Chained Together: Mandela, de Klerk, and the Struggle to Remake South Africa.

Almost four years ago, Nelson Mandela stepped through the gates of Victor Vorster Prison for the first time in 30 years. It was the grand finale of an incredible turn of events which started with President F.W. de Klerk's announcement on February 2, 1990 that the time had come to include blacks in the government of South Africa. Much like the recent Israeli-PLO accords, the notion of two old enemies agreeing to negotiate an end to one of the world's longest-running conflicts shocked the world.

But now in 1993, Mandela and de Klerk - the Nobel Peace Prize notwithstanding - are still far from reaching a settlement. Instead of initiating a period of peace in South Africa, the negotiations have plunged the country into the bloodiest period of political violence in its troubled history.

David Ottaway, a foreign correspondent for The Washington Post, arrived in South Africa in 1989, just before de Klerk's historic speech. His latest book is a fascinating first-hand account of the initial euphoria over Mandela's release and the subsequent frustration of trying to turn a symbolic agreement into a concrete political settlement. It's a process that could no doubt be repeated in the Middle East, and the lesson of South Africa is that the nitty gritty details of implementation are just as important as the emotional moments of breakthrough.

During his four years in South Africa, Ottaway saw much to make him pessimistic. Mandela's African National Congress, an umbrella organization much like the PLO, contains several smaller groups, all of which are vying for power. It is also struggling to transform itself from a guerilla movement into a political party. De Klerk did not help matters by shifting his position on several issues during the negotiations. Ottaway calls him "the consummate Politician," and the president's tendency to waver soured Mandela on de Klerk and his National Party (NP).

As if the ANC-NP relations were not strained enough, radicals on both sides have tried to derail the talks altogether. From the Pan-African Congress on the left to the Afrikaner Resistance Movement on the right, these groups have increased the tension through political demonstrations and terrorism. Nathan Buthelezi's Inkatha party, in its battles with the ANC for supremacy in the townships, has fostered the worst of the violence.

But while these factors have certainly hindered the negotiations, the root of the problem probably lies within the true goals of the NP. Ottaway suggests that whites may not be willing to surrender their power after all. He points out that some NP leaders believe that they, with their established strength in campaigning, can actually win an open election in South Africa.

Much more plausible is that de Klerk never intended to surrender at all. Evidence of this can be found in that February 1990 landmark speech. "Without contact and cooperation with the outside world," he said, "we cannot promote the well-being and security of our citizens." This "cooperation" could only come with the lifting of the international trade sanctions, and the reforms he announced were similar to those demanded by the West. You get the sense that the NP repealed apartheid not because it was oppressive or immoral but because the country, feeling the crunch of spiralling security costs and hard-hitting sanctions, could no longer afford it.

White South Africans have been forced into "reforms" in the past. In 1983, the government led by P.W. Botha faced similar international and domestic pressure and decided to include other segments of the population in the government. The constitution was cleverly rewritten, establishing a tricameral legislature with a house for whites, coloureds, and Indians (the first was sufficiently powerful to defeat any legislation supported by the other two). Unfortunately, this "reform" still left over 70 percent of the population (namely blacks) without political representation.

By 1990, this token effort had neither lifted the sanctions nor decreased the political turmoil. Although rewriting the constitution to include blacks was risky for the white population, de Klerk admitted the country had "no alternative." But since negotiations began, he has plumped for a loose form of federalism which would give each group broad powers in areas of their "own affairs." De Klerk has also failed to offer anything that would lead to redistributing land (16 percent of the population owns 87 percent of the land) or economic power. On the contrary, he has demanded the privatization of national industry so that it will remain in white hands even if the government does not.

So it is not surprising that negotiations have stalled. Mandela and the ANC would like a strong central government to oversee the redistribution of the fruits of Africa's wealthiest nation. De Klerk and the NP, realizing it's unlikely they will ever control the national government again, promote a loose federation of states, each with control over its own affairs so that the whites can retain their wealth and extravagant lifestyles. This is precisely the sort of stalemate that handshakes can't resolve.