Cannons in early entry operations: Millennium Challenge 2002.

During Millennium Challenge in the summer of 2002, a series of battles were fought at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, using a combination of live and simulated forces. The first battle required the 2d Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division, along with its direct support (DS) artillery battalion, 2d Battalion, 319th Field Artillery (2-319 FA), to accomplish a forced-entry operation and seize a flight landing strip in a classified Mid-Eastern country. The airborne brigade successfully seized and expanded the lodgment area and began preparations for follow-on operations.

According to the organizational and operational (O&O) concept for the SBCT, the brigade must be organized, equipped and configured to meet a 96hour deployment standard. At the operational level, it must be deployable intra-theater by C-130 (all end items and stocks must be C-130-transportable) to provide the joint force commander the flexibility to exploit emerging opportunities and hedge against uncertainty.

The joint task force (JTF) commander then ordered elements of the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SECT) to plan an early entry of forces to further expand and protect the airhead as well as prepare for follow-on operations. The SBCT tailored a force that consisted of a Stryker company, a 155-mm (M198) artillery battery and a Q-36 Firefinder radar from 1-37 FA and an antitank platoon to con duct air-land operations into the flight landing strip. The SBCT's follow-on mission was to secure a weapons of mass effects (WME) site.

Early entry is spelled out in the O&O as an essential task that enhances the JTF commander's ability to shape the battlespace. Within this requirement, there are a myriad of fire support tasks, both specified and implied, that must be accomplished to ensure a successful operation.

The 82d Airborne Division Artillery out of Fort Bragg, North Carolina, over the years has developed fire support doctrine that covers forced-entry operations. It has provided an azimuth of who does what during this operation. However, there is little doctrinal guidance for follow-on forces spelling out many of the additional implied tasks the early entry force must accomplish and the coordination that must occur between the two elements.

This article explores the critical role of cannon artillery in early entry operations as it follows the forced-entry unit and provides insights into some key considerations and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to ensure success in this type of operation.

Early Entry Packages-The Importance of Cannon Fires. Based on the threat to the lodgment and impending follow-on mission, the 3d brigade staff concluded during its mission analysis that the firepower of an artillery battery and the detection capability of the Q-36 radar were required on the ground very early in the (notional) flow of the brigade's forces. (See Figure 1.) In fact, the Q-36 radar was the first to flow into the theater followed by an Ml 98 battery and an antitank platoon.

The challenge for the SBCT commander was to prioritize assets to employ the optimal mix of direct, indirect, target acquisition (TA) and reconnaissance (recce) assets to accomplish the mission. The SBCT commander has much to choose from when tailoring a force for early entry.

The SBCT has the mobility to expand the operational area and the firepower to conduct immediate follow-on missions. For example, the brigade has 146 Javelin (antitank) launchers in its infantry squads and reconnaissance, surveillance and TA (RSTA) troops; nine platoons of antitank guided missiles (ATGMs); a battalion of 12 M198 155-mm howitzers; one, each, Q-36 and Q-37 radar; and a myriad of other assets from the RSTA squadron (1-14 Cav). (Eventually, the ATGM will be replaced by the mobile gun system, a tank-like, light armored vehicle with a 105-mm gun.)

The RSTA squadron includes up to 18 sections of scouts (known as recce sections), three Shadow tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAVs), ground surveillance radars and remote battlefield sensors, Prophet signals intelligence and electronic warfare (EW) system, and the Fox nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance vehicle.

The threat at the NTC could employ both artillery and mortar fires against the lodgment area and had a mix of Soviet-era tanks, BMPs and limited air assets. The brigade commander's decision to bring his radar and cannon artillery battery into theater in the first few sorties of the operation is based on this threat.

The O&O makes clear that the brigade is vulnerable to casualties when targeted by enemy artillery. Accordingly, the SBCT's artillery, while still responsible for supporting fires, is focused on providing responsive, proactive counterbattery fifes.

The battery of M198s complemented the 18 M119 howitzers from 2-319 FA already on the ground. The M119s that could quickly cover 6,400 mils and the M198s that have increased range and munition variety proved to be a good mix to protect the lodgment. An additional Q-36 radar from the 82d Airborne Division increased the detection capabilities of the force.

Tied with the Q-36 radars, the 155-mm cannons proved to be a force multiplier as soon as they were in position on the airfield. The M198s fired more than 200 rounds against high-payoff targets (HPTs) that included enemy indirect fire assets.

Subsequently, the Field Artillery fired in support of 1-14 Cav. As a result, the brigade commander shaped the battlespace for the follow-on mission executed by 1-14 Cav using indirect fires.

Command Relationship with the Forced-Entry Artillery Battalion. In some cases, early entry artillery organizations may find themselves serving as the force FA headquarters. For example, units that follow the 75th Ranger Regiment executing forced-entry operations often provide greater indirect fire support assets and additional range and capabilities, such as radars, to augment the force already on the ground. Key to success is quickly incorporating all assets into a structure that can provide the right effects at the right time and place. In contrast, during Millennium Challenge 2002, 1-37 FA served in a reinforcing role to the 2-319 FA because the airborne battalion was on the ground first and had the required level of command and control to accept additional fire support assets to protect the lodgment. 2-319 FA was the counterfire headquarters, and 1-37 FA was reinforcing during this build up of forces.

1-37 FA learned several lessons serving as a reinforcing battalion.

Direct Coordination Between Commanders. Face-to-face contact between commanders of each DS artillery battalion proved extremely valuable. Each commander and portions of their staffs attended each other's fire support rehearsals to further nest the missions that were essential to the force at key moments in time. However, face-to-face contact cannot always be counted on in many potential battlefield or geographic situations.

Close Support Battery. A battery commander in the SBCT must be able to flow into the theater early and autonomously provide close support to one of the brigade's maneuver battalions in the event there is no force FA headquarters on the ground. A close support battery establishes communications with and responds to calls-for-fire from a maneuver battalion as its first priority. The battery plots fires on targets planned by the task force fire support officer (FSO). The battery commander must fully understand the commander's intent and scheme of maneuver and should attend all maneuver rehearsals.

The ECOORD recommends to the brigade commander whether or not to establish a close support battery. 1-37 FA developed a close support battery checklist, including a list of situations in which the brigade commander might establish a close support battery. (See Figure 2 on Page 42.) Additionally, the task force FSO must be prepared to help the battery commander in the close supporting role; 1-37 FA produced a checklist for issues the task force FSO must address (Figure 3).

Trained Personnel for the Liaison Officer (LNO) Role. A Battery, 1-37 FA did not have an LNO to send to 2-319 FA. The lack of an LNO put additional stress on the 2-319 FA staff to understand the battalion's 155-mm consumption rates and limitations. It also put pressure on the M198 battery commander to understand his role and the value of his expertise to 2-319 FA.

Clearly, a DS battalion must train members of its staff to assume the LNO role, if called upon.

Preparations to Receive a Reinforcing Unit. Like the 2-319 FA, 1-37 FA must be prepared to quickly accept a reinforcing FA battalion and have systems and procedures in place that any unit reinforcing the battalion can use easily--especially those units that may not have the same weapon or digital systems as in the SBCT. Much of this can be achieved during the planning process as long as the staff anticipates these missions vice having to react to them.

Field Artillery is the longest-range weapon system that is organic to the SBCT. The decision to send a battery and Q-36 radar in early proved to be critical to the defense of the lodgment and set the conditions for the SBCT's follow-on combat operations.

Conclusion. The brigade O&O makes it clear the SBCT must be ready to conduct early entry operations that involve securing the lodgment and conducting follow-on operations. The M198 is the longest range weapon organic to the brigade. The decision to send a battery of M198s and a Q-36 early proved to be critical to the defense of the lodgment and to setting the conditions for follow-on operations.

The lessons from this exercise also showed that 1-37 FA, as a DS FA battalion, was not fully prepared to reinforce another DS FA headquarters. It did not have the experience, equipment and manning for this mission. This exercise also forced the battalion to assess its capability to receive a reinforcing unit.

Most of the challenges were handled by reactive measures vice proactive planning in anticipation of such missions. Early entry forces need to address these possibilities early in the planning cycle to develop the unique answers that will work for their specific organization to overcome any equipment, procedural and manning shortcomings to successfully perform these roles.

Additionally, the counterfire mission in this first exercise was shared between both battalions--not just delegated to the reinforcing battalion. The decision to share counterfire was based on the capabilities that each battalion had on the ground.

The SBCT is testing its early entry capabilities and principles for employing combat power during a brigade rotation at the NTC in April, the first time the entire brigade has trained together in the field. The SBCT will be certified at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana, in May, making it deployable for operations worldwide.

Figure 1

Annex BB to Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 8 to Operations Order (OPORD)
02-05. Note the Q-36 Firefinder radar was the first to flow into the
theater followed by an M198 battery.

                                                   C-130   Cumulative
Element                  Unit    Pax  # Vehicles  Sorties   Sorties

Q-36 Radar/1-37 FA     1-37 FA    6       3          1          1
A/1-37 FA (M198)       1-37 FA   61      20          9         10
Antitank Platoon       C/52 IN   12       4          6         16
Command Post 3/2       Bde       24       6          2         18
334 Sig Co Commo Node  334 Sig    8       3          1         19
A/1-14 Cav             1-14 Cav  90      20         27         46
Prophet 1/1-14 Cav     1-14 Cav   3       1          1         47
Prophet 2/1-14 Cav     1-14 Cav   3       1          1         48
Prophet 3/1-14 Cav     1-14 Cav   3       1          1         49
UAV 1,2,3              1-14 Cav  15       6          3         52

Legend:

Bde = Brigade
Cav = Cavalry

Co = Company
FA = Field Artillery

IN = Infantry
Pax = Passengers

Prophet = Signals Intercept System
UAV = Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

Sig = Signal

Figure 2: Close Support Battery Checklist

1. Purpose. Used when a firing battery is assigned to provide close support fires autonomously to a maneuver unit (normally a battalion).

2. Scope. The SBCT will encounter many situations where this relationship may be established. Examples are as follows:

a. Early entry operations where the FA battalion tactical operations center (TOC) may or may not be available and a battery is scheduled early in the brigade's flow.

b. When a battalion from the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) is given a mission outside of the span of control of the brigade and requires dedicated fire support.

c. A maneuver unit is given a mission that is so important that a close support relationship is set up to provide more responsive fires to that specific unit.

3. General. The close support battery also may have additional assets with it.

4. Prior to Departing or Conducting Link-Up with Supported Unit:

a. Battery commander fully understands the support relationship and seven inherent responsibilities (priority of fires, zone of fires, requirement to furnish fire support team or fire support element, requirement to furnish liaison officer, establishment of communications, who positions the battery and who plans the battery's fires).

b. Link up information. Determine--

- Guides at flight landing strip or port of entry.

- Passage-of-lines information (passage points, recognition signs, routes, release points).

- Known enemy and obstacle information.

c. Determine attachments and detachments to the firing battery.

d. Determine the time line for follow-on forces and command and control (include triggers for command support relationships to change).

e. Battery commander assumes the role of battery S3 and effects coordinator (ECOORD), develops battery FA support plan (FASP) and provides input to supported unit's military decision-making process (MDMP), if possible.

f. Determine if battery is to be included in brigade-level essential fires and effects tasks (EFETs) and (or) assigned essential FA tasks (EFATs).

g. Conduct rehearsals and pre-combat checks (PCCs), when possible.

5. Firing Battery information to Provide the Supported Unit:

a. Ammunition carried load (155-mm and small arms), mission requirements and munitions capabilities.

b. Equipment mission-capable status (howitzers, vehicles, generators, etc.).

c. Personnel status (numbers, key shortages and special needs).

d. Combat service support (CSS) status, requirements and unique support the battery can provide; provide unit-level logistics system-ground (ULLS-G) disk to supported unit.

e. Attachments, such as radar, survey, meteorological (Met), retransmission, etc.

f. Communication status and number of FM nets, advanced FA tactical system (AFATDS), enhanced position location reporting system (EPLRS) and Force XXI battle command brigade and below ([FBCD.sup.2]) systems.

6. Information to Coordinate/Receive from Supported Unit:

a. Mission of maneuver unit; battery commander is involved in the supported unit's MDMP.

b. Mission for the firing battery, if not provided by 1-37 FA prior to departure; get a copy of Annex D of the operations order (OPORD).

c. Commander's intent for fires.

d. Position area for artillery elements (howitzers, radar, etc.).

e. Current overlay (friendly and enemy).

f. Mortars-location, azimuth-of-fire, tube strength and ammunition load.

g. Locations for CSS assets and nodes, such as ammunition transfer points (ATPs), ammunition exchange points (AXPs), brigade support area (BSA), battalion aid station (BAS), maintenance collection points, the CSS plan, etc.

h. Observer plan, scheme of fires and fire support products, such as fire support coordinating measures (FSCM), targets, etc.

i. Participation in brigade EFETs and (or) assigned EFATs; battery commander must deconflict these with the supported unit commander.

j. Communications plan-frequencies, call signs, retransmissions, etc.

k. Met and survey support, if not available.

l. Standing operating procedures (SOP) requirements (i.e., reports and reporting times).

m. Force protection requirements--mounted/dismounted ground threat, air threat and indirect fire threat.

7. Tactical Issues to Resolve:

a. Counterfire operations; recommend senior fire support element (FSE) on ground take responsibility for counterfire.

b. Massing artillery and mortars, if needed or possible; work out issues with communications, survey and Met.

c. Liaison in the maneuver TOC, as needed.

d. Battery commander position on the battlefield during the fight to maintain situational awareness and pass information to the supported unit as well as the FA battalion and SBCT TOCs, as applicable.

e. Preparations to tie into the 1-37 FA jump-TOC or the fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) when it arrives in the area of operations.

* Integrate the battery commander into all orders processes. Depending on the situation, the battery commander may take the role of task force effects coordinator (ECOORD) and battery S3.

* Ensure the task force EFETs are a priority for the battery. The task force FSO coordinates with the deputy effects coordinator (DECOORD) to ensure the close support battery is not required to execute brigade EFETs.

* Coordinate for battery positioning. Consider distance, terrain and travel time.

* Coordinate for logistical support. Based on logistical considerations, certain classes of supply may be provided by the maneuver task force. For example, Class III and VIII must come from the task force while the flow of other classes of supplies, such as Class V, continue to be the responsibility of the brigade support battalion (BSB).

* Coordinate for force protection. This is based on enemy capabilities, terrain and distance.

* Integrate the battery into all rehearsals. Conduct task force technical/tactical rehearsals.

Figure 3: Task Force Fire Support Officer (FSO) Checklist. These are considerations for supporting the close support battery.

Lieutenant Colonel Steven A. Sliwa commands the 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery, part of the Army's first Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington. He is also the SBCT Effects Coordinator (ECOORD). In his previous assignment, he was a Strategic Planner in the Directorate for Strategy and Policy, J5, Joint Staff at the Pentagon. Among other assignments, he was the Brigade Fire Support Officer (FSO) for 1st Brigade and Battalion Executive Officer (XO) of 3d Battalion, 6th Field Artillery, both in the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) at Fort Drum, New York. He participated in Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf with the 3d Armored Division and in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti with the 25th Infantry Division (Light).

Major Robert O. Kirkland is the Deputy ECOORD (DECOORD) for the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division (SBCT) at Fort Lewis. In his previous assignment, he was the Chief of the Individual Training Branch, G3, I Corps, also at Fort Lewis. He has served as an Assistant Professor in the Department of History at the US Military Academy at West Point. He commanded B Battery, 3d Battalion, 321st Field Artillery, part of the 18th Field Artillery Brigade, XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. During Operation Desert Storm, he was the Assistant G3 Plans Officer for VII Corps. He holds an MA and Ph.D. in History from the University of Pittsburgh.

Major Rodney L. Olson is the Battalion S3 for 1-37 FA, part of the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) at Fort Lewis. Previous assignments include serving as the SBCT's DECOORD at Fort Lewis; Commander of Howitzer Battery, 3d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), and Fire Control Officer for the 42d Field Artillery Brigade, both at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and Battalion Fire Direction Officer (FDO), Battery FDO and Battery Executive Officer in 5th Battalion, 11th Field Artillery, 6th Infantry Division (Light) in Alaska. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.