Central Asian States Co-ordinate Against Militancy Amid New Shifts In The Great Game.

*** The US State Department Changes Its Classification Of 'Rogue' Countries, Now Calling Them 'States Of Concern'

*** In The Middle East The New Designation Is Seen As Meaning That From Now On Washington Will Be Able To Strike Militarily Against A State & Trade With It At The Same Time

*** It Is Make-Or-Break Time For The Israeli-Palestinian Track Of Peace Talks At Camp David 

NICOSIA - The former Soviet republics of Central Asia are linking up with Russia and China to act jointly against the spread of radical Islam. This comes at a time when energy diplomacy in the region is becoming more complex, amid promising hydrocarbon discoveries and geo-political shifts with long-term implications. As in the Great Game of the late 19th and early 20th century, there is a constant shift of friendships, creation of short-term alliances, behind-the-scenes competition and disguised motives. What is becoming clear, however, is that the US will not find it as easy to influence the direction of the Great Game as was thought in recent years.

The threat of militancy is increasingly seen to emanate out of the Afghanistan-Pakistan connection, with both countries immune to pressure for any real change. All the big players of the Great Game are aware that a peaceful Afghanistan would be one of the pillars of regional stability - but no one wants peace in Afghanistan if it means allowing rival players greater influence. Involved in this game are the global ambitions of the big players - the US, Russia and China - and the regional ambitions of the smaller players like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Growing concern about the spread of Islamic militancy and related drug trafficking into Central Asia was the focus of the annual "Shanghai Five" meeting this year on July 5 between the leaders of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan was present as an observer for the first time since the Shanghai Five meetings started in 1996, and it has indicated an interest in joining this group. At the meeting, agreement was reached to set up an anti-terrorism centre in Bishkek.

Uzbek participation signals the possibility of more concrete multilateral actions by this group in dealing with Islamic militants moving between the Central Asian nations, the Caucasus and the Afghanistan-Pakistan area. This could include joint military actions, possibly against targets within Afghanistan. Countering militancy in the region is nearly impossible without Uzbekistan, which has a border with Afghanistan and which is geo-politically the most important country in the area with a population exceeding 22 million. Taskhent has already taken an active and sometimes unilateral role in dealing with regional Islamic militancy, reportedly including discreet military action inside Afghanistan.

The US has become somewhat suspicious of the Shanghai Five grouping, viewing it as a mechanism being used both by Russia and China to draw the Central Asian states away from the American orbit. It was not a coincidence that NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson was touring Central Asia at the time of the meeting, and that he called on the countries in the area to balance their relationship between Russia and the West.

Most observers agree that, to some extent at least, the US assessment of the Shanghai Five is correct. But they also point out that it does not mean Russia and China have become strategic partners. Rather their joint effort is seen more as an attempt to gain bilateral leverage against the US, and to extract concessions from Washington on Central Asian and global issues. Underneath this current of coinciding interest, the observers say, is the reality of strategic competition between Russia and China for influence in Central Asia and globally. Indeed, they point out, the strategic competition between China and Russia will limit the extent of multilateral co-operation that can emerge from the Shanghai Five.

The Oil & Gas Factor: The search for stability by all the powers involved in the Great Game reflects their basic reason for trying to gain influence in the area: i.e. energy resources. This is where the US has so far exerted its influence financially and technologically as the sole superpower. But the limits of this influence are becoming clearer as Central Asian exporters, like Kazakhstan, begin to adapt more flexible postures aimed at retaining strategic links with all the major powers as well as the regional ones. The oil rich Central Asian countries will not extend their strategic linkage to the US to an extent that it would lead the other powers to feel that they have nothing to lose from instability in the country involved.

Kazakhstan has long sought to diversify its energy export options, seeking routes north to Russia, west to Turkey, south to Iran and east to China. Of these, the US prefers the one to Turkey and opposes transit via Russia and Iran. Kazakhstan has ignored such criticisms. Three days after meeting US Secretary of State Albright in Almaty in mid-April, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev characterised Iran as the anchor of security and stability in Central Asia.

While the US is warming to Iran, it is still far from publicly approving the idea of an export route for Central Asian energy through Iran. But things can change suddenly. During his recent visit to Germany, Iranian President Mohammed Khatami indicated Tehran had no problems in linking up with Washington, once the US ended its hostility towards Iran; he demanded some concrete moves rather than talk. The US, where policy makers are increasingly seeing the benefit of better ties with Iran, may oblige faster than expected.

In that case, the Great Game will take another dramatic turn because the possibility of an Iranian export route will reduce the importance of the Russian route as well as the Afghan-Pakistan route. At one stroke, this would address two of Washington's major post-Cold War concerns: Russian ambitions to rebuild its lost empire in Central Asia and Islamic terrorism as personified by the former Saudi exile Osama Bin Ladin, based in Afghanistan. US strategists have criticised the policy of isolating Iran in recent years. They have pointed out that by doing so Washington handed a strategic advantage to Russia "free of charge" - because it forced Tehran towards Moscow and, simultaneously, created difficulties for the Central Asian states by obliging them to set aside the cheapest and shortest route to the open sea in favour of more circuitous options like Turkey, Russia and Afghanistan/Pakistan.

Kazakhstan would benefit greatly from the possibility of an Iranian route to the open sea. Tehran has been careful not to promote a radical Islamic agenda in the area, and thus it has gained the respect of most Central Asian leaders. It has emerged instead as a reliable and stable neighbour. An Iranian route would also allow Almaty to balance its relationship with Moscow, as its dependence on the Russian route for exports will decline in relative terms. Until now the bulk of Kazakhstan's exports have been transported to Samara, Russia, and then beyond.

Both Iran and Kazakhstan are Caspian Sea countries. Anticipating future export possibilities, Iran is constructing a new pipeline system that can in future transport Kazakh oil from the Iranian Caspian Sea port of Neka to Iran's northern industrial regions. This will free up Iranian oil, which can be exported for Kazakhstan from fields bordering the Persian Gulf to the south. Apart from overall cost reduction, the "virtual pipeline" would offer an easy export route for Kazakhstan and substantial transit fees for Iran. This kind of swap arrangement could be expanded in the years ahead as major discoveries are made in the Kazakh offshore. One example is the Kashagan field where an international consortium has discovered that just its eastern part contains 15-20 billion barrels of oil reserves, putting this in the category of super-giant fields (see OMT of this week).