Certain principles and problems in antiamphibious coast defense.

As it follows from an analysis of Western military press, the armed forces of the world's advanced military powers continue to attach much importance to maritime amphibious operations. These are among the crucial operational-strategic tasks, particularly early in a war. Presumably, the capabilities of naval attackers will constantly grow as weapons become more advanced, and their landing forces will pose an increasingly greater threat. In this connection, an objective necessity arises of developing and specifying a number of tenets of the theory of antiamphibious coast defense. This theory primarily concentrates on knowing the regularities involved in the course and outcome of armed confrontation with amphibious landing forces. Let us consider some of them.

Notice in the first place that World War II and many postwar local wars and armed conflicts were characterized by large-scale, intense combat operations aimed to capture and hold different sea and oceanic coasts. For example, reciprocal amphibious and antiamphibious actions formed the main content of warfare between the U.S.A. and Japan in the Pacific TO. The failure of German-Italian land and fleet forces to beat back the 1943 Anglo-American landing in Sicily led to the opening of an anti-Hitler coalition land front in the West. The poorly organized antiamphibious defense of the port of Inchon during the Korean war (1950-1953) led to the most tragic consequences for the North Korean troops. These and other examples show that as a rule the states possessing powerful naval forces used them for a maritime invasion in the enemy territory. Consequently, while preparing for a war against a major naval power (coalition) or in its course, the possibility of an enemy coastal invasion must be constantly kept in mind.

An analysis of combat experiences enables yet another conclusion: if an antiamphibious defense force has organic fleet forces that may be even inferior in their combat potential to the enemy fleet, the latter, as a rule, renounces amphibious operations in this particular sector. If, after all, they do take place, their outcome in the majority of cases is a failure (for example, the disruption by the U.S. naval forces of Japanese amphibious landings on the Midway Island in June 1942, the Santa Cruz Islands in October 1942, and The Philippines in June 1944). At the same time, successful coast defense depends, to a decisive degree, on an antiamphibious force being able to gain and keep air supremacy in the enemy amphibious landing area. Indicative in this sense are the Germans routing an Anglo-French landing force in Norway (April 1940), the Americans a Japanese landing force at Port Moresby (1942), and Baltic Fleet aircraft a German landing force as it attempted to make a landfall on the Gogland Island (1944). Generally, the fight to gain air supremacy in WWII antiamphibious operation areas as well as in the course of the Korean war became a crucial component of those operations.

Furthermore, it might be well to point out that if defenders had at their disposal some major fleet forces, it was these forces that were set the task of destroying enemy landing forces already at their embarkation points or in the course of a sealift, while the land forces were beating back the landing of a considerably weakened force. In this case one can speak about antiamphibious operations being of maritime nature. The British and U.S. armed forces mostly operated in this way starting 1942. For its part, the German command, given that its enemies were preeminent on the seas, posed the main antiamphibious defense assignments to the land forces. Based on pre-prepared antiamphibious coast defenses, the latter pinned the landing forces down on the beach and wiped them out as reserves, primarily armor, arrived. It is lawful to speak here about the land nature of antiamphibious operations. Early in the war, the Japanese command used the former and subsequently the latter method of antiamphibious warfare against the Americans, something that was explained by Japan losing its supremacy on the seas after a number of unsuccessful sea battles in 1942.

The record of past wars and military conflicts suggests the conclusion that the timely detection of preparations for and the beginning of enemy amphibious operations as well as the cracking of their plan are the decisive factors in successful antiamphibious warfare. The following regularity can be traced in this respect. An amphibious operation was a total success if it proved possible to achieve embarkation and sealift secrecy (a most conspicuous example is the Normandy amphibious operation in 1944), which didn't give the defenders enough time for full-scale deployment of antiamphibious defenses. Conversely, an antiamphibious operation was normally a success when reconnaissance managed to spot in time that the enemy was starting an amphibious operation. A most convincing example was the U.S. Navy's operation against the Japanese landing force at Port Moresby in March 1942.

Combat experience studies also demonstrate that centralizing command and control of all troops (forces) of an antiamphibious defense force is an immutable condition of success in antiamphibious warfare. Collapse attended all antiamphibious operations that failed to form a unified force at the preparatory stage and lacked centralized command and control. A case in point is the German setback in the pursuit of the 1944 Normandy antiamphibious operation. The main reason was that the West command had no centralized command and control: the naval task force and the 3rd air fleet operated under their own commanders, while the General Field Marshal Rommel, who commanded the antiamphibious defense, had no right to use tank divisions from his reserve without the permission of the supreme high command. The record of the Korea war (1950-1953) is also convincing evidence that centralized command and control should be exercised over a temporary antiamphibious operation force made up of units belonging to different combat arms.

An analysis of World War II experience and some recent local wars and armed conflicts makes it possible to identify certain principles in the organization and pursuance of antiamphibious coast defense. These fall into general and particular. Some of the general principles of military art in the area of preparation and conduct of warfare against amphibious forces are the following: the tasks of antiamphibious warfare are subordinated to general tasks of coast defense; forces and weapons of an all-arms force are used in an agreed manner and in close coordination; efforts are resolutely concentrated on most likely avenues (areas) of amphibious assault at the decisive moment in order to perform the main tasks; pressure is brought to bear on enemy landing forces in a continuous fashion at all stages in an antiamphibious operation; aircraft, fleet forces and land troops should be committed in a well-timed maneuver within a sector threatened by an amphibious assault; firm and continuous command and control of troops (forces) should be exercised, and inexorability shown in pursuit of objectives assigned, etc.

The most important particular principle, as I see it, is the correct choice of the area of main attack on a landing force. It was believed for a fairly long time that the best method for the rout of landing forces was to concentrate the main efforts in their disembarkation area. This was explained by the lack of the needed number of landing craft, something that made disembarkation rather protracted and enabled the defenders to deal repeated strikes at landing craft and troopships. Where embarkation-point warfare against landing forces was concerned, the defenders could at best fall back on aircraft alone, which often sustained considerable losses from air defense weapons that covered the ports.

But military history has a number of examples of a different kind. In June 1942, for instance, the Japanese command prepared an amphibious operation to capture Midway Island in order to gain control over its airfields. But there were no islands in its direct vicinity where the Japanese fighter aircraft could be based in the course of the operation. Presumably this factor had much to do with the decision accepted by the U.S. naval commander, Admiral Chester Nimitz, who, rather than deal with the enemy sealift, ordered the main attack in the direct vicinity of the disembarkation point, where the Japanese shore-based aircraft were unable to operate. During just one day (June 4, 1942), the U.S. aircraft delivered several devastating strikes against the Japanese amphibious task force and the advanced screen force, which resulted in the Japanese fleet losing four aircraft carriers, a heavy cruiser, 235 planes, and 3,500 troops. The Japanese operation was disrupted with the minimal losses for the U.S. fleet (one aircraft carrier, one destroyer, 150 planes, and close on 300 troops). (1)

The same considerations obviously guided the Baltic Fleet command that planned the destruction of the German amphibious force supposed to capture Gogland Island in September 1944. Considering that the amphibious force's own air defenses were weak, while the air cover offered by the shore-based fighter aircraft was not efficient enough because of the remoteness of their airfields, the Soviet command relied mostly on the naval aviation for the destruction of the amphibious force. On September 15, Soviet fighter planes sealed off the enemy airfields at Rakver. That done, Soviet ground assault planes attacked German troopships, whereupon the enemy amphibious force had to retreat from Gogland. All in all, the Soviet aircraft sunk ten troopships and two combatant ships; they also crippled or downed 22 enemy fighter aircraft. (2)

An analysis of these and other combat episodes suggests the conclusion that an air attack on landing forces at embarkation points makes sense only when embarkation points are few in number and their air defenses are inefficient. Under these circumstances, first, the massing of aircraft is achieved, as is, second, a reduction of losses, something that secures the maximal effect of an air attack. An example of successful actions that led to the disruption of a major amphibious operation at the embarkation stage was the March 1942 attack by a U.S. carrier task force at the ports of Lae and Salamua, where a Japanese landing force had concentrated for the purpose of capturing Port Moresby. On the contrary, it makes no sense to deliver an air attack on a landing force where its embarkation takes place at many points (as was the case, for example, in the Sicilian amphibious operation mounted by the Anglo-American troops and fleet forces, where 12 points were set aside for the embarkation of amphibious forces), (3) while the points themselves were reliably protected by air defense weapons. In these cases, the aviation, as a rule, sustains heavy losses against the background of comparatively insignificant losses on the part of a landing force, that is, the efficiency of this air attack is insignificant.

Thus, the main attack against a landing force at embarkation points is efficient only where the latter are few in number and their cover from air and maritime strikes is weak. During a sealift, the main attack is possible if a landing force enjoys an insufficiently efficient advanced screen. In a disembarkation area, the main attack against a landing force makes sense where there is a strong shore-based antiamphibious defense force and an inadequate naval task force.

Another important matter involved in the planning of an antiamphibious operation is the choice of the main targets to be engaged with fires within a landing force, because fire engagement capabilities available to antiamphibious defense forces are not, as a rule, unlimited. At different times, there existed at least two points of view on how to deal with this problem. Supporters of one of these believed that the big combatant ships forming the core of advanced screen forces (aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers) should be the main targets, for their sinking will leave a landing force defenseless and it will have to turn back. Other military specialists, however, held that the main attack should be directed at transports with troops and equipment, because even grave losses in major combatant ships would not always force the enemy to renounce a landing.

Of course, both point of view have the right to exist, as was confirmed by a number of historical examples. In May 1942, for instance, the Japanese command planned disembarkation of a landing force in order to capture Port Moresby. For that purpose it put together a carrier task force (two aircraft carriers with 42 fighter planes and 83 bombers on board and an escort of cruisers and destroyers). To beat back the enemy landing, the U.S. command detailed two aircraft carriers (42 fighter planes and 99 bombers) and two groups of cruisers and destroyers (12 combatant ships all in all). In the morning of May 7, U.S. aircraft attacked the Japanese advanced screen in the Coral Sea and sunk one aircraft carrier. The next day, the Americans managed to disable the other aircraft carrier, even though losing one of their own. As a result, the threat that Port Moresby would be captured was removed from the agenda. (4)

In the earlier example where the Americans disrupted the Japanese landing on Midway Island in 1942, the Japanese had an overwhelming superiority in forces and weapons: 200 combatant ships, including eight aircraft carriers with 393 planes, 75 surface ships, 11 submarines, 12 big troopships with 5,000 infantry and the support of 600 aircraft. The Americans had three aircraft carriers with 232 planes, 42 surface ships and 25 submarines. Considering the Japanese fleet's superiority, Admiral Chester Nimitz singled out the Japanese aircraft carriers as the main targets, for his well-justified judgment was that the enemy wouldn't risk disembarking the infantry lacking an air cover. During the day on June 4, the American air attacks sunk all four Japanese heavy aircraft carriers, thus leaving the enemy without the best part of his aircraft. In consequence, Admiral Yamamoto thought better of landing the infantry and went back to base despite his general huge superiority in forces. (5)

But there are examples of a different kind. The Anglo-Canadian attempt to stage an assault landing and seize the port of Dieppe on August 19, 1942, was a complete defeat. According to plan, nearly 5,000 troops were to hit the beach, but they never managed to do that in the face of opposition from a small German squadron consisting of three armed fishing boats and five coastal motorships. Profiting by the absence of big combatant ships within the advanced screen force, the Germans successfully attacked the enemy. Soon German Air Force fighter planes and bombers went into action too. The beaching was disrupted, with the attackers losing over 3,500 troops. (6) Between March 2 and 5, 1943, U.S. aircraft sunk, in Bismarck Sea, a Japanese convoy of eight motorships with an infantry division on board, as well as four of the eight escort ships. The rest of the advanced screen retreated to base, while the surviving Japanese troops were finished off in water by the U.S. Navy's fighter planes and speedboats. (7) In a night battle that occurred in the Gulf of Velia on August 6-7, six U.S. destroyers sunk three of the four Japanese destroyers, some of which had troops on board. The rest of the landing force turned back. (8)

Thus, the conclusion suggests itself that aircraft carriers should be designated as the main targets where shore-based airfields are at a considerable distance, and landing ships and transports with troops and equipment on board ought to be such targets where the distance is insignificant. Apart from that, it makes sense to designate the guided-missile and artillery ships from among an advanced screen force as the main targets if an antiamphibious defense force enjoys an efficient air cover, and aircraft carriers and shore-based airfields if the air cover is weak. If powerful floating minefields are laid in possible beaching areas, it is better, as I see it, to designate mine-sweeping forces as the main targets, and where these are lacking--the combatant ships from among the advanced screen force.

An optimal choice of an area of concentration of main combat effort for beating back an assault landing is of no less importance in preparing antiamphibious defenses. A rather indicative case in point is the Turkish WWI defense of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The defenders concentrated their main combat effort in the depth of defenses where they were invulnerable to enemy ship gunfire. As they edged inside the peninsula, the disembarked troops lost the artillery support of big ships, their advance flagging. Failing to achieve their objectives and sustaining huge losses, the Anglo-French troops had to evacuate the peninsula.

During World War II, commanders of antiamphibious defense forces also tended to withdraw their troops from the coastline, where they were exposed to devastating ship gunfire and air attacks (particularly when the enemy possessed the supremacy on the seas and in the air in the beaching area), and to organize strong defenses inside the shore with the subsequent delivery of powerful counterstrikes at the disembarked forces. For example, while preparing the Normandy antiamphibious operation, General Field Marshal Erwin Rommel believed that the landing force had to be crushed immediately after it hit the beach and was not yet entrenched. According to his staff officers, the Field Marshal was under deep impression from memories of his troops in Africa having had to spend days on end in shelter in the face of air attacks that were much weaker than anything the air forces operating against him in Normandy were capable of mounting. The same principle guided the Japanese command as it organized the antiamphibious defenses of Biak Island in 1944. The Japanese thought better of an attempt to hold the coast where they were exposed to enemy ship artillery and bomber aviation, and deployed their main forces in caves and fortified positions atop the commanding heights. The Japanese tanks even cut off for some time the U.S. Marines. As a result, the Americans managed to occupy the whole of the island only two and a half months later. The Japanese General Kubayashi acted in the same way as he organized, in February 1945, antiamphibious defenses of the Iwo Jima Island. Knowing about the Americans' huge superiority on the seas in the disembarkation area, he created a strong defense system inside the island in rock caves that were competently concealed and linked with deep underground tunnels. Despite a prolonged air and ship artillery preparation of the beaching area, 2,500 of the 30,000 disembarked Marines died on the very first day of the operation. (9)

Yet, in cases where the attackers had only an insignificant edge on the seas and in the air, the antiamphibious force, as a rule, concentrated its main combat effort on delivering the main attack against the enemy directly at the coastline, that is, while beating back the landing thrust rather than in the course of an engagement on the shore. For example, the German forces successfully routed, in April 1940, an Anglo-French landing force that sought to beach in the Nam-sos-Andalsnes area, Norway, by concentrating the main combat effort directly on the coastline, what with the enemy expedition forces having not enough aircraft and big ships that might render the artillery support.

Thus, it is in order to believe that if the enemy has an overwhelming superiority on the seas and in the air in a beaching area, it is preferable to concentrate the main forces of an antiamphibious defense force inside the shore with the subsequent delivery of counterstrikes at disembarked troops. If, however, the superiority is insignificant, the concentration should be directly near the coastline. In the case where aircraft and cruise missiles have the main role to play in engaging with fires antiamphibious defense targets, it makes more sense to deploy the main defending forces closer to the coast. An inshore deployment is required where ship guns are relied on for the same purpose.

Currently it has become necessary to specify the role and place of different-level formations in antiamphibious coast defense, as well as the content of stages of the antiamphibious operation. Since in its character the antiamphibious operation is a defensive one, activity is one of the main requirements imposed on it. In the first place this means that aircraft, troops and fleet forces involved in an operation should deliver strikes against landing forces at a considerable distance from the defended coast, this proceeding from the capabilities of their weapons. In all evidence, it is this requirement that has lately become the decisive one in the context of efforts to define the role and place of operational-strategic, operational and operational-tactical formations to be committed to repel maritime aggression. A number of military specialists believe that an operational-strategic formation pursues an antiamphibious operation if it is able to engage enemy landing forces with available forces and weapons as early as their concentration and embarkation stage (as a rule, at a considerable distance from the defended coast). Since, however, operational and operational-tactical formations seem to be incapable of bringing this kind of pressure to bear on the enemy, they pursue only antiamphibious defense of the coast. Proceeding from this premise, they hold that only coastal front forces with an operationally subordinated portion of fleet forces are capable of preparing and mounting an anti-amphibious operation. At the same time, an army (an army corps) can be engaged in antiamphibious defense of the coast rather than an antiamphibious operation. At first sight, there is a certain rationale in this approach to defining the role and place of formations where repulsion of maritime invasions is concerned. But a closer view reveals that it cannot stand up to criticism.

First, this interpretation confuses the concepts of "the form of employment of forces" and "type of military operations." Antiamphibious defense is a variety of defense, while an operation is a form of employment of formations that carry out antiamphibious defense of the coast.

Second, I believe that the chosen criterion--the range of weapons available to a formation (and, consequently, the capacity to engage enemy landing forces at all stages of their operation)--is a debatable one, because it fails to take into account the concrete specifics of military-political situation as well as the physical-geographic and operational-strategic conditions of various regions. For example, it is hardly possible to use weapons against enemy landing forces if they concentrate at ports and board ships prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Moreover, under certain circumstances, an enemy landing force and its advance screen may also become seaborne before the actual start of combat operations. Thus a situation is likely to arise, where the engagement of enemy landing forces will begin solely at the stage of the repulsion of their disembarkation, even though the range of weapons allows to do that much earlier. If we are guided by this criterion, a front and an army (an army corps) will pursue, in this situation, antiamphibious defense of the coast, not an antiamphibious operation.

Let me give you yet another example confirming the inadequacy of the suggested approach to defining the place and role of different formations in the repulsion of maritime aggression. While defending the Far East coast, front-scale forces and weapons deployed in the Maritime Territory will be unable to bring pressure to bear on enemy landing forces as they steam toward, for example, Sakhalin Island on account of the insufficient range of their weapons. At the same time, forces that directly defend the island are quite capable of engaging enemy landing forces in the La Perouse Strait.

Other similar examples could be cited as well. For this reason, while defining the role and place of formations in antiamphibious defense of the coast, we should proceed from the assumption that operation is the form of operational employment of a front, army and army corps. As I see it, there are no sufficiently valid grounds for believing that combat operations involving the above-mentioned formations will acquire any other form.

As is common knowledge, the aim of an antiamphibious operation is achieved following performance of a number of operational objectives, such as repulsion of massed air strikes, engagement of the enemy at embarkation points or during a sealift, repulsion of his disembarkation, etc. Certain military theorists claim, however, that the actions by forces and assets executing these and other operational tasks are stages in the antiamphibious operation. One can perceive a certain inaccuracy here as well. After all, stages normally follow one another (first, second, etc.), whereas air strikes will have to be repelled throughout the operation rather than solely at its beginning. Apart from that, certain operational tasks may be dropped under definite circumstances, as is clearly evident from combat experience. For example, if a decisive defeat is inflicted on a landing force during its concentration and embarkation (boarding), the other stages may prove not necessary at all. An example of successful actions that led to the disruption of a major amphibious operation at its boarding stage was the attack by a U.S. carrier task force against the ports of Lae and Salamua (March 1942), where a Japanese landing force was concentrating to be committed in an amphibious operation to capture Port Moresby.

Thus, it is quite obvious that operational tasks must not be identified with stages in the antiamphibious operation. Besides, it is unclear why operational tasks are not viewed as stages of the offensive or defensive operation but are declared as such in the antiamphibious operation.

A comprehensive analysis and deep-going evaluation of factors and conditions influencing, in the foreseeable future, the preparation and implementation of antiamphibious defense of the coast make it possible to assert that its content remains basically the same. At the same time, the character of warfare against amphibious assault forces will be incomparably more complicated than during World War II, something that determines a number of problems in modern antiamphibious defense of the coast.

For instance, the growth of strike capabilities of naval and air forces makes increasingly topical the problem of how to raise survivability of antiamphibious defense forces. The potential adversary's capacities to engage with fires antiamphibious defense targets call into question the possibility of achieving the aims of antiamphibious operations without engaging in an efficient concealment of troops (forces) that contributes to their enhanced survivability. Consequently, there is a problem of achieving the required efficiency of concealment, camouflage and deception.

It must be stressed that the fact of fleets adopting qualitatively new landing craft made coasts more open to amphibious attack and, accordingly, increased the number of possible amphibious landing sites. This foreshadows the problem of a timely buildup in the combat strength of land, air and naval forces to be employed to address the tasks of this country's antiamphibious coast defense. On top of that, military theorists and practitioners are required to come up with a new approach to the evaluation of different coasts for a possibility of enemy amphibious landing. A rise in the number of possible amphibious landing sites foreshadows the problem of preemptive all-out operational organization of the coast. Since it is practically impossible to create a solid antiamphibious defense front along the entire coastline, it is necessary that the required forces and weapons be rapidly concentrated in main sectors. At the same time, this sort of maneuver, particularly if performed by combined units and units of the land forces, is impracticable if there is no well-developed coast infrastructure.

The necessity of including in antiamphibious defense forces a growing amount of all-arms forces and assets determines the problem of achieving close coordination in an antiamphibious operation.

It should be stressed in conclusion that in modern conditions the antiamphibious defense of the coast will be prepared and implemented under more difficult circumstances than, for example, during World War II. This dictates the need for developing and specifying the tenets of the theory of antiamphibious defense. Disrupting enemy amphibious operations can be successful only when the defenders act with reliance on the advanced military thought and skillfully use the entire available combat potential to achieve their objective.

NOTES:

1. B.L. Gart, Vtoraya mirovaya voina, Transl. from the English, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1976, pp. 336-337.

2. B. Vassiliev, "Razgrom nemetsko-fashistskogo morskogo desanta u ostrova Gogland v sen-tiabre 1944 goda," Voennaia mysl', No. 12, 1978.

3. E. Nazemblo, Sitsilia-1943, Transl. from the Polish, AST Publishers, Moscow, 2003, pp. 73-75.

4. Takushiro Hattori, Yaponia v voine 1941-1945, Transl. from the Japanese, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1973, pp. 197-199.

5. B.L. Gart, op. cit., pp. 336-337.

6. F. Rughe, Voina na more 1939-1945, Transl. from the German, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1957, p. 270.

7. Ibid., p. 337.

8. Ibid., p. 339.

9. B.L. Gart, op. cit., p. 592.

Col. L.V. BOIKOV

Doctor of Military Sciences