Certain "initiatives" in investigations of military-theoretical problems.

Military Thought editors are engaged in a very interesting and, to a certain extent, risky experiment expressed in that they opened a new discussion platform, VIEWPOINT, and published in No. 10 for 2003 (the Russian version of the journal) the first two articles (1) as they had been penned by their contributors.

In my view, the experiment will benefit the journal and its readers, being aimed at spurring reader energies in both preparing contributions for publication and discussing points raised by other authors. Hopefully, this will enliven the journal and make it more interesting in the eyes of a broad military (and nonmilitary) readership. On top of that and no less importantly, it will help early identification, resolution and development (at least as a journal summary or definition) of existing and oncoming debatable issues and problems in military science, practical operational and combat training of Armed Forces services and combat arms, infrastructure organization and everyday life of the army and the navy, as well as discrepancies and "white spots" in the current guideline documents of the Armed Forces, scientific and teaching concepts, trends, views, etc.

As a reader I support the Military Thought editors in their initiatives and call on other readers to actively join the discussion of contributions that appear in print. I would only wish to remark in this connection that the discussion ought to be businesslike and positive and that the criticism of materials thought to be erroneous should be argumentative, calm and free from unnecessary emotion, let alone offensive or even insulting epithets. At the same time, one must not gloss over mistakes and shortcomings that one comes across in some publications.

I have analyzed the two articles in the section and now would like to offer the authors and all readers my estimates and comments.

"Do the Navy's Surface Forces Need a Theory?" by Capt. 1st Rank V.I. Naumenko

In the first place, one would like to say the following: It's a very positive and commendable thing that the author pays attention to problems in military theory, including theory of the Navy, and seeks to contribute to their development and specification, "... to shed light on the problem of development of all of the Navy's component services ..."

Naumenko says it is necessary to devise and contribute to the military (naval) science a new, additional component--"a theory of the Navy's surface forces"--and attempts a detailed analysis and substantiation of the structure and content of this new theory: its aim, subject, object, methodology, etc. On that basis he formulates the concept of the "theory of the Navy's surface forces" as follows (p. 59): "... a system of scientific knowledge that gives an integral, true and progressively developed idea of the essence, content, regularities and principles of the organizational development and functioning of the surface forces in the Navy's peacetime and wartime activities ..." In his view, the theory's aim is the "description of the objective processes in the organizational development and functioning of the surface forces ..., their explanation, forecasting, and derivation on their basis of new knowledge: on regularities in ... personnel training; regularities, principles and peculiar traits of command and control ...; organizational development ..., training and employment of ... the surface forces ..." The author's boldfaced expressions (both here and later), as I see it, are not quite felicitous (or are debatable) where the formulation of the theory's concept and aim is concerned, because any theory is aimed to reveal laws, not "describe" or "explain" something, the latter being the business of historians and authors of memoirs; the "derivation of new knowledge," on the other hand, is what any scientific investigation or discovery results in.

Let us consider the substance of the suggested new "theory of the Navy's surface forces," its possible role, place and competence as a subtype (or subdivision) of the general theory of the Navy, which currently is interpreted as "a system of scientific knowledge, which reveals the laws and regularities of naval warfare, the principles of the Navy's organizational development, preparation and employment within the system of the Armed Forces ... A component part of military science ... Includes a general section considering the subject and structure of the Navy theory, its place in military science,... connection with the theories of the other AF services; the naval art theory; the organizational development theory ...; the military training and indoctrination theory; the command and control theory ...; the theory of the Navy rear services, naval history ..." (2) I'd like to stress that the theory of the Navy is precisely the generalizing (integral) scientific concept that pools and utilizes, apart from the above, a number of other sciences, applied scientific disciplines and knowledge (theories, concepts, etc.), which directly form part thereof.

Comparing the above definitions of the concept of the Navy theory with the author's formulation of the "theory of the Navy's surface forces" makes it clear that the latter partly overlaps with the former and is absorbed as it were by it. But this immediately raises at least the following questions. What after all is to be understood by the suggested "theory of the Navy's surface forces?" Can this "theory" be drawn up? Does it have, figuratively speaking, the right to exist and function (within its content and framework) as a component part of the Navy theory, which in turn, as shown above, is a component of military science? Does it make sense to artificially "drag" from the Navy theory and send into an "endurance cruise," like a separate matelot, (3) a new "theory of the Navy's surface forces?"

In my view, it hardly makes sense even to attempt to draw up a "theory of the Navy's surface forces," because its separate (isolated from the Navy theory) "existence" is quite dubious as to its aim and rationale.

In fact, forms and methods of naval warfare got modified as military art developed, and in future the theory of naval art (the Navy's organizational development) and its component theories (concepts), forms and methods of combat employment, the building of surface ships, submarines, naval aircraft, etc., will be improved as well. But as I see it, there cannot be in reality (nor is needed) a set of separate theories on surface, submarine, or air forces.

In addition, in my view, it will be in order to make the following specific remarks concerning separate parts of the article.

First. The author says: "... surface ships ... declaratively lost their status and even failed to make it to the category of 'the main component service of the Navy ...' The absence of a theory, like a void,... is filled ... with everyday knowledge: 'Not the main means supporting. The efforts (financial, intellectual, etc.) must be concentrated in the main sector!'" (p. 56). Is the author right? To my mind, he is not. It's wrong that the surface ships have "lost their status," and on top of that, for some unknown reason, "declaratively" (?). Yes sir, the Russian Navy's main forces are its submarines and missile-armed naval aviation. And this is right and warranted. In the U.S. Navy, incidentally, aircraft carriers are, as before, the main forces along with SSBN and attack SSN. And yet the aircraft carriers are not part of the U.S. Navy's strategic forces (to wit, they are not quite so "main" either). The role, place and missions of classes and subclasses of surface ships in the Russian Navy are quite accurately defined by appropriate combat manuals and other guideline documents. It's another matter that these have to be periodically updated and possibly improved. As to "efforts," say, in naval organizational development, these should be concentrated precisely, and often in the first place, on the supporting sectors (land infrastructure, specialized and auxiliary ships, and C & C, communications, information, etc., systems) rather than on the main sector (attack delivery vehicles) alone. In the golden age of the Russian Navy (the mid-1980s), when it emerged as second in the world in combat potential and numbers after the U.S. Navy, its "heel of Achilles" was precisely the weakness and inadequacy of the supporting forces and capabilities. What it was all about and why is, by the way, the theme of another serious discussion. Incidentally, the article's set of questions--"Are the surface ships ... with their C & C elements ... the surface forces ...?", "Do the surface forces exist as a complex combat system?", "... Are the surface forces an objective reality or an abstract concept?"--is not quite correct; neither is the remark that "answers to these ... simple questions cannot be found in any work aspiring to be a source of scientific knowledge about the surface forces." It's certainly clear and doesn't need to be proved that surface ships form the Navy's surface forces, that they are not an "abstraction" and exist in reality. And the "answers" to "simple questions," which the author claims he cannot find, are either self-evident or were long ago addressed and investigated in different "works" that not even particularly aspire to be outstanding "sources of scientific knowledge" or guideline documents.

Second. The author's verbal "construct:" "We have, or more precisely, don't have even a definition of such a concept as 'surface forces'" (p. 57). is again not true to fact. Surface ships are a component service of the Navy, as is defined and regulated by the Navy Regulations, the Navy Combat Manual and a number of other documents: all sailors know that.

Third. The author says: "... there is no experience of wartime employment of surface ships as an element of combined task forces" (p. 57). That's true: there could have been nothing like these task forces during the Great Patriotic War (WWII), nor was there, after the war and up till now, any "wartime," to wit, a large-scale naval war, in which the navy had a chance to operate. In all evidence, the author did not participate in appropriate exercises and has no knowledge of the experience and results of operational and combat training and drills (held in the 1970s and 1980s) that involved forces of different component services (surface ships, submarines and aviation) of the Northern and Pacific Fleets, as well as, in particular, the Navy's 5th (Mediterranean) Squadron. In the Mediterranean, different-service strike groups of surface ships and submarines intensively drilled this kind of joint operations (till July 1972, in teamwork with aircraft) not only under the combat training plans in "practice range" conditions, so to speak, but also directly in the course of combat missions as they actually trailed the strike task forces, primarily aircraft carriers, of the Sixth Fleet of the U.S. Navy. This was particularly characteristic of the periods of increased military-political tensions in the theater, like, for example, 1968-1970, or October 1973. The squadron staff accumulated much experience of these operations, which was communicated to the fleets, the Research Institute of the Navy, and the Naval Academy.

Fourth. The following claims by the author, which, incidentally, are irrelevant to the theme of his article, seem very odd, to say the least: "The fleet's role in the revolution was only determined by the participation of ... sailors, not the surface ships. The Kronstadt Rebellion nearly wrote off the young state's surface fleet" (p. 58). How then can we estimate the neutralization of the rebellious forts, Red Hill and Gray Horse, by artillery fire from Baltic battleships, the sinking of a British submarine in the Gulf of Koporje and the repulsion by Baltic Fleet destroyers of an attack on ships berthed at Kronstadt that was mounted by British torpedo boats (1919), or operations by the Azov and Volga military flotillas in the Civil War? After all, it was the Volga flotilla that was crucial to the ouster of the British interventionists from Baku (4) and the liberation of Azerbaijan from the Musavatists (nationalists) following its cruise to the Caspian Sea in 1919 and its unification with the Astrakhan-Caspian flotilla, whereupon it came to be called the Volga-Caspian flotilla. And what did the Kronstadt Rebellion (1921), which had been masterminded by the Socialists Revolutionaries, Anarchists and Mensheviks, had to do with what the author calls the writing off of the "surface fleet?"

Fifth. I see the author's comment about the building of some "unarmed and singing frigate" (p. 59) as inappropriate and not true to fact. How should one understand his referring to a new subclass of ships that is currently on the drawing boards as "singing" and especially "unarmed?" V.I. Naumenko ought not to overlook the actual state of the Navy at present and he should know that corvettes and later frigates will make a start in its revival after the conspicuous halt in its evolution. Subsequently aircraft carriers are likely to be put on the agenda, but now it is only a dream.

Sixth. The author's following "critical" remark seems superfluous and to a certain extent incorrect: "Centers controlling subjects of naval activities need systematized scientific knowledge about the essence, content, regularities and the principles of organizational development and functioning of the component services, including the surface forces, in peacetime and wartime, as they address missions related to the defense and assurance of national interests and security ... This is a practical need of the Navy's. At the same time, the naval science lacks this kind of systematized knowledge" (p. 59). In fact, a rather logical and strong organization (more precisely, system) of this sort had been devised and functioned, at least since the early 1960s, in the context of a joint endeavor involving the Main Staff, central directorates, the Research Institute of the Navy, scientific and designing organizations, and ministries in charge of defense industries. The commanders-in-chief of the Navy always followed closely in person the organization of works and the entire process of long-term planning of naval organizational development, starting from the Main Staff of the Navy issuing preliminary operational-tactical specifications for new ships and the more important naval systems. Subsequently this organization was officially enshrined in the Provisional Regulations on the Working Procedure in the Directorates and the RI of the Navy for Issues of the Navy's Development, drawn up by the Main Staff jointly with the central directorates and the Research Institute of the Navy (and put into effect by an appropriate directive of the MS of the Navy in 1981). The Regulations was due to be amended after 1986 following its application in relations between the said naval organizations and the industries. As is to be regretted, the amending, for well-known reasons, never took place. But the Provisional Regulations was not rescinded and is in effect to this day. The Military Thought, incidentally, periodically publishes detailed contributions regarding long-term planning of naval development. (5)

Seventh. One cannot help paying attention to the final paragraph of the article: "... almost in every war with Russian naval participation we sink our own combat ships." (?) But is it admissible to claim this sort of thing? Of course, a number of outmoded sailing ships of the Black Sea Fleet were sunk in the Sevastopol Bay at the end of the Crimean War (1853-1855) to prevent the English-French coalition navy from entering the fleet base. A portion of the Black Sea Fleet was torpedoed and sunk in Novorossisk's Tsemesskaya Bay in 1918 to avert its capture by the Germans. As all sailors know, both were forced measures. But since its inception in 1696 and to this day the Russian navy participated in 22 wars and engaged in 88 major naval battles! In these we didn't sink "our own" ships and the navy emerged victorious from battles (86 victories). Yes sir, Russian sailors occasionally preferred to sink their battered ships rather than let them be captured by the enemy or, what is even worse, surrender ignominiously (some cases in point are the cruiser Varyag, and the destroyers Steregushchiy, Buinyi and Bystryi in the battles of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905).

Here V.I. Naumenko drops what I see as another erroneous claim: "... we cannot find ... a place for a nuclear-powered missile cruiser (to wit, within the Navy.--V.V.) the fleet adopted ten years ago ..." First, the Navy got its first nuclear-powered missile cruisers starting 1976 rather than ten years ago. Second, their role, place and missions were substantiated and clearly defined as early as the late 1970s as programs for their building and other related documents were drawn up. More than that, work was in progress on an entire program that envisaged the building of nuclear-powered combat ships of other classes and types (including an aircraft carrier). The underlying idea was that a task force of this kind should be independent of tankers and other supply ships while operating in remote areas. But this program, again for well-known reasons, was not put into practice. Currently adopted in the Navy, these cruisers hold the place determined by its present-day composition and capabilities. This must be understood for what it is without disregarding the real situation in the Navy as it is now.

"Naval Battle, Employment of Forces in Naval Battle or a Tactical Operation?" by Capt. 1st Rank V.I. Polenin

The author attempted to investigate the essence of the concept "naval battle" as a form of tactical combat operations by naval forces, and on this basis possibly to amend and improve the definition of this concept. I believe that this aim has a leg to stand on, deserves attention and can be supported because the content and essence of the concept "naval battle" are likely to need adjustment and specification. But what, in my view, ought to be stressed right away is that the author, to investigate and analyze the content of the concept "naval battle," makes use of its definition borrowed from The Naval Dictionary, while disregarding the main guideline combat documents of the Navy, which he never mentions in his article. Though containing definitions of the concept "naval battle" that frequently differ only to an insignificant extent, various dictionaries and encyclopedias are not the guideline documents ("standards") where this concept's official interpretation is concerned. Let us consider the definitions of the concept "naval battle" as derived from the Navy's regulations and The Naval Dictionary and compare them with their "modernized" version suggested by the author.

The Navy's guideline documents: Naval battle is an armed confrontation of naval forces (groups) and forces of different component services with the enemy in seas, aimed at an organized repulsion of his strikes (attacks) and infliction of such a defeat on the enemy as would force him to renounce the performance of his mission ...

The Naval Dictionary: Naval battle is an armed confrontation of naval forces (groups), units and ships with the enemy with the purpose of destroying him or inflicting such a defeat as would force him to renounce the performance of his missions; represents a series of strikes and attacks coordinated in aim, location and time. Naval battle is the main form of the navy's tactical operations ... (6)

As suggested by the author (p. 62): Naval battle is an armed confrontation of naval forces (groups), units and ships with the enemy, which represents a series or reciprocal strikes and attacks by the parties that are coordinated in aim, location and time, in combination with repelling the strikes and attacks of one's own enemy,... is the main tactical form of armed confrontation mounted by fleet forces.

As is clear, the author's definition of the concept "naval battle" is essentially similar to the definition contained in the guideline documents of the Navy. But it also has some verbal differences, namely, certain phrases borrowed from the definition in The Naval Dictionary ("coordinated in aim, location ...," "the main tactical form ..."). The "new element" is the author's phrase "in combination with repelling strikes and attacks of one's own enemy;" for some reason he also repeats twice the collocation "armed confrontation." At the same time, he drops the words "with the purpose of destroying him" from The Naval Dictionary, the collocation "as would force him to renounce the performance of his mission (missions)" from the Navy's guideline documents and The Naval Dictionary, and the collocation "forces of different component services" from the Navy's guideline documents. On the whole the author's definition of the concept "naval battle" is more similar to the one contained in The Naval Dictionary (repeats it to a considerable extent).

Of course, one should do justice to the author's sense of purpose, persistence and thoroughness as he analyzes the concept "naval battle." But his detailed reasoning comes down to the main suggestion and conclusion, to wit, the necessity of substituting "tactical operation" for "naval battle," a legitimate form of tactical combat operations everyone is accustomed to. This is how the author formulates his main point: an operation by forces may be strategic, operational-level (a fleet operation, a naval operation), and tactical. Is this conversion (substitution) lawful? Isn't the author mistaken in his reasoning and conclusions? Let us try and see. We will consider and compare the interpretations of the concept "naval operation."

The Navy's guideline documents: Naval operation is a component of fleet operation,... a totality of coordinated naval engagements, battles and strikes that are interconnected in aim, objectives, location and time and pursued under the guidance of fleet commander.

The Naval Dictionary: Naval operation is a totality of coordinated naval engagements, battles and strikes that are interconnected in aim, location and time and pursued by groups of forces of different component services both independently and in coordination with combined units (units) of other Armed Forces services in accordance with a single concept and plan in a restricted area (zone) of an oceanic (maritime) TO in order to address individual most important operational objectives, as a rule, within the framework of a fleet operation ... (7)

As we can see, both definitions indicate that the tactical form of combat operations, naval battle, is a component of naval operation. Why then introduce, as suggested by the author, yet another identical form, "tactical operation," in the form of combat actions known as "operation?" In my view, it makes no sense. Therefore, the above "triad of operations" that is based on the author's suggestion is meaningfully unlawful either. To my mind he erred somewhat while configuring the "triad of operations" of his suggestion. After all, operations are distinguished by scale, composition of participating forces, character of combat action, timing and priority (8) (these divisions have subdivisions of kinds and types of operations). For example, strategic operations (that achieve strategic goals) can be those mounted by fronts or fleets. These operations occurred during preceding centuries and in the Great Patriotic War; they are likely to occur in would-be wars as well. In this sense, the Battle of Kulikovo Field (1380) and the Battle of Cannae (216 BC) were also strategic operations, because they radically decided (changed) the course of wars.

Polenin's reasoning in favor of the innovation is peculiar: "... When it became needed (in response to the new ... capabilities of the strategic nuclear forces), they 'came to terms and introduced' an additional concept of 'strategic operation.'" And he suggests this: "It is desirable that we come to terms and introduce the concept of 'tactical operation,' a unilateral tactical form of employment of forces" (?) (p. 64). Is the coming to terms the only thing he wants? Why then the verbose speculations and reasoning in support of "tactical operation?" The more so that nearer the close of his article the author makes this unexpected suggestion: "It is not at all compulsory to introduce the concept of 'tactical operation.' After all, it is simply a name denoting actions by friendly forces" (?) (p. 66). Why then the song and dance about establishing "tactical operation" as a new "unilateral tactical form of employment of forces?" Of course, the definitions of "naval battle" and "naval operation," two forms of combat action, require certain specification. It is also necessary to introduce identical interpretations in the encyclopedias and the guideline documents, a thing long overdue. It seems, therefore, that the author would have done better analyzing these forms of combat action by application to the existing naval operational and combat documents and various dictionaries, reference books and encyclopedias to reveal possible discrepancies and white spots, and to reduce these sources to a common denominator.

NOTES:

1. V.I. Naumenko, "Nuzhna li nadvodnym silam VMF teoriia?" (Do the Navy's Surface Forces Need a Theory?), Voennaia mysl', No. 10, 2003, pp. 56-61; V.I. Polenin, "Morskoi boi, primenenie sil v morskom boiu ili takticheskaia operatsiia?" (Naval Battle, Employment of Forces in Naval Battle or a Tactical Operation?), Voennaia mysl', No. 10, 2003, pp. 62-66.

2. Voenno-morskoi slovar', Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1990, p. 426.

3. Matelot, ship next aport or astarboard (Voenno-morskoi slovar', p. 239).

4. Voennyi entsiklopedicheskiy slovar', Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1983, p. 156.

5. A.P. Rudomyotkin, I.I. Tishakov, S.M. Korolyuk, "Specifics of Planning for Naval Organizational Development," Military Thought, No. 2, 2003.

6. Voenno-morskoi slovar', p. 260.

7. Ibid., p. 258.

8. Military Thought, No. 1, 2004, pp. 150-159.

Capt. 1st Rank V.V. VLADIMIROV (Ret.)