Pakistan, its military co-operation with Myanmar, and various military exchange programmes with Bangladesh and other countries bordering India naturally reinforce such a view. China's development of a blue-water navy may easily cause alarm in India too.

In comparison with China, India's rise in military might does not have much impact on Russian public opinion concerning foreign policy. In view of its special ties with Russia, India wields considerable influence on Russia's arms exports policy, to the extent of limiting Sino-Russian military co-operation, especially when tension escalates between India and Pakistan or when Sino-Indian relations are in difficulty. In 1999, India negotiated a bilateral defence co-operation programme with Russia extending into the twenty-first century amounting to US$16 billion; the programme promoted further co-operation in research and development relating to defence technology. Since India can acquire weapons from Britain, France and other Western European countries, it enjoys better bargaining power than China's vis-a-vis Russia. In December 1998, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov visited New Delhi and appealed for a new strategic triangle consisting of Russia, China and India. India warmly responded and announced that it planned to conclude a formal "strategic partnership" treaty with Russia in the following year. In contrast, China declined because of its position not to enter into an alliance with any country.(61) This certainly reinforced the impression that India enjoyed a closer relationship with Russia than China.

In the foreseeable future, Russia will remain as the principal source of advanced weaponry and military technology for China. In view of Russia's sophistication in defence technology and China's relative backwardness, Beijing has no intention of changing the status quo. Strengthening mutual trust, developing trade and investment activities, especially in the field of energy, may establish a better foundation to raise the level of bilateral co-operation in military technology. Improvements in Sino-Indian and Sino-American relations will also reduce the limits set by Russia in its arms sales to China as well as in the bilateral military co-operation programmes. If China can import advanced dual technology from the U.S. and Western Europe, it will improve its bargaining power in dealing with Russia.

Sino-Russian Trade and Economic Co-operation

In the early 1990s, Sino-Russian trade developed rapidly. China had to compensate for the decline of its trade with the Western world in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident, and Russia badly needed to import consumer goods whose supply had been seriously disrupted by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its production system. Border trade especially prospered. In imitation of China's southern coastal special economic zones, a number of similar arrangements were made along the Sino-Russian border. Local governments on both sides of the border initiated over two hundred joint projects, and more than fifteen thousand Chinese workers went to work in the Russian Far East region. (62)

Sino-Russian economic co-operation soon suffered severe setbacks. In the first place, Russia's economic crisis in 1991-92 meant that it could not repay the loans owed to China's exporting enterprises, and it was dissatisfied because China's exporters often deceived Russian customers with shoddy products. In 1993, both countries negotiated new cross-border visa arrangements. The Russian authorities sharply increased tariffs on Chinese goods, reduced transport subsidies, and restricted various types of organizations from engagement in foreign trade. As a result, Sino-Russian trade almost dropped by 40% in the first half of 1994. In the following year, it revived to US$5.46 billion, and further rose to US$6.85 billion in 1996. Due to the financial crisis in the Asia-Pacific region, the bilateral trade declined to US$6.12 billion in 1997 and US$5.48 billion in 1998. The devaluation of the Russian rouble in August 1998 and the associated debt restructuring dealt severe blows to Sino-Russian trade. President Yeltsin's target of US$20 billion per annum at the end of the century was beyond reach.

Sino-Soviet border trade contributed to the development of the Russian Far East, but it exacerbated the fear of the "yellow peril" among some Russians. In the Soviet era, the Far East region had benefitted from the cheap transport charges because of massive state subsidies, as well as the investment in the armaments industries from the federal government. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, these subsidies and investment disappeared; and the economic decline in the Far East region was severer than that in the European region. In 1992, the population in the Russian Far East fell for the first time, to the extent of a quarter of a million; and because of the outward migration, its population steadily declined to 7.4 million at the end of the last century. In the Heilongjiang basin in China on the other side of the border, there was a population of 120 million.

According to Chinese statistics, there were 1.38 million people entering into Russia in 1992, and this movement of Chinese people reached a peak of 1.76 million in the following year. The Russian concern was how many Chinese stayed behind. In 1994, their informal assessment was that there were one million illegal immigrants from China in the Russian Far East, and about two million throughout Russia. The estimate of the Chinese authorities was only one to two thousand people. (63) A study of the Carnegie Endowment's International Migration Programme, however, estimated the number of Chinese in Primorskiy and Karbarovskiy krays and Amur oblast to be between 30,000 and 70,000 in each region. This figure included shuttle traders. A special commission of the Russian Duma also investigated Chinese migration in the mid-1990s, and came to similar conclusions. (64)

The problem was that because of the exaggerations of some local Russian politicians and the mass media, Russians showed considerable resentment against Chinese immigrants. These feelings constituted an obstacle to the expansion of border trade and Chinese investment in Russia. An opinion survey in Russia in recent years showed that almost half of the respondents worried that in ten years' time, the Chinese population in the Far East region would constitute about 20% to 40% of the local population, and one fifth of the respondents even believed that this proportion might reach 40% to 60%. (65)

At the present stage, both governments are trying to resolve the problem. The Chinese authorities have been making stronger efforts to curb illegal immigration, the releases of entry/exit visas have been considerably tightened, and border trade is now concentrated in a number of trading outposts. The Russian authorities now tend to accept that the outward migration from the Far East region is an irreversible trend, and the introduction of Chinese labour may make an important contribution to its economic development.

Sino-Russian trade shows respectable increases in recent years, reflecting the healthy economic growth in both countries and the better establishment of the trade channels. The fast expanding Chinese economy generates a rising demand for Russia's natural resources, hence both sides appear optimistic concerning the prospects of trade and investment. China's major export items to Russia remain to be apparel, footwear, food, etc., though mechanical and electrical industrial products have been increasing in terms of their respective shares. China mainly imports raw materials and mechanical and electrical industrial products from Russia. The former include steel, fertilizers, petroleum and refined products, chemicals, timber, pulp and paper, frozen fish, etc.; while the latter largely consist of various types of machinery, equipment, and electronic products. On the whole, the commodity structure of the bilateral trade is relatively simple and lacks diversity; and the shares of hi-tech products and high-value-added products are not high. These factors hinder the further development of Sino-Russian trade. (66)

The extent of marketization of both economies has reached such a level that trade is now essentially settled in hard currencies, while barter trade comprises less than 5% of the total. In the bilateral trade, China has been consistently suffering from relatively large trade deficits. From 1992-2001, its cumulative deficits amounted to US$26.36 billion. (67) The actual situation might be slightly better, as pan of the Chinese consumer products exported via border trade have not been included in the official statistics.

Russia lacks labourers in construction, commerce and trade, industries, agriculture and forestry, etc., and there is a substantial demand for foreign labour. The Russian business community now begins to show an interest in absorbing Chinese labour for Russia's economic development. If both sides can co-operate to eliminate the "yellow peril" complex among some Russians, the potential for further co-operation is considerable. China's engineering contracts and labour service projects in Russia are concentrated in the Far East and Siberian regions, mainly covering infrastructural facilities, construction, forestry, and agriculture. Major projects are few, and the total volumes are limited. Forestry work has been a focal point of development in recent years. In 2001, various engineering and labour service contracts between the two countries amounted to US$224 million (an increase of 19% over that in the previous year), actual volume of transaction amounted to US$151 million (an increase of 35% over that in the previous year), and China exported labour services of about 12,500 worker/times (a decline of 15% compared with that in the previous year). In 2001, China introduced 45 items of technology from Russia with a value of over US$22 million, mainly in nuclear-power generation, aerospace and electronics fields. China does not have much technology exports to Russia to speak of.

At the end of 2001, Russia had invested in 1,300 projects in China, with actual investment amounting to US$270 million, concentrating in the areas of nuclear-power generation, assembly and repairs of automobiles and agricultural equipment, chemicals and construction materials. Approved Chinese investment in Russia involved 455 enterprises with an investment volume of US$282 million, mainly in trade, micro-electronics, communications, apparel, assembly of household electrical appliances, restaurants, timber processing and agriculture. (68)

The potential for enhancing mutual investment should not be under-estimated. Though Russia has been handicapped by a shortage of capital, the Russian side enjoys a substantial trade surplus in the bilateral trade. Hence it has the resources and opportunities to increase investment in China. China certainly has a strong interest in Russia's energy and other natural resources. In May 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Russia. Both sides reached agreement to build a 2400 km oil pipeline linking eastern Siberia and Daqing in China's Northeast. This US$2.5 billion pipeline project will pave the way for Russian exports of 5.13 billion barrels of oil to China between 2005 and 2030 at a value of US$150 billion. (69)

Energy supply has become a significant issue in China's economic development. It has been a net importer of oil since 1993. In 2002, it imported 70 million barrels of oil, about a third of its consumption. In 2010, about one half of its oil demand will have to be satisfied by imports. At present, over half of China's oil imports comes from the Middle East. As the U.S.'s influence in the Middle East increases, China wants to reduce its reliance on oil from the region. In early June 2003, China concluded an oil-pipeline agreement with Kazakhstan. The building of the pipeline will cost US$3-3.5 billion; and it will bring ten to twenty million tons of oil to China per annum. Earlier, China Petroleum & Chemical and China National Offshore Oil Corporation had failed to acquire an oil field in Kazakhstan's Caspian Sea region; and it is now hoped that the oil-pipeline project will allow China's oil firms to receive better treatment in purchasing oil fields in Kazakhstan. (70)

The Sino-Russian oil-pipeline agreement encountered many setbacks, reflecting the problems in Sino-Russian economic co-operation. Negotiations on the project began in 1994; and the highest-level joint declarations between the two governments in 1996, 2001 and 2003 had reaffirmed the agreement. But Japan showed interest in 2002, and it offered to assume the building cost of the pipeline to persuade Russia to abandon China; China also had to supply a subsidized loan in order to compete. (71)

Despite the agreement reached during President Hu Jintao's recent visit, the Russian authorities are still wavering. Further, China's proposal to lease two Russian ports, Posiet and Zarubino, at the mouth of the Tumen River along the Sino-Russian border for forty-nine years was rejected by the Russian government. The two ports lead to the Sea of Japan, and China's proposal planned to enhance their existing cargo-handling capacity of one million tons by ten to fifteen times, and then build a 34 km railway linking the two ports to Huichun in Jilin. China's consideration was to expand channels of marine transport for the Northeast. But it was said that President Putin recently visited the Russian Far East and was concerned with the rapid development of the Chinese border city Haihe, hence his administration rejected the Chinese proposal. (72)

Conclusion

The Sino-Russian strategic co-operative partnership represents an attempt on the part of the leaders in the two countries to get rid of the historical burden, and establish a long-term relationship of comprehensive co-operation based on mutual benefit. In terms of adjusting to the new international power configuration, and in satisfying the demands of their respective foreign policies, this partnership has made important contributions. At least the cordial development of Sino-Russian relations paves a firm foundation for realizing their respective objectives of maintaining a peaceful environment along their borders.

Basically, China and Russia have resolved their border issues. In the past decade or so, they have been engaging in co-operation in many areas. Both sides have established high-level joint committees and meeting schedules, various exchanges have been expanding, and trade and investment have shown impressive growth in recent years. In the recent visit of President Hu Jintao to Russia, President Putin just before the summit meeting observed that "Russo-China relations are at an unprecedented high level." (73)

Though Beijing and Moscow both emphasize that their strategic co-operative partnership is not an alliance, and is not directed at any third country, it is obvious that the U.S.'s global and regional security strategies have constituted a threat to both countries, and they have to co-operate and rely on each other to counter the American pressure and containment. However, in view of the U.S.'s global influence, both China and Russia accord their respective relations with the U.S. the highest priority in their foreign relations. They have been trying their best to avoid an all-out confrontation with the U.S., and they are eager to maintain good relations with the U.S. The foreign policy and military strategy of the U.S. constitute important factors affecting the interaction among the U.S., China and Russia. Under such circumstances, there are definite limits to Sino-Russian strategic cooperation. Some experts in China even consider that Russia intends to maintain a certain distance from China, so as to enhance its bargaining power vis-a-vis the U.S. Hence the U.S. factor has an important bearing on Sino-Russian relations, and how the U.S. treats the two countries may even cause some uncertainty in the bilateral relationship.

Beijing and Moscow, however, understand the limitations of their strategic cooperative partnership, and they do not have unrealistic expectations. On the contrary, they have been able to make appropriate adjustments, maintaining and adjusting to the flexibility in relations among the major powers. The Sino-Russian Treaty of Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Co-operation is a good example.

In comparison, Russia perhaps maintains an even closer relationship with France and Germany. The three countries have a scheduled summit arrangement; they were well co-ordinated in their opposition to the recent U.S. military campaign in Iraq. Russo-Indian relations are also very close, and Russia therefore has a better foundation than China in promoting multipolarity. In pushing for the same objective, Chinese leaders simply cannot afford to neglect the strengthening of Sino-Russian relations; they may even consider using Russia as a bridge to enhance co-ordination with France, Germany and India.

Both China and Russia feel substantial external pressure, and the promotion of nationalism in both countries assumes an important role in social mobilization. In the past two decades or so, China has achieved impressive economic growth and a corresponding rise in international status, hence nationalism in China reflects self-confidence and optimism. On the other hand, because of the decline of Russia, its nationalism reveals considerable dissatisfaction and a sense of crisis. Hence, "the threat from China" constitutes an important element in Russia's perception of its relations with its southern neighbour. Obviously in the past centuries, both countries had engaged in conflict and enmity for long periods of time, and they made significant impacts too. In the recent decade or so, both countries have rapidly established a documentary framework for an innovative type of relationship, but a solid foundation for the bilateral relationship has to be based on broad co-operation and exchanges so as to enhance understanding and trust at the people-to-people level, so that they can benefit from concrete joint ventures and generate momentum for further co-operation. (74)

Promotion of co-operation and enhancement of mutual trust are interactive processes. Though the potential for the expansion of Sino-Russian economic co-operation is impressive, nationalist feelings in Russia and the perception of "yellow peril" remain serious obstacles. It is anticipated that China's investment in Russia's energy resources will lead to substantial increases in the bilateral trade, providing the impetus for more exchanges in other fields.

Strengthening research on Russia and promoting people diplomacy may help raise Beijing's priority accorded to Sino-Russian relations. If Chinese leaders can allocate one half of the resources for cultivating the U.S. to improve relations with Russia, the effect should be significant. Chinese leaders have to appreciate that Russia has established its democratic institutions, and they cannot afford to neglect public opinion in Russia.

Table I: Sino-Russian Trade, 1989-2002

                                                         (US$ million)
Year  Exports to Russia  Imports from Russia     Total   Trade Balance

1989      1,849.25             2,147.33        3,996.58      -298.08
1990      2,239.19             2,139.92        4,379.11        99.27
1991      1,823.38             2,080.87        3,904.25      -257.49
1992      2,336.32             3,526.08        5,862.40    -1,189.76
1993      2,691.82             4,987.44        7,679.26    -2,295.62
1994      1,581.14             3,495.75        5,076.89    -1,914.61
1995      1,664.66             3,798.64        5,463.30    -2,133.98
1996      1,692.76             5,153.36        6,846.12    -3,460.60
1997      2,038.06             4,085.70        6,123.76    -2,047.64
1998      1,840.37             3,640.86        5,481.23    -1,800.49
1999      1,497.29             4,222.64        5,719.93    -2,725.35
2000      2,233.35             5,769.89        8,003.24    -3,536.54
2001      2,711.16             7,959.38       10,670.54    -5,248.22
2002      3,520.00             8,410.00       11,930.00    -4,890.00

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (ed.), China Statistical
Yearbook, Beijing: China Statistical Press, various issues.
The figures for 2002 come from the statistics of the General
Administration of Customs, see the website of the Economic
and Commerce Attache Office, the Embassy of the People's Republic
of China in the Russian Federation, http://www.sinorustrade.com

Notes

(1.) Zhao Mingwen, "Partnership Deepens," Beijing Review, Vol. 45. No. 52, December 26, 2002, pp. 11-12.

(2.) Ming Pao (a Chinese language newspaper in Hong Kong), March 15, 2003.

(3.) See Zhao Huasheng, "Pujing Zhizhenghou Zhonger Guanxi de Tedian (The Special Characteristics of Sino-Russian Relations During the Putin Administration)," Guoji Guancha (International Observations). Vol. 6, 2000, p. 4.

(4.) The elimination of the three obstacles meant the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Mongolia and the reduction of Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border; termination of support for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia; and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

(5.) See Zheng Yushuo and Shi Zhifu. "Zhongsu Guanxi Zhengchanghua, Zhongguo yu Dongou Guojia Guanxi de Huifu he Fazhan (The Normalization of Sino-Soviet Relations, and the Resumption and Development of China's Relations with the Eastern European Countries)," Chapter 4, in Zheng Yushuo and Shi Zhifu (eds.), Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Duiwai Guanxi Shigao (A Draft History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China. Vol. 3. 1978-1989, Hong Kong: Cosmos Books Ltd., 1999, pp. 164-222..

(6.) Ma Shusheng, "Shunying Guoji Chaoliu de Zhonger Guanxi (Sino-Russian Relations in Line with International Trends)," Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (International Issues Research), Vol. 3, 1999, p. 14. The author was a former Chinese ambassador to the German Democratic Republic and Yugoslavia.

(7.) Ibid.

(8.) During the coup in the Soviet Union, Chinese leaders had not openly indicated their support for Mikhail Gorbachev. On the public statement of Chinese foreign minister. Qian Qichen, and related developments, see Sovetskaia Rossiia, August 22, 1991, p. 5; and Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China--Genesis of an Eastern Rappallo," Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 3, March 1993, pp. 296-298.

(9.) See Zheng Yushuo and Shi Zhifu, "Zhongguo yu Dulianti Guojia, Dongou Guojia Guanxi de Queli he Fazhan (The Establishment of Relations and Subsequent Developments Between China and the CIS States and Eastern European Countries)," Chapter 4, in Zheng Yushuo and Shi Zhifu (eds.), Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Duiwai Guanxi Shigao (A Draft History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China), Vol. 4, 1989-1999, Hong Kong: Cosmos Books Ltd., 2000, pp. 133-172.

(10.) See Stephen Blank, "Which way for Sino-Russian relations?," Orbis, Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer 1998, pp. 345-360.

(11.) See Chen Qimao, "New Approaches in China's Foreign Policy," Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 3, March 1993, p. 238. For discussions of the "strategic triangle," see, for example, Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990; John W. Garver, China's Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968-1971, Boulder: Westview, 1982; and Robert S. Ross (ed.), China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1993.

(12.) See Gerald Chan, "Foreign Policy," in Joseph Yu-shek Cheng and Maurice Brosseau (eds.), China Review 1993, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, pp. 8.1-8.16.

(13.) See Zhang Yijun, "Adjustment of U.S. Military Strategy as Seen from New Annual Defense Report," International Strategic Studies (published by the China Institute for International Strategic Studies), No. 32, May 1994, pp. 5-9.

(14.) For the text of the Sino-French Joint Declaration, see Renmin Ribao, May 15, 1997.

(15.) South China Morning Post (an English newspaper in Hong Kong), September 9, 1989.

(16.) Ibid., May 10, 13 and 15, 1996.

(17.) On Premier Li Peng's visit to Africa, see "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," The China Quarterly, No. 151. September 1997, pp. 707-708.

(18.) See Russell Watson and Bill Powell, "Yeltsin's War Games," Newsweek (Asian edition). Vol. 131, No. 8, February 23, 1998, pp. 26-30; Ming Pao, November 7, 1997; and South China Morning Post, February 18, 1998.

(19.) See the author's "The Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership in the Chinese Leadership's World View," in Peter Koehn and Joseph Y.S. Cheng (eds.), The Outlook for U.S.-China Relations Following the 1997-1998 Summits, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1999, pp. 85-110: and Lowell Dittmer, "The Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10. No. 28, August 2001, pp. 399-413.

(20.) Ma Fengshu, "Zhonger Guanxi Zhong de Meiguo Yinsu (The American Factor in Sino-Russian Relations)," Dangdai Shijie Shehui Zhuyi Wenti (Issues of Socialism in the Contemporary World), No. 72. June 2002, pp. 90-97.

(21.) See Zhang Yunling (ed.), Huoban Haishi Duishou--Tiaozheng Zhong de Zhongmeirier Guanxi (Partners or Competitors--Relations Among China, the U.S., Japan and Russia in Adjustment, Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2001, p. 26; Wang Jisi (ed.), Gaochu Bushenghan--Lengzhan Hou Meiguo de Quanqiu Zhanlue he Shijie Diwei (Unbearable Coldness in Scaling the Heights--the Global Strategy and International Status of the U.S. in the Post-Cold War Era. Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe. 1999, pp. 363-364: Yu Zhengliang et al., Daiguo Zhanlue Yanjiu (A Study of the Strategies of Major Powers), Beijing: Zhongyang Bianyi Chubanshe, 1998; and Chu Shulong, Lengzhan Hou Zhongmei Guanxi de Zouxiang (Directions for American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 2001.

(22.) See Xue Gang and Jiang Yi (eds.), Yeliqin Shidai de Erluosi--Waijiaojuan (Russia in the Yeltsin Era--Volume on Foreign Relations), Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2001.

(23.) Zhao Huasheng, op. cit., p. 3.

(24.) See William C. Wohlforth, "Russia," in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, Strategic Asia 2002-03: Asia Aftershocks, Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2002, pp. 200-205.

(25.) <http://pravda.ru>, July 19, 2001.

(26.) South China Morning Post, December 14, 2001: see also the related reports in Sunday Morning Post. November 18, 2001, and South China Morning Post, December 13, 2001.

(27.) Ming Pao, November 15, 2001.

(28.) South China Morning Post, December 8, 2001.

(29.) According to Japan's Yomiuri Shimban quoting sources in Beijing, in December 2002, China first successfully tested a medium-range (about 1,800 km), multi-warheaded ballistic missile in a ballistic-missile base in Shanxi, the Dongfang 21 adopted the MIRV technology developed in recent years; Ming Pao, February 9, 2003.

(30.) South China Morning Post, March 6, 2002.

(31.) See John W. Garver, "The China-India-U.S. Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," NBR Analysis (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research), Vol. 13, No. 5, October 2002, pp. 5-56.

(32.) See James R. Millar, "Normalization of the Russian Economy: Obstacles and Opportunities for Reform and Sustainable Growth," ibid., Vol. 13, No. 2, April 2002, pp. 36-41.

(33.) Financial Times (London), April 4, 2003.

(34.) New York Times, April 8, 2003.

(35.) South China Morning Post, December 15, 2001.

(36.) See, for example, Andrey Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive until 19847, New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1971, pp. 44-67.

(37.) On the internal debates within the Soviet Union concerning China's reforms and opening to the outside world in the initial years, see Gilbert Rozman, A Mirror for Socialism: Soviet Criticism of China, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.

(38.) Mikhail L. Titarenko, Kitayskie reformy: primer, vyzov ili ugroza (Chinese reforms: an example, a challenge or a threat), Moscow: IDV RAN, April 1997.

(39.) See Gennadiy A. Zyuganov, Geografiya pobedy: Osnovy rossiyskoy geopolitiki (Geography of victory: The fundamentals of geopolitics), Moscow: 1997, pp. 211-226.

(40.) Lev Delyusin, "Epokha Dena prodolzhaetsya (The Deng Era Is Continuing)" (interview by L. Mlechin), Novaye Vremya, No. 8, 1997, p. 25.

(41.) Yevgeniy Bazhanov, "Big Neighbour--Big Headaches," New Times, August 1996, p. 47.

(42.) Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free Press, 1992.

(43.) Yegor Gaydar, Gosudarstvo i evolyutsiya (State and evolution), Moscow: Evraziya, 1995.

(44.) See Alexander Lukin, op. cit., p.30.

(45.) Aleksandr Dugin, Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii (The fundamentals of geopolitics: Russia's geopolitical future), Moscow: Arktogeya, 1997, p. 360.

(46.) Ian Anthony, "Economic Dimensions of Soviet and Russian Arms Exports," in Ian Anthony (ed.), Russia and the Arms Trade, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 75: and Julian Cooper, "Russia," in Andrew J. Pierre (ed.), Cascade of Arms: Managing Conventional Weapons Proliferation, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997, p. 177.

(47.) Alexander A. Sergounin and Sergey V. Subbotin, "Sino-Russian Military Technical Co-operation" in Ian Anthony (ed.) op. cit., pp. 194-216.

(48.) Ian Anthony, "Trends in Post-Cold War," in Ian Anthony (ed.), op. cit., p. 29.

(49.) Tai Ming Cheung, "China's Buying Spree: Russia Gears up to Upgrade Peking's Weaponry," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 156, No. 31, August 7, 1993, p. 24.

(50.) Ronald Montaperto, "China As a Military Power," Strategic Forum, No. 56, December 1995 (Internet edition).

(51.) South China Morning Post, November 28, 1996.

(52.) Norman Friedman, U.S. Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems, 1997-1998, Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1997, p. 237: see also Richard D. Fisher, "How America's Friends Are Building China's Military Power," Roe Backgrounder (Heritage Foundation), No. 1146. November 5, 1997.

(53.) Gary Klintworth, "The Chinese Navy to Get Some Big Guns, At Last," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, April/May 1997, pp. 6-7.

(54.) "Russia Helps China Take New SSNs Into Silent Era," Jane's Defence Weekly. August 13, 1997, p. 15; and Robert Karniol, "China Buys Shkval Torpedo from Kazakhstan," ibid., August 26. 1998, p. 6.

(55.) Alexander Sergounin and Sergey Subbotin, op. cit., pp. 205-206.

(56.) Stephen Blank, "Russia's Clearance Sale," Jane's Intelligence Review, November 1997, pp. 517-522.

(57.) Thomas W. Zarzecki, "Arming China or Arming India: Future Russian Dilemmas," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 18, No. 3, July-September 1999. p. 270.

(58.) Tai-ming Cheung, "Ties of Convenience: Sino-Russian Relations in the 1990s," in Richard H. Yang (ed.), China's Military: The PLA in 1992/93, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993, p. 65.

(59.) Itar-Tass, October 2, 1998; as reported by CNN Online <htttp://www.cnn.com>.

(60.) Thomas W. Zarzecki, op. cit., p. 271.

(61.) "India and Russia Will Sign Strategic Agreement," Reuters News Service (Internet edition), December 22, 1998.

(62.) See Lowell Dittmer, op. cir., pp. 406-407.

(63.) Ibid., p. 407.

(64.) See Sherman Garnett, "Challenges of the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 4, Autumn 2001, p. 54.

(65.) See Mikhail Alexseev, "'The Chinese Are Coming': Public Opinion and Threat Perception in the Russian Far East," Program on New Approaches to Russian Security: Policy Memo 184, Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 2001.

(66.) The statistics come from the website of the Economic and Commerce Attache Office, the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Russian Federation, <http://www.sinorastrade.com>.

(67.) Ibid

(68.) Ibid., see also David Kerr, "Problems in Sino-Russian Economic Relations," Europa-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 7, 1998, pp. 1133-1156.

(69.) Ching Cheong, "Russia, China bound with uneasy trade, political ties," first published in The Straits Times (Singapore), reprinted in The Daily Yimiuri (Tokyo), June 4, 2003; see also Ming Pao, May 27, 2003.

(70.) Ming Pao, June 5, 2003.

(71.) Ibid., March 15, 2003.

(72.) Ching Cheong, op. cit.

(73.) Ming Pao, May 28, 2003.

(74.) See Jiang Yi, "Anquan Liangnan ya Zhonger Guanxi (The Security Dilemma and Sino-Russian Relations," Dongou Zhongya Yanjiu (Study of Eastern Europe and Central Asia), Vol. 5, 2002. p. 31.

Christian Chua, Contemporary China Research Centre, City University of Hong Kong